Essay: The coming demographic winter

The population declinists have a powerful point, but human population will not dwindle to zero, precisely because of the 'counter-entropic' religiously-committed populations whose fertility remains above replacement even in societies experiencing general population decline. The water table may be falling, but there are important religious wellsprings, and these will become increasingly apparent. Ultra-Orthodox Jews, whether in Israel, Europe or North America, have a two or threefold fertility advantage over their liberal-Jewish counterparts. Their eventual achievement of majority status within worldwide Jewry in the twenty-first century seems certain. Evangelical and neotraditional Christians in the United States and, increasingly, in Europe will follow suit.^[11]

On the other hand, the secular West and East Asia has very low fertility and a rapidly aging population... In the coming decades, the developed world's demand for workers to pay its pensions and work in its service sector will soar alongside the booming supply of young people in the third world. Ergo, we can expect significant immigration to the secular West which will import religious revival on the back of ethnic change. In addition, those with religious beliefs tend to have higher birth rates than the secular population, with fundamentalists having far larger families. The epicentre of these trends will be in immigration gateway cities like New York (a third white), Amsterdam (half Dutch), Los Angeles (28% white), and London, 45% white British.^{[13] [14]}

...if you look at a population and its age structure now. You can tell a lot about the future. ...So by looking at the relative age structure of different populations you can already say a lot about the future...

...Religious fundamentalism is going to be on the increase in the future and not just out there in the developing world..., but in the developed world as well.^[18]

In Europe, immigration is making the continent more religiously conservative, not less; in fact, London and Paris are some of the most religiously dense areas within their respective populations. In Britain, for example, Ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Jews constitute only 17 percent of the Jewish population but account for 75 percent of Jewish births. And in Israel, Haredi schoolchildren have gone from comprising a few percent to nearly a third of all Jewish pupils in a matter of five decades, and are poised to represent the majority of the Jewish population by 2050. Since 1970, charismatic Christians in Europe have expanded steadily at a rate of 4 percent per year, in step with Muslim growth. Currently, Laestadian Lutherans in Finland and Holland’s Orthodox Calvinists have a fertility advantage over their wider secular populations of 4:1 and 2:1 respectively.

In contrast, Kaufmann’s data projects that secularists, who consistently exemplify a low fertility rate of around 1.5 (significantly below the replacement level of 2.1), will begin a steady decline after 2030 to a mere 14 to 15 percent of the American population. Similar projections apply to Europe as well. Kaufmann thus appears to have identified what he calls "the soft underbelly of secularism," namely, demography. This is because secular liberalism entails its own “demographic contradiction,” the affirmation of the sovereign individual devoid of the restraints of classical moral structures necessitates the freedom not to reproduce. The link between sex and procreation having been broken, modernist reproduction translates into mere personal preference. It thus turns out that the radical individualism so celebrated and revered by contemporary secular propagandists is in fact the agent by which their ideology implodes.^[19]

For instance, in 1900, there were approximately 10 million Christians in Africa. By 2000, there were 360 million. By 2025, conservative estimates see that number rising to 633 million. Those same estimates put the number of Christians in Latin America in 2025 at 640 million and in Asia at 460 million.

According to Jenkins, the percentage of the worlds population that is, at least by name, Christian will be roughly the same in 2050 as it was in 1900. By the middle of this century, there will be three billion Christians in the world -- one and a half times the number of Muslims. In fact, by 2050 there will be nearly as many Pentecostal Christians in the world as there are Muslims today.^[29]

Many Amish communities provide parochial schools for their children. A local farmer or other landowner will donate land for a school house and the community will assist in building it. Most of the schools are governed by a local school board made up of parents of the children in attendance at that school. They take turns serving on the board. The board deals with issues such as providing remedial work for students who are learning disabled or mentally challenged. They step in to apply discipline to problems as they arise. They set salaries for the teachers and manage the other financial affairs of the school.

Many of the Amish school teachers are young women who are just a few years out of school themselves. They take turns serving as a teacher for a few years before marrying. Some of them do well but it is a difficult challenge for others. Finding capable teachers for the school is one of the bigger challenges of the school board. In some cases a local mother will have to add teaching to her list of responsibilities until they can find an older girl to serve in that capacity. In some communities, a man will take the responsibility of educating the children but it is unusual.^[39]

The Covid-19 pandemic caused life expectancy in Russia to fall by 3.3 years. It quickly began to recover in 2022, rising by 2.7 years. However, the war has disrupted this progress, and life expectancy is now impacted by war-related deaths and stress-induced substance abuse. Lower incomes and worsening access to medication, diagnostics, equipment and treatment are further reducing life expectancy.

The war may also cause a decrease in inward migration, which has previously helped offset Russia's natural population decline. From 1992-2019, the natural loss was 13.8 million people, but inward migration compensated with 9.6 million. Russia could now find itself in a situation where natural and migratory losses reinforce one another...

Shifts in the age structure of the population pose a substantial demographic risk for Russia's economy. The generations born in the 1990s and 2000s, when Russia's birth rate was at its lowest, are now entering the labor market. This will exacerbate the existing crisis due to a lack of young workers. Meanwhile, the post-war generations of the 1950s and 60s are aging and approaching retirement.^[47]

A smaller population means a country's lower economic potential, a shrinking domestic market, worsening demographic problems and an aging population, as well as a decrease in the country's geopolitical power. The population size still correlates with the weight in international relations, the ability to promote their interests on the world stage. And the declining population for the largest country in the world may cause some neighbors on the continent, especially the eastern ones, to be tempted to solve their internal growing problems by some external adventures. But will Russia find anyone and how to fight back, will there be allies?^[48]

There are especially fewer believers among young people, and the numerical advantage of Christians over Muslims is shrinking.

The results of the survey conducted in July show that 57% of Russians consider themselves Orthodox today, which is down 6% from 2019—a trend that has been observed over the past decades, writes RIA-Novosti.

According to religious scholar Roman Lunkin, the declining number comes from those who have identified themselves as “generally Orthodoxy” in the past—a diverse group that includes “unbelieving Orthodox” and Orthodox who don’t like the Russian Orthodox Church. He also proposed that less people are identifying themselves simply on cultural or ethnic grounds now.

Archpriest Maxim Kozlov, the chairman of the ROC’s Educational Committee believes the drop is at least partially due to the greater availability of information about the Orthodox faith: “People are starting to learn that being Orthodox means taking on more ethical obligations, restrictions in life. Someone doesn’t want to do this, so he distances himself.”

Amongst people aged 18 to 24, the portion of non-believers has grown by 5 points since 2019 to 42% today. Among 25 – 34-year-olds, there is a significant number who fluctuate between belief and unbelief or who consider themselves believers but without adherence to any specific religion (10% each).^[50]