View source for FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate

In ''FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate'', 596 U.S. 289 (2022), the 6-3 [[U.S. Supreme Court]] invalidated a federal law that limited the ability of a federal candidate to raise campaign contributions to repay a debt by his campaign to himself personally. The Court also found legal [[standing]] by Sen. [[Ted Cruz]] (R-TX) to challenge this  provision.

Chief Justice [[John Roberts]] summarized the law before striking it down:
{{cquote|Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 98, 52 U. S. C. §30116(j), further restricts the use of post-election funds. Under that provision, a candidate who loans money to his campaign may not be repaid more than $250,000 of such loans from contributions made to the campaign after the date of the election.}}
''FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate'', 596 U.S. 289, 294 (2022).

== Standing ==

This decision has a useful passage for overcoming government objections to [[standing]]:
{{cquote|the Government asks us to recognize an exception to traceability for injuries that a party purposely incurs.

We have never recognized a rule of this kind under Article III. To the contrary, we have made clear that an injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury could be described in some sense as willingly incurred. See Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202, 204, 79 S. Ct. 178, 3 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1958) (per curiam) (that the plaintiff subjected himself to discrimination “for the purpose of instituting th[e] litigation” did not defeat his standing); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 374, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982) (a “tester” plaintiff posing as a renter for purposes of housing-discrimination litigation still suffered an injury under Article III).

The cases the Government cites do not alter our conclusion. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013), for example, the plaintiffs attempted to manufacture standing by voluntarily taking costly and burdensome measures that they said were necessary to protect the confidentiality of their communications in light of the Government surveillance policy they sought to challenge. Id., at 402, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Their problem, however, was that they could not show that they had been or were likely to be subjected to that policy in any event. Id., at 416, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264. Likewise, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1976) (per curiam), we held that the unilateral decisions by a group of States to reimburse their residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis to attack the legality of those taxes. Nothing in the challenged taxes required the plaintiff States to offer reimbursements; accordingly, the financial injury those States suffered was due to their own independent response to taxes levied on others. Id., at 664, 96 S. Ct. 2333, 49 L. Ed. 2d 124. Here, by contrast, the appellees’ injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the provisions they now challenge. That appellees chose to subject themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are subject to them, and will face genuine legal penalties if they do not comply. See 52 U. S. C. §30109(a)(5); 11 CFR §111.24.

One final point bears mentioning. The Government maintains that it should not be blamed for appellees’ injuries because it provided the Committee with a legally available “alternative” that would have avoided any liability—repaying Cruz’s loans in full with pre-election funds, within 20 days of the election. But even if such funds were available, the Government’s argument largely misses the point. For standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of appellees’ legal claims, so we must assume that the loan repayment limitation —including the 20-day rule—unconstitutionally burdens speech. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975) (“standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff ’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”). Demanding that the Committee comply with the Government’s “alternative” would therefore require it to forgo the exercise of a First Amendment right we must assume it has—the right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any time. And this would require the Committee to subject itself to the very framework it says unconstitutionally burdens its speech. Such a principle finds no support in our standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 158-159, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2014).
...
Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and unenforceable—as Cruz and the Committee contend—the agency’s 20-day rule is as well.}}
''FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate'', 596 U.S. 289, 296-98, 301 (2022).
[[category:Election Law]]
[[category:Standing]]
[[category:United States Supreme Court Cases]]