INF Treaty - Revision history

RobSmith: /* Scope and Exclusions */

2026-01-26T03:54:13Z

Scope and Exclusions

RobSmith: /* Indefinite Duration */

2026-01-26T03:50:13Z

Indefinite Duration

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025 */

2025-09-20T06:02:23Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025 */

2025-09-08T02:05:16Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025 */

2025-09-02T19:28:36Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025 */

2025-08-24T21:18:24Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025 */

2025-08-24T21:13:42Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025 */

2025-08-24T20:48:53Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025 */

2025-08-24T20:48:15Z

Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025

RobSmith: /* Russian Foreign Ministry on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025 */

2025-08-24T20:45:47Z

Russian Foreign Ministry on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:54, January 26, 2026
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	Support structures, such as launchers and associated equipment, were also to be destroyed or rendered unusable.		Support structures, such as launchers and associated equipment, were also to be destroyed or rendered unusable.
		+
		+	Initially, the Tomahawk missile was developed in several variants, including nuclear ones. The most notable were the BGM-109A TLAM-N (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear) and the BGM-109G GLCM (Ground Launched Cruise Missile). The former was designed for launch from surface ships and [[submarine]]s and was equipped with the W80 nuclear warhead, with a yield ranging from 5 to 200 kilotons. The latter was a land-based mobile system deployed on [[NATO]] territory in [[Europe]] and armed with the W84 warhead, yielding between 10 and 50 kilotons.
		+
		+	Both variants were retired under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. According to the treaty's terms, all ground-launched intermediate-range missiles (500–5,500 km) had to be destroyed. Although the missiles themselves were withdrawn from service, the W80 and W84 nuclear warheads were not destroyed. Instead, they were placed in storage as part of the U.S. nuclear stockpile reserve. This means that the technological and physical capability to restore a nuclear-armed Tomahawk remains intact.

	==Verification and Inspection==		==Verification and Inspection==

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 Both sides provided detailed inventories of their missile systems and destruction sites.
-==Indefinite Duration==
+==Duration==
 The treaty was of unlimited duration, meaning it remained in force until a party withdrew (as the US did in 2019, citing Russian non-compliance with the 9M729 missile).

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 ==Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025==
-{{quotebox-float|Against the backdrop of deliberate steps by the [[United States]], which resulted in the termination in 2019 of the validity and existence of the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] (INF Treaty), as well as in subsequent years, the Russian Federation has been proactively making efforts to promote restraint in this area. In particular, this was reflected in the top-level statements made in 2019-2020, which provided for the voluntary adoption by our country of unilateral self-restrictions precluding the deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles unless similar US-made [[missile]] [[weapon]]s emerge in the relevant regions of the world. In parallel, [[Russia]] directly called upon [[NATO]] countries to declare a reciprocal moratorium on deploying weapon systems formerly banned under the INF Treaty, and upon the [[US]] allies in the [[Asia]]-[[Pacific]] to support our efforts in preventing a race of such armaments in the region.
+{{quotebox-float|Against the backdrop of deliberate steps by the [[United States]], which resulted in the termination in 2019 of the validity and existence of the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] (INF Treaty), as well as in subsequent years, the Russian Federation has been proactively making efforts to promote restraint in this area. In particular, this was reflected in the top-level statements made in 2019-2020, which provided for the voluntary adoption by our country of [[unilateral]] self-restrictions precluding the deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles unless similar US-made [[missile]] [[weapon]]s emerge in the relevant regions of the world. In parallel, [[Russia]] directly called upon [[NATO]] countries to declare a reciprocal moratorium on deploying weapon systems formerly banned under the INF Treaty, and upon the [[US]] allies in the [[Asia]]-[[Pacific]] to support our efforts in preventing a race of such armaments in the region.
 However, we have to state that Russian initiatives have not been reciprocated. The United States and its allies have not only openly declared plans to deploy US ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions, but have also made significant progress in the practical implementation of their intentions. The increasing body of objective data reveals, in particular, the following: the testing of baseline versions of a wide range of the above-mentioned weapons developed by [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] has mostly completed or is at its final stages; serial production of some of these systems is now underway; the [[Pentagon]] is forming and locating specialized units and commands in respective regions to enable the forward deployment and employment of such weapons; the requisite [[infrastructure]] is also being prepared to suit these purposes; there is growing [[evidence]] that missile systems of the aforementioned range are transferred directly to areas of [[military]] exercises conducted jointly with allies outside the US national territory.

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 A significant additional factor is the stated intention by several US allies to aquire ground-launched INF-range missiles from Washington and / or develop their own missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 km, or to expand their existing national arsenals of such weapons. Obviously, such weapon systems will supplement the inventory of means to be used while practicing and potentially conducting the so-called “integrated” operations jointly planned by US and allied militaries within relevant alliances and [[coalition]]s.
-In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the [[collective West]]” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is [[strategic]] in nature. In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous escalation of tensions between [[nuclear]] powers.
+In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the [[collective West]]” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is [[strategic]] in nature. In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous [[escalation]] of tensions between [[nuclear]] powers.
 Russia has consistently made it clear that such a scenario will demand that our country take offsetting military-technical measures in order to counter newly emerging threats and maintain strategic balance. Since our repeated warnings in this regard have been ignored and the situation is developing along the path of the actual emplacement of the US-made ground-launched INF-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to state that the conditions for maintaining a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar weapons have ceased to exist. The Ministry is authorized to declare that the Russian Federation no longer considers itself bound by the relevant previously adopted self-restrictions.

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 Specifically, since 2023, we have observed instances when US systems capable of launching INF-range missiles from land were transported to some [[European]] [[NATO]] countries for trial use in the course of exercises that clearly had [[anti-Russia]]n focus. In particular, it includes drills in [[Denmark]] involving a mobile (portable) Mk70 launcher.
-With regard to the Asia-Pacific, we note that under the pretext of training activities, a [[Typhon mid-range missile]] system was brought to the [[Philippines]] in April 2024 and is still stationed on the archipelago. A system of the same type was employed this July in [[Australia]] during live-fire exercises as part of the Talisman Sabre 2025 multilateral drills. In the course of these drills, the US military personnel also deployed a [[Dark Eagle hypersonic intermediate-range system]], marking its first overseas appearance. It was openly declared that this deployment was undertaken "to project power", as well as underscored that such systems are rapidly redeployable.
+With regard to the Asia-Pacific, we note that under the pretext of training activities, a [[Typhon mid-range missile]] system was brought to the [[Philippines]] in April 2024 and is still stationed on the archipelago. A system of the same type was employed this July in [[Australia]] during live-fire exercises as part of the Talisman Sabre 2025 [[multilateral]] drills. In the course of these drills, the US military personnel also deployed a [[Dark Eagle hypersonic intermediate-range system]], marking its first overseas appearance. It was openly declared that this deployment was undertaken "to project power", as well as underscored that such systems are rapidly redeployable.
 Furthermore, during Talisman Sabre 2025, an Australian crew of the US-supplied [[HIMARS]] system launched a US-manufactured [[PrSM]] missile, which had been tested by the Pentagon back in 2021 to a range of more than 500 km and which consequently qualifies as a ground-launched INF-class missile. Prior to this, such missiles were launched by the [[US Army]] units using a future autonomous HIMARS-based platform during a live-fire event that took place last June on the territory of the [[Republic of Palau]].

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 It applied to missiles stationed in allied territories (e.g., US missiles in NATO countries, Soviet missiles in Warsaw Pact states).
-==Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 3, 2025==
+==Russian Foreign Ministry statement on the moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, August 4, 2025==
 {{quotebox-float|Against the backdrop of deliberate steps by the [[United States]], which resulted in the termination in 2019 of the validity and existence of the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]] (INF Treaty), as well as in subsequent years, the Russian Federation has been proactively making efforts to promote restraint in this area. In particular, this was reflected in the top-level statements made in 2019-2020, which provided for the voluntary adoption by our country of unilateral self-restrictions precluding the deployment of ground-launched INF-range missiles unless similar US-made [[missile]] [[weapon]]s emerge in the relevant regions of the world. In parallel, [[Russia]] directly called upon [[NATO]] countries to declare a reciprocal moratorium on deploying weapon systems formerly banned under the INF Treaty, and upon the [[US]] allies in the [[Asia]]-[[Pacific]] to support our efforts in preventing a race of such armaments in the region.

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:48, August 24, 2025
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	Decisions on the specific parameters of response measures will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation based on interagency analysis with regard to the scope of the deployment of the US and other [[Western alliance\|Western]] ground-launched INF-range missiles, as well as to the overall evolution in the area of international security and strategic stability.<ref>https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2039749/</ref>}}		Decisions on the specific parameters of response measures will be made by the leadership of the Russian Federation based on interagency analysis with regard to the scope of the deployment of the US and other [[Western alliance\|Western]] ground-launched INF-range missiles, as well as to the overall evolution in the area of international security and strategic stability.<ref>https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2039749/</ref>}}
		+
		+	==References==
		+	{{reflist}}

	==External links==		==External links==

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:48, August 24, 2025
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	In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the [[collective West]]” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is [[strategic]] in nature. In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous escalation of tensions between [[nuclear]] powers.		In aggregate, the above-mentioned steps of “the [[collective West]]” entail the formation and augmentation of destabilizing missile capabilities in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation, creating a direct threat to the security of our country, which is [[strategic]] in nature. In general, these dynamics carry a serious negative charge and are fraught with significant destructive implications for regional and global stability, including a dangerous escalation of tensions between [[nuclear]] powers.
−
−
−

	Russia has consistently made it clear that such a scenario will demand that our country take offsetting military-technical measures in order to counter newly emerging threats and maintain strategic balance. Since our repeated warnings in this regard have been ignored and the situation is developing along the path of the actual emplacement of the US-made ground-launched INF-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to state that the conditions for maintaining a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar weapons have ceased to exist. The Ministry is authorized to declare that the Russian Federation no longer considers itself bound by the relevant previously adopted self-restrictions.		Russia has consistently made it clear that such a scenario will demand that our country take offsetting military-technical measures in order to counter newly emerging threats and maintain strategic balance. Since our repeated warnings in this regard have been ignored and the situation is developing along the path of the actual emplacement of the US-made ground-launched INF-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to state that the conditions for maintaining a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar weapons have ceased to exist. The Ministry is authorized to declare that the Russian Federation no longer considers itself bound by the relevant previously adopted self-restrictions.