Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of lawsuit in federal court based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A motion under this rule can be made at any time, as subject matter jurisdiction can and should be raised at any stage of litigation, including for the first time on appeal.

Precedents

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal if the court “lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).

The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Federal courts have jurisdiction over a claim between parties only if the plaintiff presents an actual case or controversy. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 425 (5th Cir. 2001).

“The many doctrines that have fleshed out that ‘actual controversy’ requirement—standing, mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—are ‘founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’” Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).

To test whether the party asserting jurisdiction has met its burden, a court may rely upon “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Barrera–Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). When standing is challenged in a motion to dismiss, the court “must ‘accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and ... construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’” Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Tex. Med. Bd., 627 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 438 U.S. 1, 7 (1988)).

Mootness

A case is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) if it is found to be moot.

“Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies” and do not have “the power ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.’” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).

“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotation omitted).

“Mootness applies when intervening circumstances render the court no longer capable of providing meaningful relief to the plaintiff.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 425 (5th Cir. 2013). Courts may “assume without deciding that standing exists in order to analyze mootness.” Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 180 (citing Arizonans for Off. Eng., 520 U.S. at 66–67).

Amawi v. Paxton, 956 F.3d 816, 819, 821 (5th Cir. 2020) (dismissing an appeal as moot when a statutory amendment “provided the plaintiffs the very relief their lawsuit sought”).

“[A] case challenging a statute, executive order, or local ordinance usually becomes moot if the challenged law has expired or been repealed.” Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 2020).

Voluntary-Cessation Exception

There is a voluntary-cessation exception that requires courts to examine defendant-induced mootness cautiously. See Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 2018). Generally, voluntary conduct does not moot a case unless the defendant demonstrates that “it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 833 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011)); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 47 F.4th 368, 376 (5th Cir. 2022). “Essentially, the goal is to determine whether the defendant’s actions are ‘litigation posturing’ or whether the controversy is actually extinguished.” Yarls, 905 F.3d at 910.

But when governmental officials (rather than individual defendants) voluntarily cease possibly wrongful conduct, courts “presume[] that [government] actors, as public representatives, act in good faith.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 58 F.4th at 833. And “[w]ithout evidence to the contrary, [courts] assume that formally announced changes to official governmental policy are not mere litigation posturing.’” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325. “Among other things, the government’s ability to reimplement the statute or regulation at issue is insufficient to prove the voluntary-cessation exception.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 58 F.4th at 833.