Difference between revisions of "Evolutionary game theory"
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| − | In the fields of [[evolutionary biology]] and [[game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, Richard Dawkins describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref> | + | In the fields of [[evolutionary biology]] and [[game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, [[Richard Dawkins]] describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref> |
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 01:05, October 7, 2007
In the fields of evolutionary biology and game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists John Maynard Smith and George R. Price[1]. Alternatively, Richard Dawkins describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.[2]
References
Further reading
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. ISBN 0-521-28884-3