Charming Kitten

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Charming Kitten, also tracked as APT35 (by Mandiant), Phosphorus and Mint Sandstorm (by Microsoft), Ajax Security Team (by FireEye) and NewsBeef (by Kaspersky Lab), is an Iranian government-linked cyber-espionage operation associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The group has been attributed by cybersecurity researchers and government agencies to campaigns involving cyberespionage, credential theft, phishing, surveillance and the targeting of individuals and organizations considered of interest to the Iranian state.

The group's reported targets have included Iranian political dissidents, journalists, human rights defenders, academics, foreign government personnel, diplomatic staff and individuals involved in international negotiations concerning Iran. Its activities have included impersonating journalists and international media organizations, compromising personal accounts and gathering intelligence on individuals critical of the Iranian government.

In November 2025, an investigation by Iran International identified a previously undisclosed IRGC intelligence structure known as Department 40 (Edareh-ye 40), which the investigation associated with the activities widely attributed to Charming Kitten. Based on leaked internal documents, communications and interviews with an informed source, the investigation described Department 40 as an extensive cyber-intelligence and surveillance operation operating under the IRGC Intelligence Organization. Its reported activities extended beyond conventional phishing campaigns to include the acquisition of foreign databases, surveillance of Iranian citizens and overseas intelligence-gathering operations.[1]

The investigation reported that Department 40 maintained a centralized surveillance platform called Kashef, which contained personal information, communications records, travel information and location data concerning Iranian and foreign nationals. According to the documents examined by Iran International, the system was used to identify relationships between individuals and compile intelligence profiles for operations outside Iran.[1]

The United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has separately identified Iranian state-aligned cyber actors as threats to civil society organizations, including journalists, academics and human rights defenders. Such campaigns have raised concerns about the use of cyber capabilities to monitor political opposition and intimidate individuals critical of the Iranian government.[2]

Department 40 and the Kashef surveillance system (2025)

In November 2025, Iran International published an investigation identifying Department 40 as a covert cyber-intelligence unit within the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The investigation was based on leaked internal documents, operational reports, organizational records and information provided by an informed source. It described the department as an important component of the IRGC's intelligence-gathering operations against Iranian dissidents and foreign targets.[1]

According to the investigation, Department 40 operated under Unit 1582, described as a cyber-operations subdivision of Unit 1500 of the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The unit's current organizational structure was reportedly established during the first half of the 2010s, initially with a narrower cyber-operational mission that subsequently expanded.

The investigation identified approximately 60 individuals associated with the department and reported that its personnel operated through several commercial entities and front organizations, including companies registered under ostensibly civilian business activities such as website development and management consultancy. These arrangements reportedly concealed the personnel's connections to the IRGC intelligence apparatus.[1]

Kashef national surveillance platform

One of the principal findings concerned a centralized intelligence and surveillance platform known as Kashef (translated as Revealer). According to internal materials examined by Iran International, the platform aggregated information obtained through cyber intrusions and other intelligence-gathering activities.

The reported information included:

Mobile telephone records and communications metadata.

Telephone numbers and associations between individuals.

Travel histories and flight information.

Location information and records of individuals' movements.

Residential and business addresses.

Information concerning journalists, dual nationals, diplomatic personnel and employees of foreign-linked organizations.

The platform reportedly allowed authorized personnel to search for individuals and identify connections between them using telephone records, travel information and location data. Cybersecurity researcher Nariman Gharib told Iran International that information obtained through cyber intrusions could be transferred into Kashef to create intelligence profiles of selected individuals.

Gharib stated that the system could facilitate the preparation of intelligence dossiers for physical operations against identified targets. The precise intended use of individual records was not established in every case.[1]

Iran International reported that the platform contained information concerning Iranian dual nationals, journalists, embassy personnel, employees of foreign-linked companies and other individuals considered relevant to the IRGC's intelligence activities. Its reported reach also extended to foreign government institutions and private organizations.

Foreign database intrusions and intelligence gathering

Documents reviewed by Iran International described cyber intrusions targeting government and private-sector institutions in several countries. Reported targets included police databases in Abu Dhabi and Fujairah, the FlyDubai and EgyptAir airlines, Azerbaijan's SOCAR energy company and municipal institutions in Jordan, alongside organizations in Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The investigation reported that when direct access to certain databases was unsuccessful, Department 40 personnel attempted to obtain the information through third-party service providers and contractors associated with the targeted institutions.[1]

The reported activities demonstrated that the unit's operations extended beyond the theft of email credentials and conventional cyberespionage. According to the investigation, stolen information was incorporated into broader intelligence databases to facilitate the identification and monitoring of individuals and organizations.

Targeting of Iranian dissidents and overseas operations

Iran International reported that Department 40 maintained intelligence profiles on prominent opponents of the Islamic Republic, journalists, dual nationals and individuals connected to international disputes involving the Iranian government.

The investigation also described reported surveillance activities involving diplomatic facilities in Tehran, including foreign embassy premises, as well as intelligence gathering concerning personnel associated with international institutions.

According to the leaked materials, the department's overseas activities included gathering information concerning Israeli nationals and locations in Turkey. The investigation reported that information collected by the unit was used in connection with an alleged 2022 plot targeting Israeli citizens in Istanbul, including a former Israeli consul and his partner. Iran has denied involvement in such operations.[1]

The investigation further described internal projects involving the development of unmanned aerial systems and other capabilities intended for overseas operations. The documents reportedly included references to projects involving explosive-carrying drones and other remotely operated platforms.

The VIP Human Solution operation

The Iran International investigation also shed light on an operation known as VIP Human Solution, which used fraudulent online recruitment advertisements purporting to offer opportunities to work as spies for Israel.

The advertisements reportedly appeared on websites and services used by Iranians, including platforms associated with virtual private networks (VPNs). According to documents examined by Iran International, the domains used in the operation were associated with Department 40.

The apparent recruitment campaign was reportedly intended to identify and expose individuals who responded to the advertisements, potentially facilitating their subsequent identification and arrest by Iranian security authorities.[1]

The findings illustrated how cyber operations and online deception could be employed not only to obtain information from foreign targets but also to identify individuals inside Iran who might be susceptible to recruitment or contact with foreign intelligence services.

Personnel and organizational structure

Iran International identified Abbas Rahravi, a 33-year-old individual from Zanjan, as the principal operator of Department 40. The investigation reported that he used the alternative identities Mikaeil Hosseini and Abbas Hosseini.

Other individuals identified as influential personnel included Manouchehr Vosoughi Nayyeri and Amirhossein Ahmadi Zonouz. The investigation also described the involvement of family members in the unit's organizational structure and the use of multiple commercial entities to conceal its activities.

According to the documents, Ruhollah Bazghandi, a former deputy counterintelligence chief of the IRGC and former head of Unit 1500, played a direct role in establishing the department.

Iran International reported that the exposure of Department 40's organizational structure and personnel represented a significant disclosure concerning the internal operations of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.[1]


References