Difference between revisions of "RobSmith's rose colored glasses version of Russia cannot explain why Russia's military has made such slow progress in land gained in the Russo-Ukraine War"

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Primarily from late 2022 through much of 2023 (especially the “second stalemate” period of roughly November 2022–June 2023, and continuing through Ukraine’s largely stalled 2023 counteroffensive), with ongoing slow, incremental advances characterized as a war of attrition thereafter—particularly relative to the rapid gains of early 2022.
 
  
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'''Key phases of the full-scale invasion (starting February 2022) based on reporting from sources including the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), DeepState, PBS/AP timelines, New York Times maps, and analyses from CSIS and others:'''
 
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Rapid Russian gains (February–March/early April 2022): Russian forces advanced quickly toward Kyiv, Kherson, and elsewhere, reaching a high-water mark of territorial control by late March. Gains slowed as Ukrainian resistance and logistical issues mounted; Russia withdrew from northern areas around Kyiv by early April.
 
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Continued but slower eastern focus, then Ukrainian counteroffensives (spring–fall 2022): Advances continued in the southeast/Donbas (e.g., toward Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk/Lysychansk) but at a reduced pace overall. Ukraine’s counteroffensives (Kharkiv region in September and Kherson in the south by November) reversed substantial Russian gains, liberating large areas.
 
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Second stalemate / winter attrition and slow Russian gains (mid/late November 2022–early/mid 2023): After Ukraine’s counteroffensives, the front largely stabilized into positional warfare with heavy casualties but limited territorial movement. Russia’s winter offensive (including the long, costly fight for Bakhmut, captured in May 2023) produced only minor or grinding advances. Wikipedia and contemporary analyses describe this as a period of reduced frontline motion and limited Russian progress despite high losses. Net changes were very small for much of 2023.
 
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Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive (June–fall 2023) and continued limited movement: Ukraine made only modest gains against prepared Russian defenses; the effort largely stalled by late 2023 with little net change to the overall front. Russian control of Ukrainian territory stayed roughly stable around ~18% (or similar figures depending on the source and whether pre-2022 occupied areas like Crimea are included) through much of this period.
 
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Post-late 2023 / 2024 onward (Russian initiative with slow advances): Russia regained the initiative (e.g., capturing Avdiivka in February 2024) and made steady but incremental gains, especially in Donetsk Oblast, through small infantry assaults. Rates have been described as among the slowest in modern warfare—often tens of meters per day on key axes (e.g., comparisons to WWI’s Battle of the Somme), totaling roughly hundreds to low thousands of km² per year (e.g., ~0.6–0.8% of Ukraine’s territory in recent full years per DeepState/ISW-linked estimates). Gains accelerated somewhat in late 2024/parts of 2025 in places but remained attritional and far slower than early 2022; recent periods have also seen temporary slowdowns.
 
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Overall, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 18–20% of Ukraine (figures vary slightly by source and date; pre-2022 holdings in Crimea and parts of Donbas form a base). After the fluid early phase and Ukrainian reversals in 2022, the conflict has been dominated by slow, high-cost advances rather than rapid breakthroughs. Exact km² figures fluctuate with sources (ISW, DeepState, etc.) and mapping methodologies, and fighting continues with localized variations.
 

Revision as of 11:25, August 27, 2026

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