Conservapedia - User contributions [en]

User talk:Syamsu

2013-03-16T03:50:17Z

Syamsu: /* Free will article copy */

{{welcome|sig=<big>[[User:TK|'''ṬK''']]</big>/Admin[[User_Talk:TK|/Talk]] 06:42, 9 February 2010 (EST)}}

Is that your real name? It sounds like a pseudonym. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 08:53, 8 February 2010 (EST)

My given name at birth is Nando Ronteltap, but my name given to me when I became a muslim is Mohammad Nur Syamsu.

==Talk Page Edits==

While your opinion is valid regardless of how many edits you have here, you will find we accord it more weight depending on your contributions. It is not wise to come here and immediately begin discussing policy or major changes to existing pages, as little weight will be given to these suggestions and you may eventually find yourself in violation of 90/10. Start a new article, or expand an existing one, before entering into discussions on article content. [[User:JacobB|JacobB]] 18:19, 8 February 2010 (EST)

==anticipation==
I put it under the subject anticipation instead. Anticipation is currently the more scientific overall-term used to discuss these things, like in a paper about anticipation free will of people is discussed as one example of anticipation. I do put some effort into finding out what the logic in practical common use is. So I make some effort not to make this just my personal opinion.

:Your first article is puzzling and needs polishing. I moved it to your user space. [[User talk:Syamsu/Anticipation]]

:Work on it some more, and ask someone like TK if they think it's ready to publish. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 08:34, 9 February 2010 (EST)
::I was planning to make a couple of improvements to this. Am I still allowed to do this now it's in the user space?--[[User:CPalmer|CPalmer]] 09:28, 9 February 2010 (EST)

:: I don't think I will work on it more, I don't have a hope for it anymore to have something like this be published on conservapedia.--[[User:Syamsu|Syamsu]] 09:51, 9 February 2010 (EST)
:::Sorry to hear that - will you still be contributing to other articles?--[[User:CPalmer|CPalmer]] 10:27, 9 February 2010 (EST)
:::: No freedom is the main thing for me. Conservapedia is still much better on free will than wikipedia, in that in wikipedia free will is mainly presented as being a problem, and that it is impossible! But still conservapedia is weak in it's support for knowledge about freedom, compared to the self-evident matter of fact kind of certainty most people have in daily life that freedom is real.

==Free will article copy==
Your article on the subject exists in AW and RW. In this site it will be completely original or not at all. [[User:Karajou|Karajou]] 23:27, 15 March 2013 (EDT)

What a lot of bureacratic nonsense. If you don't understand free will, and the significance of the understanding of it in history, then please leave conservapedia. --[[User:Syamsu|Syamsu]] 23:43, 15 March 2013 (EDT)

Free will

2013-03-16T03:46:22Z

Syamsu: either you have a specific non-bureaucratic criticism that goes right to the main content of the revision or you desist from editing

'''Free will''' is the ability to choose future alternatives.

The logic of free will has 2 main parts, the agency which does the choosing, and the alternatives which are chosen. These two parts are wholy different from each other, the agency is called spiritual, what is chosen is called material. Together with these dual substances come dual ways of reaching a conclusion, subjectivity and objectivity.

Subjectivity: to choose / express what exists in the spiritual domain, resulting in opinions.

Objectivity: to measure what exists in the material domain, resulting in facts. <ref>William of Ockham, http://www.philosophos.com/philosophical_connections/profile_050.html#ocksec2 , quote: "we can have no knowledge of an immaterial soul; nor can we prove its existence philosophically. Instead we must rely on revealed truth and faith"</ref> [[Image:William_of_Ockham.jpg|frame|William of Ockham philosophically justified both objectivity and subjectivity]]

=== Overview of the dual categories in free will ===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! what chooses (agency)!! what is chosen
|-
| subjectively identified || objectively measured
|-
| spiritual domain || material domain
|-
| opinion (creates information) || fact (rewrites information)
|-
| soul || body
|-
| God,love, hate, self, happiness etc. || solids, gasses, fluids, (fermions), etc. fantasy figures, mathematics
|-
| creator || creation
|}

Decisions connect the spiritual domain to the material domain, which because of the freedom in choosing leaves no evidence of a spiritual domain.

===Objectivity and subjectivity===

The way in which something can be known about material is relatively straightforward, through measurement we can know the properties of a material thing. For instance when a videocamera is turned towards the moon, then the information travels from the moon by medium of light, through the lens, through the circuitry of the videocamera, onto the videotape.

This transferring or copying of information unchanged (also known as rewriting) is called being objective. The videocamera provides objective information about the moon. When somebody looks at the moon, then in the same way as the videocamera, information transfers from the moon, by medium of light, through the eyes, to the memory in the brain, resulting in objective facts about the moon in memory.

In the case of the videocamera the information from the moon was rewritten as magnetism on the videotape, in the case of the person the information was rewritten as electro-chemistry in the brain.

Where objectivity works by force, subjectivity works by freedom. The way in which something can be said about the spiritual doing the choosing is thus very different from measurement. If we want to identify the agency of any decision, then we must choose what the agency consists of.

For example: if X can turn out A or B in the moment, and the decision turns out B, then the question "What made the decision turn out B instead of A?" must be answered with a new decision between alternatives like:

1 - it was hateful that X chose B instead of A

2 - it was loving that X chose B instead of A

If for example alternative 1 is chosen, then that results in the opinion that it was hate which made X turn out B instead of A.

Because the conclusion must be arrived at by choosing, it means that for every question about what is in the spiritual domain there are at least 2 logically correct answers available. This doesn't mean that every available answer is morally upright, or that any available answer is morally upright.

== Logical fallacy of scientism ==
[[File:Jim_Parsons_(The_Big_Bang_Theory)_3781567513.jpg|right|thumb|The "mad evil scientist" is a staple character in Hollywood productions, like the portrayal by Jim Parsons of Sheldon in the Big Bang Theory TV-show]]
Refers to an argument common among scientists, which argument is to reject the existence of subjectively identified things, because subjectively identified things cannot be objectively measured.

The argument competes objectivity against subjectivity, resulting in the rejection of all emotions, and pseudoscientific knowledge of good and evil.

In scientism the definition of choosing is redefind to mean "calculating an optimum" or "sorting out the best result". Instead of the focus being on the spirit in which a decision is made, the focus is on the "best" result of a decision.

The acceptance of scientism leads to the "mad evil scientist pathology", which is often caricatured in Hollywood productions involving scientists as characters.

==Biblical interpretation==

The biblical doctrine outlined in the book of Genesis, during the creation of the world explains the importance of choosing in regards to morality. The original parents of mankind, [[Adam]] and [[Eve]] as real historical persons, made the first human choice; the choice between the will of God which they were influenced by since their creation, and their own will as influenced by Satan. Both original and separate influences offer a distinct alternative that persons decide to follow based on their free will, in relation to experience filtered through their [[sensory system]], which is analyzed by [[logic]] within the [[mind]], which offers up alternatives for the human spirit to decide. The free will exercised by Adam and Eve severed the covenant with God by acting outside of His will. This act of free will had the consequence of a generational curse upon the rest of mankind, fundamentally altering life as they (Adam and Eve) knew it because of their [[sin]]. The [[original sin]] against the will and therefore nature of God physically and spiritually had a sort of epigenetic affect on all of biology, introducing death and the struggle and survival that comes with it.<ref>[http://normangeisler.net/articles/theology/2010-EpigeneticsSolvesTheologicalProblems.htm Epigenetics Offers New Solution to Some Long-Standing Theological Problems: Inherited Sin, Christ’s Sinlessness, and Generational Curses Can be Explained] By Norman L. Geisler, 2010</ref> By eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil Adam and Eve less felt what is good and bad, instead they became more emotionless and calculating in determining their course of action. Calculating in terms of survival and death.

{{quote|1Now the serpent was more crafty than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said to the woman, "Indeed, has God said, 'You shall not eat from any tree of the garden'?" 2The woman said to the serpent, "From the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat; 3but from the fruit of the tree which is in the middle of the garden, God has said, 'You shall not eat from it or touch it, or you will die.'" 4The serpent said to the woman, "You surely will not die! 5"For God knows that in the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil." 6When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was desirable to make one wise, she took from its fruit and ate; and she gave also to her husband with her, and he ate.|book=Genesis|chap=3|verses=1-6}}

==Scientific evidence==

The problem in evidencing free will is to empirically establish the existence of alternatives '''not''' chosen. In 2006 a team of researchers at the University of Illinois managed to search a database without running the search algorithm, instead exploiting the information on the alternative state that the algorithm '''could have''' run to infer the search result. <ref> http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v439/n7079/extref/nature04523-s1.pdf </ref>

==Politics and Ideology==
[[File:CharlesDarwin.jpg‎|right|thumb|Charles Darwin wrote that he could measure love]]
[[File:Cutout_expression_of_emotion_in_man_and_animals.JPG|right|thumb|Photographic evidence used by Darwin for his theory on equating emotions with physical manifestations]]
[[File:Haeckel.jpg‎|right|thumb|Ernst Haeckel wrote that Jesus was loving, as a matter of pseudoscientific fact]]
[[File:Stalin-140508_27880t.jpg‎|right|thumb|Josef Stalin did not know what making a decision meant]]
[[File:Hitler.jpg|right|thumb|Adolf Hitler used nazi ideology to surpress his free will]]

Theories about free will in which the agency of decisions is treated as a matter of subjective opinion and faith are strongly related to ideological doctrines where democracy is central. Theories about free will which treat agency as a matter of objective fact instead, are strongly related to ideological and political doctrines in which freedom plays a subordinate role, like Nazism, Communism, Atheism and Liberalism.

Social darwinist doctrines about the heritable character of people, based on the theory of natural selection, greatly influenced intellectual and political climate of opinion in the past, and continues to do so at present. Starting from Darwin's theory of natural selection evolutionists began a massive onslaught against all knowledge in terms of freedom (alternatives and decision), replacing it with knowledge in terms of force (cause and effect). Theories about people deciding in freedom were replaced with theories about people being forced by genes and environment. Agents of the human spirit, such as love and hate, were treated as a mattter of fact, instead of as a matter of opinion.

Charles Darwin wrote a book called "The expression of emotions in man and animals.", in which he explained all emotions in terms of a darwinian struggle for survival, and advanced a pseudoscience of measuring emotions using facial measurements. <ref> http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F1142&viewtype=text </ref>

In the early part of the 20th century the influential darwinist Ernst Haeckel wrote about the “loving” agency of Jesus Christ as exhibiting an “Aryan” blood character.<ref>http://www.pantheism.net/paul/haekrace.htm Jesus' noble personality was not semitic, but "more characteristic of the higher Aryan race"</ref>Haeckel was not a Christian but an atheist, he treated the love of Christ as a matter of scientific fact, not a matter of faith. Social darwinism is considered the main ideological input in the rise of Nazism, which led to the holocaust. Specifically the denial of free will in Nazism is considered it's [http://www.amazon.com/Nazi-Germany-A-New-History/dp/0826409067 most lethal aspect]. Because of the influence of social darwinism on Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin they largely did not even know what it meant to make a decision, which willful ignorance effectively sabotaged their conscience.

China is currentely drifting towards Social darwinism. <ref>{{cite web|last=Dikötter|first=Frank|title=Throw-Away Babies
|url=http://www.frankdikotter.com/start-reading/throw-away-babies.html|publisher=Times Literary Supplement,|quote=Whether the regulation of sexuality has replaced ideological control as the main tool of repression in the People's Republic is an important question which is open to debate. It is beyond question, however, that the signs of a drift towards an authoritarian form of government guided by biological imperatives have been accumulating in China for some time, and anybody with a serious interest in that country and its people should consider the implications of that drift carefully.}}</ref> The overwhelming majority of scientists in the world at present support some form of social darwinism, where agency is treated as a matter of objective fact, and moral imperatives are derived in a context of natural selection theory.

==Psychology==

Pscyhological research has found that disbelief in free will is related to increased agression and reduced helpfulness. <ref>http://psp.sagepub.com/content/35/2/260</ref>

Inducing disbelief in free will has been found to alter brain states related to preconscious motor preparation <ref> http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/5/613.abstract</ref>

Belief in free will predicts better job performance.<ref>http://spp.sagepub.com/content/1/1/43.abstract</ref>

==Biological function of free will==

Free will of organisms appears to contribute to their survival in many ways. The variation in use of muscles caused by free will reduces wear and tear of them. Search algorithms for food are more optimal when based on freedom. Free will also provides predators with surprise in attack, and prey with unpredictability in escape.

DNA consists of chosen alternatives C,A,T and G. When looking at any particular string of DNA one should consider the alternatives that could have been chosen instead. DNA from one generation to the next is constructed based on informed and reasoned choices. <ref>{{cite web|last=Taborsky|first=Edwina|title=Biological Organisms as Semiosic Systems: the importance of strong and weak
anticipation|url=http://ebookbrowse.com/gdoc.php?id=180133786&url=0d3490b8c6d0e279f0b2fef473f4a08a |publisher=Signs vol. 2: pp. 146-187, 2008 ISSN: 1902-8822|quote=a framework that rejects anticipation and is instead based around a primary random or uninformed mutation of a single model supported by a post hoc ‘natural selection’ of that model – is an inadequate analysis. The semiosic biological system is not a random or mechanical process but an informed, reasoned and selfcontrolled process. pp 161}}</ref> The DNA is kept in a state of indecision, at which point the alternative states C, A, T, and G present themselves, and the organization of DNA as a whole is chosen.

==Creation, Creatio ex nihilo==

In a choice information is created, namely the information which way the choice turns out. The information is new in the universe, and therefore the information is derived from nothing. Commonly this principle is referred to with the latin phrase "Creatio ex nihilo". This nothing where the information derives from is objectively measurable. The measurements and calculations about where the information derives from simply turn out zero for position, mass, velocity, and so on. For instance the noise in a random number generator, which is used for encrypting data so that it remains secret, is derived from the socalled quantum mechanical zeropoint.<ref>http://www.tested.com/science/math/43887-noise-from-nothingness-the-quantum-random-number-generator/</ref> When scientists look for the origin of a thing, then they always find nothing at the origin, and not a creator. The creator can only be found by deciding about the agency of the decisions found.

==Other views==

Non creationist views on free will treat the agency of a decision as a matter of objective fact.The overwhelming majority of scientists currently support a socalled compatibilist or determinist position on free will, and thereby the majority of scientists currently provide no room for subjective opinion or faith.

===Compatibilism===
This doctrine redefines the meaning of all words associated to free will, to make them use a logic of force. For example darwinian philosopher Daniel Dennett regards a thermostat as an agent which chooses, eventhough he says that in it's workings the thermostat is completely forced. <ref>{{cite web|last=Torley|first=Vincent|title=Anatomy of a minimal mind|url=http://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/Anatomy.pdf|publisher=philosophy department University of Melbourne|quote=Dennett, on the other hand, regards the attribution of intentionality to thermostats as more than metaphorical: he argues that if we are to explain what all thermostats have in common, we “have to rise to … a level that invokes belief-talk and desire-talk or … semantic information-talk and goal-registration-talk 1995a.}}</ref>

===Dualism of fantasy and reality===
This doctrine replaces the dualism of spiritual and material, with a dualism of fantasy and reality. The objects in fantasy are contrasted with objects in the external world, where objects in fantasy are regarded as not being real. For example Descartes used the latin phrase "cogito ergo sum", which means "I think therefore I am." To Descartes this meant a demonstration of the objective matter of fact of his spiritual existence as the owner of his choices. According to the logic of Ockham, this phrase only means a subjective assertion of purpose. Like a baker might say, "I bake therefore I am, baking is my purpose.", "I think, therefore I am, thinking is my purpose." Despite hat there is a glaring inconsistency in that objects in fantasy are regarded as a matter of fact, yet they are regarded as not real, this is still an accurate representation of what these dualists believe. The distinction between gods and fantasy figures is lost with this kind of dualism, leading to widespread ridicule of religion by people believing in this doctrine, accusing religious people of believing in fantasy figures.

===Determinism===
This doctrine advances an illusion of free will. Intellectually determinists deny free will is real, but in daily life they affirm it's existence on a practical basis as an illusion.

==External Links==
* [http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/professors-coyne-and-miller-clash-on-free-will/ Professors Coyne and Miller clash on free will] October 4, 2011
* [http://www.rfmedia.org/RF_audio_video/RF_podcast/Questions_Molinism_Compatibilism_Free_Will.mp3 Questions on Molinism, Compatibilism and Free Will] Podcast by William Lane Craig.

==See Also==
* Randomness
* Probability

==References==
<references/>

[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Christian Theology]]

User talk:Syamsu

2013-03-16T03:43:52Z

Syamsu: /* Free will article copy */

Free will

2013-03-16T03:20:59Z

Syamsu:

User talk:Syamsu

2010-02-09T16:08:15Z

Syamsu:

User talk:Syamsu/Anticipation

2010-02-09T14:55:45Z

Syamsu:

'''Anticipation''' is the concept that an object is governed by deciding from the alternatives in it's future.

Anticipation and decision has the opposite time principle from cause and effect. Where in cause and effect the past determines the present, with anticipation and decision it is the future that determines the present.

In common practical use anticipation applies to the ability of a thing to turn out one way or another through choice. The alternatives are in the future in respect to the decider. What does the job of deciding can only be known subjectively and is commonly referred to as spiritual. The spiritual is understood to be things like "love", "hate" etc. Things which are known to exist by deciding that they are there, not by measuring them.

There is a distinction between alternatives that are calculated with a predefined goal, and alternatives that exist in the future. For example when a chesscomputer calculates alternatives for the best move, then the chesscomputer is forced to do the best move without any possibility of realizing an alternative, and therefore it cannot choose. In science these two different principles are referred to as "weak anticipation" (calculating alternatives), and "strong anticipation" (having alternatives in the future) [http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2000AIPC..517....3D D. Dubois 2000]).

==religion==
The common use of anticipative principles in religion is the choice of God to create the universe, the final judgement of God between heaven and hell, and the choice of people to believe in God or not (faith).

==science==
Most all scientists only use the concepts of "weak" anticipation, and deny that there are alternatives in the future (see [http://www.human-nature.com/nibbs/03/dcdennett.html Daniel Dennett]). However, in 2006 American scientists demonstrated ( [http://blogs.zdnet.com/emergingtech/?p=170 Hosten & Kwiat] 2006) that they could search a database of 4 elements by only possibly running a search algorithm. Meaning a decision was made to run the algorithm or not, and the decision turned out that the algorithm didn't run.

User talk:Syamsu

2010-02-09T14:51:09Z

Syamsu:

User talk:Syamsu

2010-02-09T14:50:50Z

Syamsu:

Talk:Free will

2010-02-09T11:37:10Z

Syamsu:

It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.

Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.

If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.

''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

:This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

::Knowing all possible outcomes does not make a being omniscient - I know all possible outcomes of a dice-roll, but I am not omniscient. Given time and inclination, I could work out all possible results to a general election, but I will still not be omniscient. No matter how complex a system, no matter how many possible outcomes exist in potentia, knowing all the possibilities does not make a being omniscient, merely clever. Omniscience would require that the being know ''which'' of the possible outcomes will occur, bringing us right back to my original point. (I like your rewrite of the article, by the way)--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:28, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

:::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible.
:::Thank you for the compliment on the edit, I'm of the opinion that it is better to note where the debate is than pretend knowledge of the truth.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
::::That is much clearer, and a response needs much more thought on my part, not something I will have time to do for at least a week or two.--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:56, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
:::::No hurry, I have this page on my watchlist so when you get a chance to respond I will see it.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:59, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

==Angels and animals==

Removed:
*<s>Within a totally naturalistic system, freewill does not exist.</s>
*In the Christian faith it is believed that humans were created with freewill so that they would chose to worship God, <s>unlike angels who were created without the choice to worship God</s>.

#I don't understand the reference to [[naturalism]]. Are you saying that '''your''' actions are all determined by physical law, L.T.?
#Which denomination says that angels are incapable of making choices? Haven't you read Jude 1:6-7? (It mentions angels who sinned, and sin is a [[choice]].) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 14:33, 27 July 2007 (EDT)

==Section on morality==
This article on free will seems quite brief so I've added a section here. It's not fantastically well written and it's a bit waffly but hopefully it'll do until it can be expanded, either by my or another person.[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 10:51, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
: I like the first sentence, bu I find the rest confusing. It seems to be starting with the assumption that determinism is the opposite of free will, then redefines free will to be determinism! This means that it's not actually the opposite after all, but simply another name for the same thing. [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 11:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
:: Yeah sorry, I should've made that clearer but I hoped I could leave it a little implicit. Essentially Hume draws a distinction between two kinds of freedom - freedom of action and freedom of will. The former is the freedom to do as you choose (i.e. it would be compromised if you were in jail or tied up or something), and the latter is the freedom to determine your own will. Hume says that confusion between these two terms is at the root of many discussions of free will, since often people use free will to mean the latter thing when in reality it doesn't make much sense - either things are determined or they are random (because of cause and effect). Is that at all clear? --[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 11:58, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
::Re-reading myself I really don't think it is. When people talk about lack of free will negating morality, they mean lack of freedom of will (as opposed to of action). Hume says that lack of freedom of will results in randomness, because thought processes are subject to the same laws of cause and effect as any other event. So an apple falling is caused by gravity or something else, and if its caused by nothing then the occurrence must be random; and the same with decisions, which are caused by a variety of external stimuli.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 12:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

:::Your addition and your writing here are not necessarily clear. If you wish to break up the article into two sections, then do so showing clearly that Hume is using his own definition of free will to make his point. In the absense of free will it is obvious that there is no blame for actions as free will would be a necessary precursor for free action. You also seem to be confused that lack of free will does not equal random. Indeed much of what occurs is structured and orderly; there is just no will involved. In nature an apple falling from a tree does so due to gravity - and will do so each and every time unless some other outside stimulus intervenes. The apple has no free action to suddenly fall up, nor does it have a free will to consider that. It reacts based upon the bio-chemical nature of its makeup. Humans are no different when considered from this same naturalistic setting. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 15:35, 15 September 2008 (EDT)

::::I agree that my writing is not clear. I'm afraid you misunderstand me entirely. What I mean by 'freedom of will' above is the idea that people can engage in thought which is essentially ''uncaused'', since if thought has a cause (like the apple falling from the tree) it's not 'free', in the same way the apple is not 'free' to fall upwards. Hume points out that logically if thoughts are uncaused then they must be random, which is obviously a problem for libertarians. This is sometimes referred to as the 'randomness problem'.

::::Anyway I agree that my contribution is lacking as it is, and when I have a bit of free time on my hands I'll re-write it substantially. Thanks for the feedback.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 16:31, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::: I'm questioning (your explanation of) Hume's view, rather than the content of the article, but without understanding the view better, I'm limited in how much I can do to fix the wording.
::::: By way of analogy, diseases can be (a) genetic/hereditary, (b) non-genetic/non-hereditary, or (c) genetically-''influenced'', but not genetically-''determined''. Hume's argument seems to be that if it's not "caused" (determined), it is ''uncaused'' (random). But what about the will being ''influenced'' by causes, but not ''determined'' by them? This would make it non-random.
::::: Further, Hume's argument appears to be materialistic, i.e. not allowing for a non-materialistic, or perhaps ''spiritual'' component.
::::: Comments?
::::: [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 22:49, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::::With regard to causation - there's no logical reason that things could not be only ''influenced'' by causes rather than entirely determined by them. However, you are left having to explain what it is providing the rest of the event (the part of the disease which is not genetically influenced). If it's randomness, then you are still left with the determined/random problem. If it is some third possibility, you would have to explain what this could be and how it would work.
::::::I think it's correct to say that Hume's approach is materialistic, although on a logical rather than ideological basis. What form would a 'spiritual component' take?
::::::Thanks by the way for the reply and for the continued discussion - it helps to sort out exactly what my arguments are to have them questioned coherently like that.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 08:38, 19 September 2008 (EDT)
::::::P.S. I am not completely positive what Hume's precise rebuttal would be to your arguments, I'm just putting forward my view since I agree with Hume. I am however reasonably confident that I've expressed his view accurately.

:::::::I think you need to rewrite your section soon. I'm uncomfortable with having an article that currently reads in a form that is misleading and/or confusing.

:::::::The difficulty that Hume faced, and those since his time, is how to allow for free will in a totally naturalistic system. I find they often take the conclusion (we have free will) and try to force it backwards to fit in a way that presumes it must fit when it doesn't. It is also common today for naturalists to simply state that we have no free will, a positition that is certainly more sound based on the naturalistic evidence, but doesn't appear to match what we see in reality. Hume also had the advantage of ignorance, having only the barest knowledge of the naturalistic system that has been fleshed out in much greater detail today. One can speculate a role for 'randomness' back then that just isn't seen in our knowledge of naturalistic functions today. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 12:54, 19 September 2008 (EDT)

(unindent) I'm jumping in here, because Hume seems to have said that either our decisions - such as mine just now to take issue with the way the article is going - are either (1) caused by external stimuli or (2) completely random. But this is the fallacy of the [[excluded middle]]. No one '''causes''' me to decide a certain way. Between stimulus and response there is plenty of time for me to exercise [[agency (philosophy)]], i.e., to "[[Be proactive]]" as Stephen Covey would say.

The error stems from the materialistic assumption that only physical forces or physical phenomena can be causes. But an angel just appeared beside me and said, "That is balderdash, my good man!" --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 13:15, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Ed, you misunderstand Hume's argument. This particular error is quite common, as elsewhere Hume argues against, e.g., the possibility of miraculous events. That said: Hume is not a physicalist in the modern sense used by philosophers of mind. The dichotomy is this: Either some event is caused or it is not. This isn't a false dilemma (what I think you mean by "fallacy of the excluded middle"; the excluded middle is just the Aristotelian term for the claim "either P is true or it is false") -- it is, as far as I at least can tell, a tautology. This event is what we'll call a "choice". Now, if the choice is caused, it is determined, because for P to cause Q, if P were to happen, Q must follow (this is basic Lewisian counterfactual causation). That's what "caused" means. The other option is, of course, that the event is uncaused. But for something to be uncaused is for it to be random.

:The only way to attack Hume here is on the nature of causation. You claim, without support, that Hume's problem is a materialist one, but this is just not the case. Even if what "causes" our choices is our willing, if there's a genuine causal relationship, there's no freedom in our willing. It's a nasty little problem indeed. The best way out is probably a quasi-Aristotelian move to posit that each free individual is an uncaused causer, but there are some severe problems there that I'm sure you can see. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 18:47, 8 December 2008 (EST)

::I don't think I misunderstood. I simply disagree with the idea that '''your choices are caused'''. Nothing "causes" you to choose to come to CP and start an argument about philosophy. Rather, you '''decide''' to do it. The essence of free will (and what links it to aspects of ethics such as responsibility) is your ability to make a choice. If you can't choose - if you are nothing more than an automaton, then you are not a moral agent at all. Robots aren't convicted of crimes, or given prizes. No one praises a computer that wins a chess tournament; the computer programmer gets the prize. A dog, trained to attack, would not be convicted of assault: rather, the person who made the dog attack is charged.

::The error lies in the false dichotomy between "caused choices" and "random choices". It is only robots and dogs who make caused choices. I hold you morally and ethically responsible for every edit you make on this website. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:39, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: Right. But now you're confusing "choice" with "event". Remember that every '''decision''' is an event, and, as such, is either caused or uncaused. You're claiming that decisions are uncaused. OK. But if decisions are uncaused, how are they anything other than random? If they're truly uncaused, that is, our '''reasons''' have nothing to do with how they're made, because then reasons would have something to do with the production of decisions, which are uncaused events; and this is clearly an absurdity. Morality demands more than just doing the right thing! It demands that we do the right thing ''for the right reasons''. This is why Hume says that determinism is necessary for moral action. If there is no causal relationship between reasons and actions, then no moral action is possible, since morality depends on reason. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::*I have spent the bulk of my waking life (at least when I'm not sleeping on the job! ;-) creating rules for computers to follow. I '''cause''' computers to make decisions based on [[if then else]] logic. All their choices are caused, and none are random. But God is not a computer programmer, and I am not some science fiction experiment or fantasy (see [[TRON]]). And neither are you. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:52, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: I fail to see the relevance of this comment. Of course we're not computer programs. But that doesn't mean that there's no problem of freedom... ? [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

:: I would just like to comment and say that this is the first page I've seen with a [citation needed] superscript anywhere on the page, though I've seen tons of spots that need them - Major props to the main contributors of this page.
::[[User:LordNelsonRepub|LordNelsonRepub]]

==Practical use of free will==
In my opinion the emphasis should be on the practical use of free will. To make clear the logic that people use when they talk in terms of choosing in daily life, but not focus on common beliefs about free will that people might have.

:Sir, you may want to avoid writing these huge "walls of text" in the future. People are less likely to read these huge essays on talk pages than simple, straightforward statements. [[User:DMorris|DMorris]] 12:09, 8 February 2010 (EST)

:: I made it much less --[[User:Syamsu|Syamsu]] 06:37, 9 February 2010 (EST)

Talk:Free will

2010-02-09T11:36:21Z

Syamsu:

It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.

Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.

If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.

''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

:This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

::Knowing all possible outcomes does not make a being omniscient - I know all possible outcomes of a dice-roll, but I am not omniscient. Given time and inclination, I could work out all possible results to a general election, but I will still not be omniscient. No matter how complex a system, no matter how many possible outcomes exist in potentia, knowing all the possibilities does not make a being omniscient, merely clever. Omniscience would require that the being know ''which'' of the possible outcomes will occur, bringing us right back to my original point. (I like your rewrite of the article, by the way)--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:28, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

:::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible.
:::Thank you for the compliment on the edit, I'm of the opinion that it is better to note where the debate is than pretend knowledge of the truth.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
::::That is much clearer, and a response needs much more thought on my part, not something I will have time to do for at least a week or two.--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:56, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
:::::No hurry, I have this page on my watchlist so when you get a chance to respond I will see it.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:59, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

==Angels and animals==

Removed:
*<s>Within a totally naturalistic system, freewill does not exist.</s>
*In the Christian faith it is believed that humans were created with freewill so that they would chose to worship God, <s>unlike angels who were created without the choice to worship God</s>.

#I don't understand the reference to [[naturalism]]. Are you saying that '''your''' actions are all determined by physical law, L.T.?
#Which denomination says that angels are incapable of making choices? Haven't you read Jude 1:6-7? (It mentions angels who sinned, and sin is a [[choice]].) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 14:33, 27 July 2007 (EDT)

==Section on morality==
This article on free will seems quite brief so I've added a section here. It's not fantastically well written and it's a bit waffly but hopefully it'll do until it can be expanded, either by my or another person.[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 10:51, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
: I like the first sentence, bu I find the rest confusing. It seems to be starting with the assumption that determinism is the opposite of free will, then redefines free will to be determinism! This means that it's not actually the opposite after all, but simply another name for the same thing. [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 11:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
:: Yeah sorry, I should've made that clearer but I hoped I could leave it a little implicit. Essentially Hume draws a distinction between two kinds of freedom - freedom of action and freedom of will. The former is the freedom to do as you choose (i.e. it would be compromised if you were in jail or tied up or something), and the latter is the freedom to determine your own will. Hume says that confusion between these two terms is at the root of many discussions of free will, since often people use free will to mean the latter thing when in reality it doesn't make much sense - either things are determined or they are random (because of cause and effect). Is that at all clear? --[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 11:58, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
::Re-reading myself I really don't think it is. When people talk about lack of free will negating morality, they mean lack of freedom of will (as opposed to of action). Hume says that lack of freedom of will results in randomness, because thought processes are subject to the same laws of cause and effect as any other event. So an apple falling is caused by gravity or something else, and if its caused by nothing then the occurrence must be random; and the same with decisions, which are caused by a variety of external stimuli.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 12:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

:::Your addition and your writing here are not necessarily clear. If you wish to break up the article into two sections, then do so showing clearly that Hume is using his own definition of free will to make his point. In the absense of free will it is obvious that there is no blame for actions as free will would be a necessary precursor for free action. You also seem to be confused that lack of free will does not equal random. Indeed much of what occurs is structured and orderly; there is just no will involved. In nature an apple falling from a tree does so due to gravity - and will do so each and every time unless some other outside stimulus intervenes. The apple has no free action to suddenly fall up, nor does it have a free will to consider that. It reacts based upon the bio-chemical nature of its makeup. Humans are no different when considered from this same naturalistic setting. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 15:35, 15 September 2008 (EDT)

::::I agree that my writing is not clear. I'm afraid you misunderstand me entirely. What I mean by 'freedom of will' above is the idea that people can engage in thought which is essentially ''uncaused'', since if thought has a cause (like the apple falling from the tree) it's not 'free', in the same way the apple is not 'free' to fall upwards. Hume points out that logically if thoughts are uncaused then they must be random, which is obviously a problem for libertarians. This is sometimes referred to as the 'randomness problem'.

::::Anyway I agree that my contribution is lacking as it is, and when I have a bit of free time on my hands I'll re-write it substantially. Thanks for the feedback.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 16:31, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::: I'm questioning (your explanation of) Hume's view, rather than the content of the article, but without understanding the view better, I'm limited in how much I can do to fix the wording.
::::: By way of analogy, diseases can be (a) genetic/hereditary, (b) non-genetic/non-hereditary, or (c) genetically-''influenced'', but not genetically-''determined''. Hume's argument seems to be that if it's not "caused" (determined), it is ''uncaused'' (random). But what about the will being ''influenced'' by causes, but not ''determined'' by them? This would make it non-random.
::::: Further, Hume's argument appears to be materialistic, i.e. not allowing for a non-materialistic, or perhaps ''spiritual'' component.
::::: Comments?
::::: [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 22:49, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::::With regard to causation - there's no logical reason that things could not be only ''influenced'' by causes rather than entirely determined by them. However, you are left having to explain what it is providing the rest of the event (the part of the disease which is not genetically influenced). If it's randomness, then you are still left with the determined/random problem. If it is some third possibility, you would have to explain what this could be and how it would work.
::::::I think it's correct to say that Hume's approach is materialistic, although on a logical rather than ideological basis. What form would a 'spiritual component' take?
::::::Thanks by the way for the reply and for the continued discussion - it helps to sort out exactly what my arguments are to have them questioned coherently like that.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 08:38, 19 September 2008 (EDT)
::::::P.S. I am not completely positive what Hume's precise rebuttal would be to your arguments, I'm just putting forward my view since I agree with Hume. I am however reasonably confident that I've expressed his view accurately.

:::::::I think you need to rewrite your section soon. I'm uncomfortable with having an article that currently reads in a form that is misleading and/or confusing.

:::::::The difficulty that Hume faced, and those since his time, is how to allow for free will in a totally naturalistic system. I find they often take the conclusion (we have free will) and try to force it backwards to fit in a way that presumes it must fit when it doesn't. It is also common today for naturalists to simply state that we have no free will, a positition that is certainly more sound based on the naturalistic evidence, but doesn't appear to match what we see in reality. Hume also had the advantage of ignorance, having only the barest knowledge of the naturalistic system that has been fleshed out in much greater detail today. One can speculate a role for 'randomness' back then that just isn't seen in our knowledge of naturalistic functions today. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 12:54, 19 September 2008 (EDT)

(unindent) I'm jumping in here, because Hume seems to have said that either our decisions - such as mine just now to take issue with the way the article is going - are either (1) caused by external stimuli or (2) completely random. But this is the fallacy of the [[excluded middle]]. No one '''causes''' me to decide a certain way. Between stimulus and response there is plenty of time for me to exercise [[agency (philosophy)]], i.e., to "[[Be proactive]]" as Stephen Covey would say.

The error stems from the materialistic assumption that only physical forces or physical phenomena can be causes. But an angel just appeared beside me and said, "That is balderdash, my good man!" --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 13:15, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Ed, you misunderstand Hume's argument. This particular error is quite common, as elsewhere Hume argues against, e.g., the possibility of miraculous events. That said: Hume is not a physicalist in the modern sense used by philosophers of mind. The dichotomy is this: Either some event is caused or it is not. This isn't a false dilemma (what I think you mean by "fallacy of the excluded middle"; the excluded middle is just the Aristotelian term for the claim "either P is true or it is false") -- it is, as far as I at least can tell, a tautology. This event is what we'll call a "choice". Now, if the choice is caused, it is determined, because for P to cause Q, if P were to happen, Q must follow (this is basic Lewisian counterfactual causation). That's what "caused" means. The other option is, of course, that the event is uncaused. But for something to be uncaused is for it to be random.

:The only way to attack Hume here is on the nature of causation. You claim, without support, that Hume's problem is a materialist one, but this is just not the case. Even if what "causes" our choices is our willing, if there's a genuine causal relationship, there's no freedom in our willing. It's a nasty little problem indeed. The best way out is probably a quasi-Aristotelian move to posit that each free individual is an uncaused causer, but there are some severe problems there that I'm sure you can see. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 18:47, 8 December 2008 (EST)

::I don't think I misunderstood. I simply disagree with the idea that '''your choices are caused'''. Nothing "causes" you to choose to come to CP and start an argument about philosophy. Rather, you '''decide''' to do it. The essence of free will (and what links it to aspects of ethics such as responsibility) is your ability to make a choice. If you can't choose - if you are nothing more than an automaton, then you are not a moral agent at all. Robots aren't convicted of crimes, or given prizes. No one praises a computer that wins a chess tournament; the computer programmer gets the prize. A dog, trained to attack, would not be convicted of assault: rather, the person who made the dog attack is charged.

::The error lies in the false dichotomy between "caused choices" and "random choices". It is only robots and dogs who make caused choices. I hold you morally and ethically responsible for every edit you make on this website. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:39, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: Right. But now you're confusing "choice" with "event". Remember that every '''decision''' is an event, and, as such, is either caused or uncaused. You're claiming that decisions are uncaused. OK. But if decisions are uncaused, how are they anything other than random? If they're truly uncaused, that is, our '''reasons''' have nothing to do with how they're made, because then reasons would have something to do with the production of decisions, which are uncaused events; and this is clearly an absurdity. Morality demands more than just doing the right thing! It demands that we do the right thing ''for the right reasons''. This is why Hume says that determinism is necessary for moral action. If there is no causal relationship between reasons and actions, then no moral action is possible, since morality depends on reason. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::*I have spent the bulk of my waking life (at least when I'm not sleeping on the job! ;-) creating rules for computers to follow. I '''cause''' computers to make decisions based on [[if then else]] logic. All their choices are caused, and none are random. But God is not a computer programmer, and I am not some science fiction experiment or fantasy (see [[TRON]]). And neither are you. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:52, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: I fail to see the relevance of this comment. Of course we're not computer programs. But that doesn't mean that there's no problem of freedom... ? [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

:: I would just like to comment and say that this is the first page I've seen with a [citation needed] superscript anywhere on the page, though I've seen tons of spots that need them - Major props to the main contributors of this page.
::[[User:LordNelsonRepub|LordNelsonRepub]]

==Practical use of free will==
In my opinion the emphasis should be on the practical use of free will. To make clear the logic that people use when they talk in terms of choosing in daily life, but not focus on common beliefs about free will that people might have.

:Sir, you may want to avoid writing these huge "walls of text" in the future. People are less likely to read these huge essays on talk pages than simple, straightforward statements. [[User:DMorris|DMorris]] 12:09, 8 February 2010 (EST)

:: I made it much less--[[User:Syamsu|Syamsu]] 18:13, 8 February 2010 (EST)

User talk:Syamsu

2010-02-09T11:34:24Z

Syamsu:

Is that your real name? It sounds like a pseudonym. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 08:53, 8 February 2010 (EST)

My given name at birth is Nando Ronteltap, but my name given to me when I became a muslim is Mohammad Nur Syamsu.

==Talk Page Edits==

While your opinion is valid regardless of how many edits you have here, you will find we accord it more weight depending on your contributions. It is not wise to come here and immediately begin discussing policy or major changes to existing pages, as little weight will be given to these suggestions and you may eventually find yourself in violation of 90/10. Start a new article, or expand an existing one, before entering into discussions on article content. [[User:JacobB|JacobB]] 18:19, 8 February 2010 (EST)

==anticipation==
I put it under the subject anticipation instead. Anticipation is currently the more scientific overall-term used to discuss these things, like in a paper about anticipation free will of people is discussed as one example of anticipation. I do put some effort into finding out what the logic in practical common use is. So I make some effort not to make this just my personal opinion.

User talk:Syamsu/Anticipation

2010-02-09T10:28:46Z

Syamsu: Created page with ''''Anticipation''' is the concept that an object is governed by deciding from the alternatives in it's future. Anticipation and decision has the opposite time principle from c...'

'''Anticipation''' is the concept that an object is governed by deciding from the alternatives in it's future.

Anticipation and decision has the opposite time principle from cause and effect. Where in cause and effect the past determines the present, with anticipation and decision it is the future that determines the present.

In common practical use anticipation applies to the ability of a thing to turn out one way or another through choice. The alternatives are in the future in respect to the decider. What does the job of deciding can only be known subjectively and is commonly referred to as spiritual. The spiritual is understood to be things like "love", "hate" etc. Things which are known to exist by deciding that they are there, not by measuring them.

There is a distinction between alternatives that are calculated with a predefined goal, and alternatives that exist in the future. For example when a chesscomputer calculates alternatives for the best move, then the chesscomputer is forced to do the best move without any possible of realizing an alternative, and therefore it cannot choose. In science these two different principles are referred to as "weak anticipation" (calculating alternatives), and "strong anticipation" (having alternatives in the future) [http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2000AIPC..517....3D D. Dubois 2000]).

==religion==
The common use of anticipative principles in religion is the choice of God to create the universe, the final judgement of God between heaven and hell, and the choice of people to believe in God or not (faith).

==science==
Most all scientists only use the concepts of "weak" anticipation, and deny that there are alternatives in the future (see [http://http://www.human-nature.com/nibbs/03/dcdennett.html Daniel Dennett]). However, in 2006 American scientists demonstrated ( [http://http://blogs.zdnet.com/emergingtech/?p=170 Hosten & Kwiat] 2006) that they could search a database of 4 elements by only possibly running a search algorithm. Meaning a decision was made to run the algorithm or not, and the decision turned out that the algorithm didn't run.

Talk:Free will

2010-02-08T23:13:29Z

Syamsu:

It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.

Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.

If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.

''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

:This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

::Knowing all possible outcomes does not make a being omniscient - I know all possible outcomes of a dice-roll, but I am not omniscient. Given time and inclination, I could work out all possible results to a general election, but I will still not be omniscient. No matter how complex a system, no matter how many possible outcomes exist in potentia, knowing all the possibilities does not make a being omniscient, merely clever. Omniscience would require that the being know ''which'' of the possible outcomes will occur, bringing us right back to my original point. (I like your rewrite of the article, by the way)--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:28, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

:::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible.
:::Thank you for the compliment on the edit, I'm of the opinion that it is better to note where the debate is than pretend knowledge of the truth.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
::::That is much clearer, and a response needs much more thought on my part, not something I will have time to do for at least a week or two.--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:56, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
:::::No hurry, I have this page on my watchlist so when you get a chance to respond I will see it.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:59, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

==Angels and animals==

Removed:
*<s>Within a totally naturalistic system, freewill does not exist.</s>
*In the Christian faith it is believed that humans were created with freewill so that they would chose to worship God, <s>unlike angels who were created without the choice to worship God</s>.

#I don't understand the reference to [[naturalism]]. Are you saying that '''your''' actions are all determined by physical law, L.T.?
#Which denomination says that angels are incapable of making choices? Haven't you read Jude 1:6-7? (It mentions angels who sinned, and sin is a [[choice]].) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 14:33, 27 July 2007 (EDT)

==Section on morality==
This article on free will seems quite brief so I've added a section here. It's not fantastically well written and it's a bit waffly but hopefully it'll do until it can be expanded, either by my or another person.[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 10:51, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
: I like the first sentence, bu I find the rest confusing. It seems to be starting with the assumption that determinism is the opposite of free will, then redefines free will to be determinism! This means that it's not actually the opposite after all, but simply another name for the same thing. [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 11:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
:: Yeah sorry, I should've made that clearer but I hoped I could leave it a little implicit. Essentially Hume draws a distinction between two kinds of freedom - freedom of action and freedom of will. The former is the freedom to do as you choose (i.e. it would be compromised if you were in jail or tied up or something), and the latter is the freedom to determine your own will. Hume says that confusion between these two terms is at the root of many discussions of free will, since often people use free will to mean the latter thing when in reality it doesn't make much sense - either things are determined or they are random (because of cause and effect). Is that at all clear? --[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 11:58, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
::Re-reading myself I really don't think it is. When people talk about lack of free will negating morality, they mean lack of freedom of will (as opposed to of action). Hume says that lack of freedom of will results in randomness, because thought processes are subject to the same laws of cause and effect as any other event. So an apple falling is caused by gravity or something else, and if its caused by nothing then the occurrence must be random; and the same with decisions, which are caused by a variety of external stimuli.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 12:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

:::Your addition and your writing here are not necessarily clear. If you wish to break up the article into two sections, then do so showing clearly that Hume is using his own definition of free will to make his point. In the absense of free will it is obvious that there is no blame for actions as free will would be a necessary precursor for free action. You also seem to be confused that lack of free will does not equal random. Indeed much of what occurs is structured and orderly; there is just no will involved. In nature an apple falling from a tree does so due to gravity - and will do so each and every time unless some other outside stimulus intervenes. The apple has no free action to suddenly fall up, nor does it have a free will to consider that. It reacts based upon the bio-chemical nature of its makeup. Humans are no different when considered from this same naturalistic setting. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 15:35, 15 September 2008 (EDT)

::::I agree that my writing is not clear. I'm afraid you misunderstand me entirely. What I mean by 'freedom of will' above is the idea that people can engage in thought which is essentially ''uncaused'', since if thought has a cause (like the apple falling from the tree) it's not 'free', in the same way the apple is not 'free' to fall upwards. Hume points out that logically if thoughts are uncaused then they must be random, which is obviously a problem for libertarians. This is sometimes referred to as the 'randomness problem'.

::::Anyway I agree that my contribution is lacking as it is, and when I have a bit of free time on my hands I'll re-write it substantially. Thanks for the feedback.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 16:31, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::: I'm questioning (your explanation of) Hume's view, rather than the content of the article, but without understanding the view better, I'm limited in how much I can do to fix the wording.
::::: By way of analogy, diseases can be (a) genetic/hereditary, (b) non-genetic/non-hereditary, or (c) genetically-''influenced'', but not genetically-''determined''. Hume's argument seems to be that if it's not "caused" (determined), it is ''uncaused'' (random). But what about the will being ''influenced'' by causes, but not ''determined'' by them? This would make it non-random.
::::: Further, Hume's argument appears to be materialistic, i.e. not allowing for a non-materialistic, or perhaps ''spiritual'' component.
::::: Comments?
::::: [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 22:49, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::::With regard to causation - there's no logical reason that things could not be only ''influenced'' by causes rather than entirely determined by them. However, you are left having to explain what it is providing the rest of the event (the part of the disease which is not genetically influenced). If it's randomness, then you are still left with the determined/random problem. If it is some third possibility, you would have to explain what this could be and how it would work.
::::::I think it's correct to say that Hume's approach is materialistic, although on a logical rather than ideological basis. What form would a 'spiritual component' take?
::::::Thanks by the way for the reply and for the continued discussion - it helps to sort out exactly what my arguments are to have them questioned coherently like that.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 08:38, 19 September 2008 (EDT)
::::::P.S. I am not completely positive what Hume's precise rebuttal would be to your arguments, I'm just putting forward my view since I agree with Hume. I am however reasonably confident that I've expressed his view accurately.

:::::::I think you need to rewrite your section soon. I'm uncomfortable with having an article that currently reads in a form that is misleading and/or confusing.

:::::::The difficulty that Hume faced, and those since his time, is how to allow for free will in a totally naturalistic system. I find they often take the conclusion (we have free will) and try to force it backwards to fit in a way that presumes it must fit when it doesn't. It is also common today for naturalists to simply state that we have no free will, a positition that is certainly more sound based on the naturalistic evidence, but doesn't appear to match what we see in reality. Hume also had the advantage of ignorance, having only the barest knowledge of the naturalistic system that has been fleshed out in much greater detail today. One can speculate a role for 'randomness' back then that just isn't seen in our knowledge of naturalistic functions today. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 12:54, 19 September 2008 (EDT)

(unindent) I'm jumping in here, because Hume seems to have said that either our decisions - such as mine just now to take issue with the way the article is going - are either (1) caused by external stimuli or (2) completely random. But this is the fallacy of the [[excluded middle]]. No one '''causes''' me to decide a certain way. Between stimulus and response there is plenty of time for me to exercise [[agency (philosophy)]], i.e., to "[[Be proactive]]" as Stephen Covey would say.

The error stems from the materialistic assumption that only physical forces or physical phenomena can be causes. But an angel just appeared beside me and said, "That is balderdash, my good man!" --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 13:15, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Ed, you misunderstand Hume's argument. This particular error is quite common, as elsewhere Hume argues against, e.g., the possibility of miraculous events. That said: Hume is not a physicalist in the modern sense used by philosophers of mind. The dichotomy is this: Either some event is caused or it is not. This isn't a false dilemma (what I think you mean by "fallacy of the excluded middle"; the excluded middle is just the Aristotelian term for the claim "either P is true or it is false") -- it is, as far as I at least can tell, a tautology. This event is what we'll call a "choice". Now, if the choice is caused, it is determined, because for P to cause Q, if P were to happen, Q must follow (this is basic Lewisian counterfactual causation). That's what "caused" means. The other option is, of course, that the event is uncaused. But for something to be uncaused is for it to be random.

:The only way to attack Hume here is on the nature of causation. You claim, without support, that Hume's problem is a materialist one, but this is just not the case. Even if what "causes" our choices is our willing, if there's a genuine causal relationship, there's no freedom in our willing. It's a nasty little problem indeed. The best way out is probably a quasi-Aristotelian move to posit that each free individual is an uncaused causer, but there are some severe problems there that I'm sure you can see. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 18:47, 8 December 2008 (EST)

::I don't think I misunderstood. I simply disagree with the idea that '''your choices are caused'''. Nothing "causes" you to choose to come to CP and start an argument about philosophy. Rather, you '''decide''' to do it. The essence of free will (and what links it to aspects of ethics such as responsibility) is your ability to make a choice. If you can't choose - if you are nothing more than an automaton, then you are not a moral agent at all. Robots aren't convicted of crimes, or given prizes. No one praises a computer that wins a chess tournament; the computer programmer gets the prize. A dog, trained to attack, would not be convicted of assault: rather, the person who made the dog attack is charged.

::The error lies in the false dichotomy between "caused choices" and "random choices". It is only robots and dogs who make caused choices. I hold you morally and ethically responsible for every edit you make on this website. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:39, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: Right. But now you're confusing "choice" with "event". Remember that every '''decision''' is an event, and, as such, is either caused or uncaused. You're claiming that decisions are uncaused. OK. But if decisions are uncaused, how are they anything other than random? If they're truly uncaused, that is, our '''reasons''' have nothing to do with how they're made, because then reasons would have something to do with the production of decisions, which are uncaused events; and this is clearly an absurdity. Morality demands more than just doing the right thing! It demands that we do the right thing ''for the right reasons''. This is why Hume says that determinism is necessary for moral action. If there is no causal relationship between reasons and actions, then no moral action is possible, since morality depends on reason. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::*I have spent the bulk of my waking life (at least when I'm not sleeping on the job! ;-) creating rules for computers to follow. I '''cause''' computers to make decisions based on [[if then else]] logic. All their choices are caused, and none are random. But God is not a computer programmer, and I am not some science fiction experiment or fantasy (see [[TRON]]). And neither are you. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:52, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: I fail to see the relevance of this comment. Of course we're not computer programs. But that doesn't mean that there's no problem of freedom... ? [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

:: I would just like to comment and say that this is the first page I've seen with a [citation needed] superscript anywhere on the page, though I've seen tons of spots that need them - Major props to the main contributors of this page.
::[[User:LordNelsonRepub|LordNelsonRepub]]

==Practical use of free will==
In my opinion the emphasis should be on the practical use of free will. To make clear the logic that people use when they talk in terms of choosing in daily life, but not focus on common beliefs about free will that people might have.

So in practical use free will is: the ability of a thing to turn out one way or another through choice. The alternatives are in the future in respect to the decider. What does the job of deciding can only be known subjectively and is commonly referred to as spiritual.

The spiritual are understood to be things like "love" "hate" etc. which are commonly known to exist by deciding that they are there, not by measuring.

There is a distinction between present alternatives that are calculated with a predefined goal, and alternatives that exist in the future. For example a chesscomputer calculates alternatives for the best move, so the chesscomputer is forced to do the best move without any possible alternative, and therefore it cannot choose. In science these principles are referred to as "weak" and "strong" anticipation (D. Dubois 2000).

religion: the common use of free will in religion is the choice of God to create the universe, the final judgement of God between heaven and hell, and the choice of people to believe in God or not (faith).

science: scientists generally deny, or redefine free will(reference Daniel Dennett, Robert Rosen). However, in 2006 American scientists demonstrated (P. Kwiat 2006) that they could search a database of 4 elements by only possibly running a search algorithm. Meaning a decision was made to run the algorithm or not, and the decision turned out that the algorithm didn't run.

:Sir, you may want to avoid writing these huge "walls of text" in the future. People are less likely to read these huge essays on talk pages than simple, straightforward statements. [[User:DMorris|DMorris]] 12:09, 8 February 2010 (EST)

:: I made it much less--[[User:Syamsu|Syamsu]] 18:13, 8 February 2010 (EST) I hope we can establish the principle to use common practical knowledge, and not "new" or ideosyncratic ideas of some philosophers

User talk:Syamsu

2010-02-08T15:37:06Z

Syamsu:

Talk:Free will

2010-02-08T15:04:53Z

Syamsu:

It is a logical inconsistancy to claim that foreknowledge of an individual's actions allows that individual to possess free will. If the will is known, it is not free. If the will is free, it cannot be known.

Thus, if a deity has foreknowledge of an individual's actions, then that deity has denied the individual's free will.

If an individual's will is genuinely free, then any claim that a deity can have prior knowledge of an individual's actions is false.

''Free will'' and ''an omniscient deity'' are mutually exclusive. If either is encompassed by a theologically honest position, the other must be denied. --[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:24, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

:This argument assumes that the future is capable of being the subject of knowledge (a fairly widely held assumption, but one I, and many other philosophers, reject). That is, it assumes that a statement about the future is true or false, rather than indeterminate. If the future is indeterminate then an omniscient deity would be able to know all that is knowable and still not know what I am going to do in the future. Of course, this position raises problems with respect to prophesy and that may be a problem for some theists (but not necessarily for all theists if they reject prophesy or if they view prophesy as a promise of what God intends to do in the future). So, while you are right, free will and the common understanding of an omniscient deity are at odds, free will and an omniscient deity are not necessarily at odds.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 15:34, 14 March 2007 (EDT)

::Knowing all possible outcomes does not make a being omniscient - I know all possible outcomes of a dice-roll, but I am not omniscient. Given time and inclination, I could work out all possible results to a general election, but I will still not be omniscient. No matter how complex a system, no matter how many possible outcomes exist in potentia, knowing all the possibilities does not make a being omniscient, merely clever. Omniscience would require that the being know ''which'' of the possible outcomes will occur, bringing us right back to my original point. (I like your rewrite of the article, by the way)--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:28, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

:::I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. My point was simply that it could be the case that the future is not something that is knowable--at all--so even an all knowing entity (one that knows everything that is knowable) would not know the future. Such an entity would know all the posable outcomes (just as we know what results a dice-roll may have), but it would not know the future. this assumes a non-static future (which is an understanding of the nature of the future that is more compatible with free will than a static, even if unknown, future). This would mean an all knowing God would still not know the future--so God's foreknowledge would not be in conflict with free will. I'm not saying it is the right answer, I'm not sure what the right answer is, but it is one way to make free will and the existence of an all knowing being compatible.
:::Thank you for the compliment on the edit, I'm of the opinion that it is better to note where the debate is than pretend knowledge of the truth.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:50, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
::::That is much clearer, and a response needs much more thought on my part, not something I will have time to do for at least a week or two.--[[User:OmnusErudito|OmnusErudito]] 14:56, 15 March 2007 (EDT)
:::::No hurry, I have this page on my watchlist so when you get a chance to respond I will see it.--[[User:Reginod|Reginod]] 14:59, 15 March 2007 (EDT)

==Angels and animals==

Removed:
*<s>Within a totally naturalistic system, freewill does not exist.</s>
*In the Christian faith it is believed that humans were created with freewill so that they would chose to worship God, <s>unlike angels who were created without the choice to worship God</s>.

#I don't understand the reference to [[naturalism]]. Are you saying that '''your''' actions are all determined by physical law, L.T.?
#Which denomination says that angels are incapable of making choices? Haven't you read Jude 1:6-7? (It mentions angels who sinned, and sin is a [[choice]].) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 14:33, 27 July 2007 (EDT)

==Section on morality==
This article on free will seems quite brief so I've added a section here. It's not fantastically well written and it's a bit waffly but hopefully it'll do until it can be expanded, either by my or another person.[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 10:51, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
: I like the first sentence, bu I find the rest confusing. It seems to be starting with the assumption that determinism is the opposite of free will, then redefines free will to be determinism! This means that it's not actually the opposite after all, but simply another name for the same thing. [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 11:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
:: Yeah sorry, I should've made that clearer but I hoped I could leave it a little implicit. Essentially Hume draws a distinction between two kinds of freedom - freedom of action and freedom of will. The former is the freedom to do as you choose (i.e. it would be compromised if you were in jail or tied up or something), and the latter is the freedom to determine your own will. Hume says that confusion between these two terms is at the root of many discussions of free will, since often people use free will to mean the latter thing when in reality it doesn't make much sense - either things are determined or they are random (because of cause and effect). Is that at all clear? --[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 11:58, 14 September 2008 (EDT)
::Re-reading myself I really don't think it is. When people talk about lack of free will negating morality, they mean lack of freedom of will (as opposed to of action). Hume says that lack of freedom of will results in randomness, because thought processes are subject to the same laws of cause and effect as any other event. So an apple falling is caused by gravity or something else, and if its caused by nothing then the occurrence must be random; and the same with decisions, which are caused by a variety of external stimuli.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 12:03, 14 September 2008 (EDT)

:::Your addition and your writing here are not necessarily clear. If you wish to break up the article into two sections, then do so showing clearly that Hume is using his own definition of free will to make his point. In the absense of free will it is obvious that there is no blame for actions as free will would be a necessary precursor for free action. You also seem to be confused that lack of free will does not equal random. Indeed much of what occurs is structured and orderly; there is just no will involved. In nature an apple falling from a tree does so due to gravity - and will do so each and every time unless some other outside stimulus intervenes. The apple has no free action to suddenly fall up, nor does it have a free will to consider that. It reacts based upon the bio-chemical nature of its makeup. Humans are no different when considered from this same naturalistic setting. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 15:35, 15 September 2008 (EDT)

::::I agree that my writing is not clear. I'm afraid you misunderstand me entirely. What I mean by 'freedom of will' above is the idea that people can engage in thought which is essentially ''uncaused'', since if thought has a cause (like the apple falling from the tree) it's not 'free', in the same way the apple is not 'free' to fall upwards. Hume points out that logically if thoughts are uncaused then they must be random, which is obviously a problem for libertarians. This is sometimes referred to as the 'randomness problem'.

::::Anyway I agree that my contribution is lacking as it is, and when I have a bit of free time on my hands I'll re-write it substantially. Thanks for the feedback.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 16:31, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::: I'm questioning (your explanation of) Hume's view, rather than the content of the article, but without understanding the view better, I'm limited in how much I can do to fix the wording.
::::: By way of analogy, diseases can be (a) genetic/hereditary, (b) non-genetic/non-hereditary, or (c) genetically-''influenced'', but not genetically-''determined''. Hume's argument seems to be that if it's not "caused" (determined), it is ''uncaused'' (random). But what about the will being ''influenced'' by causes, but not ''determined'' by them? This would make it non-random.
::::: Further, Hume's argument appears to be materialistic, i.e. not allowing for a non-materialistic, or perhaps ''spiritual'' component.
::::: Comments?
::::: [[User:Philip J. Rayment|Philip J. Rayment]] 22:49, 17 September 2008 (EDT)

::::::With regard to causation - there's no logical reason that things could not be only ''influenced'' by causes rather than entirely determined by them. However, you are left having to explain what it is providing the rest of the event (the part of the disease which is not genetically influenced). If it's randomness, then you are still left with the determined/random problem. If it is some third possibility, you would have to explain what this could be and how it would work.
::::::I think it's correct to say that Hume's approach is materialistic, although on a logical rather than ideological basis. What form would a 'spiritual component' take?
::::::Thanks by the way for the reply and for the continued discussion - it helps to sort out exactly what my arguments are to have them questioned coherently like that.--[[User:Sam99foster|Sam99foster]] 08:38, 19 September 2008 (EDT)
::::::P.S. I am not completely positive what Hume's precise rebuttal would be to your arguments, I'm just putting forward my view since I agree with Hume. I am however reasonably confident that I've expressed his view accurately.

:::::::I think you need to rewrite your section soon. I'm uncomfortable with having an article that currently reads in a form that is misleading and/or confusing.

:::::::The difficulty that Hume faced, and those since his time, is how to allow for free will in a totally naturalistic system. I find they often take the conclusion (we have free will) and try to force it backwards to fit in a way that presumes it must fit when it doesn't. It is also common today for naturalists to simply state that we have no free will, a positition that is certainly more sound based on the naturalistic evidence, but doesn't appear to match what we see in reality. Hume also had the advantage of ignorance, having only the barest knowledge of the naturalistic system that has been fleshed out in much greater detail today. One can speculate a role for 'randomness' back then that just isn't seen in our knowledge of naturalistic functions today. [[User:Learn together|Learn together]] 12:54, 19 September 2008 (EDT)

(unindent) I'm jumping in here, because Hume seems to have said that either our decisions - such as mine just now to take issue with the way the article is going - are either (1) caused by external stimuli or (2) completely random. But this is the fallacy of the [[excluded middle]]. No one '''causes''' me to decide a certain way. Between stimulus and response there is plenty of time for me to exercise [[agency (philosophy)]], i.e., to "[[Be proactive]]" as Stephen Covey would say.

The error stems from the materialistic assumption that only physical forces or physical phenomena can be causes. But an angel just appeared beside me and said, "That is balderdash, my good man!" --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 13:15, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Even if non-materialist forces can be causes (which I agree with), they are still important causes. For example, if I decided to have a hamburger for lunch, I may be influenced by the smell (external) and a series of previous events (including my past experiences) from the start of creation. Some of that would be my reflection on what I like, and would be non-physical, but it is still a causal line from the moment of creation. To me, that would argue for a deterministic outlook, because the non-physical causes would still be considered causally related. Personally, I have no problem with that as a compatiblist, but I really don't understand any real way for us to have thoughts that aren't "caused" one way or another. I don't think that Hume was, in terms of philosophy of mind, a materialist, so I think this could also fit in with his arguments. [[User:Sulli|Sulli]] 13:26, 8 December 2008 (EST)

:Ed, you misunderstand Hume's argument. This particular error is quite common, as elsewhere Hume argues against, e.g., the possibility of miraculous events. That said: Hume is not a physicalist in the modern sense used by philosophers of mind. The dichotomy is this: Either some event is caused or it is not. This isn't a false dilemma (what I think you mean by "fallacy of the excluded middle"; the excluded middle is just the Aristotelian term for the claim "either P is true or it is false") -- it is, as far as I at least can tell, a tautology. This event is what we'll call a "choice". Now, if the choice is caused, it is determined, because for P to cause Q, if P were to happen, Q must follow (this is basic Lewisian counterfactual causation). That's what "caused" means. The other option is, of course, that the event is uncaused. But for something to be uncaused is for it to be random.

:The only way to attack Hume here is on the nature of causation. You claim, without support, that Hume's problem is a materialist one, but this is just not the case. Even if what "causes" our choices is our willing, if there's a genuine causal relationship, there's no freedom in our willing. It's a nasty little problem indeed. The best way out is probably a quasi-Aristotelian move to posit that each free individual is an uncaused causer, but there are some severe problems there that I'm sure you can see. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 18:47, 8 December 2008 (EST)

::I don't think I misunderstood. I simply disagree with the idea that '''your choices are caused'''. Nothing "causes" you to choose to come to CP and start an argument about philosophy. Rather, you '''decide''' to do it. The essence of free will (and what links it to aspects of ethics such as responsibility) is your ability to make a choice. If you can't choose - if you are nothing more than an automaton, then you are not a moral agent at all. Robots aren't convicted of crimes, or given prizes. No one praises a computer that wins a chess tournament; the computer programmer gets the prize. A dog, trained to attack, would not be convicted of assault: rather, the person who made the dog attack is charged.

::The error lies in the false dichotomy between "caused choices" and "random choices". It is only robots and dogs who make caused choices. I hold you morally and ethically responsible for every edit you make on this website. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:39, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: Right. But now you're confusing "choice" with "event". Remember that every '''decision''' is an event, and, as such, is either caused or uncaused. You're claiming that decisions are uncaused. OK. But if decisions are uncaused, how are they anything other than random? If they're truly uncaused, that is, our '''reasons''' have nothing to do with how they're made, because then reasons would have something to do with the production of decisions, which are uncaused events; and this is clearly an absurdity. Morality demands more than just doing the right thing! It demands that we do the right thing ''for the right reasons''. This is why Hume says that determinism is necessary for moral action. If there is no causal relationship between reasons and actions, then no moral action is possible, since morality depends on reason. [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::*I have spent the bulk of my waking life (at least when I'm not sleeping on the job! ;-) creating rules for computers to follow. I '''cause''' computers to make decisions based on [[if then else]] logic. All their choices are caused, and none are random. But God is not a computer programmer, and I am not some science fiction experiment or fantasy (see [[TRON]]). And neither are you. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 10:52, 10 December 2008 (EST)

::: I fail to see the relevance of this comment. Of course we're not computer programs. But that doesn't mean that there's no problem of freedom... ? [[User:StevenK|StevenK]] 13:41, 10 December 2008 (EST)

:: I would just like to comment and say that this is the first page I've seen with a [citation needed] superscript anywhere on the page, though I've seen tons of spots that need them - Major props to the main contributors of this page.
::[[User:LordNelsonRepub|LordNelsonRepub]]

==Practical use of free will==
In my opinion the emphasis should be on the practical use of free will. To make clear the logic that people use when they talk in terms of choosing, but not focus on the common beliefs about free will that people have. And after that you can have some philosphical / scientific / religious talk about it. I don't have a problem with it if anybody has a different take than mine on what the logic in common practical use of free will is. Go ahead and criticize my take on it below. I have a BIG problem with it if some philosopher is mentioned who doesn't set out to find out what the logic in the common use is. Maybe common use is wrong, and some science suggests that it is false, but we should respect what it is, and then you can try to convince people to have something better. But to ignore common knowledge is really very elitist. And in my opinion the logic in common knowledge about freedom is actually very good, which I guess is why we use it all the time.

So free will is: the ability of a thing to turn out one way or another through choice. The alternatives are in the future in respect to the decider. What does the job of deciding is spiritual, and can therefore only be known subjectively.

For example the way people use words such as love and hate, is that those things do the job of deciding, realize one alternative over another. And how they come to know that any particular decision is loving, is by deciding it with their own free will. It is a social convention that these words should be used in this spontaneous way. So that means that in principle you may not calculate wether or not a choice is loving or hateful, so that the outcome is forced by the calculation, so that even a computer could determine who is loving or hateful. Instead you must determine what the spiritual quality of the decision is on the spot, by deciding from the available alternatives yourself spontaneously.

It's important to note the distinction between (often inaccurate) descriptions of alternatives, and the actual alternatives themselves. For example a chesscomputer may calculate all possible moves and attribute a value to each move according to it's chance of winning. So the computer has gathered descriptions of alternatives, and then it calculates which alternative has the highest value. However the chesscomputer does not choose because the computer is forced to do the move with the highest value it calculates. There don't exist alternatives in the future of the computer, there only exists 1 forced result, the result with the highest calculated value of winning.

religion: according to Christian, Muslim and Jewish religions everything begins and ends with a decision. In the beginning the creation is a free act, and at the end the final judgement is also a free act. It is shown that the final judgement is a free act by the emphasis on the mercy of God in these religions. This means that the final judgement is not just a calculation of good and bad deeds with a forced result, it shows things may turn out another way by said mercy of God. In these religions the believer also relates to God of their own free will, by faith.

science: scientists generally deny free will is real or have redefined free will so that there are no alternative results possible (reference Daniel Dennett, Robert Rosen). But in 2006 American scientists have demonstrated that alternatives are real with an experiment in which they searched a database of 4 elements, without actually running the search algorithm. The search algorithm was only possibly running, meaning a decision was made between the alternatives of running and not running the algorithm, and the decision turned out that the algorithm was not run. They could still functionally use the algorithm to search the database by only possiby, not actually, running it.