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Although Chiang was nominally in charge of the "China-Burma-India" theater, actual command was held by American and British generals, especially [[Joseph Stilwell]]. Relatively little fighting took place in China. Nevertheless, Chiang gained world stature, and China was given a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1945. Chiang became an ardent opponent of Communism in the late 1920s, but lost to [[Mao Zedong]] in the Chinese civil war, fleeing with his government and army to Taiwan in 1949.  In Taiwan he built a modern Chinese nation--much smaller than the mainland of course--but proved that rapid, modernization, fast economic growth--and democracy--was possible in a Chinese nation. In 1947 he repressed traditional Taiwanese natives who hated to be overrun and ruled by the elites from the mainland, and to this day his reputation is controversial on Taiwan.

Although Chiang was nominally in charge of the "China-Burma-India" theater, actual command was held by American and British generals, especially [[Joseph Stilwell]]. Relatively little fighting took place in China. Nevertheless, Chiang gained world stature, and China was given a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1945. Chiang became an ardent opponent of Communism in the late 1920s, but lost to [[Mao Zedong]] in the Chinese civil war, fleeing with his government and army to Taiwan in 1949.  In Taiwan he built a modern Chinese nation—much smaller than the mainland of course—but proved that rapid, modernization, fast economic growth—and democracy—was possible in a Chinese nation. In 1947 he repressed traditional Taiwanese natives who hated to be overrun and ruled by the elites from the mainland, and to this day his reputation is controversial on Taiwan.

American conservatives greatly admired and supported Chiang and his wife. Long derided by liberals, his reputation has been improving among scholars. For eighty years the Chinese history has unfolded in the rivalry of Chiang and Mao.  In recent years Mao's reputation has collapsed, as China has discarded socialism, embraced capitalism, and taken off to economic prosperity--following the model of the much smaller Taiwan. Meanwhile the Chinese are embracing the vision that Chiang espoused: the vision of a China achieving modernity in its economy, parity in military prowess, and building political stability on a basis of traditional nationalism.  Taylor (2009) argues that, far from being incompetent, Chiang was a farsighted, disciplined and canny strategist who repeatedly predicted major geopolitical events and worked effectively for China, given its poverty. Chiang laid the foundation not only for Taiwan's prosperity, but also for its transformation into the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, and one of the few in Asia.  Even the mainland, where he was the great enemy for a half century, Chiang is now widely regarded as a national patriot who made valuable contributions to the modernization of China. The Communist leaders in Beijing have looked to Taiwan as a model for what a prosperous and free Chinese society might be like. Some mainstream Chinese scholars are suggesting that the country might have been better off had Chiang triumphed in 1949 instead of Mao.<ref>Jonathan D. Spence, "The Enigma of Chiang Kai-shek," [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=23175 ''New York review of Books,'' Volume 56, Number 16 (Oct. 22, 2009) excerpt online] </ref>

American conservatives greatly admired and supported Chiang and his wife. Long derided by liberals, his reputation has been improving among scholars. For eighty years the Chinese history has unfolded in the rivalry of Chiang and Mao.  In recent years Mao's reputation has collapsed, as China has discarded socialism, embraced capitalism, and taken off to economic prosperity—following the model of the much smaller Taiwan. Meanwhile the Chinese are embracing the vision that Chiang espoused: the vision of a China achieving modernity in its economy, parity in military prowess, and building political stability on a basis of traditional nationalism.  Taylor (2009) argues that, far from being incompetent, Chiang was a farsighted, disciplined and canny strategist who repeatedly predicted major geopolitical events and worked effectively for China, given its poverty. Chiang laid the foundation not only for Taiwan's prosperity, but also for its transformation into the only democracy in the Chinese-speaking world, and one of the few in Asia.  Even the mainland, where he was the great enemy for a half century, Chiang is now widely regarded as a national patriot who made valuable contributions to the modernization of China. The Communist leaders in Beijing have looked to Taiwan as a model for what a prosperous and free Chinese society might be like. Some mainstream Chinese scholars are suggesting that the country might have been better off had Chiang triumphed in 1949 instead of Mao.<ref>Jonathan D. Spence, "The Enigma of Chiang Kai-shek," [http://www.nybooks.com/articles/article-preview?article_id=23175 ''New York review of Books,'' Volume 56, Number 16 (Oct. 22, 2009) excerpt online]</ref>

=== Early life ===

=== Early life ===

=== Northern Expedition ===

=== Northern Expedition ===

As commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang had to work closely with Soviet advisors and [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) officials (the KMT and the CCP had formed a "united front" as a result of the Sun-Joffe Agreement). Communist leader [[Chou En-lai]] was a senior political commissar at the academy. However, Chiang was very suspicious of his Communist allies. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang became the most powerful individual KMT leader, and on March 11 1926 launched a limited purge of communists in Canton (the "Canton Coup"), as a result of which all his Soviet advisors were expelled from China. However, he did not dissolve the [[united front]], and the CCP, under orders from Moscow, also continued to maintain the status quo.

As commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy, Chiang had to work closely with Soviet advisors and [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) officials (the KMT and the CCP had formed a "united front" as a result of the Sun-Joffe Agreement). Communist leader [[Chou En-lai]] was a senior political commissar at the academy. However, Chiang was very suspicious of his Communist allies. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang became the most powerful individual KMT leader, and on March 11, 1926 launched a limited purge of communists in Canton (the "Canton Coup"), as a result of which all his Soviet advisors were expelled from China. However, he did not dissolve the [[united front]], and the CCP, under orders from Moscow, also continued to maintain the status quo.

===Northern Expedition, 1926-1927===

===Northern Expedition, 1926-1927===

=== President of the Republic of China ===

=== President of the Republic of China ===

The period of the 'Nanjing Republic' (1928-37)  was too short and too troubled to enable a full assessment of what established Kuomintang rule might have brought China. Chiang was faced by a series of serious internal and external problems:

The period of the 'Nanjing Republic' (1928–37)  was too short and too troubled to enable a full assessment of what established Kuomintang rule might have brought China. Chiang was faced by a series of serious internal and external problems:

Although President of China, his direct rule only extended to the lower Yangtse provinces; the rest of China continued to be ruled by warlords expressing greater or lesser degrees of loyalty to Chiang. In 1929-30 his erstwhile allies Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan rebelled against him and his rule was saved by the intervention of [[Zhang Xueliang]], heir of the assassinated north-eastern warlord Zhang Zuolin.

Although President of China, his direct rule only extended to the lower Yangtse provinces; the rest of China continued to be ruled by warlords expressing greater or lesser degrees of loyalty to Chiang. In 1929-30 his erstwhile allies Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan rebelled against him and his rule was saved by the intervention of [[Zhang Xueliang]], heir of the assassinated north-eastern warlord Zhang Zuolin.

===Relations with Japan===

===Relations with Japan===

After the [[Mukden Incident]] of September 18, 1931 and Japan's rapid seizure of Manchuria, Chiang realized that the vast disparity in national strength and military power between China and Japan put China at great risk. Therefore he rejected advice to fight back by people who called him an appeaser and did his best to avoid all-out war, using "peace" as a way to postpone war. On the other hand, he gathered allies widely, adjusted policies, maintained domestic order, built "national defense strongholds," organized a southwestern base area, and prepared to fight against Japan. However, the Japanese began negotiating with regional Chinese leaders and promoted a "north China autonomy movement" for the five northern provinces that weakened Nationalist control. <ref>Stephen G. Craft, "Opponents of Appeasement: Western-educated Chinese Diplomats and Intellectuals and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1932-37." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 2001 35(1): 195-216. Issn: 0026-749x  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/313092 in  Jstor ] </ref>

After the [[Mukden Incident]] of September 18, 1931 and Japan's rapid seizure of Manchuria, Chiang realized that the vast disparity in national strength and military power between China and Japan put China at great risk. Therefore he rejected advice to fight back by people who called him an appeaser and did his best to avoid all-out war, using "peace" as a way to postpone war. On the other hand, he gathered allies widely, adjusted policies, maintained domestic order, built "national defense strongholds," organized a southwestern base area, and prepared to fight against Japan. However, the Japanese began negotiating with regional Chinese leaders and promoted a "north China autonomy movement" for the five northern provinces that weakened Nationalist control.<ref>Stephen G. Craft, "Opponents of Appeasement: Western-educated Chinese Diplomats and Intellectuals and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1932-37." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 2001 35(1): 195-216. Issn: 0026-749x  [http://www.jstor.org/pss/313092 in  Jstor ]</ref>

Full scale war &mdash; the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] began at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking in July 1937.

Full scale war &mdash; the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] began at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking in July 1937.

In September 1943, Chiang Kai-shek formally became president of the central executive committee of the KMT, and was recognized as the head of state and head of government of free China. In November 1943 Chiang attended the [[Cairo Conference]], where he, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] drafted the Cairo declaration proclaiming Allied war objectives for the Far East. China was assured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council when it formed in 1945.<Ref> Chiang and his son controlled the seat until 1970, when the UN voted to give it to the Communist regime.</ref>  

In September 1943, Chiang Kai-shek formally became president of the central executive committee of the KMT, and was recognized as the head of state and head of government of free China. In November 1943 Chiang attended the [[Cairo Conference]], where he, President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] drafted the Cairo declaration proclaiming Allied war objectives for the Far East. China was assured a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council when it formed in 1945.<ref>Chiang and his son controlled the seat until 1970, when the UN voted to give it to the Communist regime.</ref>  

Chiang was elected tsung-tsai (director-general) of the Kuomintang on May 17, 1945.  After 1927 he never had a serious contender who might threaten his control of the party.

Chiang was elected tsung-tsai (director-general) of the Kuomintang on May 17, 1945.  After 1927 he never had a serious contender who might threaten his control of the party.

Chiang in 1942 gave Stilwell command of two Chinese divisions, while often overuling Stilwell. The recovery of Burma became an obsession for Stilwell, and he began to think of himself as the one man who could save China. With few American ground troops available Stilwell decided to rebuild the Chinese army and use it to attack the Japanese in Burma. He demanded, with scant success, that airlifted supplies go to these operations, and not to Chennault's Air Force. The Chinese government desperately needed American aid just to survive, and realized that only the Americans could defeat Japan. Indeed, Chiang and his KMT saw that after the Japanese were defeated then the Communists would be their main foe, and they sought to hoard their military resources. In Burma Stilwell was badly defeated by Japanese and barely managed to escape to India. Chiang sent to India new Chinese divisions which were be supplied with American equipment. Stilwell set out to systematically retrain them along American lines, with the long-term goal of eventually recruiting, training, and equipping sixty divisions in China, but they never were an effective army.

Chiang in 1942 gave Stilwell command of two Chinese divisions, while often overuling Stilwell. The recovery of Burma became an obsession for Stilwell, and he began to think of himself as the one man who could save China. With few American ground troops available Stilwell decided to rebuild the Chinese army and use it to attack the Japanese in Burma. He demanded, with scant success, that airlifted supplies go to these operations, and not to Chennault's Air Force. The Chinese government desperately needed American aid just to survive, and realized that only the Americans could defeat Japan. Indeed, Chiang and his KMT saw that after the Japanese were defeated then the Communists would be their main foe, and they sought to hoard their military resources. In Burma Stilwell was badly defeated by Japanese and barely managed to escape to India. Chiang sent to India new Chinese divisions which were be supplied with American equipment. Stilwell set out to systematically retrain them along American lines, with the long-term goal of eventually recruiting, training, and equipping sixty divisions in China, but they never were an effective army.

Time and again Stilwell was frustrated and vehemently angry with Chiang (whom he ridiculed--calling Chiang "peanut" in messages to Washington) and with the Chinese government.  Chiang refused to provide Stilwell any more Chinese soldiers and instead supported Chennault's plans.  Chennault indeed obtained long-range [[B-29]] bombers, and they started making raids on Japanese cities.  The Japanese response, as Stilwell had long predicted, was an overland campaign  (code-named "ICHI-GO") inside China to overrun Chennault's air bases in late summer 1944.  Chiang finally forced the U.S. to recall Stilwell, who left in disgust in October, 1944, and was replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer (1897-1989), who got along much better with Chennault and Chiang.

Time and again Stilwell was frustrated and vehemently angry with Chiang (whom he ridiculed—calling Chiang "peanut" in messages to Washington) and with the Chinese government.  Chiang refused to provide Stilwell any more Chinese soldiers and instead supported Chennault's plans.  Chennault indeed obtained long-range [[B-29]] bombers, and they started making raids on Japanese cities.  The Japanese response, as Stilwell had long predicted, was an overland campaign  (code-named "ICHI-GO") inside China to overrun Chennault's air bases in late summer 1944.  Chiang finally forced the U.S. to recall Stilwell, who left in disgust in October, 1944, and was replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer (1897-1989), who got along much better with Chennault and Chiang.

=== Conclusion of the Chinese Civil War  ===

=== Conclusion of the Chinese Civil War  ===

General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent in late 1945 by President Truman to resolve the Chinese civil war, hopefully by creating a new shared power arrangement between the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists. <ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', (1987), p. 61.</ref>  Communist leader Mao Zedong had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', (1963), p. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', (1964), p. 429.</ref>

General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent in late 1945 by President Truman to resolve the Chinese civil war, hopefully by creating a new shared power arrangement between the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists.<ref>Forrest C. Pogue, ''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', (1987), p. 61.</ref>  Communist leader Mao Zedong had already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism." <ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', (1963), p. 238.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', (1964), p. 429.</ref>

American policy in China was largely being shaped by the so-called "China Hands" in the U.S. State Department:  [[John Stewart Service]], [[John Paton Davies]], [[John Carter Vincent]], and others.  Because they knew the Chinese language and had been in China for years, their recommendations carried much weight, and they played a major part in the fall of China.

American policy in China was largely being shaped by the so-called "China Hands" in the U.S. State Department:  [[John Stewart Service]], [[John Paton Davies]], [[John Carter Vincent]], and others.  Because they knew the Chinese language and had been in China for years, their recommendations carried much weight, and they played a major part in the fall of China.

The [[U.S. War Department]] however, had more realistic and clearer view of the situation. In July 1945, a memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the Communist movement.  The report stated the Maoists were more rigidly controlled than the KMT, allowed no opposition groups to exist in their areas (in contrast to the KMT), and were part of the [[Comintern|international Communist]] movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>

The [[U.S. War Department]] however, had more realistic and clearer view of the situation. In July 1945, a memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the Communist movement.  The report stated the Maoists were more rigidly controlled than the KMT, allowed no opposition groups to exist in their areas (in contrast to the KMT), and were part of the [[Comintern|international Communist]] movement.<ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>

Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism.  Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively.  Marshall himself testified that similar aid might have worked in China, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of International Communism directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  (1982), pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism.  

Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism.  Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively.  Marshall himself testified that similar aid might have worked in China, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance.<ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report.<ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of International Communism directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him.<ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  (1982), pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism.  

Chiang was forced from the Chinese mainland to the island of [[Taiwan]] in 1949, where he resumed his position as president, albeit of a massively reduced territory.

Chiang was forced from the Chinese mainland to the island of [[Taiwan]] in 1949, where he resumed his position as president, albeit of a massively reduced territory.

White clouds drift slowly for a thousand years.

White clouds drift slowly for a thousand years.

==see also==

==See also==

* [[Kuomintang]]

* [[Kuomintang]]

==Bibliography==

==Bibliography==

* Boorman, Howard L. "Chiang Kai-shek" in Howard L. Boorman, ed. ''Biographical Dictionary of Republican China'' (1967) 1: 319-38; excellent starting place.  

* Boorman, Howard L. "Chiang Kai-shek" in Howard L. Boorman, ed. ''Biographical Dictionary of Republican China'' (1967) 1: 319-38; excellent starting place.  

* Fenby, Jonathan. ''Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'' (2004), 592pp [http://www.amazon.com/Chiang-Kai-Shek-Chinas-Generalissimo/dp/B000T9VO2U/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214082451&sr=8-5 excerpt and text search]

* Fenby, Jonathan. ''Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'' (2004), 592pp [http://www.amazon.com/Chiang-Kai-Shek-Chinas-Generalissimo/dp/B000T9VO2U/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214082451&sr=8-5 excerpt and text search]

* Huang, Grace C.  "Chiang Kai-shek's Uses of Shame: An Interpretive Study of Agency in Chinese Leadership."  PhD dissertation U. of Chicago 2005. 282 pp.  DAI 2005 66(6): 2370-A. DA3181356  Fulltext: [[ProQuest Dissertations & Theses ] ]  

* Huang, Grace C.  "Chiang Kai-shek's Uses of Shame: An Interpretive Study of Agency in Chinese Leadership."  PhD dissertation U. of Chicago 2005. 282 pp.  DAI 2005 66(6): 2370-A. DA3181356  Fulltext: [[ProQuest Dissertations & Theses]]

* Li, Laura Tyson. ''Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China's Eternal First Lady'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Madame-Chiang-Kai-shek-Chinas-Eternal/dp/0802143229/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214082451&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Li, Laura Tyson. ''Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China's Eternal First Lady'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Madame-Chiang-Kai-shek-Chinas-Eternal/dp/0802143229/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214082451&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

* Taylor, Jay. ''The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China''  (2009), 722 pp. highly favorable scholarly biography

* Taylor, Jay. ''The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China''  (2009), 722 pp. highly favorable scholarly biography