Difference between revisions of "War of attrition"
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| − | A '''war of attrition''' is a | + | [[File:Bradley Square.jpg|right|300px|thumb|[[NATO war in Ukraine]]: a 21st century war of attrition.]] |
| + | A '''war of attrition''' is a [[military]] [[strategy]] "which seeks to gradually erode the combat power of the enemy's armed forces."<ref>[http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a40096/definitions-of-strategies/ There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy] by Robert Bateman</ref> | ||
| − | + | Attrition warfare is a strategy that is often employed by the side with the greater resources.<ref>[http://www.military-sf.com/typesofwar.htm Types of War], www.military-sf.com, undated (accessed 20 January 2007)</ref> | |
| − | + | One of the better known examples of a war of attrition was the conflict on the [[Western Front]] in the [[First World War]] (1914-1918); another is the [[Iran-Iraq War]] (1980-1988). Another is the [[Operation Prosperity Guardian]] (2023-2025). | |
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| + | The war of attrition [[strategy]] of depleting the enemy of manpower, munitions, and disrupting supply lines is all geared toward setting up a kill zone to finish off the enemy once attrition is near completion, after which large chunks of territory may be taken. It is much suited for a defensive war against a war of aggression. This stands in marked contrast to the "[[Blitzkrieg]]" or "[[Shock and Awe]]" model introduced by [[Nazi Germany]] and later adopted by the [[United States]], of racing at the enemy to occupy large swaths of territory. The strategy largely is intended to impress domestic audiences with early success, and intimidate opponents into not defending against a war of aggression. The Blitzkreig and Shock and Awe models, despite their widespread promotion by so-called [[Pentagon]] "experts" on [[Western alliance|Western]] [[propaganda]] outlets such as [[Fox News]], historically has not been effective in holding large swaths of territory as in [[France]] (1940), [[Poland]] (1939) the [[Soviet Union]] (1941), [[Korea]] (1950), [[Iraq]] (2003) or [[Afghanistan]] (2001). | ||
| + | {{clear}} | ||
| + | ==21st century wars of attrition== | ||
| + | [[File:27-1 exchange ratio.jpg|right|300px|thumb|27 to 1 Ukrainian dead (blue) to Russian dead (red) exchange ratio of corpses KIA.]] | ||
| + | Alex Vershinin of the [[UK]]'s [[Royal United Services Institute]] (RUSI), a [[globalist]] and [[military industrial complex]] [[think tank]], says attritional wars "require their own 'Art of War' and are fought with a 'force-centric' approach, unlike [[wars of manoeuvre]] which are 'terrain-focused'. They are rooted in massive [[industry|industrial]] capacity to enable the replacement of losses, [[geography|geographical depth]] to absorb a series of defeats, and [[technology|technological]] conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, [[military]] operations are shaped by a [[state]]'s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win." Vershinin adds, | ||
| + | "[[The West]] is not prepared for this kind of war." | ||
| + | |||
| + | Commenting on the global situation in 2024, "Vershinin noted: "Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the [[geography]] and the [[population]] and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the [[economy]], doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict. If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the [[Iraq War]] taught us, [[hope]] is not a method."<ref>[https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine], Alex Vershinin, [[RUSI]], 18 March 2024. rusi.org </ref> | ||
Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors. A [[pyrrhic victory]] is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it. | Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors. A [[pyrrhic victory]] is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it. | ||
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==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| + | |||
| + | * [[List of military strategies and concepts]] | ||
* [[Fourth generation warfare]] | * [[Fourth generation warfare]] | ||
* [[Irreligion/religion and war]] | * [[Irreligion/religion and war]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==References== | ||
| + | {{reflist}} | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==External link== | ||
| + | *[https://www.brighteon.com/b53a6303-3181-4da2-b1fe-1e009e7c9a81 Russia’s Strategy of Attrition: Kiev’s Reserves Strained Under Mounting Frontline Pressure] | ||
[[Category:Wars]] | [[Category:Wars]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Military]] | ||
Latest revision as of 20:02, November 21, 2025
A war of attrition is a military strategy "which seeks to gradually erode the combat power of the enemy's armed forces."[1]
Attrition warfare is a strategy that is often employed by the side with the greater resources.[2]
One of the better known examples of a war of attrition was the conflict on the Western Front in the First World War (1914-1918); another is the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Another is the Operation Prosperity Guardian (2023-2025).
The war of attrition strategy of depleting the enemy of manpower, munitions, and disrupting supply lines is all geared toward setting up a kill zone to finish off the enemy once attrition is near completion, after which large chunks of territory may be taken. It is much suited for a defensive war against a war of aggression. This stands in marked contrast to the "Blitzkrieg" or "Shock and Awe" model introduced by Nazi Germany and later adopted by the United States, of racing at the enemy to occupy large swaths of territory. The strategy largely is intended to impress domestic audiences with early success, and intimidate opponents into not defending against a war of aggression. The Blitzkreig and Shock and Awe models, despite their widespread promotion by so-called Pentagon "experts" on Western propaganda outlets such as Fox News, historically has not been effective in holding large swaths of territory as in France (1940), Poland (1939) the Soviet Union (1941), Korea (1950), Iraq (2003) or Afghanistan (2001).
21st century wars of attrition
Alex Vershinin of the UK's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a globalist and military industrial complex think tank, says attritional wars "require their own 'Art of War' and are fought with a 'force-centric' approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are 'terrain-focused'. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state's ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win." Vershinin adds, "The West is not prepared for this kind of war."
Commenting on the global situation in 2024, "Vershinin noted: "Unfortunately, many in the West have a very cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons outlined above. Even middling global powers have both the geography and the population and industrial resources needed to conduct an attritional war. The thought that any major power would back down in the case of an initial military defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict between great powers would be viewed by adversary elites as existential and pursued with the full resources available to the state. The resulting war will become attritional and will favour the state which has the economy, doctrine and military structure that is better suited towards this form of conflict. If the West is serious about a possible great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and means of waging a protracted war, rather than conducting wargames covering a single month of conflict and hoping that the war will end afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not a method."[3]
Although wars of attrition can be won eventually often it is at great cost to the victors. A pyrrhic victory is a victory that comes at such a high cost that it's questionable if it was worth it.
See also
References
- ↑ There Are Three (And Only Three) Types of Military Strategy by Robert Bateman
- ↑ Types of War, www.military-sf.com, undated (accessed 20 January 2007)
- ↑ The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine, Alex Vershinin, RUSI, 18 March 2024. rusi.org