Cuban Missile Crisis

President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the top climactic points of the Cold War. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR -- which had agents in Cuba since the arrival of Fabio Grobart, who arrived in the 1920s and was Stalin's man when the Moscow loyal Cuban communist party was founded a few years afterwards -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime. Expelled by the democratically elected Prio government (1948-1852) Grobart returned to Cuba in early 1959 at the request of Castro's new government and spent most of the rest of his life there; in later years Raul Castro would refer to him as El Maestro, the master. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. The crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.^[1]

An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.

Many reports of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken, At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the United States in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the U-2, or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.^[2]

After a U-2 Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the CIA was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.^[3] No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.

The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

• George W.Ball, Under Secretary of State
• Charles "Chip" Bohlen, Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France
• McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
• William C. Foster, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• Roswell Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department
• Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President
• John F. Kennedy, President
• Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
• Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department
• John A. McCone, Director - Central Intelligence Agency
• Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
• Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
• Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President
• Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
• Bramley Smith, Executive Secretary
• Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President
• Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations
• Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union
• Donald Wilson, Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency

^[4]

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.^[5]The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba^[5], to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the Organization of American States, and the United Nations.

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."

^[6]

The United States followed up by publicly showing the U-2 photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.

Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the SS-4 "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.^[7]

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the SS-5 "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.^[7]

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.^[8]

Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that Fidel Castro had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the United States Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington D.C. and Moscow, the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General Robert Kennedy payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in Turkey, both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with NATO agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!^[9]

In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet military regained ascendancy in the Communist ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the Politburo with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the KGB. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the Strategic Rocket Forces who controlled nuclear weapons. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other NATO allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the Cold War, both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

• The Cuban Missile Crisis, Ray S. Cline, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1989.
• Thirteen Days - Robert F. Kennedy
• Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
• The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

1. ↑ Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days
2. ↑ Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball
3. ↑ http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html
4. ↑ http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm
5. ↑ ^{5.0 5.1} http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html
6. ↑ http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html
7. ↑ ^{7.0 7.1} http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html
8. ↑ http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm
9. ↑ CNN Cold War: Vol. 4