Events of the last two years, including the two elections this year, suggest that Brexit is the biggest crisis for the British Conservative (Tory) Party, and British conservatism in general, in 160 years. In this essay, I will examine what brought us to this crisis, the nature of the crisis and what is likely to happen next. It is analytical, not descriptive or narrative - there's plenty of detail and data elsewhere. It is based on over thirty years of closely following British politics, including my own time as a researcher for the Conservative Party, and conversations with senior researchers and analysts of the EU, senior Conservatives and senior UKIP activists.
On June 23, 2016, the British public voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the EU, much to the shock of David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, and the political classes in general. Cameron had called the referendum because he was struggling to keep the Tory Party together. Since the 1980s, a significant number of MPs and activists had been uncomfortable with our membership of the EU and were pushing against the leadership. Margaret Thatcher and John Major were able to keep a lid on things but, since the landslide against the Tories in 1997, it was becoming open civil war within the party. To complicate matters, Cameron was firmly on the liberal wing of the Tory Party and saw its future as a centrist party. Because UKIP were snapping at his party's heels on the right, Cameron intended the referendum as a vote of confidence in his vision, giving him a mandate to marginalise the conservative wing of the party.
Why he lost is not straightforward. Yes, people voted leave because they resented being in the EU and people voted leave because they rejected Cameron's plans. But people also voted leave because the Remain campaign smugly assumed many voters were stupid and did not need positive reasons to vote remain. They voted leave - particularly in the regions - because, ironically, they were deeply unhappy with Tory austerity policies. They voted leave because they were promised a lot of things by the Leave campaign - including an implied end to austerity, an extra £350 million a week for the National Health Service, strict immigration controls and easy trade deals. It is significant that neither side was strong on detail and nobody defined at the time what leave means.
In short, although we voted to leave, there was not a strong qualitative or quantitative mandate.
The day after the referendum, David Cameron stood down and Theresa May became Prime Minister shortly after. Boris Johnson had his eye on the prize but he was treated with suspicion before being brought down by Michael Gove, one of his closest allies. Significantly, Nigel Farage also stepped down as leader of UKIP. And that's when it started to get serious.
Neither the Remain or Leave campaigns had fully understood what leaving the EU would entail and the British government soon realised they were in trouble - they could not deliver what the Leave campaign had promised. May, with her party 21% ahead in the polls, decided to call a general election to strengthen her hand. Her priority was to keep the Conservative Party from falling apart, with delivering Brexit second, and - like Cameron - she gambled and lost. Instead of a substantial Parliamentary majority, she was forced into partnership with the Democratic Unionist Party and found herself with a more fractured party than ever.
Parliament, which is the sovereign authority under the UK constitution, insisted on full consultation and a vote on any final agreement with the EU. This strengthened the hand of her opponents in her party, both conservatives - like the European Research Group - and remainers. It was clearly in favour of leaving the EU but legally blocked a hard, WTO rules based, Brexit. Theresa May was forced into the humiliation of having to ask the EU for more time to put her house in order.
This situation, largely misreported in both the lamestream media and alternative media, went down very badly in the country at large. In the recent local elections, the strongly pro-Europe Liberal Democrat party gave an unexpectedly strong performance at the cost of the Tory and Labour parties. In the EU elections, the Liberal Democrats, Greens and Nigel Farage's Brexit parties repeated the humiliation.
Theresa May's failure to deliver caused deep discomfort among MPs and activists, and frustrated the 1922 Committee, the most influential group in the party. Party rules meant she could not be openly challenged for the leadership so she was left alone with the political equivalent of a loaded gun.
Unfortunately, the talent pool in today's Tory party is shallow. There is a mixed bag of candidates for he seat, the most visible of which is Boris Johnson. The party still sees him as untrustworthy, particularly given his ambiguous track record on the EU. The party has a history of electing compromise candidates in times of crisis so there is an odds-on chance that Boris will not be chosen.
Whoever does win has until the end of October to get the support of Parliament for their version of Brexit - and that's where the crisis lies.
Let's go back to the EU election. The Brexit Party won a clear majority of EU parliamentary seats for three reasons - it had a charismatic leader in Nigel Farage, it was the only real party with an unambiguous Leave message, and UKIP had already done the ground work for them in the previous election. Most of the seats the Brexit Party won were already held by UKIP, which had imploded once Farage left. However, the Remain parties got more votes between them. What's more, there is no clear right-left division in the country as a whole. The increasingly socialist Labour party, which has a strong Leave tendency at its core, has got the message and is leaning towards a second referendum and/or rejecting Brexit.
So which way does the new Tory leader go? Remember, nobody defined what Leave means. The conservative wing of the Tory party wants a hard, "no deal" Brexit but the liberal faction would rather bring the government down than agree with that. The country as a whole is still split but the tendency is to Remain. If the new leader pushes for "no deal", they could be forced into a general election by the end of the year and risk losing to a socialist party more in tune with the mood of the nation - and at least another decade of crippling infighting. If the new leader marginalises the conservatives and goes for a softer Brexit, they risk an internal rupture and losses to the Brexit Party - and at least another decade of crippling infighting. If, as some senior conservatives believe Boris Johnson would do and be comfortable with, the new leader takes a third gamble and gives the nation another referendum in the hope of getting a mandate for either course, they risk losing again and keeping Britain in the EU - and at least another decade of crippling infighting. Lose-lose-lose for the British Conservative Party. Even if the new leader has the vision and the spine to deliver a conservative Brexit, and keeps the party from breaking apart, the country will realise how empty some of the Leave campaign promises were and punish the Tories eventually. Lose-lose-lose today or lose tomorrow.
So where does that leave independent British conservatives? Unfortunately, the Tory Party is the only right wing show in town. The Brexit Party, like UKIP before it, is the Nigel Farage show with not much of a party machine to build on its success. Remember, Nigel Farage's UKIP won the EU elections in 2014 - and got only one MP in 2015 and none in 2017. More worryingly, it doesn't have any policies yet. This was also a serious problem with UKIP, which focused so much on the EU that its manifesto in 2015 and 2017 could be generously described as shallow.
UKIP itself has imploded, limping along after three years of infighting and haemorrhaging support. If it was weak on policy before, it is moribund now.
For Britain, an offshoot of UKIP, was described by Nigel Farage as "racist". Let's just say it has a cult following and no real presence.
Tommy Robinson, the EDL and their like are extremely marginalised. Tommy Robison managed only 2.2% of the vote despite some intense campaigning. Even if we ignore the connection with soccer hooliganism, they have no significant policies.
So do we stick to our principles, lobby our MPs and party connections to push for "no deal" and risk a socialist government with a Marxist Prime Minister? Do we compromise our principles and allow the party to slide towards a soft Brexit, risking becoming a client state of the EU? Do we walk away from the party - and the problem - and start a long-term project to build a fighting conservative alternative through one of the smaller parties?
Whatever we choose, this is when we need to be clear, to decide, and start acting.