Ohio standing -- the requirements for legal standing to sue in Ohio -- is either based on the common law or on an Ohio statute.
Common law
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Ohio courts generally adhere to the traditional principles of standing that "require litigants to show, at a minimum, that they have suffered '(1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'" ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7, 13 N.E.3d 1101, quoting Moore at ¶ 22, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992); see State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 147 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2016-Ohio-1176, ¶ 23, 59 N.E.3d 1240 ("The test for Article III standing, like the test for common-law [standard] in Ohio, requires an injury in fact, causation, and redressability."). These three requirements are considered the "'irreducible constitutional minimum'" of standing. Moore at ¶ 22, quoting Lujan at 560.
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Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2017-Ohio-8836, ¶ 10 (Ct. App.).
Statutory standing
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"Statutory standing" in Ohio has been described as the statutory grant of authority to sue. Wooster v. Enviro-Tank Clean, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 13CA0012, 2015-Ohio-1876, ¶ 12. The Supreme Court of Ohio has indicated that, in addition to standing authorized by "common-law," which requires injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, "standing may also be conferred by statute." ProgressOhio.org, Inc. at ¶ 17, citing Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 25 Ohio B. 125, 495 N.E.2d 380 (1986); State ex rel. Walgate at ¶ 23; see State ex rel. Mason v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 133 Ohio App. 3d 213, 217, 727 N.E.2d 181 (10th Dist.1999) (common-law standing principles were not required because the Ohio General Assembly conferred standing on "any person" seeking to enforce Ohio's Sunshine Law under R.C. 121.22). For a statute to confer standing in the absence of a concrete injury, the statute must "clearly express[] an intention to abrogate the common-law requirements for standing." ProgressOhio.org, Inc. at ¶ 22. Under this framework outlined in ProgressOhio.org, Inc., the "common-law" standing requirements must be established unless the party is suing pursuant to a statute that expresses a clear intent to abrogate those requirements.
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Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2017-Ohio-8836, ¶ 13 (Ct. App.)
Federal statute cannot confer standing in Ohio
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[E]ven though Ohio courts have, in some circumstances, found standing despite no allegation of concrete injury, appellants fail to cite, and our independent research does not reveal, any case in which an Ohio court has analyzed and found standing to exist on the basis of a federal statute despite the absence of an alleged injury-in-fact. To the extent the "statutory standing" doctrine constitutes an exception to the traditional principles of standing in Ohio, we decline to extend that exception to this circumstance involving the application of a federal statute. To find statutory standing here under the standard expressed in ProgressOhio.org, Inc., we would need to find that Congress intended to abrogate the Ohio common-law requirements to establish standing. However, there is no indication that Congress intended the pertinent FCRA statute to supplant the traditional requirements of standing in Ohio state court. Further, such a finding would be improper as it would permit Congress to affect the parameters of standing in Ohio courts, even though it is well-settled that Ohio law determines standing in Ohio courts.
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Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2017-Ohio-8836, ¶ 14 (Ct. App.).