Difference between revisions of "Nike v. Kasky"

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(New page: In ''Nike, Inc. v. Kasky'', 539 U.S. 654 (2003), a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court disposed of a difficult case with this unusual resolution: :"The writ of certiorari is dismissed as imp...)
 
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In ''Nike, Inc. v. Kasky'', 539 U.S. 654 (2003), a unanimous [[U.S. Supreme Court]] disposed of a difficult case with this unusual resolution:
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In ''Nike, Inc. v. Kasky'', 539 U.S] 654 (2003), a unanimous [[U.S. Supreme Court]] disposed of a difficult case with this unusual resolution]:
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:"The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."
 
  
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:"The writ of certiorai is dismissed as impro]
 
In concurring, Justice [[John Paul Stevens]] explained that cert. had been granted to decide:
 
In concurring, Justice [[John Paul Stevens]] explained that cert. had been granted to decide:
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]
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:(1) whether a corporation participating in a public debate may "be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are 'commercial speech' because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions"; and  
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:(1) whether a corporation participating in a public debate may "be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that is statements are 'commercial speech' because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions"; and  
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:(2) even assuming the California Supreme Court properly characterized such statements as commercial speech, whether the "First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] subjecting speakers to the legal regime approved by that court in the decision below." Pet. for Cert. i. Today, however, the Court dismisses the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
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:(2) even assuming the California Supree Court properly characterized such statements as commercial speech, whether the "First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] subjeting speakersto the legal regime approved by that court in the decision below." Pet. for Cert. i. Today, however, the Court dismisses the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
  
 
But Justice Stevens supported dismissing the writ of certiorari on three independently sufficient grounds:  
 
But Justice Stevens supported dismissing the writ of certiorari on three independently sufficient grounds:  
  
 
:(1) the judgment entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 USC § 1257 [28 USCS § 1257];  
 
:(1) the judgment entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 USC § 1257 [28 USCS § 1257];  
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:(2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and  
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:(2) neithe party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and  
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:(3) the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case.
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:(3) the reasons for avoiding he premature adjudicaion of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case.
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[[category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]
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[[category:Uned States Supreme Court Cases]]
 
[[category:First Amendment]]
 
[[category:First Amendment]]

Revision as of 23:23, September 27, 2007

In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S] 654 (2003), a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court disposed of a difficult case with this unusual resolution]:

"The writ of certiorai is dismissed as impro]

In concurring, Justice John Paul Stevens explained that cert. had been granted to decide: ]

(1) whether a corporation participating in a public debate may "be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that is statements are 'commercial speech' because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions"; and
(2) even assuming the California Supree Court properly characterized such statements as commercial speech, whether the "First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] subjeting speakersto the legal regime approved by that court in the decision below." Pet. for Cert. i. Today, however, the Court dismisses the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

But Justice Stevens supported dismissing the writ of certiorari on three independently sufficient grounds:

(1) the judgment entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 USC § 1257 [28 USCS § 1257];
(2) neithe party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and
(3) the reasons for avoiding he premature adjudicaion of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case.