Difference between revisions of "Evolutionary game theory"
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| − | In the field of [[ | + | In the field of '''[[evolution]]ary game theory''', an 'evolutionarily stable strategy or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]].<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref> It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population. |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
*[[Behavioral ecology]] | *[[Behavioral ecology]] | ||
| − | *[[ | + | *[[Evolution]] |
*[[Game theory]] | *[[Game theory]] | ||
*[[Prisoner's dilemma]] | *[[Prisoner's dilemma]] | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
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[[Category:Evolution]] | [[Category:Evolution]] | ||
| − | [[Category: | + | [[Category:Game Theory]] |
Latest revision as of 13:43, June 23, 2016
In the field of evolutionary game theory, an 'evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by population geneticists John Maynard Smith and George R. Price.[1] It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population.
See also
References
- ↑ Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246: 15-18.
Further reading
- Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. ISBN 0-521-28884-3