Difference between revisions of "Evolutionary game theory"
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| − | In the | + | In the field of [[evolutionary game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, [[Richard Dawkins]] describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref> |
| − | ==See | + | |
| + | ==See also== | ||
| + | *[[Behavioral ecology]] | ||
| + | *[[Evolutionary biology]] | ||
| + | *[[Game theory]] | ||
| + | *[[Prisoner's dilemma]] | ||
*[[Theory of evolution]] | *[[Theory of evolution]] | ||
| + | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
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==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
*Maynard Smith, J. (1982) ''Evolution and the Theory of Games''. ISBN 0-521-28884-3 | *Maynard Smith, J. (1982) ''Evolution and the Theory of Games''. ISBN 0-521-28884-3 | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:Evolution]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Mathematics]] | ||
Revision as of 02:30, October 13, 2007
In the field of evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists John Maynard Smith and George R. Price[1]. Alternatively, Richard Dawkins describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.[2]
See also
References
Further reading
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. ISBN 0-521-28884-3