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[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|right|thumb|Carl von Clausewitz]]'''Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz''' (1780-1831) <ref>also known as: Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz, Carl Maria von Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz, Karl von Clausewitz</ref> was an influential Prussian military theorist. His major work ''On War'' remains a central treatise on military and general strategy in the 21st century.

Also Known As: Carl Maria von Clausewitzstressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work ''On War'' was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitzstressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, Karl von and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitzsaw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to his great intellectual rival [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs. Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is, "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means," a working definition of war which has won wide acceptance.

Carl von ==Influence==Clausewitz, had a native of Prussia was a professional soldierstrong influence on German military thought, a master strategic theorist and a renowned after 1890 on British thought, as typified by naval historian Julian Corbett (1854-1922). He had little influence on American military philosopher thought before 1945. But he influenced [1],[2Lenin]] . He was both a valiant warrior and a brilliant intellectual. He belongs to the exclusive group Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the very few extraordinary military thinkers - who have truly left age of imperialism and presented the impression armed struggle of their genius on the centuries to come. Even today he is unquestionably working class as the most frequently quoted and only path toward the most revered strategisteventual elimination of war. Despite <ref>Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: the fact that his major work was published over two centuries ago Militarization of Marxism, 1914- it remains to be a very much modern treatise on military and general strategy1921. His major opus “On War” " ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(original German title4): “Vom Kriege”184-191. Issn: 0026-3931 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(198510) has been translated into every major language, 49%3A4%3C184%3ALACTMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in Jstor]</ref> Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]]. Mao read Clausewitz's ''On War'' in 1938 and it continues to have an impact organized a seminar on modern militaryClausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, business and political strategistsvia Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study.

Von Clausewitz was a Prussian patriot - who had Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and continues to even more since the [[9-11 Attack]] on the United states in 2001, many commentators have tremendous influence argued that ''On War'' has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. Since Clausewitz focused solely on wars between countries by well-defined armies, they say the American military and business schools sorts of thoughtsconflicts which he interpreted are limited chiefly to Europe between 1648 and 1990. “On War” Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a required reading in all American military academies. It continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also taught with inapplicable historically.<ref>For an increasing frequency in civilian strategic studies opposing view see Hew Strachan, and business programs Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. ''Clausewitz in America and all over the world.Twenty-First Century'' (2007)</ref>

'''Brief Biography In 1806, he fought French invaders in the failed Jena Campaign. He was captured spent two years as a prisoner of Carl war in France. After his return von ClausevitzClausewitz was immediately appointed by his former mentor General von Scharnhorst as a military assistant to Prussian Army Chief of Staff. He worked with an exemplary dedication reorganizing and modernizing the Prussian Army. In year 1810, in recognition of his service he was appointed as a professor at the War Academy and assigned the prestigious task of military education of the Prussian Crown Prince. Von Clausewitz spent the next two years advancing not only his military career but also advancing his scholarly studies, interacting with many prominent Berlin intellectuals.'''

Carl von Von Clausewitz was born in 1780 in Burg, Kingdom profoundly resented French political and cultural domination of Prussia [3]. He was born His dissatisfaction culminated in a middle-class family [4]. Despite its quite humble origin his family had claims to noble origins which eventually have been officially recognized [5]. In the year 1792 as a 12 year old boy Carl von 1812, when Prussia allied with Napoleon and Clausewitz has entered Prussian army as a cadet in 34th Infantry Regiment. One year later, at a tender age of thirteen he participated in his first military campaign fighting against revolutionary French forces [6]defiantly refused to collaborate with France. He was promoted left Prussia to serve in the rank of lieutenant at age 15 when he stationed with his garrison at Neuruppin Russian Army. [4]However, [6]. In order to continue his military and general education he entered the Berlin War Academy at before this forced exile von Clausewitz left the age manuscript of 21. There he met his very influential mentor General Gerhard von Scharnhorst who at that time directed this military school. General von Scharnhorst became later a leader and a reformer first major work "Principles of War" with the Prussian Army and an important political figure in PrussiaCrown Prince as a tutorial. In addition He fought for Russia against Napoleon. When Prussia switched to being influenced by von Scharnhorst’s strategic theoriesbecome an ally of Russia against Napoleon, young von Clausewitz studied diligently history and philosophy – especially ideas he became Russian liaison officer with the headquarters of Immanuel Kant [7]. In year 1804 von Clausewitz graduated “summa cum laude” from the War AcademyPrussian Field Marshal Blücher, and ultimately was appointed as a military assistant (aidechief of staff of the German-de-camp) to Prussian Prince AugustRussian legion. In the same year decisive 1815 Waterloo campaign he met his future wife - served as a prominent Berlin’s socialite Marie chief of staff to General von Brühl [4], [6]Thielmann's III Prussian Army Corps.

In 1806 he fought French invaders Participation in the tragic Jena Campaign. He was captured by enemy forces after a defeat battles of the Prussian Army Ligny and spent two years as Wavre had a prisoner deep influence on von Clausewitz's understanding of war in France and Switzerlandthe strategic Arcanum. In year 1808 he both those battles Prussian Army was released greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed by the French Army forces, and came back to Prussia. After his return von Clausewitz was immediately appointed by his former mentor General von Scharnhorst as a military assistant to Prussian Army Chief of Staff. He worked with an exemplary dedication reorganizing and modernizing eventually forced into the Prussian Armyretreat. In year 1810Nevertheless, in recognition of his service he was appointed as a professor at those battles were hollow victories for the War Academy French and assigned the prestigious task of military education of the Prussian Crown Prince [4], [5], [6]. Same year he married Marie von Brühl. Von Clausewitz spent the next two years advancing not only his military career but also advancing his scholarly studies, interacting with many prominent Berlin intellectualsmajor strategic victories for Prussians because they delayed Napoleon long enough to prevent reinforcements at Waterloo.

As an honest and deeply patriotic man In 1818 von Clausewitz profoundly resented French political was promoted to Major-General and cultural domination appointed as a director of Prussia [1], [3], [6]the War College in Berlin. His dissatisfaction with French influences culminated in the He remained at this prestigious post until year 18121830 spending his time on research, when he defiantly refused to collaborate with Franceteaching and writing his scholarly treatises. Given no other option In 1830 he left Prussia to serve in the Russian Army in accordance with the principle that “the enemy became Chief of my enemy is my friend”. However, before this forced exile von Clausevitz left the manuscript Staff of his first major work “Principles of War” with the Prussian Crown Prince as a tutorial [1], [3]. Von Clausevitz fought bravely through the Russian Campaign. He played instrumental role in orchestrating defection of troops led by Prussian Field Marshal Hans Yorck von Wartenburg from loyal to Napoleon Prussian Army [8]. This was a turning point in the history promotion coincided with an impromptu mobilization of Prussia, Prussian forces which ultimately paved a road were rushed to massive insurgency against Napoleon. Subsequently, von Clausewitz became Russian liaison officer with the headquarters eastern borders of Field Marshal Blücher, the Prussian Kingdom. The hasty mobilization and ultimately sealing-off Prussian borders was appointed chief done in an anticipation of staff possible outbreak of the Germanviolence -related to a turbulent political situation in the Russian legionEmpire. In the year 1814 While staying with his troops von Clausewitz was fully reinstated with all honors contracted cholera and died in the Prussian Army. A year later he fought in the bloody Waterloo campaign serving as a chief city of staff to General von Thielmann's III Prussian Army Corps [1], [3Wrocław], [9]. His personal participation in the famous Battles of Ligny and Wavre had a deep influence on von Clausewitz’s understanding of the strategic Arcanum [10]. In both those battles Prussian Army was greatly outnumbered and overwhelmed by French forcesNovember 16, and was eventually forced into the retreat1831. Nevertheless, those battles were hollow victories for French and major strategic victories for Prussians. Prussian Army He was able to engage French forces long enough to prevent their entry into the Waterloo battlefield. This ultimately resulted buried in Napoleon’s defeathis native city of Burg.

After the war ended == Importance of ideas of von Clausewitz served for two years on staff of ==Some historians describe the beloved ideas conceived by Prussians military hero General August von Gneisenau. In a year 1818 von Clausewitz was promoted to Major-General and appointed as a director direct product of the War College in Berlin"Napoleonic era. He remained at this prestigious post until year 1830 spending his time on research" However, teaching and writing his scholarly treatises. In 1830 he has been appointed as a Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army. This promotion coincided with an impromptu mobilization of Prussian forces which were rushed to the eastern borders of the Prussian Kingdom. The hasty mobilization and sealing-off Prussian borders was done in an anticipation of possible outbreak of violence - related to a turbulent political situation in the Russian Empire. While staying with transcended his troops von Clausevitz contracted cholera and died in the city of Breslau on November 16, 1831. He was buried in his native city of Burg. Von Clausewitz’s modest tomb has been guarded by the Honorary Military Guard of Kingdom of Prussia, Imperial Germany, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, and communist Eastern Germany [11]. It is now attended by the Honorary Guard of the Federal Army of the United Germany. This is a true testament to the greatness of the man – whose universal thoughts transcended short-lived contemporary political fashions and trends. Major works of von Clausewitz including “On War” were published after his death by his widow in Berlin from 1832 to 1837 [12], [13], [14], [15]historical reality.

Most studies of war soon became obsolete. Books that have survived the passage of time include [[Sun-tzu]]'s "The Art of War" (500 B.C.), [[Thucydides]]': "The Peloponnesian War" (400 B.C.), Jomini'Importance of ideas s ''The Art of War'' (1838) and von Clausewitz.'s ''On War'' (1832).

Some historians due to their political bias describe ideas conceived by von Von Clausewitz as did not recommend any detailed strategic program nor did he advise any specific tactical solutions. He had a direct product keen understanding that future readers of the “Napoleonic era”his books had to live in a world distinctively different from his own. The objective scholarVon Clausewitz knew this future world would be unpredictable for him due to unimaginable changes in technology, howeversocial structure and political status. Therefore, he has chosen to question such use a notiondescriptive theoretical approach suitable for analysis of any conflict, at any time. One A descriptive nature of the most amazing features his theory allows readers to develop their own strategic way of von Clausewitz’s philosophy was the ability thinking, which may be practically applied to transcend his contemporary political and historical reality. This is the reason that his works were not forgottensolve, nor they are perceived as outmoded todaystrategic problems in virtually any environment. Von Clausewitz‘s most enlightening discovery was that one universal element unifying all existence is a constant <ref>Recently, some authors noticed many similarities between von Clauzewitz's theses and unpredictable strugglemodern theories of nonlinearity and complexity. This discovery was as brilliantD.S. Alberts, as it was simpleet al. Von Clausewitz’ books were written in a specific political and historical setting, therefore''Complexity, he had to use examples and analogies which would be understood by his contemporary readers. Howeverglobal politics, those analogies and examples were illustrating ideas and concepts of the most universal and fundamental naturenational security. '' 1997, Washington: National Defense University</ref>

There were countless attempts to summarize knowledge related to issues of human conflict in the form of studious treatise. A vast majority of those discourses became obsolete soon after they were written, and Von Clausewitz saw himself as such have been forgottena modern "scientist". There areYet he ridiculed the popular thesis, howeverattributed to Jomini, at least three books that have survived the passage of time. Those are Sun-tzu’s “The Art of War” (written probably 500 B.C.), Thucydides’: “The Peloponnesian War” (written about 400 B.C.), and von Clausevitz’s “On War” (published 1832 A.D.). Even among this distinct trio von Clausewitz’s masterpiece is easily distinguished by it universalistic and astonishingly modern character. Recently, some authors noticed many similarities between von Clauzewitz’s theses and modern theories one can create a "science of nonlinearity and complexity [16]war."

Von == Main ideas of von Clausewitz did not recommend any detailed strategic program nor did he advise any specific tactical solutions. He had a keen understanding that future readers ==The texts of his books had to live in a world distinctively different from his ownvon Clauzewitz are notoriously difficult. Von Christopher Bassford summarized the importance of reading the actual text: :"Unfortunately, the annoying thing about von Clausewitz knew this future world would be unpredictable for him due to unimaginable changes in technologyis that, social structure and political status. Thereforein order to understand him, he has chosen you actually have to use a descriptive theoretical approach suitable for analysis of read his book....any conflict, attempt to summarize von Clausewitz is inherently misleading. This is true in part because von Clausewitz's dialectical method is at least as important as any timeparticular insight that he offers. A descriptive nature But all of his theory allows readers von Clausewitz's insights are woven together in a fascinating whole; efforts to develop their own strategic way of thinking, which may be practically applied extract particular "nuggets" are destructive to solvea genuine understanding."''<ref>Bassford, strategic problems in virtually any environment [17]C., [18]Clausewitz Homepage.www.clausewitz.com, 2006.</ref>

• '''Realistic approach.''' Von Clausewitz was by all means elected to use a modern scientist. Yet, realistic as opposed to idealistic approach in his own discussion analysis of war theory . His treatise is not rigorously dry or pretentiously “mathematical”. In fact, he himself ridiculed the popular in the XIX century thesis that one can create a "science pragmatic description of war” or “science of all things” for that matter [17]. As an objective scientist he was way ahead intricate and volatile matrix of his timesnever-ending struggle. In a contrast to his contemporaries systematic but not overly pedantic way he understood limitations provides an account of science complex interactions between unquantifiable human psyche and its inherent deficienciesharsh realities of physical world in the process of armed conflict.

• '''Main ideas Dialectical method of von Clausewitzpresentation.''' In addition to realistic approach von Clausewitz employed Hegelian dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis.

Christopher Bassford - American scholar fascinated • '''"War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."'''. This is one of the Prussian war philosopher most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz's dialectical method - has elegantly summarized the importance it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of reading the actual text facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled "What Is War" von Clausewitzwrote:"war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses." The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausewitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act.<ref>Bassford, C., Clausewitz Homepage. www.clausewitz.com, 2006.</ref> Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the "fascinating trinity of war" which is discussed below.

• ''“Unfortunately, the annoying thing about von Clausewitz is that, 'Fascinating Trinity of War.''' Literary in order to understand him, you actually have to read his book German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote "fascinating" rather than some convenient précis"wonderful" character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, writteninherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, most likelychance, by some wannabe-competitorand rational calculation.<ref>Bassford, propagandist, special pleader, or historical hack writerC. Even if it is honestly and competently done, any attempt to summarize von Clausewitz is inherently misleadingHomepage. This www.clausewitz.com, 2006.</ref> "Trinity of War" is true in part because von Clausewitz's dialectical method is at least sometimes misinterpreted as important as any particular insight notion that he offersa war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. But all This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz's insights are woven together in a fascinating whole; efforts to extract particular "nuggets" are destructive to a genuine understanding.”'' [17]Keeping the above in mind, <ref>Villacres E.J. and encouraging everybody to read and understand Bassford C., Reclaiming The Clausewitzian Trinity Parameters. The journal of the original text “On war” the following selected principles will be discussed below:U.S. Army War College., 1995.</ref>

•Realistic approach. Von Clausewitz elected to use a realistic as opposed to idealistic approach in his analysis of war [17], [19]. His treatise is a pragmatic description of an intricate and volatile matrix of never-ending struggle. In a systematic but not overly pedantic way he provides an account of complex interactions between unquantifiable human psyche and harsh realities of physical world in the process of armed conflict. •Dialectical method of presentation. In addition to realistic approach Von Clausewitz employed basic dialectical method as a way of presenting his concepts. This method is based upon the introduction of two conflicting proposals - thesis and its anti-thesis - in order to achieve the synthesis [20]. Understanding of this methodology is crucial to properly interpret von Clausewitz’s work. Readers of “On War” who are unaware about the nature of dialectical method may easily misconstrue the meaning of this text. •“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means." [21]. This is one of the most frequently quoted and misquoted arguments of Von Clausewitz. When taken out of context and without understanding of von Clausewitz’s dialectical method - it may be misinterpreted as a vicious advocacy for engaging in military conflicts. It is no so, however. The above quote is not a promotional phrase; it is neither a statement of the facts. In his point #24 of the Chapter One entitled “What Is War” von Clausewitz wrote: “war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses.” [21] The above phrase is the dialectical antithesis to the presented before thesis that :''"war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." Introduction of those two opposing notions leads ultimately to dialectical synthesis. In the Clausevitz’s synthesis, deficiencies of both those extreme statements are elegantly resolved in one unifying conclusion. This conclusion states that war is neither only an act of brute force nor purely rational political act [17]. Von Clausewitz formulated his synthesis as the “fascinating trinity of war” which is discussed below. •Fascinating Trinity of War. Literary in German wunderliche dreifaltigkeit - where word wunderliche is used to denote “fascinating” rather than “wonderful” character of the trinity. As discussed above fascinating trinity was a dialectical synthesis of the nature of war. Von Clausewitz defined this fascinating trinity as dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation [17]. “Trinity of War” is sometimes misinterpreted as notion that a war is simply a triumvirate of people, military and government. This is however oversimplification of the actual point made by von Clausewitz [22]. Let us examine his original text:Von Clausewitz wrote: ''“War is (…) a wonderful trinity, composed of;

The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second more the general and his army; the third more the Government. “"'' [21] •Center • '''Center of gravity. ''' Von Clausewitz introduced a concept of a “center "center of gravity” gravity" to illustrate his points about prioritization of choices in selection of military objectives. This concept became one of the most crucial elements of a current American war doctrine. It is considered to be a cornerstone of an American operational art; and it occupies a common place in a vocabulary of American military strategists [23]. Von <ref>Echevarria, A.J., Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph., 2002.</ref> Von Clausewitz's definition of a “center "center of gravity” gravity" follows principles of Mechanics Newtonian mechanics in the context of his metaphor comparing a war to a wrestling match. In Mechanicsmechanics, center of gravity represents a point where forces of gravity converge within an object. Striking at the object’s center of gravity with sufficient force will cause the object to lose its balance and fall. In von Clausewitz’s Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor center of gravity is a factor of balance of the wrestling opponent, rather than his source of strength. If one knows his opponent’s opponent's center of gravity, one can defeat his enemy faster and with less force by concentrating one’s one's decisive blow on the opponent’s center of gravity. •Fog of war. While discussing peculiarities of war von Clausewitz pointed out the uncertainty of all data as one of major peculiarities of combat in progress. He wrote: “(…) the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance.” [21] The fog of war is a very important concept with applications beyond a wartime battlefield. In fact, it applies to all adversarial actions such as business competition, lawsuits, etc. A party to the adversarial process has to act upon more or less uncertain data about an opponent. Even in the discovery process of a legal action there will be instances when access to critical information may be blocked despite an underlying legal theory. Such a party should also understand that opponent’s actions may be based upon erroneous data. The possibilities of misjudging a true nature and capabilities of one’s adversary due to the war fog phenomenon are endless.  •Attack versus defense. The von Clausewitz’s opinion about the asymmetry of offense and defense has been vulgarized in the attributed to him saying that “the attack is the best form of the defense”. In reality von Clausewitz wrote: "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. (…) Thus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles (…) The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows." [21] Contrary to conventional wisdom von Clausewitz simply considered the defense as the easiest (and therefore - not necessary - most proper) form of waging a war. He stated: “The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, defense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest (…) If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object." [21]  '''Conclusion''' Carl von Clausevitz was a Prussian patriot, professional soldier, military educator and erudite doctrine writer. The importance of his major work “On War” goes beyond description of the intricacies of the military conflict. This stellar work provides a solid framework for understanding the nature of life itself – which is based upon ever-lasting and never predicable struggle.  '''References:''' 1. Blaschke, R., Carl von Clausewitz, der soldat und kriegsphilosoph. 1936, Leipzig,: P. Reclam jun. 78 p. 2. Aron, R., Clausewitz, philosopher of war. 1st Touchstone ed. 1986, New York: Simon & Schuster. xi, 418 p. 3. Heyck, H., Clausewitz; ein Lebens- und Zeitbild. 1968, Leoni am Starnberger See,: Druffel-Verlag. 976 p. 4. Parkinson, R., Clausewitz : a biography. 1st Cooper Square Press ed. 2002, New York: Cooper Square Press. 352 p. 5. Hahlweg, W., Carl von Clausewitz. 1957, Göttingen,: Musterschmidt-Verlag. 111 p. 6. Scholtz, G., et al., Carl von Clausewitz : Bildnis eines deutschen Soldaten. 1936, Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag. 143, [1] p. 7. Schössler, D., Carl von Clausewitz : mit Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten. Rowohlts Monographien ;. 1991, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 160 p. 8. Rose, O., Carl von Clausewitz : Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Russland. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte ;. 1995, München: R. Oldenbourg. vi, 275 p. 9. Clausewitz, K.v. and W.M. Schering, Carl von Clausewitz: Geist und Tat. 1941, Stuttgart,: A. Kröner. xxxv, 382 p. 10. Blaschke, R. and C.v. Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz, ein Leben im Kampf. 1934, Berlin,: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 313 p. 11. Förster, G., Carl von Clausewitz : Lebensbild eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers. 1. Aufl. ed. Militärgeschichtliche Skizzen. 1983, Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 55 p. 12. Clausewitz, C.v., Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung. 1832, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 10 v.

13• '''Fog of war. ''' While discussing peculiarities of war von Clausewitz, K.vpointed out the uncertainty of all data as one of major peculiarities of combat in progress.He wrote: "(…) the great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, Vom kriege. 1832because all action must, Berlinto a certain extent,: F. Dümmler. 3 v. be planned in 1a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight, talent must discover, or must be left to chance."

14The "fog of war" is a very important concept with applications beyond a wartime battlefield. ClausewitzIn fact, Kit applies to all adversarial actions such as business competition, lawsuits, etc.vA party to the adversarial process has to act upon more or less uncertain data about an opponent., Der feldzug von 1815 Even in Frankreichthe discovery process of a legal action there will be instances when access to critical information may be blocked despite an underlying legal theory. 2Such a party should also understand that opponent's actions may be based upon erroneous data. aufl. ed. 1862, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. vi, 194 pThe possibilities of misjudging a true nature and capabilities of one's adversary due to the war fog phenomenon are endless.

15• '''Attack versus defense. Schwartz, K''' The von Clausewitz’s opinion about the asymmetry of offense and defense has been vulgarized in the attributed to him saying that "the attack is the best form of the defense., Leben des generals Carl " In reality von Clausewitz und der frau Marie von Clausewitz gebwrote: "if we are really waging war, we must return the enemy's blows. gräfin von Brühl. 1878, Berlin,: F. Dümmler. 2 vThus a defensive campaign can be fought with offensive battles.... The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."

16Contrary to conventional wisdom von Clausewitz simply considered the defense as the easiest (not necessarily the best) form of waging a war. AlbertsHe stated: "The object of defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, Ddefense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest.S., et al.. If defense is the stronger form of war, Complexityyet has a negative object, global politicsit follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and national security. 1997, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University. xvi, 381 pbe abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object."

17==Bibliography==* Aron, Raymond. ''Clausewitz: Philosopher of War.'' (1985). 418 pp. * Bassford, CChristopher.''Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.'' (1994)* Echevarria, Antulio J., II. ''After Clausewitz Homepage: German Military Thinkers before the Great War. '' (2001). 346 pp. * Echevarria, Antulio J., II. ''Clausewitz and Contemporary War'' (2007) [http://www.clausewitzamazon.com/Clausewitz-Contemporary-War-Antulio-Echevarria/dp/0199231915/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1213823024&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]* Gat, 2006Azar. ''The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz'' (1989)* Handel, Michael I., ed. ''Clausewitz and Modern Strategy.'' 1986. 324 pp. * Handel, Michael I. ''Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought.'' (2001) 482 pages. Based on comparison of Clausewitz's ''On War'' with Sun Tzu's ''The Art of War''* Heuser, Beatrice. ''Reading Clausewitz.'' (2002). 238 pp. * Holmes, Terence M. "Planning Versus Chaos in Clausewitz's on War." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 2007 30(1): 129-151. Issn: 0140-2390 Fulltext: [[EBSCO]]* Howard, Michael. ''Clausewitz : a very short introduction.'' (2002)* Paret, Peter, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds. ''Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age'' (1986)* Paret, Peter. "From Ideal to Ambiguity: Johannes von Müller, Clausewitz, and the People in Arms." ''Journal of the History of Ideas'' 2004 65(1): 101-111. Issn: 0022-5037 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]* Smith, Hugh. ''On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas.'' (2005). 303 pp. * Strachan, Hew, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. ''Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Clausewitz-Twenty-First-Century-Hew-Strachan/dp/0199232024/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_b excerpt and text search]* Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. "On the Relationship of History and Theory in on War: the Clausewitzian Ideal and its Implications." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(2): 333-354. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/2677163 in Jstor]* Wallach, Jehuda L. ''The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars.'' (1986). 334 pp.

18. Buschmann===Primary Sources===* Clausewitz, KCarl Von, ''On War,'' edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.(2nd ed. 1984). ISBN 0691056579.* Clausewitz, Motivation und Menschenführung bei Carl von Clausewitz. 1980''Historical and Political Writings, '' ed. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (1992). ==External links==* [Bonn]http: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte I 4//www. 48 pclausewitz.com Bassford, ed, "Clausewitz Homepage"]

20. Young, W., Hegel's dialectical method : its origins and religious significance. 1972, ==See also==* [Nutley, N.J.[Sun Tzu]] - The [[Art of Warfare]]* [[List of military strategies and concepts]]: Craig Press. vii, 135 p.

21. Clausewitz, C.v. [[Category:Military Strategies and J.J. Graham, On war. 1873, London,Concepts]][[Category:History]][[Category:European History]][[Category:War]][[Category: N. Trübner & Co. 3 v. in 1.Philosophy]]

23. Echevarria, A.J., Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity{{DEFAULTSORT: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine—Again! Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph.Clausewitz, 2002.Carl von}}[[Category:Military]][[Category:Military History]][[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]