History of Russia

Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

This article covers the History of Russia from 862 AD to the present. For current conditions see Russia.

Kievan Rus

See also: Kievan Rus

Although human experience on the territory of present-day Russia dates back to Paleolithic times, the first lineal predecessor of the modern Russian state was founded in 862. The political entity known as Kievan Rus was established in Kiev in 962 and lasted until the 12th century. In the 10th century, Christianity became the state religion under Vladimir, who adopted Greek Orthodox rites. Consequently, Byzantine culture predominated, as is evident in much of Russia's architectural, musical, and artistic heritage. Over the next centuries, various invaders assaulted the Kievan state and, finally, Mongols under Batu Khan destroyed the main population centers except for Novgorod and Pskov in the 13th century and prevailed over the region until 1480. Some historians believe that the Mongol period had a lasting impact on Russian political culture.

Muscovy

Ivan the Terrible and his son Ivan by Ilya Repin

In the post-Mongol period, Muscovy gradually became the dominant principality and was able, through diplomacy and conquest, to establish suzerainty over European Russia. Ivan III (1462-1505) referred to his empire as "the Third Rome" and considered it heir to the Byzantine tradition. Ivan IV (the Terrible) (1530-1584) was the first Russian ruler to call himself tsar. He pushed Russian eastward with his conquests but his later reign was marked by the cruelty that earned him his familiar epithet. He was succeeded by his feeble son, the childless Feodor I Ivanovich who reigned from 1584–1598. Boris Godunov,the brother-in-law of Feodor, became the tsar Boris I. He ruled from 1598-1604 when he was disposed and killed, along with this wife and son, by a cabal of boyar. With the death of Boris I Russia commenced the so-called Time of Troubles which was to see further brief and bloody reigns. In 1613, after relative stability was achieved, fifteen year old Michael Romanov was selected by an assembled council of lay and ecclesiastical to be the new tsar. The dynasty that bore his name survived until 1917 with the death of Nichols II and his family.

Siege of Kazan

On June 16, 1552, a large and well-armed Russian force led by Ivan IV set out from Moscow towards Kazan. The Russian army numbered 150,000 men with 150 cannons, facing Khan Yediger’s 65,000 troops. Kazan’s garrison had 33,000 men and 70 cannons.

On August 30, a detachment led by General A.B. Gorbaty defeated Kazan’s field forces and took control of the Arsk side of the city. The city’s water supply system was destroyed, and sections of the walls were breached. By September 30, the siege ring had tightened, with only a moat remaining between the Russian siege towers and the fortress. On October 1, during the Feast of the Protection of the Virgin, the moat was filled in, tunnels were dug under the city walls, and the walls were blown up.

On October 2, 1552, after the garrison refused to surrender, the Russian army launched an assault on the fortress, and by midday, the defenders were overcome, and Kazan was captured.

After the fall of Kazan, the Kazan Khanate was dissolved, and the Middle Volga region became part of the Russian Tsardom. This set the stage for expansion into the Urals and Siberia, as well as increased trade with the Caucasus and the East.

Peter the Great and Modernization

Prince Potemkin, Prime Minister of Imperial Russia during the reign of Catherine the Great.

During the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725), modernization and European influences spread in Russia. Peter created Western-style military forces, subordinated the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy to the tsar, reformed the entire governmental structure, and established the beginnings of a Western-style education system. He moved the capital westward from Moscow to St. Petersburg, his newly established city on the Baltic. His introduction of European customs generated nationalistic resentments in society and spawned the philosophical rivalry between "Westernizers" and nationalistic "Slavophiles" that remains a key dynamic of current Russian social and political thought.

Catherine the Great

Catherine the Great continued Peter's expansionist policies and established Russia as a European power. During her reign (1762–96), power was centralized in the monarchy, and administrative reforms concentrated great wealth and privilege in the hands of the Russian nobility. Catherine was also known as an enthusiastic patron of art, literature and education and for her correspondence with Voltaire and other Enlightenment figures. Catherine also engaged in a territorial resettlement of Jews into what became known as "The Pale of Settlement," where great numbers of Jews were concentrated and later subject to vicious attacks known as pogroms.

Russia played a significant role in the American Revolutionary War. In the summer of 1775, King George III of Great Britain sought the support of Russia to send a 20,000-strong military corps to crush the rebellion in North America. This corps would consist of combat units from the Russian army and would be led by a British general. Great Britain would pay for the recruitment of the troops and their transportation by ship to North America. The British believed that the Russian troops would guarantee Great Britain success in the upcoming campaign.

However, Russia refused to send any troops and proclaimed "armed neutrality," meaning resistance to British attempts to restrict trade with the rebel colonies at sea. Northern European countries such as Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Prussia supported this policy.

Alexander I & Nicholas II

Alexander I (1801-1825) began his reign as a reformer, but after defeating Napoleon's 1812 attempt to conquer Russia, he became much more conservative and rolled back many of his early reforms. During this era, Russia gained control of Republic of Georgia and much of the Caucasus. In the 19th century, the Russian Government sought to suppress repeated attempts at reform and attempts at liberation by various national movements, particularly under the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855).

After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), Pan-Slavism - the notion that Russia should “liberate” Ottoman and Austrian Slavs, gained popularity among journalists, army officers, politicians, and even within the ruling dynasty.

Alexander II

In 1861, Czar Alexander II (1855-1881) quickly began tackling endemic corruption, and worked to transform Russia by freeing the 25 million Russian serfs, earning him the namesake “the Great Liberator”. This occurred only months before Abraham Lincoln was to earn the same title by announcing the Emancipation Proclamation ending slavery in the USA.

Russia's economy failed to compete with those of Western countries. Russian cities were growing without an industrial base to generate employment, although emancipation of the serfs in 1861 foreshadowed urbanization and rapid industrialization late in the century. At the same time, Russia expanded into the rest of the Caucasus, Central Asia and across Siberia. The port of Vladivostok was opened on the Pacific coast in 1860. The Trans-Siberian Railroad opened vast frontiers to development late in the century. In the 19th century, Russian culture flourished as Russian artists made significant contributions to world literature, visual arts, dance, and music. The names of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Gogal, Repin, and Tchaikovsky became known to the world.

Alexander II assassination on 1881, however, prompted the reactionary rule of Alexander III (1881-1894).

1900-1917

Dagestani man and woman, 1904.

By 1900, imperial decline became evident. Russia was defeated in the unpopular Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The Russian Revolution of 1905 forced Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) to grant a constitution and introduce limited democratic reforms. The government suppressed opposition and manipulated popular anger into anti-Semitic pogroms. Attempts at economic change, such as land reform, were incomplete.

1917 Revolutions and the U.S.S.R.

The ruinous effects of World War I, combined with internal pressures, sparked the 1917 February Revolution that led Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate the throne. A provisional government came to power, headed by Aleksandr Kerenskiy. Kerensky organized the “Kerensky Offensive” intended to restart Russia’s momentum on the collapsing front against the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey). The Kerensky Offensive quickly turned into a rout against Russia. The Central Powers advanced almost without opposition deeper into Russian territory. The Provisional Government's ruling coalition collapsed in early July over the humiliations of the Offensive and continued disputes over the autonomy of the provinces that made up the Ukraine (When authors add “the” before Ukraine is used to refer to the borderlands, divorced from a national context), which was then a part of Russia.

In the October Revolution, the Bolshevik Party, led by Vladimir Lenin, seized control and established the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Civil war broke out in 1918 between Lenin's "Red" army and various "White" forces and lasted until 1920, when, despite foreign interventions and an unsuccessful war with Poland, the Bolsheviks triumphed. After the Red army conquered Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, a new nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), was formed in 1922.

First among its political figures was Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Party and head of the first Soviet Government, who died in 1924.

Stalin

In the late 1920s, Josef Stalin emerged as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) amidst intra-party rivalries; he maintained complete control over Soviet domestic and international policy until his death in 1953. In the 1930s, Stalin oversaw the forced collectivization of tens of millions of its citizens in state agricultural and industrial enterprises. Millions died in the process. Millions more died in political purges, the vast penal and labor system, and in state-created famines. Initially allied to Nazi Germany, which resulted in significant territorial additions on its western border, the U.S.S.R. was attacked by Gerfmany on June 22, 1941. Twenty million Soviet citizens died during World War II in the successful effort to defeat the Nazi regime, in addition to over two million Soviet Jews who perished in the Holocaust. After the war, the U.S.S.R. became one of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. In 1949, the U.S.S.R. developed its own nuclear arsenal.

After Stalin

Khrushchev

Yuri Gagarin Russia.

Under Nikita Khrushchev, Russia moved away from a dictatorship to Democratic Socialism. Stalin's successor served as Communist Party leader until he was ousted by other progressives in the Politburo over their dissatisfaction with his handling of foreign affairs and domestic policy. Khrushchev was considered reckless and an embarrassment for provoking, then backing down, during the Cuban missile crisis. On the domestic front Khrushchev allowed publication and distribution of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich without censorship of its Christian theme in a multicultural Leftwing totalitarian state.

Although considered "the next Hitler" by the CIA and American mainstream media in his time, Khrushchev is now viewed by both Russian and Western historians as a liberal reformer.

Brezhnev

Aleksey Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Leonid Brezhnev was made First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1964. In 1971, Brezhnev rose to become "first among equals" in a collective leadership.

The Brezhnev era is known as the Years of Stagnation, while the collective Marxist leadership continued the manufacture and export of conventional weapons to "oppressed" malcontents globally with the stated aim of overthrowing bourgeois and imperialist governments worldwide, while sacrificing domestic economic development. Living standards scarcely improved while the free market and profit motive remained banned. Corruption, the blackmarket, and an unholy alliance between the KGB and local mafia groups, who smuggled and traded in foreign goods, flourished. The communist corruption of society, culture, and government engendered during this time has survived in the post-Soviet era through fraudulent accounting practices, bribery, kickbacks, tax evasion and ethical compromises being commonplace and socially acceptable, and considered necessary to survive.

Brezhnev died in 1982 and was succeeded by Yuri Andropov (1982–84) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-85).

Gorbachev and Soviet dissolution

See also: NATO enlargement

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the next (and last) General Secretary of the CPSU. Gorbachev introduced policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). But his efforts to reform the creaky Communist system from within failed. The people of the Soviet Union were not content with half-freedoms granted by Moscow; they demanded more and the system collapsed. Boris Yeltsin was elected the first president of the Russian Federation in 1991. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus formed the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991. Gorbachev resigned as Soviet President on December 25, 1991. Eleven days later, the U.S.S.R. was formally dissolved.

To assent to the reunification of Germany, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ultimately agreed to a proposal from then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker (DOS) that a reunited Germany would be part of NATO but the military alliance would not move “one inch” to the east, that is, absorb any of the former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO.

On Feb. 9, 1990, Baker said: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East.” On the next day, then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.” Gorbachev’s mistake was not to get it in writing as a legally-binding agreement.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to collapsing the Soviet Union in exchange for a non-NATO expansion pledge. In 2021 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg denied such agreements ever existed or discussions even took place.

“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous ‘not one inch eastward’ assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents … The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels. … The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of ‘pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.’ … President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (‘I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests.’”

In May 1995 President Bill Clinton was invited to Moscow for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the victory over Hitler. In Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin berated Clinton about NATO expansion, seeing “nothing but humiliation” for Russia: “For me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding towards those of Russia – that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.”

The minutes of a March 6, 1991 meeting in Bonn, West Germany between political directors of the foreign ministries of the US, UK, France, and Germany contain multiple references to “2+4” talks on German unification in which Western officials made it “clear” to the Soviet Union that NATO would not push into territory east of Germany. “We made it clear to the Soviet Union – in the 2+4 talks, as well as in other negotiations – that we do not intend to benefit from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe,” the document in British foreign monistry archives quotes US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Raymond Seitz. “NATO should not expand to the east, either officially or unofficially,” Seitz added. A British representative also mentions the existence of a “general agreement” that membership of NATO for eastern European countries is “unacceptable.”

The Russian Federation

After the December 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation became its successor state, inheriting its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as well as the bulk of its foreign assets and debt. By the fall of 1993, politics in Russia reached a stalemate between President Yeltsin and the parliament. The parliament had succeeded in blocking, overturning, or ignoring the President's initiatives on drafting a new constitution, conducting new elections, and making further progress on democratic and economic reforms.

In a dramatic speech in September 1993, President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament and called for new national elections and a new constitution. The standoff between the executive branch and opponents in the legislature turned violent in October after supporters of the parliament tried to instigate an armed insurrection. Yeltsin ordered the army to respond with force to capture the parliament building and crush the insurrection. In December 1993, voters elected a new parliament and approved a new constitution that had been drafted by the Yeltsin government. Yeltsin remained the dominant political figure, although a broad array of parties, including ultra-nationalists, liberals, agrarians, and communists, had substantial representation in the parliament and competed actively in elections at all levels of government.

Global integration

The United States and Russia shared common interests on a broad range of issues, including counterterrorism and the drastic reduction of our strategic arsenals. However, US support for jihadism compromised those efforts. Russia shared the basic goal of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, however the Clinton administrations aid to North Korea which facilitated the North Korea's aquisition of the nuclear bomb, and the Obama administration Iran nuke deal compromised those efforts. The US supposedly worked with Russia to compel Iran to bring its nuclear programs into compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 according to Western propaganda. On North Korea, Russia was a participant in the Six-Party Talks aimed at the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program, however the U.S. Deep State's undermining of President Donald Trump compromised those efforts. Russia also took part in the Middle East Peace Process "Quartet" (along with the UN and the EU), however the Obama administration's Arab Spring color revolutions compromised those efforts. Russia immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union interacted with NATO members as an equal through the NATO-Russia Council but without veto power over NATO decisions, but NATO efforts to threaten the national security of the Russian Federation with NATO expansion compromised those efforts. Without Western intervention, Russia has intensified its efforts to combat trafficking in persons.

U.S. Col Douglas MacGregor, a critic of the globalist and Uniparty war on Russia said, "Russia to them [the Uniparty] represents the last major European state that is not part of the globalist internationalist empire, if you will. They've [Russia] resisted LGBTQ, they've resisted what I would call this interesting blend of nihilism-Marxism-atheism, and as a result, they [Russia] have to be subverted and overthrown."

Yeltsin

Yeltsin was re-elected with CIA and the corrupt Clinton administration's help. The Russians called American open interference in their elections "dermokratiya".

In a review of New York Times reporter Anne Williamson's book, Contagion: The Betrayal of Liberty -- Russia and the United States in the 1990s, Paul Likoudis writes: "According to the socialist theoreticians at Harvard, Russia needed to be brought into the New World Order in a hurry; and what better way to do it than [Jeffrey] Sachs' "shock therapy" -- a plan that empowered the degenerate, third-generation descendants of the original Bolsheviks by assigning them the deeds of Russia's mightiest state-owned industries -- including the giant gas, oil, electrical, and telecommunications industries, the world's largest paper, iron, and steel factories, the world's richest gold, silver, diamond, and platinum mines, automobile and airplane factories, etc. -- who, in turn, sold some of their shares of the properties to Westerners for a song, and pocketed the cash, while retaining control of the companies.

These third-generation Bolsheviks -- led by former Pravda hack Yegor Gaidar, grandson of a Bolshevik who achieved prominence as the teenage mass murderer of White Army officers, now heads the Moscow-based Institute for Economies in Transition -- became instant millionaires (or billionaires) and left the Russian workers virtual slaves of them and their new foreign investors."

Vladimir Putin revealed that the Boris Yeltsin administration had been compromised by corrupt CIA agent who were exploiting Russia for personal gain during the hard times in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its painful transition to a free market economy:

"in the mid-1990s, we had, as it later turned out, cadres of the US Central Intelligence Agency sitting as advisers and even official employees of the Russian government...They were later prosecuted in the United States for violating US law and taking part in privatization while they were CIA employees working for us...They lived and worked here…They didn’t need such subtle instruments of interference in our political life because they controlled everything anyway”.

Historic Center of St. Petersburg.

The Russian economy underwent tremendous stress in the 1990s as it moved from a centrally planned economy to a free market system. Difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms aimed at raising government revenues and a dependence on short-term borrowing to finance budget deficits led to a serious financial crisis in 1998. Lower prices for Russia's major export earners (oil and minerals) and a loss of investor confidence due to the Asian financial crisis exacerbated financial problems. The result was a rapid and steep decline (60%) in the value of the ruble, flight of foreign investment, delayed payments on sovereign and private debts, a breakdown of commercial transactions through the banking system, and the threat of runaway inflation.

Human Rights

Some specific areas of human rights violations of the Soviet era continued on into the late 1990s and even have been reported up to 2002. These involved experimentation on humans and the use of imported foreign forced labor, particularly from North Korea, to work in forestry in gulag type camps of Siberia (for Russian and other newspaper accounts, see Essay: KAL 007 Survivors and Gulags of Russia). Experimentation on humans have been noted by Russian rights activists in connection with certain medical facilities. The Serbsky Institute and Mental Hospital figuring in as a center for mind altering experiments receives startling confirmation from Emilia Cherkover, former Deputy of the Zelenograd Soviet and member of the Russian Federation Human Rights Commission. Cherkover maintains that, along with Vladivostok and Moscow prisons and the mental hospital in Oryal, microwave (psychotronic and electromagnetic application) experiments had been conducted on humans between 1989 and 1990 at the Serbsky Institute in Moscow (see The Stavitski Account).^{[Citation Needed]}

Journalist Yury Vorobyovsky has been investigating the top secret program of "psychotronic" brainwashing techniques developed by the KGB and the Ministry for three years. He notes Emilia Cherkova's claim that there are over a million victims. Her group, Ecology and Living Environment had filed damages against the Federal Security Service (FSB). The newspaper reports, "there is strong evidence that some kind of psychotronic warfare program did exist in the Soviet period, and that the technology may be falling into the wrong hands" (From Moscow Times, 7-11-95).^{[Citation Needed]}

Chechen wars

Government palace building in Grozny, Chechnya.

In late 1994, the Russian security forces launched a military operation in the Republic of Chechnya against internationally financed Islamists who were intent on creating a Caliphate. The protracted conflict, which received close coverage in the Russian media, was ignored by Western media. In August 1996 the Russian and Chechen Republic authorities negotiated a settlement that resulted in greater autonomy for the Republic to deal with Islamists a complete withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of elections in January 1997.

Following a number of continued terrorist attacks from Chechen jihads against non-Muslims, the Russian government launched a new military campaign into Chechnya in 1997. By spring 2000, federal forces claimed control over Chechen territory, but fighting continued as jihadis regularly ambushed Russian forces in the region. Throughout 2002 and 2003, the ability of Islamists to battle the Russian forces waned but they claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts. In 2005 and 2006, key terrorist leaders were killed by Russian forces.

the leading group which pleads the Chechen cause is the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (ACPC). The list of the self-styled "distinguished Americans" who are its members is a rollcall of the most prominent neoconservatives who so enthusiastically support the "war on terror".

They include Richard Perle, the notorious Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams of Iran-Contra fame; Kenneth Adelman, the former US ambassador to the UN who egged on the invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be "a cakewalk"; Midge Decter, biographer of Donald Rumsfeld and a director of the Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of the Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed Martin, later president of the US Committee on Nato; Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute, a former admirer of Italian fascism and later a leading proponent of regime change in Iran; and R James Woolsey, the former CIA director and leading cheerleaders behind George Bush's plans to re-model the Muslim world along pro-US lines.

The ACPC heavily promoted the idea that the Chechen rebellion showed the undemocratic nature of Putin's Russia, and cultivated support for the Chechen cause by emphasizing the seriousness of human rights violations in the tiny Caucasian republic. It compared the Chechen crisis to those other fashionable "Muslim" causes, Bosnia and Kosovo - implying that only international intervention in the Caucasus could stabilize the situation. In August 2004, the ACPC welcomed the award of [[political asylum[[ in the US, and a US-government funded grant, to Ilyas Akhmadov, foreign minister in the opposition Chechen government, and a man Moscow described as a terrorist. Coming from the uniparty, the ACPC members represented the backbone of the US foreign policy establishment, and their views were indeed those of the US administration.

Poland, Hungary, and Czechia join NATO

After the Soviet Union collapsed depriving NATO of its original reason for existence, skeptics of the alliance included liberals as much as conservatives. In 1998, 10 Democratic Senators joined nine Republicans in opposing the first, fateful round of NATO enlargement with Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland added, extending the alliance to Russia’s border. Among the dissenters was Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota. In between voting against the first Iraq war in 1991 and the second after Sept. 11, Sen. Wellstone warned that expanding NATO would jeopardize Europe’s hard-won gains. “There is peace between states in Europe, between nations in Europe, for the first time in centuries,” he said. “We do not have a divided Europe, and I worry about a NATO expansion which could redivide Europe and again poison relations with Russia.”

Putin

On December 31, 1999 Boris Yeltsin resigned, and Vladimir Putin was named Acting President. In March 2000, he won election in his own right as Russia's second president with 53% of the vote. Putin moved quickly to reassert Moscow's control over the regions, whose governors had confidently ignored edicts from Boris Yeltsin. He sent his own "plenipotentiary representatives" (commonly called ‘polpred' in Russian) to ensure that Moscow's policies were followed in recalcitrant regions and republics. He won enactment of liberal economic reforms that rescued a faltering economy and stopped a spiral of hyperinflation. Putin achieved wide popularity by stabilizing the government, especially in marked contrast to what many Russians saw as the chaos of the latter Yeltsin years. The economy grew, both because of rising oil prices and in part because Putin was able to achieve reforms in banking, labor, and private property. During this time, Russia also moved closer to the U.S., especially after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council was established, giving Russia a voice in NATO discussions.

In an interview with David Frost broadcast on the BBC on March 13, 2000, Putin expressed his desire to see Russia join NATO:

Frost: Tell me about your views on NATO, if you would. Do you see NATO as a potential partner, or rival, or an enemy? Putin: Russia is a part of European culture. I simply cannot see my country isolated from Europe, from what we often describe as the civilized world. That is why it is hard for me to regard NATO as an enemy. I think that such a perception has nothing good in store for Russia and the rest of the world. ... We strive for equal cooperation, partnership, we believe that it is possible to speak even about higher levels of integration with NATO. But only, I repeat, if Russia is an equal partner. As you know, we constantly express our negative attitude to NATO's expansion to the East. ... Frost: Is it possible that Russia will ever join NATO? Putin: Why not? I do not rule out such a possibility. I repeat, on condition that Russia's interests are going to be taken into account, if Russia becomes a full-fledged partner. I want to specially emphasize this. ... When we say that we object to NATO's expansion to the East, we are not expressing any special ambitions of our own, ambitions in respect of some regions of the world. ... By the way, we have never declared any part of the world a zone of our national interests. Personally, I prefer to speak about strategic partnership. The zone of strategic interests of any particular region means first of all the interests of the people who live in that region. ...

Post-9/11 attacks

Within hours after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call President George W. Bush and offer sympathy and support for what became the first invocation of NATO Article V, "an attack against one is an attack against all." Putin announced a five-point plan to support the war on terror, pledging that the Russian government would (1) share intelligence with their American counterparts, (2) open Russian airspace for flights providing humanitarian assistance (3) cooperate with Russia's Central Asian allies in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to provide similar kinds of airspace access to American flights, (4) participate in international search and rescue efforts, and (5) increase direct assistance -humanitarian as well as military assistance -- to the Afghan Northern Alliance. The intelligence Putin shared, including data that helped American forces find their way around Kabul and logistical information about Afghanistan’s topography and caves, contributed to the success of operation and rout of the Taliban. Two weeks after the attacks, Putin was invited to make a speech to a Special Session of the Bundestag, the first ever by a Russian head of state to the German parliament. Among the numerous subjects Putin addressed in fluent German was peace and stability in the common European home:

"But what are we lacking today for cooperation to be efficient? In spite of all the positive achievements of the past decades, we have not yet developed an efficient mechanism for working together. The coordinating agencies set up so far do not offer Russia real opportunities for taking part in drafting and taking decision. Today decisions are often taken, in principle, without our participation, and we are only urged afterwards to support such decisions. After that they talk again about loyalty to NATO. They even say that such decisions cannot be implemented without Russia. Let us ask ourselves: is this normal? Is this true partnership? Yes, the assertion of democratic principles in international relations, the ability to find a correct decision and readiness for compromise are a difficult thing. But then, it was the Europeans who were the first to understand how important it is to look for consensus over and above national egoism. We agree with that! All these are good ideas. However, the quality of decisions that are taken, their efficiency and, ultimately, European and international security in general depend on the extent to which we succeed today in translating these obvious principles into practical politics. It seemed just recently that a truly common home would shortly rise on the continent, a home in which the Europeans would not be divided into eastern or western, northern or southern. However, these divides will remain, primarily because we have never fully shed many of the Cold War stereotypes and cliches. Today we must say once and for all: the Cold War is done with! We have entered a new stage of development. We understand that without a modern, sound and sustainable security architecture we will never be able to create an atmosphere of trust on the continent, and without that atmosphere of trust there can be no united Greater Europe! Today we must say that we renounce our stereotypes and ambitions and from now on will jointly work for the security of the people of Europe and the world as a whole.

In the 8 years after Vladimir Putin took power, GDP growth averaged just under 7% due to a devalued ruble, implementation of key economic reforms (tax, banking, labor and land codes), tight fiscal policy, and favorable commodities prices. Household consumption and fixed capital investments have both grown by about 10 percent per year since 1999 and have replaced net exports as the main drivers of demand growth. Inflation and exchange rates have stabilized due to a prudent fiscal policy (Russia has run a budget surplus since 2003). The government created a stabilization/rainy day fund ($127 billion in mid-2007), and had the third-largest foreign exchange reserves in the world (close to $420 billion in mid-2007) which should shelter it from commodity price shocks.

Russia's balance of payments moves from strength to strength. In 2004 the current account balance grew from $58.6 billion to $95.3 billion in 2006, almost entirely due to oil price increases. The capital account turned positive in 2006, with net inflow of $6.1 billion. In addition, net private capital flows in 2006 increased significantly to $40.9 billion, compared to an inflow of $0.1 billion in 2005 due to liberalization of the capital account in mid-2006. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows dramatically improved in 2006 to an estimated $31 billion (inflows totaled $15.4 billion and $14.6 billion in 2004 and 2005, respectively). As of July 1, 2006, the ruble is convertible for both current and capital transactions. Russia prepaid its entire Soviet-era Paris Club debt of $22 billion in late 2006, pushing Russia's sovereign foreign debt down to $45 billion at the end of 2006, or about 5 percent of GDP. Russia's total public and private foreign debt at the end of 2006 was $310 billion, or 31 percent of GDP. Such a dramatic reversal to the macroeconomic situation is truly remarkable. Russia currently has a sovereign investment-grade rating from Standard and Poor's of BBB+.

Street in Znamensk.

Although the economy began to diversify, the government budget remains dependent on oil and gas revenues; consumption and investment are, however, contributing to an increasing share to GDP growth. While currently sheltered from external price shocks, the government realizes the need to intensify reforms that will promote new investment in aging infrastructure and continued productivity gains. The government believes it can do this by creating state-sponsored investment funds, special economic zones, and by exercising control of strategic enterprises (a draft law defining strategic sectors was submitted to the Duma in August 2007). Although investors are returning to Russia, excessive bureaucracy, corruption, insufficient and insufficiently enforced legislation, selective interpretation of laws (particularly tax laws), unclear limits and conditions on foreign investment, obsolete infrastructure, and stalled economic reforms still remain a problem.^{[Citation Needed]} In 2005, the government announced reform programs in four priority areas (health, education, housing, and agriculture), but further work is needed on them as well as in financial regulation, civil service reform, and reform of government monopolies, such as railroads, gas, and electricity.

At the end of March, 2009, the World Bank issued a grim forecast of the Russian Economy, projecting a 4.5% decline in the economy in 2009 and warning that 5.8 million Russians would fall into poverty unless the government shifts spending to poor families. It praised the government's $85 billion anticrisis program, which stabilized Russia's banks and prevented financial panic. But it said too little had gone to households — a hazard in a society where 37 million people, a quarter of the population, lives near the poverty line.

At the beginning of 2014, oil was pricing steadily in the ~$100-130 per barrel range. Then a major geopolitical crisis developed. The U.S. and the CIA staged the Ukrainian 'Euromaidan' coup which overthrew the legitimate democratically elected Ukrainian government in the opening months of that year. In March, Crimea held a democratic referendum to once more rejoin Russia. This was a massive blow to the United States geopolitical ambitions to secure the Sevastopol naval base for itself as a NATO base. For this, Russia had to be punished, as it had now grown too strong, regaining its major warm water port in Sevastopol that could be used to challenge the Western Atlanticist designs in the Middle East by way of the Black Sea fleet's access to the Mediterranean.

City garden, Kolpino.

The Atlanticists took action, and with their Saudi Arabian partners carried out a plan to crash the price per barrel of oil by flooding the world market with cheap oil in order to hurt Russia as much as possible, since—by conventional thinking—the Russian economy was more tied to fossil fuel production than most other countries. They crashed the oil market with a large concerted campaign that was multipart: the U.S. vastly jacked up its fracking for shale oil while OPEC was strong-armed by Washington into increasing production as well. At the same time, the entire Atlanticist West hit Russia with huge sanctions based on the Crimean Annexation and Flight MH17 false flag shoot down. And lastly, the U.S. orchestrated many Russian currency/bond holders to sell everything by encouraging ‘panic’, spreading false info about Russia’s collapse—basically spooking investors. This caused large sell-offs of the Ruble.

By 2015-2016 the price of oil crashed from the ~$100-115 per barrel range to the ~$40-50 per barrel range, becoming roughly ~50% of its original price, the price of $96 in 2014 being halved to $40-49 in 2015-2016. The Ruble to Dollar conversion rate went from a low of roughly ~37 Rubles to 1 Dollar in 2014, soaring to the range of ~60-75 Rubles to 1 Dollar in 2015 to exactly coincide with the oil price crash. The Ruble also devalued by ‘half’, as it went from ~35 to ~70 against the Dollar by 2015-2016. However, because Russia has a huge trade surplus and does not need foreign currency earnings, the devaluation in exchange rates had little impact on the Russian economy. Per capita GDP continued to rise.

While the state budget was heavily dependent on oil revenues, the Russian economy as a whole is not. Fossil fuel production only accounts for 12-14% of GDP. The Russian economy is incredibly diversified, self-contained, and not dependent on imports. A 50% drop in the world oil price did not translate into a massive drop in Russian GDP as planned, hoped for, and claimed by Western analysts, think tanks, and media propaganda outlets.

Western institutions, such as the World Bank, errantly applied the devalued currency exchange rate to Nominal GDP which created a distorted picture showing a supposed 40% decline in Nominal GDP from $2 trillion to $1.2 trillion when in fact Russian Nominal GDP continued to grow. The miscalculation had disastrous consequences for the West in coming years as Western policymakers jokingly referred to Russia as "a gas station with nuclear weapons", and arrogantly sought to destroy the Russian state through sanctions and war.

• GDP: $1.65 trillion (2020)
• Growth rate: 3.0% (2020)
• Natural resources: Petroleum, natural gas, timber, furs, precious and nonferrous metals.
• Agriculture: Products—Grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, meat, dairy products.
• Industry: Types—Complete range of manufactures: automobiles, trucks, trains, agricultural equipment, advanced aircraft, aerospace, machine and equipment products; mining and extractive industry; medical and scientific instruments; construction equipment.
• Trade (2006): Exports--$304 billion: petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, woods and wood products, metals, chemicals. Major markets—EU, CIS, China, Japan. Imports--$165 billion: machinery and equipment, chemicals, consumer goods, medicines, meat, sugar, semi-finished metal products. Major partners—EU, U.S., NIS, Japan, China. U.S. exports--$4.7 billion. Principal U.S. exports (2006)--oil/gas equipment, meat, inorganic chemicals, tobacco, aircraft, medical equipment, autos/parts. U.S. imports--$19.8 billion. Principal U.S. imports (2006)--oil, aluminum, chemicals, platinum, iron/steel, fish and crustaceans, nickel, wood, and copper.

Russia’s foreign debt-to-GDP ratio fell below 15% for the first time in history, reaching $343.4 billion at the end of June 2023. External debt per capita decreased by four percent to $2,300. By contrast, the external debt per capita in the United States is over $73,000.

Beslan massacre

The Beslan massacre occurred when a group of Chechen jihadis took over 1200 pupils and their teachers hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, on September 1, 2004. The people of Beslan are mostly Christian and this is why they were targeted. The terrorists began by executing male teachers; female teachers were raped, tortured and taunted for being Christian. Pupils, both female and male, were forced to strip to their underwear; many of the children were raped by fanatical jihadists who recorded the rapes on video. An 18 Month old baby was knifed to death by one of the Muslim terrorists.

On September 4, possibly accidentally, a battle erupted between Russian forces and the terrorists. More than 330 civilians died, including 186 children. Many of the children were shot in the back by the terrorists. The Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev, who was trained in Afghanistan by the Taliban and Pakistani ISI claimed responsibility for the attack, which ranks as one of the worst terrorist outrages in history. Basayev was later killed by Russian forces.

Although the GW Bush White House issued a condemnation of the Beslan hostage-takers, its official view remained that the Chechen conflict must be solved politically. According to ACPC member Charles Fairbanks of Johns Hopkins University, US pressure would then increase on Moscow to achieve a political, rather than military, solution - in other words to negotiate with terrorists, a policy the US resolutely rejected elsewhere.

Allegations were even made in Russia that the West itself was somehow behind the Chechen rebellion, and that the purpose of such support was to weaken Russia, and to drive her out of the Caucasus. The fact that the Chechens were believed to use as a base the Pankisi gorge in the neighboring Republic of Georgia - a country which aspired to join Nato, had an extremely pro-American government, and where the US already had a significant military presence - only encouraged such speculation.

Baltic states join NATO

In 2004 the Baltic states - Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joined NATO, setting up another common border between the Russian Federation and a NATO state. Three years later, at the Munich Security Conference, Putin declared, “We have the right to ask: against whom is this [NATO] expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them.” In 2008 NATO said Ukraine and Georgia would become members. Four other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2009.

Crimean Annexation

See also: 2014 Crimean Annexation

Poll conducted in Crimea by USAID and a NED front group just prior to the US-backed Maidan coup.

A U.S.-backed Color Revolution advocated for stronger ties with Europe and sought to join the European Union and perhaps even NATO. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured by Russia to delay signing a treaty that would lead to Ukraine joining the EU, which lead to widespread Euromaidan riots in a U.S.-backed color revolution with support from Ukrainian neo-Nazi paramilitary group that overturned the government. Yanukovych singed a pledge on February 21, 2014 not to run for reelection to quell the street unrest with the German and French Ambassadors as witnesses. However, the following day U.S.-backed Nazi terrorist groups threatened Yanukovych's personal safety and he fled Kyiv, eventually landing in Russia. He was then unconstitutionally "impeached" in sham impeachment.

Five days after the ouster of Ukraine's democratically elected president in the Western-backed Maidan coup, Russian soldiers landed in Crimea. Because most of the people living in Crimea are ethnic Russians, there was a dispute whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine or to Russia. On March 11, 2014, Crimea declared its independence from Ukraine. The Crimean Peninsula—82% of whose households speak Russian, and only 2% mainly Ukrainian—held a plebiscite on March 16, 2014 on whether or not they should join Russia, or remain under the foreign-back Ukrainian regime. The Pro-Russia camp won with 95% of the vote. The UN General Assembly, led by the US, voted to ignore the referendum results on the grounds that it was contrary to Ukraine’s constitution. This same constitution had been set aside to oust President Yanukovych a month earlier.

Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela recognize Crimea as a part of Russia. On March 27, the U.N. General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution (100 in favor, 11 against and 58 abstentions) declaring Crimea's referendum invalid. In response, the Western alliance imposed sanctions against Russian trade.

Economy

The Russian labor force is undergoing tremendous changes. Russia's labor force is largely mismatched to the rapidly changing needs of the Russian economy. Official unemployment has shrunken in recent years to 6.9%, and labor shortages have started to appear in some high-skilled job markets. Nonetheless, pockets of high unemployment remain and many Russian workers are underemployed. Unemployment is highest among women and young people. Following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic dislocation it engendered, the standard of living fell dramatically. However, real disposable incomes have doubled since 1999, and experts estimate that the middle class ranges from one-fifth to one-third of the population. In 2006, 15.8% of the population lived below the subsistence level, in contrast to 38.1% in 1998.^{[Citation Needed]}

Productivity

See also: Russia's labor productivity

On February 7, 2024, Reuters reported:

“

According to Rosstat, Russia's labour productivity index, one of Putin's key national development goals, fell 3.6% year-on-year in 2022, its steepest annual fall since the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2009. Labour Minister Anton Kotyakov has said Russia needs to increase labour productivity in order to become more technologically self-sufficient. Labour productivity data for 2023 will not be published until late-2024, but the authorities' warnings about manpower shortages suggest there was no rebound in that figure last year.

”

The RBC Group, a Russian media group headquartered in Moscow, reported on December 4, 2023 in their article Experts estimate the level of Russian GDP losses due to personnel shortages:

“

According to experts, in order to eliminate the deficit, it will be necessary to achieve labor productivity growth of at least 2.4% per year - this is twice as fast as the historical level (the average rate over the last ten years is 1.2%) and higher than the forecast (for 2023-2026 it does not exceed 2%). Over the period since 2018, the maximum increase in productivity was observed in 2021 (3.7%), last year it fell by 3.6%. “The growing need for qualified personnel is most noticeable in the regions, especially if you pay attention to the increase in the proposed salary. It is worth noting that in the regions the proposed salary for qualified personnel is growing faster than in Moscow,” noted Vladimir Dzhuma, director of the Center for Digital Transformation and Data Analysis of the All-Russian Research Institute of Labor.

”

Labor shortages

Full employment during the Special Military Operation has led to labor shortages. According to the Eurasian Research Institute:

“

Depopulation, aging and shrinking number of the working-age population are some of the biggest challenges which Russian labor market face today. The year 1995 is an important year for demographic dynamics in Russia because after that year number of population continuously decreased and according to forecasts it will fall even further in the near future. The current problems could be solved by either natural or migration-based option. First, option refers to solve the issues of the labor market with increasing the natural growth of the population while the second solution advocates attracting a large number of migrants to Russia (Rosstat, 2016). However, total fertility rate of Russia is below sustainable growth rate indicating that Russian population will decline and consequently the number of working-age population will decrease. Moreover, the current level of the migration flow is not large enough to compensate the losses in the number of population and working-age population (World Bank, 2016).

”

The central US Deep State Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) think tank issued a report on Russia. CEPA, an organization actively promoting LGBT propaganda, is funded by the US military industrial complex, Lockheed, the CIA regime change outfit the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Raytheon, Smith Richardson Foundation, US Department of Defense, the Biden State Department, United States Institute of Peace, among others. The the report read:

“

Towards the end of last year, experts from the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences estimated that Russia faced a shortfall of nearly 5 million workers in 2023, which is already impeding economic growth. The total workforce is a little under 74 million. With perhaps a million Russians, including many working-age men, having fled the country, with more than 300,000 dead or wounded in Ukraine, with more than a million men in the military, and a fertility rate of 1.5 — far below the so-called replacement rate of 2.1 — the country simply cannot meet its needs. The head of the Central Bank is among those describing it as the country’s most serious problem, hardly surprising when unemployment is just 2.9% and the vacancy rate is 6.8%. This scarcity is particularly pronounced in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation sectors. According to recruitment agencies and company management, the workforce deficit will worsen in 2024. Beyond skilled professionals, Russia struggles to meet even basic labor demands, including those for military purposes. Increasingly, schoolchildren and students are being enlisted for war-related tasks. Just last week, a major investigation revealed how minors as young as 14 are involved in activities for the “Mayor’s Labor Unit” in Krasnoyarsk, weaving camouflage nets and preparing parcels for frontline needs.

”

GDP estimates in dollars

Estimates of Russian GNP 1991 to August 2023 measured in US fiat dollars; exchange rates between the dollar and the ruble ended in March 2022 when the ruble became gold-backed.

A strong expansion in domestic demand continues to drive GDP growth, despite a slowdown in manufacturing. GDP growth and industrial production for 2006 were 6.7% and 4.8%, respectively, relative to 6.4% and 5.7% in 2005. GDP growth is currently derived from non-tradable sectors, but investment remains concentrated in tradables (oil and gas). Construction was the fastest growing sector of the economy, expanding by 14% in 2006. The main private sector services—wholesale & retail trade, banking & insurance, and transportation & communications—showed strong growth of about 10%. In contrast, public sector services—education, health care, and public administration—lagged behind with only 2-4% growth in 2006. Recent productivity growth has still been strong in some parts of domestic manufacturing. Real disposable incomes grew by 10.2% in 2006, spurring considerable growth in private consumption.

Monetary Policy

Large balance of payments surpluses have complicated monetary policy for Russia. The Central Bank has followed a policy of managed appreciation to ease the impact on domestic producers and has sterilized capital inflows with its large budget surpluses. However, the Central Bank also has been buying back dollars, pumping additional ruble liquidity into the system. Given the rising demand for money, this has softened the inflationary impact, but these policy choices have complicated the government's efforts to lower inflation to the single digits. Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation was 9% in 2006 and 10.9% in 2005, having steadily decreased from 20.2% in 2000, due primarily to prudent fiscal policy and in 2006 lower world oil prices.

Commercial Law

Russia has a body of conflicting, overlapping and rapidly changing laws, decrees and regulations, which has resulted in an ad hoc and unpredictable approach to doing business. In this environment, negotiations and contracts from commercial transactions are complex and protracted. Uneven implementation of laws creates further complications. Regional and local courts are often subject to political pressure, and corruption is widespread.^{[Citation Needed]} However, more and more small and medium businesses in recent years have reported fewer difficulties in this regard, especially in the Moscow region. In addition, Russian businesses are increasingly turning to the courts to resolve disputes. Russia's WTO accession process is also helping to bring the country's legal and regulatory regime in line with internationally accepted practices.

Natural Resources

See also: Urals oil

The mineral-packed Ural Mountains and the vast oil, gas, coal, and timber reserves of Siberia and the Russian Far East make Russia rich in natural resources. However, most such resources are located in remote and climatically unfavorable areas that are difficult to develop and far from Russian ports. Nevertheless, Russia is a leading producer and exporter of minerals, gold, and all major fuels. Natural resources, especially energy, dominate Russian exports. Ninety percent of Russian exports to the United States are minerals or other raw materials.

Energy Superpower

Uranium spot prices

The global demand for uranium is on the rise, driven by the increasing need for nuclear energy as a clean and efficient power source. Russia stands to benefit significantly from this trend due to its substantial uranium reserves. As the sixth-largest producer of uranium, Russia holds about 8% of the world's uranium resources, with an estimated 486,000 tons.

Russia's main strength, however, lies not in its reserves but in its dominance in the uranium enrichment sector. Russia controls nearly half of the global enrichment capacity, making it a crucial player in the nuclear fuel supply chain. This strategic advantage positions Russia to meet the growing international demand for enriched uranium, particularly from countries seeking to expand their nuclear energy capabilities.

With its robust infrastructure and expertise in uranium conversion and enrichment, Russia can offer competitive pricing and reliable supply to global markets. This not only enhances Russia's economic prospects but also solidifies its role as a key supplier in the global nuclear industry. As countries around the world seek sustainable energy solutions, Russia's ability to export enriched uranium will be instrumental in meeting these needs, thereby reinforcing its position as a leading player in the nuclear energy sector and enriching its people in the process.

Industry

Russia is one of the most industrialized of the former Soviet republics. However, years of very low investment have left much of Russian industry antiquated and highly inefficient. Besides its resource-based industries, it has developed large manufacturing capacities, notably in metals, food products, and transport equipment. Russia is now the world's third-largest exporter of steel and primary aluminum. Russia inherited most of the defense industrial base of the Soviet Union, so armaments remain an important export category for Russia. Efforts have been made with varying success over the past few years to convert defense industries to civilian use, and the Russian Government is engaged in an ongoing process to privatize the remaining 9,222 state-owned enterprises, 33% of which are in the industrial manufacturing sector.

Agriculture

In Russia, the triangle St. Petersburg – Irkutsk – Rostov-on-Don can be used for agriculture. The distribution of the population in Russia also coincides with this: More than 80% of Russia’s population lives in the European part of the country, namely in the St. Petersburg – Ekaterinburg – Chelyabinsk – Rostov-on-Don quadrangle.

Investment/Banking

Russian Federation Central Bank.

Russia attracted an estimated $31 billion in FDI in 2006 (3.2% of GDP), up from $13 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2005.Russia's annual FDI figures are now in line with those of China, India, and Brazil. However, Russia's per capita cumulative FDI still lags far behind such countries as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The paradox is that Russia's challenging business climate, lack of transparency, and weak rule of law/corruption^{[Citation Needed]} has taken a back seat to Russia's extraordinary macroeconomic fundamentals and the consumer and retail boom, which is providing double digit returns to investors and attracting new flows. Russian domestic investment is also returning home, as the foreign investment coming into Russia from havens like Cyprus and Gibraltar, is actually returning Russian capital . As of the end of 2006, loans to the financial sector were 57.2% of total banking sector assets. Retail loans amounted to $78.4 billion at the end of 2006, up from $41 billion at the end of 2005. Retail deposits increased to $144.1 billion from $95.7 billion over the same period. Also, currently deposits are fully insured up to $4,000 and an additional $12,000 is insured at 90%.

Although still small by international standards, the Russian banking sector is growing fast and is becoming a larger source of investment funds. To meet a growing demand for loans, which they were unable to cover with domestic deposits, Russian banks borrowed heavily abroad in 2006, accounting for two-thirds of the private-sector capital inflows in that year. Ruble lending has increased since the October 1998 financial crisis, and in 2006 loans were 63% of total bank assets, with consumer loans posting the fastest growth at 74% that same year. Fewer Russians prefer to keep their money outside the banking sector, the recent appreciation of the ruble against the dollar has persuaded many Russians to keep their money in rubles or other currencies such as the euro, and retail deposits grew by 65% in 2006. Despite recent growth, the poorly developed banking system, along with contradictory regulations across banking, bond, and equity markets, still makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to raise capital as well as to permit capital transfer from a capital-rich sector such as energy to capital-poor sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing and to diversify risk. Banks still perceive small and medium commercial lending as risky, and some banks are inexperienced with assessing credit risk, though the situation is improving. In 2003, Russia enacted a deposit insurance law to protect deposits up to 100,000 rubles (about $3,700) per depositor, and a bill is currently in the Duma, which if passed will increase this coverage to 190,000 rubles (about $7,000) per depositor.

London-based Brand Finance, which evaluates brand strength, rated Sper bank as the strongest brand in Europe in 2023 with a BSI score of 92.3 out of 100 and a corresponding AAA+ rating despite economic sanctions imposed by the European Union.

Trade

Moscow International Business Centre, 2008.

The U.S. exported $4.7 billion in goods to Russia in 2006, a 21% increase from the previous year. Corresponding U.S. imports from Russia were $19.8 billion, up 29%. Russia is currently the 33rd-largest export market for U.S. goods. Russian exports to the U.S. were fuel oil, inorganic chemicals, aluminum, and precious stones. U.S. exports to Russia were machinery, meat (mostly poultry), electrical equipment, and high-tech products.

Russia's overall trade surplus in 2006 was $139 billion, up from $118 billion in 2005. World prices continue to have a major effect on export performance, since commodities—particularly oil, natural gas, metals, and timber—comprise 80% of Russian exports. Russian GDP growth and the surplus/deficit in the Russian Federation state budget are closely linked to world oil prices.

Russia is in the process of negotiating terms of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The U.S. and Russia concluded a bilateral WTO accession agreement in late 2006, and negotiations continue in 2007 on meeting WTO requirements for accession. Russia reports that it has yet to conclude bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia and Georgia.

According to the 2005 U.S. Trade Representative's National Trade Estimate, Russia continues to maintain a number of barriers with respect to imports, including tariffs and tariff-rate quotas; discriminatory and prohibitive charges and fees; and discriminatory licensing, registration, and certification regimes. Discussions continue within the context of Russia's WTO accession to eliminate these measures or modify them to be consistent with internationally accepted trade policy practices. Non-tariff barriers are frequently used to restrict foreign access to the market and are also a significant topic in Russia's WTO negotiations. In addition, large losses to U.S. audiovisual and other companies in Russia owing to poor enforcement of intellectual property rights in Russia is an ongoing irritant in U.S.-Russia trade relations. Russia continues to work to bring its technical regulations, including those related to product and food safety, into conformity with international standards.

Further reading

• Channon, John. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia (1995).
• Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Steinberg, Mark. A History of Russia (2004), latest version of the best survey excerpt and text search
• Service, Robert. A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin (2005)
• Westwood, J. N. Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-1992 (1993) online edition
• Ziegler, Charles E. The History of Russia (1999) 250 pp. online edition

Specialized bibliography

• Freeze, Gregory,ed. Russia: A History (1997), essays by British and American scholars.
• Kaiser, Daniel H., Gary Marker, eds. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s (1994) online edition, essays by scholars

Subjects: Russia—Historiography, Russia—History—Sources

Medieval to 1613

• Crummey, Robert O. The Formation of Muscovy, 1304- 1613 (1987)
• Martin, Janet. Medieval Russia 980-1584 (1995), advanced

Tsarist: 1613-1917

• Alexander, John T. Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (1989),
• Lincoln, W. Bruce. The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the Russias (1981), Tsars from 1613 to 1917
• Lincoln, W. Bruce. In War's Dark Shadow: The Russians Before the Great War (1983), 1890 to 1914
• Massey, Robert O. Peter the Great (1992)

Soviet Era 1918-1991

• Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1990)
• Ingram, Philip. Russia and the USSR, 1905-1991 (1997) excerpt and text search
• Keep, John L. H. Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945-1991 (1996) online edition
• McCauley, Martin. The Soviet Union: 1917-1991 (1993) online edition
• McCauley, Martin. Who's Who in Russia since 1900, (1997) online edition
• Malia, Martin. Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia (1995) excerpt and text search
• Nove, Alec. An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991 (3rd ed. 1993)
• Pipes, Richard. Communism: A History (2003), by a leading conservative
• Pipes, Richard. The Russian Revolution (1990), in-depth histgory by conservative scholar
• Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States. (1998) online edition

Lenin and Stalin

• Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (1992), a double biography covering each man in separate but parallel chapters
• Lee, Stephen J. Stalin and the Soviet Union (1999) online edition
• McCauley, Martin. Stalin and Stalinism (3rd ed 2003), 172pp
• Service, Robert. Stalin: A Biography (2004), along with Tucker the standard biography
• Service, Robert. Lenin: A Biography (2002)
• Tucker, Robert C. Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929 (1973); Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1929-1941. (1990) online edition with Service, a standard biography; online at ACLS e-books
• Ulam, A. B. Stalin (1973), good older biography; replaced by Tucker and Service
• Wood, Alan. Stalin and Stalinism, (2004), 105pp online edition

Peoples, society, culture

• Cole, J. P. Geography of the Soviet Union (1984) online edition
• Davis, Nathaniel. A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (1995) online edition
• Denber, Rachel. The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context (1992) online edition
• Lane, David. Soviet Society under Perestroika (1992) online edition
• Lapidus, Gail Warshofsky. Women, Work, and Family in the Soviet Union (1982) online edition
• Lutz, Wolfgang Lutz, Sergei Scherbov, Andrei Volkov. Demographic Trends and Patterns in the Soviet Union before 1991 (1994) online edition
• Wixman, Ronald. The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook (1984) online edition

1918-1939

• Daniels, R. V., ed. The Stalin Revolution (1965)
• Davies, Sarah, and James Harris, eds. Stalin: A New History, (2006), 310pp, 14 specialized essays by scholars excerpt and text search
• De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union (1986)
• Fitzpatrick, Sheila, ed. Stalinism: New Directions, (1999), 396pp excerpts from many scholars on the impact of Stalinism on the people (little on Stalin himself) online edition
• Hoffmann, David L. ed. Stalinism: The Essential Readings, (2002) essays by 12 scholars
• Pipes, Richard. A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (1996) excerpt and text search, by a leading conservative
• Tucker, Robert. Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (1998) excerpt and text search

Gulag and Terror

• Applebaum, Anne. Gulag: A History. 2003. 736 pp. excerpt and text search
• Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment (1991) online edition
• Pohl, J. Otto. Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949 (1999) online edition
• Rosefielde, Steven. "Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 48, No. 6 (Sep., 1996), pp. 959–987 in JSTOR

World War II

• Broekmeyer, Marius. Stalin, the Russians, and Their War, 1941-1945. 2004. 315 pp.
• Overy, Richard. The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. 2004. 448 pp. focus on 1930-45 excerpt and text search
• Priestland, David. Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization (2007) excerpt and text search
• Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (2006).

Cold War

• see Cold War
• Craig, Campbell, and Yuri Smirnov. Truman, Stalin, and the Bomb (2008)
• Gaddis, John. A New History of the Cold War (2006)
• Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (1996) excerpt and text search
• Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (1998) online edition online at ACLS e-books
• Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007) excerpt and text search

Khruschev, Gorbachev

• Brown, Archie. The Gorbachev Factor (1996) online edition
• Dallin, Alexander, and Gail W. Lapidus. The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse (1995) online edition
• Matlock, Jack. Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (2005), by leading conservative excerpt and text search
• Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (2004) excerpt and text search
• Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007) [https://www.amazon.com/Failed-Empire-Soviet-Gorbachev-History/dp/0807859583/ref=pd_bbs_sr_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1232393695&sr=8-5 excerpt and text search==See also==

See also

• Pelageya