Difference between revisions of "New York Times v. Sullivan"
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| − | In | + | In '''''New York Times Company v. Sullivan''''', , 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] ruled that a ''public official'' seeking [[libel]] damages for a matter relating to his official conduct must prove that the false statement about him had been made with ''actual malice'' that is, with conscious knowledge that the statement was false or with ''[[reckless disregard]]'' for whether it was or not. The Court held that, otherwise, the [[press]] or other critics would be restrained from speaking or writing for fear they could not readily demonstrate that what they had said was true. |
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| + | A showing of actual [[malice]] requires proof that the defendant knew that his statement was false or spoke with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.<ref>376 U.S. at 279-80.</ref> | ||
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| + | == References == | ||
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| + | <references/> | ||
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[[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]] | [[Category:United States Supreme Court Cases]] | ||
[[category:defamation]] | [[category:defamation]] | ||
Revision as of 21:09, February 3, 2008
In New York Times Company v. Sullivan, , 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a public official seeking libel damages for a matter relating to his official conduct must prove that the false statement about him had been made with actual malice that is, with conscious knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was or not. The Court held that, otherwise, the press or other critics would be restrained from speaking or writing for fear they could not readily demonstrate that what they had said was true.
A showing of actual malice requires proof that the defendant knew that his statement was false or spoke with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.[1]
References
- ↑ 376 U.S. at 279-80.