{| border="1" align="right" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="300" style="margin-left:5px"
|align="center" colspan="2"|[[Image:AmRev Logo.PNG|300px]]
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!colspan="2" align="center" style="color: white; height: 30px; background: gray no-repeat scroll top left;"|American Revolutionary War
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|Begun
|19 April 1775
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|Ended
|13 September 1783
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|}
The '''American Revolutionary War''' (1775-1783) was a [[war]] between [[Kingdom of Great Britain|Great Britain]] and their thirteen [[North America|American]] [[Colony|colonies]]. The leadership of the colonies decided to unite and attempt to gain their [[independence]] from Britain, largely due to high taxes levied by [[Parliament]] without adequate representation. The decision to reject [[British]] rule was not universal in the colonies. Those that favored independence were called [[Patriot]]s and those that remained loyal to the throne were called [[Loyalist]]s. There was also a significant contingent that tried, for the most part, to remain neutral.

== Origins of the Revolution ==
[[Image:american-revolution-map.gif|thumb|200px|The 13 British colonies in North America by 1770]]
The American Revolution came about fundamentally because by 1763 the [[English]]-speaking communities on the far side of the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]] had matured to the extent that their interests and goals were distinct from those of the [[ruling class]]es in the mother country. [[British]] statesmen failed to understand or adjust to the situation. Ironically enough, British victory in the [[Seven Years' War]] set the stage for the revolt, for it freed the colonists from the need for British protection against a [[French]] threat on their frontiers and gave free play to the forces working for separation.

In 1763 the British government, reasonably from its own point of view, moved to tighten the system of imperial control and to force the colonists to contribute to imperial defense. As part of an effort to make the costs of empire be borne by all British subjects, his majesty’s government sought to create an "American Establishment," a force of 10,000 British regular soldiers in North America. The cost of this military force would be paid for by taxes the British Parliament levied on Americans. This imperial defense plan touched off the long controversy about Parliament’s right to tax that started with the Stamp and Sugar Acts and led to a final provocative deed in December 1773: protesting "taxation without representation", a patriot mob dressed as Indians boarded several ships of the East India Company moored in Boston harbor and destroyed their cargo of tea in an event since called the "Boston Tea Party".

The ten-year controversy over taxation escalated to violence in large measure because several successive British ministries failed to understand the differences that had grown between the American colonies and the metropolitan power. Although possessing a professional army and navy, the British government nevertheless failed to act decisively enough to enforce British regulations or work toward the more viable form of imperial union that the colonial leaders, at least until 1776, insisted they sought.

In response to the [[Boston Tea Party]], the King and his ministers blindly pushed through Parliament a series of measures collectively known in America as the [[Intolerable Acts]]: closing the port of Boston, suspending civilian government in [[Massachusetts]], and massing troops in [[Boston]] under the military rule of Maj. Gen. Sir Thomas Gage. Outraged by the heavy-handed response to one colony, the other American political leaders called for a continental congress, in effect an American parliament, to coordinate a political drive to defend what the colonists deemed to be their rights and interests as Englishmen.

Since 1763 the colonial leaders, in holding that only their own popular assemblies, not the British Parliament, had a right to levy taxes on Americans, had raised the specter of an arbitrary British government collecting taxes in America to support red-coated regulars who might be used not to protect the frontiers but to suppress American liberties. Placing Massachusetts under military rule gave that specter some substance and led directly to armed revolt.

==The outbreak==
[[Image:Paul Revere.jpg|200px|left|thumb|Paul Revere]]
The [[First Continental Congress]] meeting at [[Philadelphia]] on September 5, 1774, addressed respectful petitions to Parliament and King but also adopted nonimportation and nonexportation agreements in an effort to coerce the British government into repealing the offending measures. To enforce these agreements, committees were formed in almost every county, town, and city throughout the colonies. In each colony, these committees soon became the effective local authorities, the base of a pyramid of revolutionary organizations with revolutionary assemblies, congresses, or conventions, and with committees of safety at the top.

This loosely knit combination of de facto governments superseded the constituted authorities and established firm control over the whole country before the British were in any position to oppose them. The de facto governments took over control of the militia and other colonial military resources such as armories and powder stores. They also identified which local militia officers could be trusted and which were known to be loyal to Britain. Where possible the various colonies reorganized the standing militia and formed rapid response units, including the famous Minutemen intended to turn out fully armed "in a minute’s notice." In colonies where a British governor’s official control over the militia could not be challenged, volunteer companies began training under the guidance of veterans of the French and Indian War. As winter turned into spring in 1775, patriot leaders were busily shaping the military forces that, if the necessity arose, might oppose the British Army in the field.

Massachusetts, the seat of the crisis, led the way in making military preparations. The Provincial Congress, eyeing Gage’s unprecedented military force in Boston, directed town officials to formally enlist a third of their adult males as Minutemen. It began plans to combine local militia companies into regiments and started selecting generals to command the force. It also began to collect ammunition, artillery pieces, and other military stores at locations outside of Gage’s immediate reach. One of the most important of these depots lay at Concord, about twenty miles inland from Boston.

General Gage learned of the collection of military stores at [[Concord]] and determined to send a force of Redcoats to destroy them. His preparations were made with the utmost secrecy. Yet so alert and ubiquitous were the patriot eyes in Boston that when the picked British force of 700 men set out on the night of April 18, 1775, two messengers, [[Paul Revere]] and William Dawes, preceded them to spread the alarm throughout the countryside. At dawn on the next day, when the British arrived at Lexington, the halfway point to Concord, they found a body of militia drawn up on the village green. Some nervous finger—whether of a British regular or an American militiaman is unknown to this day—pressed a trigger. The impatient British regulars, apparently without any clear orders from their commanding officer, fired a volley then charged with the bayonet. The militiamen dispersed, leaving eight dead and ten wounded on the ground. The British column went on to Concord, engaged in another unanticipated skirmish, and destroyed such of the military stores as the Americans had been unable to remove. Their return journey to Boston took a civil disturbance issue and transformed it into open warfare.

By this time, the alarm had spread far and wide, and both ordinary militia and Minutemen had assembled along the British route. From behind walls, rocks, and trees, and from houses, they poured their fire into the columns of Redcoats, while the frustrated regulars found few targets for their accustomed volleys or bayonet charges. Only the arrival of reinforcements from Gage enabled the British column to get back to the safety of Boston. At day’s end the British counted 273 casualties out of a total of 1,800 men engaged; American casualties numbered 95 men, including the toll at Lexington. What happened was hardly a tribute to the marksmanship of New England farmers — it has been estimated that 75,000 shots poured from their muskets that day — but it did testify to a stern determination of the people of Massachusetts to resist any attempt by the British to impose their will by armed force.

The spark lit in Massachusetts soon spread throughout the rest of the colonies. Whatever really may have happened in that misty dawn on Lexington Green, the news that speedy couriers riding horses to exhaustion carried through the colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia was of a savage, unprovoked British attack and of farmers rising in the night to protect their lives, their families, and their property. Lexington, like Fort Sumter, Pearl Harbor, and September 11 in subsequent years, furnished an emotional impulse that led all true patriots to gird themselves for battle. From the other New England colonies, militia poured in to join the [[Massachusetts]] men; together they soon formed a ring around [[Boston]]. Other forces mobilized under Ethan Allen of Vermont and [[Benedict Arnold]] of Connecticut seized the British forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, strategic positions on the route between New York and Canada. These posts yielded valuable artillery and other military stores. The Second Continental Congress, which assembled in Philadelphia on May 10, 1775, found itself forced to turn from embargoes and petitions to the problems of organizing, directing, and supplying a military effort.

Before [[Congress]] could assume effective control, the New England forces assembled near Boston fought another battle on their own. After Lexington and Concord, the New England colonies implemented their military plans and, as they had in the earlier wars with the French and Indians, moved to replace the militia gathered before Boston with volunteer forces, constituting what may be loosely called a New England army. Each of the four New England states raised and administered its own force under its own commander. As might be expected with such a loose organization, discipline was lax and there was no unified chain of command. Though Artemas Ward, the Massachusetts commander, exercised overall control by informal agreement, it was only because the other commanders chose to cooperate with him; all decisions were made in council. The volunteers in the Connecticut service had enlisted until December 10, 1775, those from the other New England states until the end of the year. The men were dressed for the most part in homespun clothes and armed with muskets of varied types; powder and ball were short, and only the barest few had bayonets.

Late in May Gage received limited reinforcements from England, bringing his total force to 6,500 rank and file. With the reinforcements came three major generals of reputation—Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, and Sir John Burgoyne—men destined to play major roles in England’s loss of its American colonies. The newcomers all considered that Gage needed more elbow room and proposed to fortify Dorchester Heights, a dominant position south of Boston previously neglected by both sides. News of the intended move leaked to the Americans, who immediately countered by dispatching a force onto the Charlestown peninsula, where other heights, Bunker Hill and Breed’s Hill, overlooked Boston from the north. The original intent was to fortify Bunker Hill, the eminence nearest the narrow neck of land connecting the peninsula with the mainland, but the working party sent out on the night of June 16, 1775 decided instead to move closer in and construct works on Breed’s Hill—a tactical blunder, for these exposed works could much more easily be cut off by a British landing on the neck in their rear.

The British scorned such a tactic, making a conscious decision to try and stop the conflict short with a psychologically crushing demonstration of brute force. However, the British generals committed a critical error, having assumed that the assembled "rabble in arms" would disintegrate in the face of an attack by disciplined British regulars. On the seventeenth Gage ferried some 2,200 of his men under Howe over to the tip of the Charlestown peninsula under the cover of Royal Navy warships. Howe then sent his troops directly against the American positions, by this time manned by perhaps an equal force. Twice the British advanced on the front and flanks of the redoubt on Breed’s Hill; and twice the Americans, holding their fire until the compact British lines were at close range, decimated the ranks of the advancing regiments and forced them to fall back and re-form. With reinforcements Howe carried the hill on the third try, largely because the Americans had run short of ammunition and had no bayonets. The American retreat from Breed’s Hill was, for inexperienced volunteers and militia, an orderly one; and Howe’s depleted regiments were unable to prevent the escape. British casualties for the day totaled a staggering 1,054, almost half the force engaged, as opposed to American losses of about 440.
[[image:Bunker hill.jpg|300px|right|thumb|Battle of Bunker Hill]]
The [[Battle of Bunker Hill]] (Bunker gave its name to a battle actually fought on Breed’s Hill) has been aptly characterized as a "tale of great blunders heroically redeemed." The American command structure violated the principle of unity of command from the start; in moving onto Breed’s Hill, the patriots exposed an important part of their force in an indefensible position, violating the principles of concentration of force, mass, and maneuver. Gage and Howe, for their parts, sacrificed all the advantages the American blunders gave them, violating the principles of maneuver and surprise by undertaking a frontal attack on a fortified position. Their gamble to end the rebellion with a single stroke had failed.

Bunker Hill was a Pyrrhic victory, its strategic effect practically nil since the two armies remained in virtually the same position they had held previously. Its consequences, nevertheless, cannot be ignored. Although frequently depicted as a force of farmers and townsmen, fresh from their fields and shops, with hardly a semblance of orthodox military organization, the New Englanders used their militia training to field forces modeled on the British. Led by officers with, in some case, more direct combat experience than many of Gage’s, the Americans had met and fought on equal terms with a professional British Army. On some of the more senior British commanders this astonishing feat had a sobering effect, for it taught them that American resistance was not to be easily overcome; never again would British commanders lightly attempt such an assault on Americans in fortified positions. Many Americans, on the other hand, misread the battle. Bunker Hill, along with Lexington and Concord, went far to create an American myth that the citizen-soldier when aroused by patriotic emotion is more than a match for the trained professional, a tradition that was to be reflected in American military policy for generations afterward.

==Formation of the Continental Army==
The response of George III and his ministers to the events at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill was a determined effort to subdue the rebellious colonists by force. It took time to mount this effort, and after Bunker Hill the Americans enjoyed a respite lasting almost a year. During most of this period the Second Continental Congress reacted to the events in New England and New York by hesitantly assuming the mantle of leadership, but it continued to assert that these actions were defensive in nature. It charged that Americans had banded together to oppose the unconstitutional actions of Parliament but that they still hoped to find a formula for reconciliation by appealing directly to the King for justice. Military preparations were designed for a short struggle, to endure no longer than the end of the year 1776. Nevertheless, the Americans took advantage of the respite to create a national army, to consolidate their hold on the governmental machinery throughout the thirteen colonies, to invade Canada, and finally to force the British to evacuate Boston.

The creation of the [[Continental Army]] was in the long run perhaps their most significant achievement. Some time before Bunker Hill the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, aware of the necessity of enlisting the support of all the colonies in the struggle against the British, appealed to the Continental Congress to adopt the New England army. Because of the need to preserve secrecy, Congress made its decision as a committee of the whole. After determining the necessity of accepting national responsibility for the troops at Boston and in New York, Congress voted to create the Continental Army on June 14, 1775. On the same day it voted to raise ten companies of riflemen—the first soldiers to be enlisted directly in the Continental service—in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to march north to join the army before Boston. The message was clear: This was no regional outbreak of violence but was instead the united response of all of the mainland North American colonies.

===The appointment of Washington===
[[Image:GWashington at Princeton.jpg|200px|right|thumb|George Washington]]
The next day, June 15, Congress chose [[George Washington]], a Virginian, to be Commander in Chief. As was the case with the riflemen, Congress made the choice for geographical and political as much as for military reasons. The New Englanders felt a southerner should be chosen for the post to prove that this was not a New England–only conflict. Washington’s military experience was perhaps greater than that of any other American, and he came from the largest and most important of the southern colonies. His impressive appearance, quiet and confident manner, and good work in the military committees of Congress had impressed all.

The choice proved fortunate. Washington himself recognized, when he accepted the command, that he lacked the requisite experience and knowledge in handling large bodies of men. His whole military experience had been in frontier warfare during the French and Indian War. But he had commanded a brigade of troops from several colonies during the capture of Fort Duquesne in the French and Indian War—he was the only native-born American up to that time to command a force of that size. Experience gained as a political leader in his native Virginia and in directing the business affairs of his large plantation at Mount Vernon also stood him in good stead. He brought to the task traits of character and abilities as a leader that in the end more than compensated for his lack of European military experience. Among these qualities were a determination and a steadfastness of purpose rooted in an unshakable conviction of the righteousness of the American cause, a scrupulous sense of honor and duty, and a dignity that inspired respect and confidence in those around him. Conscious of his own defects, he was always willing to profit by experience. From the trials and tribulations of eight years of war he was to learn the essentials of strategy, tactics, and military organization.

Congress also appointed four major generals and eight brigadiers to serve under Washington, set up a series of staff offices closely resembling those in the British Army, prescribed a pay scale and standard ration, and adopted Articles of War to govern the military establishment. The same mixture of geographical, political, and military considerations governed the choice of Washington’s subordinates. Two - thirds of them came from New England, in recognition of the fact that the existing army was a New England army. Three others — Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, and Richard Montgomery — were chosen because of their experience in the British Army. Lee in particular, who had come from England to the colonies in 1773, was in 1775 deemed the foremost military expert in America, and he was for a time to be Washington’s first assistant.

The army of which Washington formally took command on July 3, 1775, he described as "a mixed multitude of people … under very little discipline, order or government." Out of this mixed multitude, Washington set out to create an army shaped in large part in the British image. Basing his observations on his experience with British regulars during the French and Indian War, he wrote: "Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak and esteem to all." Employing Gates, his experienced Adjutant General, to prepare regulations and orders, the Commander in Chief set out to inculcate discipline. He and his staff made a strenuous effort to halt the random comings and goings of officers and men and to institute regular roll calls and strength returns. Suspicious of the "leveling" tendencies of the New Englanders, Washington made the distinction between officers and enlisted men more rigid. He introduced various punishments (lash, pillory, wooden horse, and drumming out of camp), and on courts-martial sat almost constantly.

While establishing discipline in the existing army, Washington had at the same time to form a new one enlisted directly in the Continental service. Out of conferences with a congressional committee that visited camp in September 1775 emerged a plan for such an army, composed of 26 regiments of infantry of 728 men each, plus 1 regiment of riflemen and 1 of artillery, 20,372 men in all, to be uniformly paid, supplied, and administered by the Continental Congress and enlisted to the end of the year 1776. Except for the short term of enlistment, it was an excellent plan on paper; but Washington soon found he could not carry it out. Both officers and men resisted a reorganization that cut across the lines of the locally organized units in which they were accustomed to serve. The men saw as their first obligation their families and farms at home, and they were reluctant to reenlist for another year’s service. On December 10, despite pressures and patriotic appeals, many of the Connecticut men went home and militia from New Hampshire and Massachusetts had to be brought in to fill their places in the line. Others, who had jeered and hooted when the Connecticut men left, also went home when their enlistment expired only three weeks later. On January 1, 1776, when the army became "Continental in every respect," Washington found that he had only slightly more than 8,000 troops in the lines around Boston instead of the 20,000 planned. Returns in early March showed only a thousand or so more. "I have often thought how much happier I would have been," wrote a sorely tried commander, "if, instead of accepting a command under such circumstances, I had taken up musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks, or, if I could have justified the measure to posterity and my own conscience, had retired to the back country and lived in a Wigwam."

While waiting for the regiments to reach full strength, short-term militia continued to fill the gaps in the lines. A Continental Army had been formed, but it fell far short of the goals Washington and Congress had set for it. This army was enlisted for but a year, and the whole troublesome process would have to be repeated at the end of 1776. The short term of enlistment was, of course, a cardinal error; but in 1775 everyone, including Washington, had anticipated only a short campaign.

While organizing and disciplining his army, Washington had also to maintain the siege of Boston and overcome his deficiencies in supply. In these efforts he was more successful. Congress and the individual colonies sponsored voyages to the West Indies, where the French and Dutch had conveniently exported quantities of war materials. Washington put some of his troops on board ship and with an improvised navy succeeded in capturing numerous British supply ships. He sent Col. Henry Knox, later to be his Chief of Artillery, to Fort Ticonderoga; and Knox in the winter of 1775–1776 brought some fifty pieces of captured cannon to Cambridge over poor or nonexistent roads in icebound New York and New England. By March 1776, despite deficiencies in the number of continentals, Washington was ready to close in on Boston.

==The Invasion of Canada==
The major military operations of 1775 and early 1776 were not around [[Boston]] but in faraway Canada, which the Americans considered the fourteenth colony needing only a little shove to join the others in rebellion against Britain. Canada seemed a tempting and vulnerable target. To take it would eliminate a British base at the head of the familiar invasion route along the lake and river chain connecting the St. Lawrence with the Hudson. Congress, while appealing to the Canadians to join in the cause, in late June 1775 instructed Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler of New York to take possession of Canada if "practicable" and "not disagreeable to the Canadians."

Schuyler managed to get together a force of about 2,000 men from [[New York]] and [[Connecticut]], thus forming the nucleus of what was to become known as the Northern Army. In September 1775 Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery set out with this small army from Ticonderoga with the objective of taking Montreal. To form a second prong to the invasion, Washington detached a force of 1,100 under Col. Benedict Arnold, including a contingent of riflemen under Capt. Daniel Morgan of Virginia, to proceed up the Kennebec River, across the wilds of Maine, and down the Chaudière to join with Montgomery before Quebec. Montgomery, advancing along the route via Lake George, [[Lake Champlain]], and the Richelieu River, was seriously delayed at the British fort at St. Johns but managed to capture Montreal on November 13. Arnold, meanwhile, had arrived opposite Quebec on November 8, after one of the most rugged marches in history. Part of his force had turned back, and others were lost by starvation, sickness, drowning, and desertion. Only 600 men crossed the St. Lawrence on November 13, and in imitation of Wolfe
scaled the cliffs and encamped on the Plains of Abraham. It was a magnificent feat, but the force was too small to prevail even against the scattered Canadian militia and British regulars who, unlike Montcalm, shut themselves up in the city and
refused battle in the open.

Arnold’s men were finally forced to withdraw to Point aux Trembles, where Montgomery joined them with all the men he could spare from the defense of Montreal, a total of 300. Although the Canadians did raise two regiments for the Continental Army, most did not rally to the American cause. With the enlistments of about half their men expiring by the new year, Arnold and Montgomery undertook a desperate assault on the city during the night of December 30 in the middle of a raging blizzard. The defenders outnumbered the Americans, and the attack was a failure. Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded.

The wounded Arnold, undaunted, continued to keep up the appearance of a siege with the scattered remnants of his force while he waited for reinforcements. Continental regiments raised in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania came in driblets. There were never enough to build a force capable of again taking the offensive, though a total of 8,000 men were eventually committed to the Canadian campaign. Smallpox and other diseases took their toll; and the supply line never brought in adequate food, clothing, or ammunition. Meanwhile, the British received reinforcements and in June 1776 struck back against a disintegrating American army that retreated before them almost without a fight. By mid-July the Americans were back at Ticonderoga, where they had started less than a year earlier. The initiative on the northern front passed to the British.

While the effort to conquer Canada was moving toward its dismal end, Washington finally took the initiative at Boston. On March 4, 1776, he moved onto Dorchester Heights and emplaced his newly acquired artillery in position to menace the city; a few days later he fortified Nook’s Hill, standing still closer in. On March 17 the British moved out. It would be presumptuous to say that their exit was solely a consequence of American pressure. Sir William Howe, who succeeded Gage in command, had concluded long since that Boston was a poor strategic base and intended to stay only until the transports arrived to take his army to Halifax in Nova Scotia to regroup and await reinforcements. Nevertheless, Washington’s maneuvers hastened his departure, and the reoccupation of Boston was an important psychological victory for the Americans, balancing the disappointments of the Canadian campaign. The stores of cannon and ammunition the British were forced to leave behind were a welcome addition indeed to the meager American arsenal.

==The New Nation==
[[Image:76485685i79.jpg|right|thumb|300px|''The Signing of the Declaration of Independence'', by [[John Trumbull]] (1817–1819)]]
The [[Declaration of Independence]] on July 4, 1776, established a new nation and transformed a limited uprising to secure rights within the British Empire into a far-reaching revolution aimed at complete independence from British control. Since the King and his ministers had determined to restore British rule, the Americans now faced a long, difficult struggle for independence that required a sustained national effort such as they had not expected in 1775.

The new nation was still a weak confederation of thirteen independent states. Such national feeling as existed was a new phenomenon growing out of common opposition to British measures. Colonial tradition, divided loyalties, the nature of the economy, and the spirit of a revolt born in opposition to the use of military force to suppress popular liberties all worked against the creation of any new strong central authority capable of mobilizing resources effectively for the long struggle that lay ahead.

The thirteen states proclaiming their independence in 1776 possessed a total population of about 2.5 million people, but not all the males of military age were part of the military potential. About 20 percent were African American slaves who except under special circumstances were not eligible for service, though African Americans did serve in the Revolution in integrated units (a feature that Americans did not repeat until after World War II). A significant minority within the colonies remained loyal to the King, either reluctantly out of sense of obligation or passionately as armed supporters. As in any society, there were also the apathetic and indifferent who swayed with the tide. The genuine patriots still provided a far larger potential of military manpower than the British could possibly transport and supply across the Atlantic, but most of the men of military age were farmers with families. Whatever their patriotic sentiments, few were ready to undertake long terms of military service, fearing that their farms and families at home would suffer. Accustomed to the tradition of short-term militia service under local commanders, they infinitely preferred it to longer terms in the Continental Army.

The economy of the thirteen new states was neither self-sufficient nor truly national. The states were essentially a collection of separate agricultural communities accustomed to exchanging their agricultural surplus for British-manufactured goods and West Indian products. Manufacturing was still in its infancy, and America produced few of the essentials of military supply. Despite diligent efforts to promote domestic production during the war years, the Continental Army had to rely primarily on captures and imports from Europe and the West Indies, run through a British blockade, for much of its military hardware and even for clothing. While the country produced foodstuffs in ample quantity, transport from one area to another was difficult. The normal avenues of commerce ran up and down the rivers, not overland; roads running north and south were few and inadequate. There were always shortages of wagons, boats, and other means of transportation. Under these circumstances, it was far easier to support local militia for a few days or weeks than any sizable and continuously operating national army in the field.

The governmental machinery created after the Declaration was characterized by decentralization and executive weakness. The thirteen new "free and independent states" transformed their existing de facto revolutionary governments into legal state governments by adapting institutions. Almost invariably the new constitutions vested most of the powers of government in the state legislatures, successors to the popular assemblies of the colonial period, and severely restricted the executive authority of the governors. At the national level the same general distrust of strong authority was apparent; and the existing Continental Congress, essentially a gathering of delegates chosen by the state legislatures and without either express powers of its own or an executive to carry out its enactments, was continued as the only central governing body. Articles of Confederation stipulating the terms of union and granting Congress specific but limited powers were drawn up shortly after the Declaration, but jealousies among the states prevented ratification until 1781. In the interim, Congress exercised most of the powers granted it under the Articles; but the Articles did not include either the right to levy taxes or the power to raise military forces directly under its auspices. Congress could only determine the Confederation’s need for troops and money to wage war and set quotas for the states to meet in proportion to their population and wealth. It had no means of ensuring that the states met their quotas; indeed, they seldom did.

One major weakness of this decentralized structure was that it provided no adequate means of financing the war. The state legislatures, possessing the power to tax that Congress lacked, hesitated to use it extensively in the face of popular opposition to taxation and was usually embarrassed to meet even its own expenses. Congress very early took unto itself the power to issue paper money and to negotiate domestic and foreign loans, but it shared these powers with the states, which also printed paper money in profusion and borrowed both at home and abroad to the extent they could. The paper money was a useful expedient in the early part of the war; indeed, the Revolution could not have been carried on without it. But successive issues by Congress and the states led to first gradual and then galloping [[inflation]], leaving the phrase "not worth a Continental" as a permanent legacy in the American language. The process of depreciation and the exhaustion of credit gradually robbed both the states and Congress of the power to pay troops, buy supplies, and otherwise meet the multitudinous expenses of war.

==Evolution of the Continental Army==
It is not surprising that under these circumstances Washington never got the kind of army molded in the European image that he desired. The experience before Boston in 1775 was repeated many times, as local militia had to be called in frequently to give the American Army a numerical superiority in the field. The Continental Army nevertheless became the center of American resistance and its commander, Washington, the symbol of the patriot cause. The extent to which militia could be expected to rally to that cause was very largely determined by the Continental Army’s success or failure in the field.

Though the militia belonged to the states, the Continental Army was a creation of the [[Continental Congress]]. Congress prescribed its size and composition, chose its generals, commissioned its officers, and governed the system for its administration and supply. Suspicious on principle of a standing army and acutely aware of historic examples of seizure of political power by military leaders, its members kept a watchful eye on the Army’s commanders and insisted they defer to civilian authority. Washington countered these suspicions by constantly deferring to congressional wishes, and he was rewarded by the assiduity with which Congress usually adopted his recommendations.

Lacking an executive, Congress had to rely on committees and boards to carry out its policies—unwieldy devices at best and centers of conflicting interest and discord at worst. In June 1776 it set up a Board of War and Ordnance, consisting of five of its members, the lineal ancestor of the War Department. In 1777 Congress changed the composition of the board, directing that it henceforth be made up of persons outside Congress who could devote full time to their military duties. Neither of these devices really worked well, and Congress continually handled administrative matters by action of the entire membership or by appointment of special committees to go to camp. In 1781, with the implementation of the Articles of Confederation, the board was replaced by a single Secretary at War.

Under the Articles of Confederation, while the Continental Congress passed the authorizing legislation setting the terms, size, and configuration of the army, the states remained responsible for raising the troops. Therefore, recruiting and equipping efforts depended heavily on thirteen separate bodies, each acting in response to local conditions and concerns. State authorities called out militia sometimes at the request of Congress and sometimes on their own initiative. When they joined the Continental Army, the militia normally shared in its supplies and equipment. The states, however, maintained an interest in supplying and administering the troops of their own "lines" as well as their militia. As a result, the Continental agents continually went through delicate negotiations with state officials any time they tried to accomplish major tasks. Lines of authority crisscrossed at every turn.

It was an inefficient military system for an organized national effort. Washington could never depend on having enough trained men or supplies. He continually inveighed against sending militia to fight his battles and by early 1776 had concluded that he needed an army enlisted for the duration of the war. Congress did not, as has often been charged, ignore his wishes. In October it voted a new establishment, superseding the plan developed for the army before Boston in 1775 and haphazard arrangements made in the interim for raising Continental regiments in various states. This establishment was to contain eighty-eight infantry regiments, or about 60,000 men, enlisted to serve three years or "during the present war," with each state assigned a quota in proportion to its population. After the disastrous retreat across New Jersey in December 1776, Congress authorized additional regiments to be recruited by Washington’s officers directly into the Continental service, including regiments of artillery and light cavalry. These regiments remained the authorized strength of the Continental Army until 1781, when Congress cut it to fifty-nine.

The large army fell short from the start. Many states found it impossible to sustain their quotas, especially as the war dragged on. By the winter of 1777–1778, the effort to enlist men for the duration of the war collapsed; the following spring, with the sanction of Washington, Congress reverted to a system of shorter enlistments and recommended to the states that they institute a system of drafting men from the militia for one year’s service. This first American wartime draft was applied irregularly because it was not a national program. Each state followed its own policies and procedures, some effectively; but most states performed no better when trying to draft men than they had when trying to encourage volunteers. Bounties, instituted by both the states and the Congress very early in the war and progressively increased one step behind the pace of inflation, also produced only temporary and irregular results.

The coin did have another side. In reality the shortage of arms and ammunition and of facilities for producing them limited the number of men who could be kept continuously in the field as effectively as did the failure of enlistment drives. The militia system allowed many able-bodied males to perform part-time military service and still remain most of the time in the labor force that kept the economy going. It is doubtful whether the American economy could have sustained such an army as Washington and Congress had proposed in 1776, even had there been a central administration with adequate power. As it was, the small Continental Army that did remain in the field intermittently faced extreme hardship and even near starvation. On the other hand, the American ability to raise local armies in any threatened region helped to balance the strategic mobility that the British Fleet gave to the British Army. Although militia generally did not perform well in regular warfare, when highly motivated and ably led they could fight well on terrain suited to their capabilities. Washington and most of his generals recognized this and sought to use the mobilized militia for flank security or to perform envelopments of isolated British detachments and outposts. Given the conditions under which the Revolution was fought, the American military system was more effective than its critics have recognized, though it failed to provide adequately for a sustained military effort over a period of years.

Perhaps Washington’s greatest achievement was simply in maintaining the Continental Army continuously in the field. Despite its many vicissitudes and defeats, that army remained constituted as an ever-present threat to any British field force, while the American militia units solidified patriot control of all the areas not fully garrisoned by the British. The Army of the United States was thus shaped by the war into a distinctively American military organization, neither a replica of a professional European Army on which it was modeled nor yet the type of national army raised by conscription that was to appear in France after the Revolution of 1789.

The Continental Army operated in territorial divisions or departments, each containing one or more maneuver forces. Washington exercised direct command over the main area and defended the Middle States, operating most of the time in the area between New York City and Philadelphia. After the British retreat from Boston, the New England department operated mostly in the Rhode Island area. The Northern Department was located in northern New York, and the Southern Department controlled military operations in the Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia. Two additional departments existed at times with limited independent roles: the Western Department centered on Pittsburgh, and the Canadian Department focused on Canada until the retreat from that region in the summer of 1776. A special territorial area, the Highlands Department, consisting of the mountains in the vicinity of West Point, was an area of such great strategic concern that it deserved its own department.

Although Washington was Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, the commanders of the other departmental armies still operated with a considerable measure of independence. Congress, rather than Washington, named their commanders and communicated directly with them. Of the two "separate armies," the Northern Army was by far the most important until 1777; the small Southern Army performed limited defensive missions in a relatively quiet sector of the country. By 1780 the situation was reversed as the British transferred their main effort to the southern states.

The Continental Army was composed mainly of infantry with limited cavalry and artillery. The basic unit of infantry organization was the regiment, composed of eight or more companies. Regiments were administrative formations; different terms were used when talking about tactical employment. A battalion served as the basic tactical unit. It contained eight platoons, the number needed in linear warfare to provide a constant wave of volley fire. Customarily in both the American and British armies of the Revolution, a regiment of eight companies would form a single battalion with each company serving as a single platoon. A brigade was usually formed of several regiments plus an attached direct support artillery company and was usually commanded by a brigadier general; a division consisted of several brigades commanded by a major general. In the northern areas, the artillery consisted of a brigade of four regiments and several separate companies under the Chief of Artillery, Henry Knox. Knox employed some of the separate companies in direct support of the infantry brigades but used others in garrison or general support assignments. The army’s mounted arm consisted of four regiments of light dragoons, normally employed in reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance duties, plus several smaller units, including two deep-strike partisan corps (a mix of light dragoons and light infantry). Other regular forces included a corps of engineers; three companies of sappers and miners; several military police elements; two regiments of artificers, who handled the servicing and repair of ordnance and vehicles; and a headquarters guard force.

Washington was provided with a staff generally corresponding to that of contemporary European armies. One of his critical staff officers was the Quartermaster General, responsible not only for transportation and delivery of supplies but also for arranging the camp, regulating marches, and employing the army’s watercraft. There were also an Adjutant General (responsible for issuing orders for the commander and administrative paperwork), a Judge [[Advocate]] General, a Paymaster General, a Commissary General of Musters, several Commissary Generals of Provisions (procurement and issue of rations), a Clothier General, a Chief Surgeon, and a Chief Engineer. Each of the separate armies usually had staff officers in these positions, designated as deputies to those of the main army. Early in 1778 the Continental Army introduced a new innovation—the Inspector General. This officer provided a focal point for developing standard battle drills and written tactical texts and during the second half of the war emerged as Washington’s de facto chief of staff.

All these staff officers had primarily administrative and supply functions. The modern concept of a general staff that acts as a sort of collective brain for the commander had no real counterpart in the eighteenth century. For advice on strategy and operations, Washington relied on a council of war made up of his principal subordinate commanders; and, conforming to his original instructions from Congress, he usually consulted the council before making major decisions.

Both organization and staff work suffered from the ills that afflicted the whole military system. Regiments were constantly under strength, were organized differently by the various states, and prior to Valley Forge used varying systems of drills and training. In the promotion of officers in the state lines, Continental commanders shared authority with the states; the confused system gave rise to all sorts of rivalries, jealousies, and resentment, leading to frequent resignations. Staff officers were generally inexperienced, and few had the patience and perseverance to overcome the obstacles posed by divided authority, inadequate means, and poor transportation and communication facilities. The supply and support services of the Continental Army never really functioned efficiently; and with the depreciation in the currency, they came close to collapse.

==The British Problem==
Whatever the American weaknesses, the British government faced no easy task when it undertook to subdue the revolt by military force. Even though England possessed the central administration, stable financial system, and well-organized army and navy that the Americans so sorely lacked, the whole establishment was ill prepared in 1775 for the struggle in America. A large burden of debt incurred in the wars of the preceding century had forced crippling economies on both Army and Navy. British administrative and supply systems, though far superior to anything the Americans could improvise, were also characterized by division and confusion of authority; and there was much corruption in high places.

To suppress the revolt, Britain had first to raise the necessary forces, then transport and sustain them over 3,000 miles of ocean, and finally use them effectively to regain control of a vast and sparsely populated territory. Recruiting men for an eighteenth century army was most difficult. The British government had no power to compel service except in the militia in defense of the homeland, and service in the British Army overseas was immensely unpopular. To meet Howe’s request for 50,000 men to conduct the campaign in 1776, the ministry resorted to an old practice of obtaining auxiliary troops, mercenaries, from many of the small German states, particularly Hesse-Cassell (hence Hessians). These [[German]] states were to contribute almost 30,000 men to the British service during the war—complete organizations with their own officers up to the rank of lieutenant general and schooled in the system of Frederick the Great. Howe did not get his 50,000 men; but by midsummer 1776 his force had grown to 30,000 British and Hessians, and additional reinforcements were sent to Canada during the year.

Maintaining a force of this size proved to be another problem. The attrition rate in America from battle losses, sickness, disease, and desertion was tremendously high. English jails and poorhouses were drained of able-bodied men; bounties were paid; patriotic appeals were launched throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland; and all the ancient methods of impressments were tried. But the British were never able to recruit enough men to meet the needs of their commanders in America and at the same time defend the home islands and provide garrisons in the [[Caribbean]], the [[Mediterranean]], [[Africa]], and [[India]].

Providing adequate support for this army over a long ocean supply line was equally difficult. Even for food and forage, the British Army had to rely primarily on sea lines of supply. Transports were in short supply, the hardships of the two-to-four-month voyage terrible, and the loss of men and supplies to natural causes heavy. Moreover, though the Americans could muster no navy capable of contesting British control of the seas, their privateers and the ships of their infant navy posed a constant threat to unprotected troop and supply transports. British commanders repeatedly had to delay their operations to await the arrival of men and supplies from England.

Once in America, British armies could find no strategic center or centers whose capture would bring victory. Flat, open country where warfare could be carried on in European style was not common. Woods, hills, and swamps suited to the operations of militia and irregulars were plentiful. A British Army that could win victories in the field over the continentals had great difficulty in making those victories meaningful. American armies seemed to possess miraculous powers of recuperation; a British force, once depleted or surrendered, took a tremendous effort to replace.

As long as the British controlled the seas, they could land and establish bases at nearly any point on the long American coastline. The many navigable rivers dotting the coast also provided water avenues of invasion well into the interior. But to crush the revolt, the British Army had to cut loose from coastal bases and rivers. When it did so, its logistical problems multiplied and its lines of communications became vulnerable to constant harassment. British armies almost inevitably came to grief every time they moved very far from the areas where they could be nurtured by supply ships from the homeland. These difficulties, a British colonel asserted in 1777, had "absolutely prevented us this whole war from going fifteen miles from a navigable river."

The British could not, in any case, ever hope to muster enough strength to occupy with their own troops the vast territory they sought to restore to British rule. Their only real hope of meaningful victory was to use Americans loyal to the British cause to control the country, as one British general put it, to help "the good Americans to subdue the bad." However, there were many obstacles to making effective use of the Tories. Patriot organization, weak at the center, was strong at the grass roots, in the local communities throughout America; the Tories were neither well organized nor energetically led. The patriots seized the machinery of local government in most communities at the outset, held it until the British Army appeared in their midst, and then normally regained it after the British departed. Strong local control enabled the patriots to root out the more ardent Tories at the very outset, and by making an example of them to sway the apathetic and indifferent. British commanders were usually disappointed in the number of Tories who flocked to their standards and even more upset by the alacrity with which many of them switched their allegiance when the British Army departed. They found the Tories a demanding, discordant, and puzzling lot; they made no earnest effort to enlist them in British forces until late in the war. By 1781 they had with their armies some 8,000 "provincial rank and file"; perhaps 50,000 in all served the British in some military capacity during the war.

On the frontiers, the British could also expect support from the Indian tribes who almost inevitably drifted into the orbit of whatever power controlled Canada. But support from the Indians was a two-edged sword, for nothing could raise frontier enthusiasm for battle like the threat of an Indian attack. Ruthless Indian raids would often polarize a frontier community that otherwise might have remained sympathetic or at least neutral to the British cause.

Finally, the British had to fight the war with one eye on their ancient enemies in Europe. France, thirsting for revenge for its defeat in the Seven Years’ War, stood ready to aid the American cause if for no other purpose than to weaken British power. By virtue of the Bourbon family connections, [[France]] could almost certainly carry Spain along in any war with England. France and Spain could at the very least provide badly needed money and supplies to sustain the American effort and force the British to divert their forces from the contest in America. At most, the combined Franco-Spanish fleet might well prove a match for the British Fleet and neutralize that essential control of the seas the British needed to carry on the American war. As the war dragged on, the British found themselves increasingly isolated from the international community.

==Strategy==
The story of the American Revolution can hardly be told in terms of long-term strategy and its success or failure. Neither side ever had any really consistent plan for the conduct of the war. The British, who retained the strategic initiative most of the time, failed to use it to great advantage. They were highly uncertain about their objective; they laid plans from year to year and seldom coordinated them even for a single year. Blame for this uncertain approach falls in almost equal part on the administration in England and the commanders in America. [[King]] George III; Lord North, his Principal Minister; and [[Lord]] George Germain, Secretary of State for the American Department, were the three British officials mainly responsible for the conduct of the war. If they never provided the timely guidance that might have been expected of them, their inability to do so came about in part because the commanders in the field never furnished accurate enough predictions of what to expect and differed so much among themselves as to the proper course to pursue. In assessing blame in this fashion, one must keep in mind the difficulties of logistics and communications under which the British labored, for these difficulties made it virtually impossible to coordinate plans over great distances or to assemble men and materials in time to pursue one logical and consistent plan.

The American strategy was primarily defensive and consequently had to be shaped largely in terms of countering British moves. Uncertainties as to the supply of both men and materials acted on the American side even more effectively to thwart the development of a consistent plan for winning the war. Yet Washington was never so baffled by the conditions of the war or uncertain of his objective as were the various British commanders. After some early blunders, he soon learned both his own and the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses and did his best to exploit them. Though unable to develop a consistent plan, he did try to develop a consistent line of action. He sought to maintain his principal striking force in a central position to block any British advance into the interior; to be neither too bold nor too timid in seeking battle for limited objectives; to avoid the destruction of his army at all costs; and to find some means of concentrating a sufficient force to strike a decisive offensive blow whenever the British overreached themselves. He showed a better appreciation than did the British commanders of the advantages in mobility their Navy gave them. After 1778, when the French entered the war, he clearly saw that the decisive blow he desired could be struck only by a combined effort of the Continental Army and the French Fleet.

==The British Offensive in 1776==
If the British ever had a single strategic objective in the war, it was the Hudson River–Lake Champlain line. The British believed that by taking and holding this line they would separate [[New England]], considered to be the principal center of the rebellion, from colonies they considered more malleable in the south. Howe proposed to make this the main objective of his campaign in 1776 by landing at New York, securing a base of operations there, and then pushing north. He wanted to concentrate the entire British force in America in New York, but the British government diverted part of it to Canada in early 1776 to repel the American invasion, laying the groundwork for the divided command that was so to plague British operations thereafter.

After the evacuation of Boston, Howe stayed at [[Halifax]] from March until June, awaiting the arrival of supplies and reinforcements. While he tarried, the British government ordered another diversion in the south, aimed at encouraging the numerous loyalists who, according to the royal governors watching from their havens on board British warships, were waiting only for the appearance of a British force to rise and overthrow rebel rule. Unfortunately for the British, a naval squadron and army expedition sent from Ireland under Sir Peter Parker was delayed and did not arrive off the American coast until late in May. By this time all hopes of effective cooperation with the Tories had been dashed. Loyalist contingents had been completely defeated and dispersed in [[Virginia]], [[North Carolina]], and [[South Carolina]].

Parker joined Lt. Gen. [[[Henry Clinton]], sent south by Howe, off the North Carolina coast. Undeterred by the local setbacks, they determined to attack Charleston, the largest city in the south. There, South Carolina militia and newly raised continentals from the Carolinas and Virginia had prepared and manned defenses under the guidance of Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, whom Washington had dispatched south to assist them. The South Carolinians, contrary to Lee’s advice, centered their defenses in Fort Moultrie, a palmetto log fort constructed on Sullivan’s Island, commanding the approach to the harbor. It was an unwise decision, somewhat comparable to that at Bunker Hill, but fortunately for the defenders the British had to mount an uncoordinated attack in haste. Clinton’s troops landed on nearby [[Battle of Long Island|Long Island]], but on the day the Navy attacked, June 28, the water proved too deep for them to wade across to Sullivan’s Island as expected. The British Army consequently sat idly by while the gunners in Fort Moultrie devastated the British warships. Sir Peter suffered the ultimate indignity when his pants were set afire.

The battered British Fleet hastily embarked the British soldiers and sailed north to join Howe at New York, for it was already behind schedule. For three years following the fiasco at Charleston the British were to leave the south unmolested. Overconfident Americans decided they did not need to send any large regular forces to the south, creating a weakness that would come back to haunt them. The latent loyalists in the south, whatever their potential strength in 1775, never recovered from the devastating blows they suffered while expecting British help. Loyalist refugees in London and New York, however, continued to insist that large numbers of loyal subjects of the King were still waiting for the British in the south, ready to rise again if only British troops returned.

Howe was meanwhile beset by other delays in the arrival of transports from England, and his attack did not get under way until late August, leaving insufficient time before the advent of winter to carry through the planned advance along the Hudson River–Lake Champlain line. He therefore started his invasion of New York with only the limited objective of gaining a foothold for the campaign the following year.

The British commander had, when his force was all assembled, an army of about 32,000 men, supported by a powerful fleet under the command of his brother, [[Admiral]] Richard Howe. To oppose him, Washington had brought most of his army down from Boston; Congress exerted its utmost efforts to reinforce him by raising Continental regiments in the surrounding states and issuing a general call for the militia. Few of Washington’s roughly 19,000 troops could match Howe’s forces in training, nor did his senior commanders have much in the way of experience in maneuvering large forces in the open.

Washington and Congress made the same decision the South Carolinians had made at [[Charleston]] and Maj. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton had made in Canada in 1775—to defend their territory in the most forward positions—and they paid the price for their mistake. The geography of the area gave the side possessing naval supremacy an almost insuperable advantage. The city of New York stood on Manhattan Island, surrounded by the Hudson, Harlem, and East Rivers. There was only one connecting link with the mainland, Kingsbridge across the Harlem River at the northern tip of Manhattan. Across the East River on Long Island, Brooklyn Heights stood in a position dominating the southern tip of [[Manhattan]]. With the naval forces at their disposal, the Howes could land troops on either Long Island or Manhattan proper and send warships a considerable distance up either the East or the [[Hudson River]].

Washington decided he must defend Brooklyn Heights on Long Island if he was to defend Manhattan. He therefore divided his army between the two places—a violation of the principle of mass and the first step toward disaster. For all practical purposes, command on Long Island was also divided. Maj. Gen. [[Nathanael Greene]], to whom Washington first entrusted the command, came down with malaria and was replaced by Maj. Gen. John Sullivan. Not completely satisfied with this arrangement, at the last moment Washington placed Maj. Gen. [[Israel Putnam]] over Sullivan; but Putnam hardly had time to become acquainted with the situation before the British struck. The forces on Long Island, numbering about 10,000, were disposed in fortifications on Brooklyn Heights and in forward positions in back of a line of thickly wooded hills that ran across the southern end of the island. Sullivan was in command on the left of the American forward line, Brig. Gen. William Alexander on the right. Four roads ran through the hills toward the American positions. Unfortunately Sullivan, in violation of the principle of security, left the Jamaica-Bedford road virtually unguarded.

Howe consequently was able to teach the Americans lessons in maneuver and surprise. On August 22 he landed a force of 20,000 on the southwestern tip of Long Island and, in a surprise attack up the Jamaica-Bedford road against the American left flank, crumpled the entire American position. Alexander’s valiant fight on the right went for naught as some of the more inexperienced American units along the line fled in terror before the British and Hessian bayonets, falling back to the fortifications on Brooklyn Heights. Had Howe pushed his advantage immediately, he might have carried the heights and destroyed half of the American Army then and there. Instead, perhaps rendered cautious by his repulse the previous year at Bunker Hill, he halted at nightfall and began to dig trenches, signaling an intent to take the heights by "regular approaches" in traditional eighteenth century fashion. Washington managed to evacuate his forces across the East River on the night of August 29. According to one theory, wind and weather stopped the British warships from entering the river to prevent the escape; according to another, the Americans had placed impediments in the river that effectively barred their entry. In any case, it was a narrow escape, made possible in large measure by the skill, bravery, and perseverance of Col. John Glover’s Marblehead Regiment, infantrymen who had been recruited from Massachusetts fishing villages, who manned the boats.

Washington had two weeks to prepare his defenses on Manhattan before Howe struck again, landing a force at Kip’s Bay above the city of New York (now about 34th Street) on September 15 under the cover of a devastating naval bombardment. Raw Connecticut militia posted behind shallow trenches at this point broke and ran "as if the Devil was in them," defying even the efforts of a raging Washington to halt them. Howe once again had an opportunity to split the American Army in two and destroy half, but again he delayed midway across the island to wait until his entire force had landed. General Putnam was able to bring the troops stationed in the city up the west side of Manhattan to join their compatriots in new fortifications on Harlem Heights. There, the Americans held out for another month and even won a morale-enhancing skirmish; but this position was vulnerable to being outflanked.

In mid-October Howe landed again in Washington’s rear at Pell’s Point. The American commander then finally evacuated the Manhattan trap via Kingsbridge and took up a new position at White Plains. He left a garrison behind to hold Forts Washington and Lee, on opposite sides of the Hudson, in an attempt to block British ships from going up the river. Howe launched a probing attack on the American position at White Plains and was repulsed; but Washington, sensing his inability to meet the British in battle on equal terms, moved away to the north toward the Hudson highlands. Uncertain of Howe’s next move, Washington divided his forces into three elements. Lee with one contingent remained on the east side of the Hudson to counter any advance into [[Connecticut]]. Washington crossed over to the west bank with a comparable force to counter any attempt by Howe to invade [[New Jersey]]. Maj. Gen. William Heath occupied the forts in the Highlands themselves to provide the lines of communication between the two maneuver forces and to prevent a British advance up the river. On November 16 Howe turned against Fort Washington and with the support of British warships on the Hudson stormed it successfully, capturing 3,000 American troops and large quantities of valuable munitions. Greene then hastily evacuated Fort Lee; by the end of November Washington, with mere remnants of his army, was in full retreat across New Jersey with Lord Charles Cornwallis, detached by Howe, in hot pursuit.

While Washington was suffering these disastrous defeats, the army that had been gathered was slowly melting away. Militia left by whole companies when their periods of service expired. Casualties and disease took their toll among the continentals. By early December Washington had crossed the Delaware River into [[Pennsylvania]], where his small force began to regroup and draw supplies from Philadelphia’s extensive network of depots. Other regiments, including forces released by the British retreat to Canada, slowly joined him while other regiments from Lee’s force swung through the Highlands and started south toward Washington (without their general, who was captured in a tavern by a British cavalry raid). Washington’s situation was precarious, but he determined to go on the offensive as soon as possible and began planning a lightning descent on West Jersey toward the end of December.

Neither the unreliability of the militia nor the short period of enlistment fully explained the debacle that had befallen the Continental Army. Washington’s generalship also came under criticism. In contrast to the defeat of British invasion forces at Charleston and Lake Champlain, where militia seemed to be more effective than Continental regulars, the main defenses of the important city of New York crumpled at the first blow. Many faulted the Commander in Chief’s decision to hold Fort Washington. General Lee, the ex–British colonel, ordered by Washington to bring his forces down from New York to join him behind the Delaware, delayed, believing that he might himself salvage the American cause by making incursions into New Jersey. He wrote Horatio Gates, "entre nous [between us], a certain great man is most damnably deficient."

There was only one bright spot in the picture in the autumn of 1776. While Howe was routing Washington around New York City, other British forces under Carleton were attempting to follow up the advantage they had gained in repulsing the attack on Canada earlier in the year. Carleton rather leisurely built a flotilla of boats to carry British forces down Lake Champlain and Lake George, intending at least to reduce the fort at Ticonderoga before winter. Benedict Arnold countered by throwing together a much weaker flotilla of American boats to contest the British passage. Arnold lost this naval action on the lakes, but he so delayed Carleton’s advance that the British commander reached Ticonderoga too late in the year to consider undertaking a siege. He returned his army to winter quarters in Canada, leaving the British with no advance base from which to launch the next year’s campaign. Once again Arnold had shown himself one of the most dynamic and courageous of the patriot commanders.

Although the consequences were to be far reaching, this limited victory did little to dispel the gloom that fell on the patriots after Washington’s defeats in New York. The British, aware that Continental enlistments expired at the end of the year, had high hopes that the American Army would simply fade away and the rebellion would collapse. Howe halted Cornwallis’ pursuit of Washington and sent Clinton with a detachment of troops under naval escort to seize Newport, Rhode Island. He then dispersed his troops into winter quarters, establishing a line of posts in New Jersey at Perth Amboy, New Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown and retiring himself to New York. Howe had gained the object of the 1776 campaign, a strong foothold, and possibly, as he thought at the time, a great deal more.

===Trenton and Princeton===
[[Image:washington-deleware.jpg|300px|right|thumb|''Washington Crossing the Delaware'', by Emmanuel Leutze (1850)]]
While Howe rested comfortably in New York, he dispatched Clinton to capture Newport, Rhode Island, as a much-desired winter anchorage for the Royal Navy. Washington took advantage of this distraction. By the last week of December 1776, Washington had built up a small, but competent striking force of veteran regiments about 7,000 strong. If he was to use this force, he would have to do so before the enlistments expired on December 31. With great boldness, Washington formulated a plan to strike enemy garrisons along the [[Delaware]] River early on the twenty-sixth of December, when the troops might be expected to have relaxed their guard for holiday revelry. The plan was for American forces to cross the river simultaneously and conduct raids on the outposts at Trenton and Bordentown, each held by a reinforced brigade of Hessian soldiers. A Continental force of around 2,400 men under Washington’s personal command was to cross the Delaware at McConkey’s Ferry above Trenton and then proceed in two columns by different routes, converging on the opposite ends of the main street of Trenton in the early morning of December 26. A second force, mainly militia under Col. John Cadwalader, was to cross below near Bordentown to attack the Hessian garrison there. A third force, also militia, under Brig. Gen. James Ewing, was to cross directly opposite Trenton to block the Hessian route of escape across Assunpink Creek.

Christmas night was cold, windy, and snowy; and the Delaware River was filled with blocks of ice. These adverse conditions prevented Cadwalader and Ewing from fulfilling their parts of the plan. Driven on by Washington’s indomitable will, the main force did cross as planned; the two columns, commanded respectively by Greene and Sullivan, converged on Trenton at eight o’clock in the morning of December 26, taking the Hessians completely by surprise. A New England private noted in his diary for that day: "This morning at 4 a clock we set off with our Field pieces and Marched 9 miles to Trenton where we ware attacked by a Number of Hushing and we Toock 1000 of them besides killed some. Then we marched back and got to the River at Night and got over all the Hushing." This rather undramatic description of a very dramatic event was not far wrong, except in attributing the attack to the "Hushings." The Hessians surrendered after a fight lasting only an hour and a half. Forty were killed, and the prisoner count was 918. Only 400 escaped to Bordentown, only because Ewing was not in place to block their escape becasue he could not cross the river. The Americans lost only 4 wounded, among the wounded being future President [[James Monroe]].

Encouraged by this success, Washington determined to make another foray. By an impassioned appeal to the patriotism of the men, supplemented by an offer of a $10 bounty in hard money, he persuaded at least part of his old army to remain for six more weeks. With a force of around 5,000 Washington again crossed the Delaware on the night of December 30–31. By this time Cornwallis had hastily gathered together the scattered British garrisons in New Jersey and took up a position confronting Washington at Trenton on January 2, 1777. Convinced that he had the Americans in a trap, he put off battle until the next day because of the exhausted state of his troops. In the night Washington slipped away, leaving campfires burning brightly to deceive the British. The next morning he struck another surprise blow at Princeton, inflicting heavy losses on three British regiments just leaving the town to join Cornwallis. Washington then went into winter quarters in the hills around Morristown, New Jersey. Cornwallis did not pursue. The British had had enough of winter warfare, and Howe drew in his outposts in New Jersey to New Brunswick and Perth Amboy.

Trenton and Princeton not only offset the worst effects of the disastrous defeats in New York but also restored Washington’s prestige as a commander with friend and foe alike. In the execution of the two strokes east of the Delaware, Washington had applied the principles of offensive, surprise, and maneuver with great success and finally achieved stature as a military commander. If these victories did not assure him that he could recruit such an army as Congress had voted, they did at least guarantee that he would be able to field a force the following year. Sir William Howe found that, despite his smashing rout of the Americans in New York, he was left with little more than that city, a foothold in New Jersey, and the port of Newport in Rhode Island. The rebellion was far from being crushed.

==The Campaign of 1777==
With secure bases at New York and Newport, Sir William Howe had a chance to get the early start in 1777 that had been denied him the previous year. His first plan, advanced on November 30, 1776, was probably the most comprehensive put forward by any British commander during the war. He proposed to maintain a small force of about 8,000 to contain Washington in New Jersey and 7,000 to garrison New York, while sending one column of 10,000 from Newport into New England and another column of 10,000 from New York up the Hudson to form a junction with a British force moving down from Canada. On the assumption that these moves would be successful by autumn, he would next capture [[Philadelphia]], the rebel capital, then make the southern provinces the "objects of the winter." For this plan, Howe requested 35,000 men, 15,000 more effective troops than he had remaining at the end of the 1776 campaign. Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State responsible for strategic planning for the American theater, could promise Howe only 8,000 replacements. Even before receiving this news, but evidently influenced by Trenton and Princeton, Howe refined his plan and proposed to devote his main effort in 1777 to taking Philadelphia. On March 3, 1777, Germain informed Howe that the Philadelphia plan was approved but that there might be only 5,500 reinforcements. At the same time Germain and the king urged a "warm diversion" against New England.

Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne, who had succeeded in obtaining the separate military command in Canada, submitted his plan for an advance south to "a junction with Howe." Germain and the king also approved this plan on March 29, though they had earlier approved of Howe’s intention to go to Philadelphia. Because of the lag in communicating across the Atlantic, Germain and other senior planners in London viewed themselves merely as coordinators and providers of resources, not as operational commanders. Operational decisions, they felt, should be made by the commanders on the scene. They seem to have expected that Burgoyne and Howe would work together without direction from London. Specifically, they believed that Howe would be able to form his junction with Burgoyne by the warm diversion or that he would take Philadelphia quickly and then turn north to aid Burgoyne. In any case, they felt sure that Howe’s drive south would draw Washington and most American troops away from Burgoyne. Once Germain approved the two separate plans, difficulties in communicating in a timely manner left Howe and Burgoyne to go their separate ways.

Howe’s Philadelphia plan left only enough force in New York under General Sir Henry Clinton for what the latter would call "a damn’d starved offensive," but Clinton’s orders called upon him only to assist Burgoyne’s drive. His first priority remained the safety and security of New York City and its outposts. There is no question that Burgoyne knew before he left England for Canada that Howe was going to Philadelphia, but ambitious "Gentleman Johnny" was determined to make a reputation in the American war. Never one to doubt his own abilities and having enjoyed swift victory by driving the Americans from the Ticonderoga complex with minimal effort, Burgoyne quickly convinced himself that he could succeed alone. Even when he learned certainly on August 3, 1777, that he could not expect Howe’s cooperation, he persisted in his design. As Howe thought Pennsylvania was filled with loyalists, Burgoyne cherished the illusion that legions of Tories in upstate New York and western New England were simply awaiting the appearance of the king’s troops to rally to the colors.
[[Image:Marquis de Lafayette.jpg|200px|right|thumb|Marie Paul Yves Roch Gilbert de Motier, the
Marquis de Lafayette]]
[[Image:VonSteuben.jpg|200px|right|thumb|Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben]]
Again in 1777 the late arrival of Howe’s reinforcements and supply ships gave Washington time that he sorely needed. Men to form the new Continental Army came in slowly, and not until June did the Americans have a force of 8,000. On the northern line, the defenses were even more thinly manned. Supplies for troops in the field were also short, but the arrival of the first three ships bearing secret aid from France vastly improved the situation. They were evidence of the covert support of the French government; a mission Congress sent to France was meanwhile working diligently to enlist open aid and to embroil France in a war with England. The French Foreign Minister, Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, had already decided to take that risk when and if the American rebels demonstrated their serious purpose and ability to fulfill it by some signal victory in the field.With the first foreign material aid in 1777, the influx of foreign officers into the American Army began. These officers were a mixed blessing. Most were adventurers in search of fortune or of reputation with little aptitude for adjusting themselves to American conditions. Few were willing to accept any but the highest ranks. Nevertheless, many brought with them professional military knowledge and competence the Continental Army sorely lacked. When the misfits were culled out, the knowledge and competence were used to considerable advantage. Louis DuPortail, a Frenchman, and Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a Pole, did much to advance the art of engineering in the Continental Army. Casimir Pulaski, another Pole, organized its first genuine cavalry contingent. Johann de Kalb and [[Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben]], both Germans, and Maj. Gen. Gilbert du Montier, the [[Marquis de Lafayette]], an influential French nobleman who financed his own way, were all to make valuable contributions as trainers and leaders. But as the 1777 campaign began, these foreign volunteers had not yet had time to make much of an impact on the Continental Army.

In the spring of 1777 Washington’s army occupied high ground at Middlebrook, New Jersey, in a position either to bar Howe’s overland route to Philadelphia or to move rapidly up the Hudson to oppose any northward advance. Washington confidently expected Howe to move north to form a junction with Burgoyne but decided he himself must stay in front of the main British Army wherever it went. Following the principle of economy of force, he disposed a small part of his army under Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam in fortifications guarding the approaches up the Hudson, and at a critical moment detached a small force to aid Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler against Burgoyne. The bulk of his army he kept in front of Howe in an effort to defend Philadelphia. Forts were built along the Delaware River, and other steps were taken to block the approach to the Continental capital by sea.

In the effort to defend Philadelphia, Washington again failed but hardly so ignominiously as he had the year before in New York. With American forts and a galley squadron blocking a direct advance up the Delaware River, in August Howe put most of his army on board ship and sailed down the coast and up the Chesapeake Bay to Head of Elk (now Elkton) in Maryland, putting himself even farther away from Burgoyne. Surprised by Howe’s movement, Washington did not oppose the landing but rapidly shifted his own force south and took up a position at Chad’s Ford on Brandywine Creek, blocking the approach to Philadelphia.

There, on September 11, 1777, Howe executed a flanking movement reminiscent of his tactics on Long Island the previous year. He sent Lt. Gen. Wilhelm van Knyphausen’s largely Hessian column directly against the American position at Chad’s Ford to fix the American attention on that part of the battlefield. During the predawn darkness Howe and Lord Charles Cornwallis took the larger part of the British army north by back roads and crossed the Brandywine at unguarded lesser fords miles upstream, hoping to take Washington from the flank and rear.

Confusing reports caused by inadequate reconnaissance befuddled Maj. Gen. John Sullivan, who commanded the American forces on that flank. Washington himself realized what was happening only at the eleventh hour. He immediately ordered Sullivan to lay a trap, set up a reverse slope ambush on high ground, and shifted reinforcements under Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene from positions facing Knyphausen to extend Sullivan’s line. Cornwallis and Howe moved slowly, preventing the British plan from working as intended; ironically, that very slowness worked to their advantage. Because the Americans lacked iron discipline, they kept creeping up to the crest of their ridge to look for the British. Alert scouts, mostly Hessian jaegers (woodsmen armed with rifles), noted the movement; and Howe avoided walking into the trap.

What followed was one of the most intense battles of the war. In a series of five separate attacks, the British drove Sullivan off the high ground in some confusion. General Greene with two brigades of Virginians allowed Sullivan’s men to fall back through their lines and then carried out a valiant rear-guard action lasting until dark. Once he could hear the sounds of the fighting, Knyphausen drove across the ford and struck Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne’s defenses that had been weakened by the transfers, forcing the Americans to fall back. Darkness and the heavy, bloody fighting left Howe’s men too exhausted to pursue, and the Continental Army retired in good order to Chester. However, the way to Philadelphia was now left open to Howe.

Howe followed his victory at the Brandywine with a series of maneuvers comparable to those he had executed in New York and entered Philadelphia with a minimum of fighting on September 26. A combined attack of British Army and Navy forces shortly afterward reduced the forts on the Delaware and opened the river as a British supply line.

On entering Philadelphia, Howe dispersed his forces, stationing 9,000 men at Germantown, north of the city; 3,000 in New Jersey; and the rest in Philadelphia. As Howe had repeated his performance in New York, Washington sought to repeat Trenton by a surprise attack on Germantown. The plan was much like that he used at Trenton but involved far more complicated movements by much larger bodies of troops. Four columns (two assault forces of continentals under Sullivan and Greene and two flank security forces of militia), moving at night over different roads, were to converge simultaneously on Germantown at dawn on October 4. The plan violated the principle of simplicity, for such a maneuver would have been difficult even for well-trained professionals to execute. The two columns of continentals arrived at different times and fired on each other in an early morning fog. Despite losing the element of surprise, the Americans drove forward and smashed two elite battalions of British light infantry.

Initial success rapidly turned to disappointment. Part of a British regiment took cover in Cliveden, the Chew family mansion, and opened a galling fire on Americans attempting to move up or join the advance. Instead of isolating and bypassing this annoyance, the inexperienced American generals held up a large portion of the [[Maryland]] Division while they argued whether they could leave a "fortress" in their rear. The British, though surprised, had better discipline and cohesion and were able to re-form and send fresh troops into the fray. Once Washington realized that he had lost the chance for a decisive victory, he wisely chose to avoid risking his army and broke contact.The Americans retreated about 8:00 a.m., leaving Howe’s troops in command of the field.

After Germantown Howe once again concentrated his army and moved to confront Washington at Whitemarsh, hoping to lure the Virginian into a rash attack. The ploy failed, so he withdrew to winter quarters in Philadelphia without giving battle. Washington chose the site for his own winter quarters at a place called Valley Forge, twenty miles northwest of the city. Howe had gained his objective, but it proved of no lasting value to him. Congress fled west to York, Pennsylvania. No swarms of loyalists rallied to the British standards. And Howe had left Burgoyne to lose a whole British army in the north.

Burgoyne set out from Canada in June, his object to reach Albany by fall. His force was divided into two parts. The first and largest part (7,200 British and Hessian regulars and 650 Tories, Canadians, and Indians under his personal command) was to take the route down Lake Champlain to Ticonderoga and thence via Lake George to the Hudson. The second (700 regulars and 1,000 Tories and Indians under Col. Barry St. Leger) was to move via Lake Ontario to Oswego and thence down the Mohawk Valley to join Burgoyne before Albany. In his preparations, Burgoyne evidently forgot the lesson the British had learned in the French and Indian War: In the wilderness, troops had to be prepared to travel light and fight like Indians. He carried 138 pieces of artillery and a heavy load of officers’ personal baggage. Numerous ladies of high and low estate accompanied the expedition. When he started down the lakes, Burgoyne did not have enough horses and wagons to transport his artillery and baggage once he had to leave the water and move overland.

At first Burgoyne’s American opposition was very weak: only about 2,500 continentals at Ticonderoga and about 450 at old Fort Stanwix, the sole American bulwark in the Mohawk Valley. Dissension among the Americans was rife; the New Englanders refused to support Schuyler, the aristocratic New Yorker who commanded the Northern Army, and openly intrigued to replace him with their own favorite, Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates. Ticonderoga fell to Burgoyne on June 27 all too easily. The American forces dispersed, and Burgoyne pursued the remnants down to Skenesborough. Once that far along, he decided to continue overland to the Hudson instead of returning to Ticonderoga to float his force down Lake George, though much of his impedimenta still had to be carried by boat down the lake.

The overland line of advance was already a nightmare, running along wilderness trails, through marshes, and across wide ravines and creeks swollen by abnormally heavy rains. Schuyler, who had wrestled with supply problems during the French and Indian Wars on this very ground, adopted the tactic of making it even worse by destroying bridges, felling trees into Burgoyne’s path, and digging trenches to let the waters of swamps onto drier ground. The British were able to move at a rate of little more than a mile a day and took until July 29 to reach Fort Edward on the Hudson. By that time Burgoyne was desperately short of horses, wagons, and oxen. Yet Schuyler, with an unstable force of 4,500 men discouraged by continual retreats, was in no position to give battle.

Washington did what he could to strengthen the Northern Army at this juncture. He first dispatched Maj. Gen. [[Benedict Arnold]], his most aggressive field commander, and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, a Massachusetts man noted for his influence with the New England militia. On August 16 he detached Col. Daniel Morgan with 500 riflemen from the main army in Pennsylvania and ordered them along with 750 men from Putnam’s force in the New York highlands to join Schuyler. The riflemen were calculated to furnish an antidote for Burgoyne’s Indians who despite his efforts to restrain them were terrorizing the countryside.

It was the rising militia, rather than Washington, that was to provide the Northern Army with the most numerous reinforcements. Nothing worked more to produce this result than Burgoyne’s employment of Indians. The murder and scalping of a white woman, Jane McCrea, dramatized the Indian threat as nothing else probably could have. New England militiamen now began to rally to the cause, though they still refused to cooperate with Schuyler. New Hampshire commissioned John Stark, a colonel in the Continental Army and a veteran of Bunker Hill and Trenton, as a brigadier general in the state service (a rank Congress had denied him), and Stark quickly assembled 2,000 men. Refusing Schuyler’s request that he join the main army, Stark took up a position at Bennington in southern Vermont to guard the New England frontier. On August 11 Burgoyne detached a force of 650 men under Hessian Col. Friedrich Baum to forage for cattle, horses, and transport in the very area Stark was occupying. At Bennington on August 16, Stark annihilated Baum’s force and nearly did the same to a second column of reinforcements Burgoyne sent to rescue Baum. Burgoyne not only failed to secure his much-needed supplies and transport but also lost about a tenth of his command.

Meanwhile, St. Leger with his Tories and Indians had appeared before Fort Stanwix on August 2. The garrison, fearing massacre by the Indians, was determined to hold out to the bitter end. On August 4, the Tryon County militia under Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer set out to relieve the fort but was ambushed by the Indians in a wooded ravine near Oriskany. The militia, under the direction of a mortally wounded Herkimer, took cover in the woods and fought a bloody, ferocious, close-quarters battle all afternoon in a summer thunderstorm. Both sides suffered heavy losses; and though the militia was unable to relieve Stanwix, the losses discouraged St. Leger’s Indians, who were already restless in the static siege operation at Stanwix. More significantly, the Continental garrison of the fort sallied out during the Oriskany fight and destroyed most of St. Leger’s camp and siege supplies.

Despite Shuyler’s own weak position, when he learned of the plight of the Stanwix garrison he courageously detached Benedict Arnold with 950 continentals to march to its relief. Arnold devised a ruse that took full advantage of the dissatisfaction and natural superstition of the Indians. Employing a half-wit Dutchman, his clothes shot full of holes, and a friendly Oneida Indian as his messengers, Arnold spread the rumor that the continentals were approaching "as numerous as the leaves on the trees." The Indians, who had special respect for any madman, departed in haste; and St. Leger was forced to abandon the siege and retreat to Canada.

Bennington and Stanwix were serious blows to Burgoyne. By early September he knew he could expect help from neither Howe nor St. Leger. Disillusioned about the Tories, he wrote Germain: "The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with Congress in principle and zeal; and their measures are executed with a secrecy and dispatch that are not to be equaled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia in the amount of three or four thousand assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their subsistence, etc., and the alarm over, they return to their farms." Nevertheless, gambler that he was, Burgoyne crossed the Hudson to the west side on September 13 and 14. A victim of his own preconceptions and already seeking to protect himself politically, Burgoyne now stated that his orders required him to get to Albany at all costs. While his supply problem daily became worse, his Indians, sensing approaching disaster, drifted off into the forests, leaving him with little means of gaining intelligence of the American dispositions.

The American forces were meanwhile gathering strength. Congress finally deferred to New England sentiment on August 19 and replaced Schuyler with Gates. Gates was more the beneficiary than the cause of the improved situation, but his appointment helped morale and encouraged the New England militia. (Washington’s emissary, General Lincoln, also did his part.) Gates did not change Schuyler’s tactics and continued to take full advantage of Burgoyne’s plight. He advanced his forces four miles north and took up a position, surveyed and prepared by the Polish engineer Kosciusko on Bemis Heights, a few miles below Saratoga. Against this position, Burgoyne launched his attack on September 19 and was repulsed with heavy losses. In the battle, usually known as the First Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Arnold persuaded Gates to let him go forward to counter the British attack. Colonel Morgan’s riflemen, in a wooded terrain well suited to the use of their specialized weapon, took a heavy toll of British officers and men.
===Saratoga===
[[Image:Surrender of General Burgoyne.jpg|300px|right|thumb|''Surrender of General Burgoyne'', by John Trumbull, c. 1819]]
After Freeman’s Farm, the lines remained stable for three weeks. Burgoyne had heard that Clinton, with the force Howe had left in New York, had started north to relieve him. Clinton in fact had finally received reinforcements from Europe and launched a lightning strike against Putnam’s weakened Highlands Department. The British stormed Forts Clinton and Montgomery on the Hudson on October 6 and forced a path through the mountains. Clinton could not do more because he received explicit orders from Howe to send the reinforcements on to Philadelphia. He took a chance and sent out a small diversion to Kingston but returned to New York when that probe indicated it could do nothing of value.

Burgoyne was left to his fate. Gates strengthened his entrenchments and calmly awaited the attack he was sure Burgoyne would have to make. Militia reinforcements increased his forces to around 10,000 by October 7. Meanwhile, Burgoyne’s position grew more desperate. Unable to hold his supply line open, Burgoyne faced a choice. He could cut his losses and fall back toward Canada and safety, or he could stay and fight. He chose to stay and fight in hopes of defeating the army in front of him and pushing on to Albany. Food was running out; the animals had grazed the meadows bare; and every day more men slipped into the forest, deserting the lost cause. With little intelligence of American strength or dispositions, on October 7 Burgoyne sent out a reconnaissance in force to feel out the American positions. On learning that the British were approaching, Gates sent out a contingent including Morgan’s riflemen to meet them; a second battle developed, usually known as Bemis Heights or the Second Battle of Freeman’s Farm. Although Gates intended to fight a cautious, defensive battle, he lost control of his own men. Arnold, an open supporter of Schuyler and critic of the cautious Gates, had been placed under house arrest for insubordination. When Arnold learned of Burgoyne’s probe, he impetuously broke arrest and rushed into the fray, distinguishing himself before he was wounded in leading an attack on Breymann’s Redoubt. The British suffered severe losses, five times those of the Americans, and were driven back to their fortified positions.

Two days after the battle, Burgoyne withdrew to a position in the vicinity of [[Battle of Saratoga|Saratoga]]. Militia soon worked around to his rear and hemmed him in from the north as well. His position hopeless, Burgoyne finally capitulated on October 17 at Saratoga. The total prisoner count was nearly 6,000, and great quantities of military stores fell into American hands. The victory at Saratoga brought the Americans out well ahead in the campaign of 1777 despite the loss of Philadelphia. What had been at stake soon became obvious. In February 1778 France negotiated a treaty of alliance with the American states, tantamount to a declaration of war against England.

===Valley Forge===
[[Image:Washington at Valley Forge.jpg|300px|right|thumb|''Washington at Valley Forge'', William B.T. Trego, 1883]]
The name of Valley Forge has come to stand, and rightly so, as a patriotic symbol of suffering, courage, and perseverance. The hard core of continentals who stayed with Washington during that bitter winter of 1777–1778 suffered much indeed. Supply problems caused some men to go without shoes, pants, and blankets. Weeks passed when there was no meat, and men were reduced to boiling and eating their shoes. It was no place for "summer soldiers and sunshine patriots."

The symbolism of Valley Forge should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the suffering was largely unnecessary. While the soldiers shivered and went hungry, food rotted and clothing lay unused in depots throughout the country. True, access to Valley Forge was difficult, but little determined effort was made to get supplies into the area. The supply and transport system had broken down. In mid-1777 both the Quartermaster and Commissary Generals resigned along with numerous subordinate officials in both departments, mostly merchants who found private trade more lucrative. Congress, in refuge at York, Pennsylvania, and split into factions, found it difficult to find replacements. If there was not, as most historians now believe, an organized cabal seeking to replace Washington with Gates, there were many, both in and out of the Army, who were dissatisfied with the Commander in Chief; and much intrigue went on. Gates was made President of the new Board of War set up that winter, and at least two of its members were Washington’s enemies. In the administrative chaos at the height of the Valley Forge crisis, there was no functioning Quartermaster General at all.

Washington weathered the storm, and the Continental Army would emerge from Valley Forge a more effective force than before. With his advice, Congress instituted reforms in the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments that temporarily restored the effectiveness of both agencies. Washington’s ablest subordinate, General Greene, reluctantly accepted the post of Quartermaster General. The Continental Army itself gained a new professional competence from the training given by Steuben.

Steuben appeared at Valley Forge in February 1778. He represented himself as a baron, a title of dubious validity, and as a former lieutenant general on the staff of [[Frederick the Great]]. (In reality he had been only a captain. The fraud was harmless, for Steuben had a broad knowledge of military affairs and had the ability to communicate with the American soldiers and teach them the basics of their new craft.) Appointed by Washington as Inspector General in charge of a training program, Steuben vigorously drilled the troops that remained under arms during the winter of 1777–1778 at Valley Forge. He taught the Continental Army a simplified but effective version of the drill formations and movements of European armies and the proper care of equipment and supplemented American marksmanship with instruction on the use of the bayonet, a weapon in which British superiority had previously been marked. All through the training, Steuben never lost sight of a major difference between the American citizen-soldier and the European professional. He early noted that American soldiers had to be told why they did things before they would do them well, and he applied this philosophy in his training program. His trenchant good humor and vigorous profanity delighted the Continental soldiers and made the rigorous drill more palatable. After Valley Forge, continentals would fight on equal terms with British regulars in the open field.

==First Fruits of the French Alliance==
While the Continental Army was undergoing its ordeal and transformation at Valley Forge, Howe dallied in Philadelphia, forfeiting whatever remaining chance he had to win a decisive victory before the effects of the French alliance were felt. He had had his fill of the American war; and the king accepted his resignation from command, appointing General Clinton as his successor. As Washington prepared to sally forth from Valley Forge, the British Army and the Philadelphia Tories said goodbye to Howe in a series of lavish parties. However, Clinton already had orders to evacuate the American capital. With the French in the war, the strategic situation had changed dramatically. England now had to ensure the safety of the long ocean supply line to America, as well as its valuable commercial possessions in other parts of the world, in particular the rich sugar plantations of the Caribbean. Clinton’s orders were to detach 5,000 men to the West Indies and 3,000 to Florida and to return the rest of his army to New York by sea. He was then to give thought to recovering the southern states, where once again ever-hopeful refugees insisted the majority of the population would rally to the royal standard.

As Clinton prepared to depart Philadelphia, Washington had high hopes that the war might be won in 1778 by a cooperative effort between his army and the French Fleet. Charles Hector, the Comte d’Estaing, with a French naval squadron of eleven ships of the line and transports carrying 4,000 troops left France in May to sail for the American coast. D’Estaing’s fleet was considerably more powerful than any Admiral Howe could immediately concentrate in American waters. For a brief period in 1778, the strategic initiative passed from British hands; Washington hoped to make full use of it.

Clinton had already decided, before he learned of the threat from d’Estaing, to move his army overland to New York prior to making any detachments, largely because he lacked sufficient transports to make the voyage by sea. On June 18, 1778, he set out with about 10,000 men. Washington, having gathered by that time about 12,000, immediately occupied Philadelphia and then took up the pursuit of Clinton. His council of war was divided, though none of his generals advised a "general action." The boldest, General Wayne, and the young General Lafayette urged a "partial attack" to strike at a portion of the British Army while it was strung out on the road. The most cautious, Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, who had been exchanged and had rejoined the army at Valley Forge, advised only guerrilla action to harass the British columns. On June 26 Washington decided to take a bold approach, though he issued no orders indicating an intention to bring on a general action. He sent forward an advance guard composed of almost half his army to strike at the British rear when Clinton moved out of Monmouth Court House on the morning of June 27. Lee, the cautious, claimed the command from Lafayette, the bold, when he learned the detachment would be so large.

In the early morning Lee advanced over rough ground that had not been reconnoitered and made contact with the British rear, but Clinton reacted quickly and maneuvered to envelop the American right flank. Lee, feeling that his force was in an untenable position and underestimating the training transformation of the American Army during the encampment at Valley Forge, fell back in confusion. Washington rode up and, exceedingly irate to find the advance guard in retreat, exchanged harsh words with Lee. He then assumed direction of what had to be a defense against a British counterattack. The battle that followed, involving the bulk of both armies, lasted until nightfall on a sultry day with both sides holding their own. For the first time the Americans fought well with the bayonet as well as with the musket and rifle, and their battlefield behavior generally reflected the Valley Forge training. Nevertheless, Washington failed to strike a telling blow at the British Army, for Clinton slipped away in the night and in a few days completed the retreat to New York. Lee demanded and got a court-martial at which he was judged, perhaps unjustly, guilty of disobedience of orders, poor conduct of the retreat, and disrespect for the Commander in Chief. As a consequence he retired from the Army, though the controversy over his actions at Monmouth was to go on for years.

Washington meanwhile sought his victory in cooperation with the French Fleet. D’Estaing arrived off the coast on July 8, and the two commanders at first agreed on a combined land and sea attack on New York; but d’Estaing feared he would be unable to get his deep-draft ships across the bar that extended from Staten Island to Sandy Hook to get at Howe’s inferior fleet. They decided to transfer the attack to the other and weaker British stronghold at Newport, Rhode Island, a city standing on an island with difficult approaches. They agreed that the French Fleet would force the passage on the west side of the island and an American force under General Sullivan would cross over and mount an assault from the east. The whole scheme soon went awry. The French Fleet arrived off Newport on July 29 and successfully forced the passage; Sullivan began crossing on the east on August 8, and d’Estaing began to disembark his troops. Unfortunately, at this juncture Admiral Howe appeared with a reinforced British Fleet, forcing d’Estaing to reembark his troops and put out to sea to meet him. As the two fleets maneuvered for advantage, a great gale scattered both on August 12. The British returned to New York to refit and the French Fleet to Boston; d’Estaing decided to move on to tasks he considered more pressing in the West Indies. Sullivan was left to extricate his forces from an untenable position as best he could, and the first experiment in Franco-American cooperation came to a disappointing end with recriminations on both sides.

The fiasco at Newport ended any hopes for an early victory over the British as a result of the French alliance. By the next year, as the French were forced to devote their major attention to the West Indies, the British regained the initiative on the mainland; the war entered a new phase.

==The New Conditions of the War==
After France entered the war in 1778, it rapidly took on the dimensions of a major European as well as an American conflict. In 1779 Spain declared war against England, and in the following year Holland followed suit. The necessity of fighting European enemies in the West Indies and other areas and of standing guard at home against invasion weakened the British effort against the American rebels. Yet the Americans were unable to take full advantage of Britain’s embarrassments, for their own effort suffered more and more from war weariness, lack of strong direction, and inadequate finance. Moreover, the interests of the European states fighting Britain did not necessarily coincide with American interests. Spain and Holland did not ally themselves with the American states at all, and even France found it expedient to devote its major effort to the West Indies. Finally, the entry of ancient enemies into the fray spurred the British to intensify their effort and evoked some, if not enough, of that characteristic tenacity that has produced victory for England in so many wars. Despite the many new commitments the British were able to maintain in America an army that was usually superior in numbers to the dwindling Continental Army, though it was never strong enough to undertake offensives again on the scale of those of 1776 and 1777.

Monmouth was the last major engagement in the north between Washington’s and Clinton’s armies. In 1779 the situation there became a stalemate and remained so until the end of the war. The defense system Washington set up around New York with its center at West Point was too strong for Clinton to attack. The British commander did, in late spring 1779, attempt to draw Washington into the open by descending in force on unfinished American outpost fortifications at Verplanck’s Point and Stony Point, but Washington refused to take the bait. When Clinton withdrew his main force to New York, the American commander retaliated on July 15, 1779, by sending General Wayne with an elite corps of light infantry on a stealthy night attack on Stony Point, a successful action more notable for demonstrating the proficiency with which the Americans now used the bayonet than for any important strategic gains. Thereafter the war around New York became largely an affair of raids, skirmishes, and constant vigilance on both sides. Twice in 1780 large British forces pushed into northern New Jersey in foraging operations intended to lure Washington into the open, but both times the flexible American defensive belt repulsed them easily.

Clinton’s inaction allowed Washington to attempt to deal with British-inspired Indian attacks. Although Burgoyne’s defeat ended the threat of invasion from Canada, the British continued to incite the Indians all along the frontier to bloody raids on American settlements. From Fort Niagara and Detroit, they sent out their bands, usually led by Tories, to pillage and burn in the Mohawk Valley of New York, the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania, and the new American settlements in Kentucky. Although local defense was primarily the responsibility of state governments and the militia, the pressure on the Mohawk frontier soon prompted a Continental response. In August 1779 Washington detached General Sullivan with a force to deal with the Iroquois in Pennsylvania and New York. Sullivan laid waste the Indians’ villages and defeated a force of Tories and Indians at Newtown on August 29. Although Sullivan’s mission did not end Indian frontier raids, it essentially broke the back of Iroquois power and ensured the flow of supplies to the army from these fertile areas.

In the winter of 1778–1779, the colony of Virginia had sponsored an expedition that struck a severe blow at the British and Indians in the northwest. Young Lt. Col. George Rogers Clark, with a force of only 175 men ostensibly recruited for the defense of Kentucky, overran all the British posts in what is today Illinois and Indiana. Neither he nor Sullivan, however, was able to strike at the sources of the trouble—Niagara and Detroit. Indian raids along the frontiers continued, though they were somewhat less frequent and less severe.

==British Successes in the South==
Late in 1778 the British began to turn their main effort to the south. The king’s ministers hoped to bring the southern states into the fold one by one. From bases there, they would strangle the recalcitrant north. A small British force operating from [[Florida]] cooperated with the first reinforcements sent by Clinton and quickly overran thinly populated Georgia in the winter of 1778–1779. Alarmed by this development, Congress sent General Lincoln south to Charleston in December 1778 to command the Southern Army and organize the southern effort. It hoped that he could repeat his performance during the Saratoga campaign as a leader who could mix Continental regulars and militiamen. Lincoln gathered 3,500 continentals and militiamen; but in May 1779, while he maneuvered along the Georgia border, the British commander, Maj. Gen. Augustine Prevost, slipped around him to raid Charleston. The city barely managed to hold out until Lincoln returned to relieve it.

In September 1779 Admiral d’Estaing arrived off the coast of [[Georgia]] with a strong French Fleet and 6,000 troops. Lincoln hurried south with 1,350 Americans to join him in a siege of the main British base at Savannah. Unfortunately, the Franco-American force had to hurry its attack because d’Estaing was unwilling to risk his fleet in a position dangerously exposed to autumn storms. The French and Americans mounted a direct assault on Savannah on October 9, abandoning their plan to make a systematic approach by regular parallels. The British in strongly entrenched positions repulsed the attack in what was essentially a Bunker Hill in reverse, with the French and Americans suffering staggering losses. D’Estaing then sailed away to the West Indies, Lincoln returned to Charleston, and the second attempt at Franco-American cooperation ended in much the same atmosphere of bitterness and disillusion as the first.

Meanwhile Clinton, urged on by the British government, determined to push the southern campaign in earnest. In October 1779 he withdrew the British garrison from Newport, pulled in his troops from outposts around New York, and prepared to move south against Charleston with a large part of his force. With d’Estaing’s withdrawal, the British regained control of the sea along the American coast, giving Clinton a mobility that Washington could not match. While Clinton drew from New York and Savannah to achieve a decisive concentration of force (14,000 men) at Charleston, Congress had sent only piecemeal reinforcements to Lincoln over difficult overland routes.

Applying the lessons of his experience in 1776, Clinton this time carefully planned a coordinated Army-Navy attack. First, he landed his force on John’s Island to the south, then moved up to the Ashley River, investing Charleston from the land side. Lincoln, under strong pressure from the South Carolina civilian authorities, concentrated his forces in a citadel defense on the neck of land between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, leaving Fort Moultrie and other harbor defenses lightly manned. On April 8 British warships successfully forced the passage past Moultrie, investing Charleston from the sea. The siege then proceeded in traditional eighteenth century fashion, and on May 12, 1780, despite a masterful delaying defense that humiliated Clinton, Lincoln had to surrender his entire force of 5,466 men in the greatest disaster to befall the American cause during the war. Meanwhile, Col. Abraham Buford with 350 Virginians was moving south to reinforce the garrison. When he learned of the garrison’s fate, Buford tried to withdraw; but Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton with a force of British light cavalry and infantry took Buford by surprise at the Waxhaws, a district near the North Carolina border, and slaughtered most of Buford’s men after they attempted to surrender. This brutality shocked most Americans and, as had happened with the Jenny McCrea incident, motivated the militia forces to take to the field in ever-increasing numbers.

After the capture of Charleston, Clinton returned to New York with about a third of his force, leaving General Cornwallis with 8,000 men to follow up the victory. Cornwallis established his main seaboard bases at Savannah, Beaufort, Charleston, and [[Georgetown]]. In the interior, he extended his line of control along the Savannah River westward to Ninety-Six and northward to Camden and Rocky Mount. Cornwallis’ force, however, was too small to police so large an area, even with the aid of the Tories who took to the field. Though no organized Continental force remained in the Carolinas and Georgia, American guerrillas, led by Brig. Gens. Thomas Sumter and Andrew Pickens and Lt. Col. Francis Marion, began to harry British posts and lines of communications and to battle the bands of Tories. A bloody, ruthless, and confused civil war ensued, its character determined in no small degree by Tarleton’s action at the Waxhaws. In this way, as in the Saratoga campaign, the American grass roots strength began once again to assert itself and to deny the British the fruits of military victory.

On June 22, 1780, the Maryland Division (two understrength brigades) from Washington’s army arrived at Hillsborough, North Carolina, to form the nucleus of a new Southern Army around which militia could rally and which could serve as the nerve center of guerrilla resistance. In July [[Congress]], without consulting Washington, provided a commander for this army in the person of General Gates, the hero of Saratoga. Gates soon lost his northern laurels. Gathering a force of about 4,000 men, over half of them militia, and ignoring the advice of his subordinates who were more familiar with the terrain, he set out to attack the British post at Camden, South Carolina. Instead of taking a more circuitous route that could be supported logistically, Gates marched through a district already denuded of food. Cornwallis hurried north from Charleston with reinforcements, and his army of 2,200 British regulars made contact with Gates outside Camden on the night of August 15.

In the battle that ensued the following morning, Gates deployed his militia on the left and the continentals under Maj. Gen. Johann de Kalb on the right. Morning fog, compounded by the smoke muskets, prevented each of the two parts of the American force from seeing what was happening to the other. The militia was still forming when Cornwallis struck, and they fled in panic before the British onslaught. On the other side of the field, de Kalb’s continentals drove back the British forces opposing them. At this point the British who had driven the militia from the field wheeled on the continentals and brought an end to the valiant but hopeless fight. Tarleton’s cavalry pursued the fleeing Americans for thirty miles, killing or making prisoner those who lagged. Gates himself fled too fast for Tarleton, reaching Hillsborough, 160 miles away, in three days and leaving his men to fend for themselves. To add to the disaster, Tarleton caught up with General Sumter, whom Gates had sent with a detachment to raid a British wagon train, and virtually destroyed his force in a surprise attack at Fishing Creek on August 18. Once more South Carolina seemed safely in British hands.

==Nadir of the American Cause==
In the summer of 1780 the American cause seemed to be at as low an ebb as it had been after the New York campaign in 1776 or after the defeats at Ticonderoga and Brandywine in 1777. Defeat in the south was not the only discouraging aspect of patriot affairs. In the north, a creeping paralysis had set in as the patriotic enthusiasm of the early war years waned. The Continental currency had depreciated virtually out of existence, and Congress was impotent to pay the soldiers or purchase supplies. At Morristown, New Jersey, in the winter of 1779–1780, the army suffered worse hardships than at Valley Forge. Congress could do little but attempt to shift its responsibilities onto the states, giving each the task of providing clothing for its own troops and furnishing certain quotas of "specific supplies" for the entire Army. The system of specific supplies worked not at all. Not only were the states laggard in furnishing supplies, but when they did it was seldom at the time or place they were needed. This breakdown in the supply system was more than even General Greene as Quartermaster General could withstand; in early 1780, under heavy criticism in Congress, he resigned his position.

Under such difficulties, Washington had to struggle to hold even a small Army together. Recruiting of continentals, difficult to begin with, became almost impossible when the troops could neither be paid nor supplied adequately and had to suffer such winters as those at Morristown. Enlistments and drafts from the militia in 1780 produced not quite half as many men for one year’s service as had enlisted in 1775 for three years or the duration. While recruiting lagged, morale among those men who had enlisted for the longer terms naturally fell. Mutinies in 1780 and 1781 were suppressed only by measures of great severity.

Germain could write confidently to Clinton: "so very contemptible is the rebel force now … that no resistance … is to be apprehended that can materially obstruct … the speedy suppression of the rebellion … the American levies in the King’s service are more in number than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service of the Congress." The French were unhappy. In the summer of 1780 they occupied the vacated British base at Newport and moved in a naval squadron and 4,000 troops under the command of Lt. Gen. Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, the Comte de Rochambeau. Rochambeau immediately warned his government: "Send us troops, ships and money, but do not count on these people nor on their resources, they have neither money nor credit, their forces exist only momentarily, and when they are about to be attacked in their own homes they assemble … to defend themselves." Another French commander thought only one highly placed American traitor was needed to decide the campaign.

Clinton had in fact already found his highly placed traitor in Benedict Arnold, the hero of the march to Quebec, the naval battle on the lakes, Fort Stanwix, and Saratoga. "Money is this man’s God," one of his enemies had said of Arnold earlier; evidently, he was correct. Lucrative rewards promised by the British led to Arnold’s treason, though he evidently resented the slights Congress had dealt him; and he justified his act by claiming that the Americans were now fighting for the interests of Catholic France and not their own. Arnold wangled an appointment as commander at West Point and then entered into a plot to deliver this key post to the British. Washington discovered the plot on September 21, 1780, just in time to foil it, though Arnold himself escaped to become a British brigadier.

Arnold’s treason in September 1780 marked the nadir of the patriot cause. Yet in the closing months of 1780, the Americans somehow put together the ingredients for a final and decisive burst of energy in 1781. Congress persuaded Robert Morris, a wealthy Philadelphia merchant, to accept a post as Superintendent of Finance; Col. Timothy Pickering, an able administrator, would replace Greene as Quartermaster General. Greene, as Washington’s choice, was then named to succeed Gates in command of the Southern Army. General Lincoln, exchanged after Charleston, was appointed Secretary at War; and the old board was abolished. Morris took over many of the functions previously performed by unwieldy committees. Working closely with Pickering, he abandoned the old paper money entirely and introduced a new policy of supplying the army by private contracts, using his personal credit as eventual guarantee for payment in gold or silver. It was an expedient but, for a time at least, it worked.

==Greene’s Southern Campaign==
It was the frontier militia assembling "when they were about to be attacked in their own homes" who struck the blow that actually marked the turning point in the south. Late in 1780, with Clinton’s reluctant consent, Cornwallis set out on the invasion of North Carolina. He sent Maj. Patrick Ferguson, who had successfully organized the Tories in the upcountry of South Carolina, to move north simultaneously with his "American Volunteers," spread the Tory gospel in the North Carolina back country, and join the main army at Charlotte with a maximum number of recruits. Ferguson’s advance northward alarmed the independent- minded "over-mountain men" in western North Carolina, southwest Virginia, and what is now east Tennessee. A picked force of mounted militia riflemen gathered on the Catawba River in western North Carolina, set out to find Ferguson, and brought him to bay at King’s Mountain near the border of the two Carolinas on October 7. In a battle of patriot against Tory (Ferguson was one of only a handful of British soldiers present), the patriots’ triumph was complete. Ferguson himself was killed, and few of his command escaped death or capture. Some got the same "quarter" Tarleton had given Buford’s men at the Waxhaws.

King’s Mountain was as fatal to Cornwallis’ plans as Bennington had been to those of Burgoyne. The North Carolina Tories, cowed by the fate of their compatriots, gave him lame support. The British commander on October 14, 1780, began a wretched retreat in the rain back to Winnsboro, South Carolina, with militia harassing his progress. Meanwhile, Clinton, acting on guidance from London, launched an expedition of 2,500 men under Benedict Arnold to establish a base in Virginia to reinforce Cornwallis.

The frontier militia had turned the tide; but having done so, they returned to their homes. To keep the tide moving against the British was the task of the new commander, General Greene. When Greene arrived at Charlotte early in December 1780, he found 1,500 men fit for duty, only 949 of them continentals. The army lacked clothing and provisions and had little systematic means of procuring them. Greene decided not to engage Cornwallis’ army in battle until he had built up his strength, instead to pursue delaying tactics to wear down his stronger opponent. To accomplish this goal, he built on Gates’ earlier dispositions. Gates had created a mobile screening force from his best troops. Greene first took the unorthodox step of dividing his army in the face of a superior force, moving part under his personal command to Cheraw Hill and the augmented light screening forces under Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan west across the Catawba over 100 miles away. It was an intentional violation of the principle of mass. Greene wrote:
:''"I am well satisfied with the movement.… It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia, while I am here with the whole country open before me. I am as near to Charleston as he is, and as near Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut off from my reinforcements."''
Left unsaid was the fact that divided forces could live off the land much easier than one large force and would constitute two rallying points for local militia instead of one. Greene was in effect sacrificing mass to enhance maneuver.

Cornwallis, at this point in his career an aggressive commander often prone to act before thinking, had determined to gamble everything on a renewed invasion of North Carolina. Ignoring Clinton’s warnings, he depleted his Charleston base by bringing almost all his supplies forward. In the face of Greene’s dispositions, Cornwallis divided his army into not two but three parts. He sent a holding force to Camden to contain Greene, directed Tarleton with a fast-moving contingent of 1,100 infantry and cavalry to find and crush Morgan, and moved cautiously with the remainder of his army up into North Carolina to cut off any of Morgan’s force that escaped Tarleton.

===Cowpens===
[[Image:Cornwallis.JPG|left|thumb|200px|Lord Charles Cornwallis]]
On January 17, 1781, Tarleton caught up with Morgan west of King’s Mountain at a place called the Cowpens, an area of open forest near the Broad River. Morgan chose this site to make his stand less by design than by necessity, for he had intended to get across the Broad. Nevertheless, on ground seemingly better suited to the action of regulars, he achieved a little tactical masterpiece, making the most effective use of his heterogeneous force, numerically equal to that of Tarleton but composed of three-fourths militia. Selecting a low hill as the center of his position, he placed his Continental infantry on it, deliberately leaving his flanks open. In front of the main line he posted militia infantry in two lines, instructing the first line to fire two volleys and then fall back on the second, the combined line to fire until the British pressed them, then to fall back to the rear of the continentals and re-form as a reserve. He placed Lt. Col. William Washington’s cavalry detachment behind the hill, ready to charge the attacking enemy at the critical moment. Every man in the ranks was informed of the plan of battle and the part he was expected to play in it.

On finding Morgan, Tarleton ordered an immediate attack. His men moved forward in regular formation and were momentarily checked by the militia rifles; but, taking the retreat of the first two lines to be the beginning of a rout, Tarleton’s men rushed headlong into the steady fire of the continentals on the hill. When the British were well advanced, the American cavalry struck them on the right flank, broke the British [[cavalry]], and then wheeled on the infantry. The militia, having re-formed, charged out from behind the hill to hit the British left. Caught in a classic double envelopment, the British surrendered after suffering heavy losses. Tarleton managed to escape with only a small force of cavalry he had held in reserve. It was on a small scale and with certain significant differences a repetition of the classic double envelopment of the [[Romans]] by a [[Carthaginian]] army under [[Hannibal]] at Cannae in 216 b.c., an event of which Morgan, no reader of books, probably had not the foggiest notion. But it was a clever use of the terrain and troops by one of the American Army’s most intuitive and inspirational commanders.

Having struck this fatal blow against Tarleton, Morgan still had to move fast to escape Cornwallis. Covering 100 miles and crossing two rivers in five days, he rejoined Greene early in February. Cornwallis by now was too heavily committed to the campaign in North Carolina to withdraw. Hoping to match the swift movement of the Americans, he destroyed all his superfluous supplies, baggage, and wagons and set forth in pursuit of Greene’s army. The American general retreated through North Carolina into southern Virginia and crossed to safety behind the Dan River. Cornwallis’ exhausted forces began to retreat into North Carolina to reach their depot and replenish their supplies. As the British started south, Greene recrossed the Dan and followed, keeping just out of reach of his adversary to avoid any battle he did not wish. Finally, on March 15, 1781, at Guilford Court House in North Carolina, on ground he had chosen himself, Greene gave battle. By this time he had collected 1,500 continentals and 3,000 militia to oppose the 1,900 regulars the British could muster. The British nominally won this contest because they managed to hold the field after a hard-fought battle, but they suffered disproportionate casualties of about one-fourth of the force engaged. It was like Bunker Hill a Pyrrhic victory. His ranks depleted and his supplies exhausted, Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington on the coast to once again rebuild his army. Then he decided to move north to join the British forces General Clinton had sent to Virginia.

Greene, his army in better condition than six months earlier, pushed quickly into South Carolina to reduce the British posts in the interior. He fought two battles—at Hobkirk’s Hill on April 25 and at Eutaw Springs on September 8—losing both but with approximately the same results as at Guilford Court House. One by one the British interior posts fell to Greene’s army or to militia and partisans. By October 1781 the majority of the British had been forced to withdraw to their two strongholds along the coast, Charleston and Savannah. Greene had lost battles but won a campaign. In so doing, he paved the way for the greater victory to follow at Yorktown.

==[[Battle of Yorktown|Yorktown]]==
As Howe and Burgoyne went their separate ways in 1777, each seemingly determined to satisfy only personal ambitions, so Clinton and Cornwallis in 1781 paved the road to Yorktown with their disagreements and lack of coordination. Clinton was Cornwallis’ superior in this case, but the latter enjoyed the confidence of Germain to an extent that Clinton did not. Clinton, believing that without substantial reinforcements the British could not operate far from coastal bases, had opposed Cornwallis’ ventures in the interior of the Carolinas. When Cornwallis came to Virginia, he did so without even informing his superior of his intention.

Since 1779 Clinton had sought to paralyze the state of Virginia by conducting raids up its great rivers, arousing the Tories, and establishing a base in the Chesapeake Bay region. He thought this base might eventually be used as a starting point for one arm of a pincers movement against Pennsylvania for which his own idle force in New York would provide the other. A raid conducted in the Hampton Roads area in 1779 was highly successful; but when Clinton sought to follow it up in 1780, the force sent for the purpose had to be diverted to Charleston to bail out Cornwallis after King’s Mountain. Finally, in 1781 he got an expedition into Virginia, a contingent of 1,600 under the American traitor, Benedict Arnold. In January Arnold conducted a destructive raid up the James River all the way to [[Richmond]]. His presence soon proved to be a magnet that drew forces of both sides to Virginia.

In an effort to trap Arnold, Washington dispatched Lafayette to Virginia with 1,200 of his scarce continentals and persuaded the French to send a naval squadron from Newport to block Arnold’s escape by sea. The plan went awry when a British fleet drove the French squadron back to Newport and Clinton sent another 600 men to Virginia along with a new commander, Maj. Gen. William Phillips. Phillips and Arnold continued their raids, which Lafayette was too weak to prevent. Then on May 20 Cornwallis arrived from Wilmington and relieved Phillips. With additional temporary reinforcements sent by Clinton, he was able to field a force of about 7,000 men, about a quarter of the British strength in America. Washington sent down an additional reinforcement of 800 continentals under General Wayne; but even with Virginia militia, Lafayette’s force remained greatly outnumbered.

Cornwallis and Clinton were soon working at cross-purposes. Cornwallis proposed to carry out major operations in the interior of Virginia, but Clinton saw as little practical value in this tactic as Cornwallis did in Clinton’s plan to establish a base in Virginia to launch amphibious raids along the Chesapeake Bay. Cornwallis had no respect for his superior’s military skills and saw no reason to give up his independent command. Instead, he did his level best to ignore Clinton’s orders. Cornwallis at first turned to the interior and engaged in a fruitless pursuit of Lafayette north of Richmond. Then, on receiving Clinton’s positive order to return to the coast and return part of his force to New York, Cornwallis moved back down the Virginia peninsula to take up station at Yorktown, a small tobacco port on the York River just off the Chesapeake Bay. In the face of Cornwallis’ insistence that he must keep all his troops with him, Clinton vacillated, reversing his own orders several times and in the end granting Cornwallis’ request. Lafayette and Wayne followed Cornwallis cautiously down the peninsula, lost a skirmish with him at Green Spring near Williamsburg on July 6, and finally took up a position at Williamsburg to keep an eye on Yorktown.

Meanwhile, Washington had been trying to persuade the French to cooperate in a combined land and naval assault on New York in the summer of 1781. Rochambeau brought his 4,000 troops down from Newport and placed them under Washington’s command. The prospects were still bleak, since the combined Franco-American regular force numbered but 10,000 and would still be outnumbered by Clinton’s 17,000 in well-fortified positions. Then on August 14 Washington learned that the French Fleet in the West Indies, commanded by Admiral Francois de Grasse, would not come to New York but would arrive in the Chesapeake later in the month and remain there until October 15. He saw immediately that if he could achieve a superior concentration of force on the land side while de Grasse still held the bay, he could destroy the British army at Yorktown before Clinton had a chance to relieve it.

The movements that followed illustrate most effectively a successful application of the principles of the offensive, surprise, objective, mass, and maneuver. Even without unified command of Army and Navy forces, Franco-American cooperation this time was excellent. Admiral Louis, the Comte de Barras, immediately put out to sea from Newport to join de Grasse. Washington sent orders to Lafayette to contain Cornwallis at Yorktown. Employing an elaborate deception to convince Clinton that the Americans were about to attack New York, on August 21 Washington started the major portion of the Franco-American army on a rapid secret movement to Virginia via the Chesapeake Bay, leaving only 2,000 Americans under General Heath behind to watch Clinton.

On August 30, while Washington was on the move south, de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake with his entire fleet of twenty-four ships of the line and a few days later debarked 3,000 French troops to join Lafayette. Admiral Thomas Graves, the British naval commander in New York, meanwhile had put out to sea in late August with nineteen ships of the line, hoping either to intercept Barras’ squadron or to block de Grasse’s entry into the Chesapeake. He failed to find Barras; and when he arrived off Hampton Roads on September 5, he found de Grasse already in the bay. The French admiral sallied forth to meet Graves, and the two fleets fought an indecisive action off the Virginia capes. Yet for all practical purposes the victory lay with the French, for while the fleets maneuvered at sea for days following the battle, Barras’ squadron slipped into the Chesapeake and landed heavy artillery for the siege. Then de Grasse got back into the bay and joined Barras, confronting Graves with so superior a naval force that he decided to return to New York to refit.

===Surrender of Cornwallis===
[[Image:Yorktown Surrender.JPG|right|thumb|300px|''The Surrender at Yorktown'', by John Trumbull, 1820]]
When Washington’s army arrived at Williamsburg on September 26, the French Fleet was in firm control of the bay, blocking Cornwallis’ sea route of escape. A decisive concentration had been achieved. Counting 3,000 Virginia militiamen, Washington had a force of over 9,000 Americans and 6,000 French troops with which to conduct the siege. It proceeded in the best traditions of Marshal Sebastien Vauban under the direction of French engineers. Cornwallis obligingly abandoned his forward position on September 30, and on October 6 the first parallel was begun 600 yards from the main British position. [[Artillery]] placed along the trench began its destructive work on October 9. By October 11 the zigzag connecting trench had been dug 300 yards forward and work on the second parallel had begun. Two British redoubts needed to be reduced to extend the line to the York River. Washington brilliantly carried out that action by using a surprise attack at bayonet point just after
dark: Americans under Lafayette took Redoubt 10; and Frenchmen under Lafayette’s brother-in-law, the Viscount Louis-Marie Noailles, secured Redoubt 9. This accomplished, Cornwallis’ only recourse was a desperate attempt to escape across the river to Gloucester Point, where the allied line was thinly held. A storm on the night of October 16 frustrated his attempt to do so, leaving him with no hope except relief from New York. Clinton had been considering such relief for days, but he acted too late. On the very day, October 17, that Admiral Graves set sail from New York with a reinforced fleet and 7,000 troops for the relief of Yorktown, Cornwallis began negotiations on terms of surrender. On October 19 his entire army marched out to lay down its arms with the British band playing an old tune, "The World Turned Upside Down."

So far as active campaigning was concerned Yorktown ended the war, though neither side realized it at the time. Both Greene and Washington maintained their armies in positions near New York and Charleston for nearly two years more, but with only some minor skirmishing in the south. Cornwallis’ defeat led to the resignation of the British [[Cabinet]] and the formation of a new government that decided the war in America was lost. With some success, Britain devoted its energies to trying to salvage what it could in the West Indies and in India. The independence for which Americans had fought thus virtually became a reality when Cornwallis’ command marched out of its breached defenses at Yorktown.

==Summary==
The American victory in the War of the Revolution was a product of many factors, no one of which can be positively assigned first importance. Washington, looking back on the vicissitudes of eight years, could only explain it as the intervention of "Divine Providence." American historians in the nineteenth century saw that divine providence as having been manifested primarily in the character and genius of the modest Commander in Chief himself. Washington’s leadership was clearly one of the principal factors in American success; it seems fair to say that the Revolution could hardly have succeeded without him. Yet in many of the events that led to victory—Bennington, Saratoga, King’s Mountain, and Cowpens, to name but a few—his personal influence was remote.

Today many scholars stress not the astonishment that Washington felt at the victory of a weak and divided confederation of American states over the greatest power of the age but the practical difficulties the British faced in suppressing the revolt. These were indeed great, but they do not appear to have been insuperable if one considers military victory alone and not its political consequences. The British forfeited several chances for military victory in 1776–1777, and again in 1780 they might have won had they been able to throw 10,000 fresh troops into the American war. American military leaders were more resourceful and imaginative than their British counterparts, and they proved quite capable of profiting from British blunders. In addition to [[George Washington]], Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, Daniel Morgan, and Benedict Arnold showed remarkable military abilities; of the foreign volunteers, Steuben and the young [[Marquis de Lafayette|Lafayette]] were outstanding. The resourcefulness of this extraordinary group of leaders was matched by the dedication to the cause of the Continental rank and file. Only men so dedicated could have endured the hardships of the march to Quebec, the crossing of the Delaware, Valley Forge, Morristown, and Greene’s forced marches in the southern campaign. British and Hessian professionals never showed the same spirit; their virtues were exhibited principally in situations where discipline and training counted most.

The militia, the men who fought battles and then went home, also exhibited this spirit on many occasions. The militiamen have been generally maligned as useless by one school of thought and glorified by another as the true victors in the war. Any balanced view must recognize that their contributions were great, though they would have counted for little without the Continental Army to give the American cause that continued sustenance that only a permanent force in being could give it. It was the ubiquity of the militia that made British victories over the continentals in the field so meaningless. And the success with which the militia did operate derived from the firm political control the patriots had established over the countryside long before the British were in any position to challenge it—the situation that made the British task so difficult in the first place.

For all these American virtues and British difficulties and mistakes, the Americans still required French aid—money, supplies, and in the last phase military force—to win a decisive and clear-cut military victory. Most of the muskets, bayonets, and cannon used by the Continental Army came from France. The French contested the control of the seas that was so vital to the British and compelled them to divert forces from the American mainland to other areas. The final stroke at Yorktown, though a product of Washington’s strategic conception, was possible only because of the temporary predominance of French naval power off the American coast and the presence of a French army. The French entered the war for reasons of their own national interest, but they were no less instrumental in the winning of American independence.

French aid was doubly necessary because the American war effort lacked strong national direction. The Revolution showed conclusively the need for a central government with power to harness the nation’s resources for war. It is not surprising that in 1787 nearly all those who had struggled so long and hard as leaders in the Continental Army or in administrative positions under the Congress were to be found in the ranks of the supporters of a new constitution that created such a central government with a strong executive and the power to "raise armies and navies," call out the militia, and directly levy taxes to support itself.

The strictly military lessons of the Revolution were more equivocal. Tactical innovations were not radical; but they did represent a culmination of the trend, which started during the French and Indian War, toward employment of light troops as skirmishers in conjunction with traditional linear formations. By the end of the war both armies were fighting in this fashion. The Americans strove to develop the same proficiency as the British in regular line-of-battle tactics, while the British adapted to the American terrain and tactics by employing skirmishers and fighting when possible from behind cover. Washington was himself a military conservative, and Steuben’s training program was designed to equip American troops to fight in European fashion with modifications to provide for the increased use of light infantry. The guerrilla tactics that characterized many actions, principally those of the militia, were no product of the design of Washington or his leading subordinates but of circumstances over which they had little control. The American rifle, most useful in guerrilla actions or in the hands of skirmishers, played no decisive role in the Revolution. It was of great value in wooded areas, as at Saratoga and King’s Mountain; but for open-field fighting, its slow rate of fire and lack of a bayonet made it inferior to the musket.

Since both militiamen and continentals played roles in winning the war, the Revolutionary experience provided ammunition for two diametrically opposed schools of thought on American military policy: the one advocating a large Regular Army, the other reliance on the militia as the bulwark of national defense. The real issue, as Washington fully recognized, was less militia versus regulars—for he never believed the infant republic needed a large standing army—than the extent to which militia could be trained and organized to form a reliable national reserve. The lesson Washington drew from the Revolution was that the militia should be "well regulated," that is, trained and organized under a uniform national system in all the states and subject to call into national service in war or emergency.

The lesson had far greater implications for the future than any of the tactical changes wrought by the American Revolution. It balanced the rights of freedom and equality proclaimed in the [[Declaration of Independence]] with a corresponding obligation of all citizens for military service to the nation. This concept, which was to find explicit expression in the "nation in arms" during the French Revolution, was also implicit in the American; and it portended the end of eighteenth century limited war fought by professional armies officered by an aristocratic class. As Steuben so well recognized, American continentals were not professional soldiers in the European sense and militia even less so. They were instead a people’s army fighting for a cause. In this sense then, the American Revolution began the "democratization of war," a process that eventually lead to the new concept of a nation in arms.

== See also ==

*[[French Revolution]]
*[[Virginia Declaration of Rights]]

==References==
*Billias, George A., ed. ''George Washington’s Generals'', Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticutt (1967).
*Higginbotham, Don, ed. ''Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays'', Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticutt (1978).
*Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert, eds. ''Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution'', University of Virginia Press (1984).
*Middlekauf, Robert. ''The Glorious Cause'' Oxford University Press, New York (1986).
*Morgan, John S., and Daniel J. Boorstein. ''The Birth of the Republic, 1763–1789'', University of Chicago Press (1993).
*Shy, John. ''A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence'', University of Michigan Press (1990).
*Wright, Robert K., Jr. ''The Continental Army'', U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C. (1983).

[[Category:American Revolutionary War Battles]]

[[Category: United States]]
[[Category:American Revolutionary War]]

World War II

2008-08-15T17:08:51Z

Red4tribe:

[[Image:Caen_sniper.jpg|right|thumb|300px|An allied soldier in the ruins of Caen, 9 July 1944]]
'''World War II''' was a global conflict fought between the [[Allies|Allied powers]] which eventually came to include the [[United States]], the [[Soviet Union]], the [[British Commonwealth]], the [[Republic of China]], and many other nations, and the [[Axis Powers]] (mainly [[Third Reich|Nazi Germany]], [[Fascism|Fascist]] [[Italy]], and Imperial [[Japan]]). Several conflicts involving some world major powers precipitated the general conflagration. On September 1, 1939 [[Poland]] was invaded by Nazi Germany. On September 3, the [[United Kingdom]] and the [[French Third Republic]] with its allies entered the war.

During the war, eight major world powers fought, along with several lesser states joining with one side or the other. On the side which lost were the Axis Powers Germany, [[Japan]], and [[Italy]]. Against them came to be the Allied Powers [[United States]], [[United Kingdom]] and the Commonwealth, the [[Soviet Union]] with its [[Comintern]] allies, and the [[Republic of China]]. The conflict was the deadliest in human history with estimated deaths ranging from 50 million to over 70 million depending on research methodology.<ref>http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Second</ref>

==Failure of the League treaty==
The causes of World War II are complicated. The immediate causes of World War II are generally held to be the Japanese attacks on China and the British and Dutch colonies, and the German invasion of Poland on the 1st September 1939. Following the two day deadline for the withdrawal of German forces, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand declared war on Germany, followed quickly by France, South Africa, Canada and Nepal.

The condition of Germany in the aftermath of [[World War I]] is also considered to be a contributing factor. The [[Weimar Republic]] that was founded at the end of WWI, was struggling from the beginning. One reason were the harsh terms of [[Versailles]] treaty. Although the terms of the treaty were never fully enforced, the psychological damage was immense, since they were perceived as a grave injustice. The republic was also struggling with the rejection by monarchist, who were still occupying important position in the state. Many WWI veterans believed that the German forces in WWI were not defeated, but that the social democratic leaders, who founded the Weimar republic to thwart a communist revolution, surrendered to the allies for political gains. It was known as the "stab-in-the-back myth", and was used to discredit the republic. [http://www.germannotes.com/hist_weimar_dolch.shtml] Although the Weimar Republic enjoyed a time of economic resurgence after the early years of hyper-inflation it failed to gain deep public support. The Weimar Republic was famously called a ''democracy without democrats''.
[[Image:58742big.jpg|thumb|300px|right|Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1928 - 1941. [http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/maps2.html]]]

In the early 1930 Germany was in a permanent political and constitutional crisis, caused by rising unemployment during the great depression. Germany was hit harder than most other countries. The National Socialists, known as the Hitler movement, promised to restore national pride and statue, by disbanding the Versailles treaty, and reverting the injustices imposed onto Germany by its international enemies. It was common to blame the "international Jewdom." Part of this ideology was that Germany deserved to be larger, and that in order to survive, it would have to conquer the East.

===Chinese Civil War===

China was engaged at the same time in two separate wars. One was with Japan and the other with the [[Comintern]]. The Soviet Union fought China with an army of [[Chinese Communist Party|Chinese revolutionaries]], the CCP, directed and armed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's ambitions in China were to transform all northern China — [[Sinkiang]], [[Mongolia]] and [[Manchuria]] — into Soviet dependencies and to convert what remained of China into a [[Communist]] satellite state.

[[Edgar Snow]] wrote his 1937 book, ''Red Star Over China'' "the political ideology, tactical line and theoretical leadership of the Chinese Communists have been under the close guidance, if not positive detailed direction, of the [[Communist International]], which during the last decade has become virtually a bureau of the [[Russian Communist Party]]." And he further declared that the CCP had to subordinate itself to the "strategic requirements of [[Soviet Russia]], under the leadership of [[Stalin]]."<ref>Red Star Over China by Edgar Snow, New York, 1937.</ref>

===Mukden Incident===

The Japanese invasion of [[Manchuria]] in 1931 marked the beginning of World War II in Asia. In March 1932 the Japanese set up the [[puppet state]] of [[Manchukuo]]. On 24 February, 1933, the [[League of Nations]] adopted a resolution calling for the non-recognition of Manchukuo, however the [[Soviet Union]] nonetheless did recognize Manchukuo and sold Japan the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1935.<ref>''While You Slept : Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York : The Devin - Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pgs. 18, 36, 65] pdf.</ref>

===The Ethiopian War===

In 1935, [[fascist]] [[Italy]] under the leadership of [[Mussolini]] invaded [[Ethiopia]], the only uncolonized nation in [[Africa]] and a member state of the [[League of Nations]]. While Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie tried to get the League to help his country, his pleas in [[Geneva]] went unheard. Italy's colonial occupation of Italy was marked by the aerial bombardment and use of poison gas against civilian populations.

===Reoccupation of the Rhineland===

===Spanish Civil War===
:''Main article: [[Spanish Civil War]]''

===Second Sino-Japanese War===
:''Main article:[[Second Sino-Japanese War]]''

In 1937, when the Japanese invaded China, Soviet General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] ordered the CCP to cease operations against China's government, the [[Kuomintang]] or KMT, and present a [[united front]] to the Japanese. This lasted until 1939.<ref>''While You Slept : Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York : The Devin - Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 46] pdf.</ref>

[[CCP]] Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] sent a secret directive to his followers which said:
:"The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion . . . the first stage is a compromising stage . . . but in reality this will serve as camouflage for the… development of our party. The second [stage]. . . should be spent in laying the foundation of our party's political and military powers . . . until we can match and break the [[Kuomintang]]. The third is an offensive stage . . . in which our forces. . . isolate and disperse…and wrest the leadership from the hands of the Kuomintang."<ref>Documents on the Problem of the Chinese Communist Party (Chungking, 1944).</ref>

With the making of the [[Hitler-Stalin pact]] the Soviet Union was at war on the side of Germany. The CCP stopped fighting the Japanese and resumed [[guerrilla]] operations against the Kuomintang (KMT). The CCP devoted its energies to fighting the Chinese government for the portions of eastern China between the railroad lines, held by the Japanese.

===Treaty of Munich===
:''Main article [[Munich conference]]''

The [[Locarno Pacts]] formed the background for the events of 1938 when Czechoslovakia was dismembered at Munich. When the guarantee of Locarno became due in 1936, Britain dishonored its agreement, the Rhineland was remilitarized and the way was open for Germany to move eastward. Poland protested vigorously at the refusal to guarantee her frontiers.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 293.ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>

At Munich, Hitler, British Prime Minister [[Neville Chamberlain]], [[Mussolini]] and French Premier [[Edouard Daladier]] carved up Czechoslovakia without consulting anyone, least of all the Czechs and Slovaks.<ref>''Tragedy and Hope'', Quigley, pg. 638.</ref> The outlawry of war was relatively meaningless without some sanctions that could compel the use of peaceful methods. Efforts in this direction were nullified by Britain.<ref>''Tragedy and Hope'', Quigley, pg. 296.</ref>

==Polish Partition==
[[Image:Communazi Peace Pact.jpg|thumb|300px|right|By terms of a secret protocol to the [[Nazi-Soviet pact]], Poland was partitioned with Germany and the USSR each occupying 200,000 square kilometers.]]
:''Main article: [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]]''

In the immediate run up to WWII, there were frequent reports of trespassing Polish troops. On August 31, 1939 German covert operatives staged a fake attack by Polish troops on a German radio station. WWII started on September 1, 1939, when German troops invaded Poland. Hitler justified this as a defensive act, pointing to the frequent border incidents, and said famously that from this moment on Germany would strike back.

The major tactical innovation of the war was the use of combined arms warfare, typified by the German doctrine of [[blitzkrieg]]. In this style of warfare armor, infantry, artillery and air power (see [[Luftwaffe]]) all coordinate to achieve overwhelming superiority at point on the enemy lines. Armor and fast-moving infantry units then exploit the gap and penetrate deep behind enemy lines. The objective is to cause a widespread collapse of the enemy's ability to fight. It was particularly effective during the early stages of the war, before the Allies developed effective countermeasures.
[[Image:Communazipact1.JPG|thumb|300px|left|Partition of Poland. Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY; Time magazine [http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/fdr-diplo-images.html].]]
On September 17, 1939, Poland was invaded from the east by Hitler’s noble ally, Josef Stalin.

In 1939-1940, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia were invaded and annexed into the Soviet Union proper. The Soviets lowered the local standard of living and disrupted and destroyed the prevailing socioeconomic structure. Local currencies were still legal tender but so was the Russian ruble. The occupying Russian soldiers were paid in rubles and the established exchange rate inflated the ruble by as much as 2000 to 3000 per cent. Overvaluing made the average Russian soldier extremely rich. This huge influx of rubles started a wave of inflation that natives did not notice at first. Eventually shortages were caused by Soviet purchasing agents that fanned out through the newly occupied nations, buying up wholesale goods in warehouses and the production of local factories.

Goods produced locally were shipped to Russia instead of resupplying the local market. Russian propaganda stated the goal was to raise the ordinary working person's standard of living. Prices were frozen, and wages raised by as much as ten times. Merchants and factory owners declared bankruptcy and went out of business. Shortages of food and other necessities introduced growing inflation, a black market, and discontent among the population. These deliberate Soviet policies raised the cost of living but not the actual standard of living. Once annexation was complete, local stores and industries were nationalized, their former owners arrested, stripped of their possessions, including their accumulated rubles, and shipped to the [[gulag]]s of Siberia. Workers still employed were then paid in rubles. <ref>Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, pgs. 173 -175.</ref>
[[Image:2-463.jpg|thumb|350px|right|Soviet and German troops meet up in the town of Brześć on September 18, 1939.<ref>[http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/en/23/211/September_17_1939__Soviet_aggression_on_Poland.html September 17, 1939 - Soviet aggression on Poland], The Institute of National Remembrance - Commission of the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation.</ref>]]
The French and British were initially reluctant to honor promises to the Polish government, avoiding serious consideration of an invasion of Germany. The British failed to send land forces in time to support the Poles (see [[Western betrayal]]). The French mobilized slowly and then launched a token offensive in the Saar. The Meanwhile, on September 8, the Germans reached Warsaw, having slashed through the Polish defenses. On September 17, the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the East.

Following the completion of the invasion of Poland, German forces regrouped and Allied forces remained defensive, leading US commentators to dub it the [[Phoney War]]. May 10 1940 marked the end of any accusation of a phony war, with the invasion of France by Germany, via the [[Netherlands]], [[Luxembourg]] and [[Belgium]]. Resistance by the British armies and French armies proved weak and the occupation of France began. British troops were routed and evacuated mainland Europe at Dunkirk. France was divided into the northern [[Occupied France]] and the collaborationist [[Vichy regime]] in the south of France, including [[Corsica]].

The collapse and occupation of France, together with Germany's non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union,<ref>[http://nobsopus.blogspot.com/2007/01/celebrations-marking-60-years-since-end.html Celebrations Marking 60 Years Since the End of World War II], Pavel Vitek, ''Russkii vopros - Studies'', No. 1 2005. Translation from Russian.</ref>, their alliances with fascist Italy, and an expansionist Japan, benevolent neutrality of fascist Spain, with little of Europe outside of Axis hands led many to assume that the United Kingdom had been defeated. Indeed it would appear that the, seemingly foolish, decision of the relatively weak United Kingdom to continue the war took the Axis powers off guard. This decision ensured the remaining British Empire was still involved in the war, with Japan threatening many British possessions in Asia.

In 1940 [[Denmark]] and [[Norway]] were invaded by German forces, to preempt a British occupation of Norway. Norway also contained a source of [[Heavy water]], possibly crucial in the construction of an atomic weapon. This was soon followed by the British invasion of neutral [[Iceland]] (the invasion of [[Denmark]] by German forces marks the start of an independent Iceland).

With Britain the sole opposing European nation, the [[Battle of Britain]] commenced. The [[Luftwaffe]] attempted to achieve aerial dominance over the south of Britain, in order to allow a sea based invasion of Britain to proceed. For many months the [[Royal Air Force]] and Luftwaffe fought for dominance, with the resilience of the RAF, with British, Canadian and [[Republic of Poland|London Polish exile]] pilots forced a rethink of [[German]] tactics. The period that followed is known as the [[Blitz]], where the RAF and Luftwaffe attempted to undermine the infrastructure of the opposing country. This was a period of great economic devastation, which took both countries a considerable period to recover from. More seriously it led to huge numbers of civilian deaths.

==Finnish War==

The Soviet Union invaded [[Finland]], a member of the [[neutral]] [[Oslo Group of States]] on November 30 1939. This conflict came to be known as the [[Winter War]]. Despite the overwhelming numbers of the [[Red Army]], the Finnish resistance was strong and the battle was hard fought before the Soviet army took control. The Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on December 12, 1939 for violations of the League treaty.<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1939/391214a.html League of Nations' Expulsion of the USSR, December 12, 1939].</ref> The League of Nations found the Soviet Union conducting "a [[war of aggression]] [which] constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime."<ref>[http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_League_of_Nations_Protocol_for_the_Pacific_Settlement_of_International_Disputes The League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes], 2 October, 1920.</ref>

==Soviet-German War==
[[Image:SOVietOffense med.gif|thumb|300px|right|Soviet map of offense plans in the West. The map is dated May 15, 1941.<ref>Stalin's chance. Soviet Union and struggle for the Europe: 1939-1941. 2000. (In Russian) [http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html] Index to Maps and Illustrations [http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/ill.html]</ref>]]
1941 marked the major turning point in the war in Europe, when the Germans undertook [[Operation Barbarossa]] - the invasion of the Soviet Union. In a war of major turning points, this was the most significant in Europe. This miscalculation diminished the German army's capacity.

Stalin was informed by his master spy in Japan, [[Richard Sorge]], of the Japanese Imperial Conference in Tokyo which decided on July 2 not to move against the Soviet Union from [[Manchuria]] through Siberia, but instead to prosecute a plan of advance to the south at the risk of war with the United States and United Kingdom. The possibility of a Japanese attack and a two front war with both Germany and Japan was a specter that haunted Soviet officials. <ref>President Roosevelt followed the debate through the medium of "Magic" -- a name applied to intercepted and decoded Japanese messages. He described the Imperial Conference as "a real drag-down and knockout fight... to decide which way they were going to jump --attack Russia, attack the South Seas (or) sit on the fence and be more friendly with us." President Roosevelt to Secretary Ickes, July l, l941 cited in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, ''The Undeclared War, 1940-41'', (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 646.</ref><ref>Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, [[Institute of Pacific Relations]], Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref> Russia had over 200,000 men facing Japan in the Far East. These troops were desperately needed in the war against Germany. [[Victor Kravchenko]] a high Soviet official and defector wrote, "Beginning with the nineteenth (October, 1941), the situation improved. The first seasoned Siberian and Far Eastern forces began to arrive... Far Eastern troops, hardened in border struggle with the Japanese, and Siberian forces inured to winter warfare were rushing westward across a continent to hold the invaders." <ref>Victor Kravchenko, ''I Chose Freedom'', New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1950, p. 377-378.</ref>

The German war against the Soviet Union (known as the [[Great Patriotic War]] in the Soviet Union) demanded a huge dedication of resources and lengthy supply lines in need of defense later in the war permitted an invasion of mainland Europe by Allied Forces on [[D-Day]].
[[Image:Molotov-matsuoka.JPG|thumb|300px|left|Soviet Foreign Minister [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] signs the [[Matsuoka pact]]. Japanese Foreign Minister [[Yosuke Matsuoka]] is to his immediate left, Joseph Stalin is seen standing between the two.<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/s1.htm Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact April 13, 1941], The Department of State Bulletin Vol. XII, No. 305, April 29, 1945. Retrieved from the Avalon Project 11 August 2007.</ref> ]]
==United States enters the War==

American naval escort of British convoys carrying [[Lend-Lease]] aid lead to a shooting war with Germany. On October 17, 1941, the U.S. destroyer Kearney was torpedoed; two weeks later, the destroyer Rueben James was blown to pieces with the loss of 115 lives.<ref>Oxford Guide to World War II, ed. by I.C.B. Dear, Oxford University Press, 1995</ref> On November 10, an American escort of 11 vessels picked up a convoy of six vessels including America's three largest ocean liners with 20,000 British troops and guarded them from Halifax to India and Singapore. Many of the activities of the American Navy in the summer of 1941 were not known at all to the American public. In September, Roosevelt sought to repeal the [[Neutrality Act]] forbidding the arming of merchant vessels which was done on October 17. Two weeks later, all the essential points
of the Neutrality Act were repealed. <ref>Carroll Quigley, ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 720. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>

The [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|attack on Pearl Harbor]] officially brought the United States into World War Two. Admiral [[Isoroku Yamamoto]] of the Japanese Imperial Navy was against engaging with the United States, due to fear of "waking a sleeping giant". The United States recovered from the shell shock of the initial attack and plunged into the war with the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor!".

==Yugoslav and Chinese Partisans==
Hitler invaded Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Yugoslavian government fled to [[London]] and joined the Allied governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovak, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the [[French National Committee]]. At the Inter-Allied Meeting held of September 24, 1941 in London, the Yugoslavian government along with the other governments-in-exile and the Soviet Union, pledged their "adherence to the common principles of policy set forth" in the [[Atlantic Charter]], to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic/at17.htm The Atlantic Conference : Resolution of September 24, 1941].</ref> On January 1, 1942, the Yugoslavian government and the other signatories of the Atlantic Charter, along with most other Powers of the British [[Commonwealth]] and the [[Pan American Union]] of States, put forward the [[Declaration by United Nations]], "being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and [[religious freedom]], and to preserve [[human rights]] and [[justice]] in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world....
each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto."<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/274.html Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942], U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. VI, p. 3.</ref>

Within Yugoslavia, Colonel [[Draja Mikhailovitch]], a Serb, organized a resistance army on behalf of the Yugoslavian government known in the press as the Chetniks.<ref>''While You Slept : Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York : The Devin - Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 46] pdf.</ref> Yet Mikhailovitch soon found it more important to fight communism than the occupator and at the end of 1941 started colaborating with Germans. Interestingly, despite both being collaborators, there were still fights betheen the chetniks and the [[Croatia]]n [[ustashe]] movement.

[[Josip Broz Tito]], a member of the [[Comintern]], led the communist [[Yugoslav Partisans]]. In the United States, [[Louis Adamic]] had access to the First Lady, [[Eleanor Roosevelt]]. Adamic was invited to the [[White House]] and pressed upon U.S. President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] support for the [[subversion]] of Colonel Mikhailovitch in favor of Tito. The U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) began a campaign against Mikhailovitch which was repeated in [[mainstream media]] sources, with a call for unity with the partisans.

The Yugoslav government-in-exile in London continued to support Mikhailovitch. [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] in 1942 paid tribute to Mikhailovitch and his men. But at the [[Teheran conference]], as part of the policy of [[appeasement|appeasing]] Stalin, Roosevelt and [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] abandoned Mikhailovitch completely and yielded to Soviet Union’s choice of Tito. The U.S. withheld arms and aid from the United Nations ally and gave them to Tito and thus delivered Yugoslavia to communism, but also shortened the war as partisans were by then a strong force at fighting the occupator.

At the [[Cairo conference]] the same program was launched against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. [[OWI]] and the American press began referring to the CCP as "partisans." The [[propaganda]] campaign originated in the Soviet Union. ''War and the Working Class'', a [[Bolshevik]] publication, in March 1943 printed the following:
:"The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Army in China consist of the most progressive, steadfast and self-sacrificing people of China. They are led by the Communist Party. . . . China has every possibility over the enemy."<ref>Quoted in ''While You Slept'', Flynn, pg. 47.</ref>

And it added, "national unity is necessary." This began to appear in the United States. The Chinese Communists and Mao were referred to as "partisans," and the call for "unity in China." [[Edgar Snow]] in the ''Saturday Evening Post'' wrote that the situation in China was much like that in Yugoslavia, with the Chinese partisans led by General [[Chu Teh]], and Mao Zedong corresponding to Marshal Tito and his following.<ref>"Sixty Million Lost Allies", by Edgar Snow, ''Saturday Evening Post'',
June 10, 1944.</ref>

Shortly after the Teheran conference, Churchill in a speech in February 1944 indicated that the allies were no longer sending supplies to Mikhailovitch. Two months later King Peter, the Yugoslavian Head of State was forced to dismiss Premier Purich, which meant the entire cabinet in which Mikhailovitch was Minister of War. A delegate of the partisans Subasich was made Prime Minister. With the subsequent Russian invasion and the aid of American supplies, the Communists with Tito took control. Mikhailovitch, an ally of the Atlantic Charter, was sentenced by Tito after the war as a traitor.

==War in Europe 1944==

"The time of liberation is at hand. Poles, to arms! There is not a moment to lose!" This was broadcast on the Polish language radio station from Moscow on July 29, 1944, at 8:15 in the evening. A force of 40,000 responded. <ref>''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time'', Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 795. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> But the Red Army, for sixty-three days, denying they knew anything about it, refused to drop weapons and food to assist the Polish fighters for whose liberty the British government had gone to war in September 1939. The Polish resistance fighters were massacred methodically by the Germans. At the very time at which Prime Minister Mikolajczyk from the legitimate [[Republic of Poland|Polish Government in exile]] in London flew to Moscow, the Kremlin "recognized" the [[Comintern]] puppet regime, the [[Lublin Committee]], as the new Polish "people's government." <ref>Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, ''The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet Aggression'', (NY: Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 70.</ref>

While Romania was frantically imploring the West for assistance, the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) praised the Soviet Unions’ "new democracy" and the "innocent nature of Communism." <ref>Reuben M. Markham, ''Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke'' (Boston: Meader, 1949), p.
169.</ref> By November, [[Andrey Vyshinsky]], the legal mastermind who presided at the major show trials of Stalin's [[Great Purge]], arrived to "restore internal order."

==War in Europe 1945==
:''See also [[Western_betrayal#Warsaw_Uprising|Warsaw Uprising]]''

On January 5, 1945, the Soviet Union announced that the [[Comintern]] affiliated [[Lublin Committee]], with which it had dealt ''de facto'' ever since its birth, was now officially recognized as provisional government of Poland. "The [[Yalta Declaration]]," Soviet Deputy Commissar of Defense [[Nikolai Bulganin]] told the Lublin Committee on February 17, 1945 "is a scrap of paper.... You will be the Government of Poland, no matter how those elections turn out and whatever might happen in the meantime. Be steadfast and have faith in Stalin!" <ref>Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias and Ladislas Farago, ''Behind Closed Doors; the Secret History of the Cold War'', (NY:Putnam, 1950), p. 58.</ref>

On February 24, 1945, in violation of the Yalta pact -- which had been signed on February 11 -- the U.S.S.R. indicated her unwillingness to co-operate in the Allied Control Councils in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and on February 27, [[Andrey Vyshinsky]], in another violation of the Yalta pact, insisted by an official [[demarche]] that King Michael of Romania substitute Communists and Communist tools for certain members of his cabinet. Despite these Soviet manifestations of contempt for the agreements which had been signed at the Crimea Conference, [[Franklin Delano Roosevelt]], on March 1, 1945, told a joint session of Congress that "more than ever before, the major Allies are closely united."

On May 26 presidential adviser [[Harry Hopkins]] met [[Stalin]] at the [[Kremlin]] to discuss the fundamental relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hopkins told Stalin that two months earlier there had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union and complete support for President Roosevelt's policies but now this body of American public opinion was seriously disturbed. Hopkins noted the deterioration of public opinion the previous six weeks had been so serious as to affect adversely the relations between the two countries.

Hopkins stated public opinion was alarmed and worried at the present trend of events and did not quite understand why, but it was obvious to them that if present trends continued unchecked the entire structure of world cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union would be destroyed. [[President Truman]] asked Hopkins to relay his great anxiety at the present situation and his desire to continue Roosevelt's policy, and intention to carry out all arrangements, formal and informal, which Roosevelt and Stalin made together. Hopkins said he wished to state as clearly and as forcibly as possible, the question of Poland had become a symbol of the U.S ability to resolve problems with the Soviet Union.

Stalin replied that at the [[Yalta conference]] it had been agreed that the existing Polish government was to be reconstructed and that anyone with common sense could see that this meant the [[Lublin Committee]] was to form the basis of the new government. Stalin said no other understanding of the Yalta Agreement was possible.

Stalin went on to declare that at Yalta it had been agreed that the three powers would sit on the Reparation Commission. Now the United States Government was insisting that France should be represented on the same basis as the Soviet Union. This, Stalin said, was an insult to the Soviet Union in view of the fact that France had concluded a separate peace with Germany and had opened the frontier to the Germans. To attempt to place France on the same footing as the Soviet Union looked like an attempt to humiliate the Russians. <ref>''Roosevelt and Hopkins : An Intimate History'', Robert E. Sherwood, New York Harper and Brothers, 1948. Full record of meeting, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Roosevelt_and_Hopkins-An_Intimate_History-Robert_E_Sherwood-1948-1034pgs-GOV-POL.sml.pdf&id=252&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 920 - 934] pdf. Those in attendance were Stalin, Molotov and Pavlov and Hopkins, Harriman and Bohlen. </ref>

==Far Eastern Theatre==

After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese juggernaut seemed unstoppable. In the south, they conquered the [[Philippines]], the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, Malaysia, and extended their reach as far as the Solomon Islands. In the west, they seized [[Burma]] and the vital port at [[Rangoon]], and even attacked British forces at [[Ceylon]]. The Japanese empire now reached as far as [[Wake Island]] in the east and the [[Aleutian Islands]] to the north. Attacks on Japanese targets, including the Doolittle raid, boasted American morale, but did little material damage. In May 1942, Japanese forces were finally halted at the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]], which cost the Americans a precious [[aircraft carrier]], but saved southern [[New Guinea]]. At the [[Battle of Midway]] a month later, the Japanese lost four of their best carriers, suffering a blow to their sea power from which they never recovered.

The Americans took the offensive in August with a landing on the island of [[Guadalcanal]]. The overall American offensive strategy was two-pronged. Forces in the south advanced up the Solomon island chain and New Guinea, while in the central Pacific, Marines took island after island, including [[Battle of Tarawa|Tarawa]], Eniwetok, [[Saipan]], and [[Guam]]. The two lines of attack came together at the Philippines.

Integral to the strategy was the policy of island hopping. Many Japanese strongholds were bypassed, allowing the American forces to concentrate on more strategically significant islands. For example, [[Truk]] and Rabaul were home to major Japanese air and naval bases, but once the bases were neutralized, there was no reason to take on the troops there. This policy not only saved thousands of American (and Japanese) lives, it shortened the war by at least several months.

The American invasion of the Philippines took place in late October of 1944 when Marines landed on Leyte Island. A few days later, the US Navy shattered what was left of Japanese naval power in the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]]. The Japanese fought hard, however, and Leyte took two months to secure. When the Americans landed on the other islands, they found the troops there equally unwilling to retreat, but with American superiority in almost every area, the outcome was never really in doubt. [[Manila]] was captured by March, and the American position had become solid enough that leaders could start preparing for the final stage: [[Operation Downfall|the invasion of Japan]]. The first step was taken when the island of [[Okinawa]] was captured in June after two months of heavy fighting. Operation Olympic, the invasion of [[Kyushu]], was scheduled for November 1945, followed by Operation Coronet, the invasion of [[Honshu]], in March of 1946.

The Japanese, soldiers and civilians alike, were expected to put up a fierce defense. Army Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]] believed that Japan would fight to the last man, and insisted on preparing for a land invasion of Japan with an army of 2,000,000 men anticipating a tremendous number of casualties. Some analysts estimated the number of projected casualties from Operation Olympic alone at 250,000 dead and wounded.<ref>Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy, by Craig L. Symonds, the Naval Institute, 1995</ref> For this reason, many considered Soviet assistance necessary to the success of the invasion.

[[Image:Ww2-asia usma.edu pic.gif|thumb|300px|left|Time Line of Pacific War]]
===Soviet Involvement===
The Soviet Union was allied with Japan through the [[Matsuoka pact]] while giving aid and direction to the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), its [[Comintern]] ally, to subvert the Kuomintang (KMT) government. This duplicity of motives and actions bore out tragic and disastrous events -- most specifically the eventual [[slavery|enslavement]] of 550 million Chinese people and a deeply partisan crisis in American domestic politics. The Soviet Union agreed to President Roosevelt's "Great Design" for a [[United Nations]] with "Four Policeman" to enforce the peace, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Nationalist Government avowed in the [[Joint Four Power Declaration]] of United Nations at the Moscow conference of October 1943<ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref> But [[Stalinist]] agents in several countries, including subversive infiltrators in key [[U.S. Government]] positions, were able to subvert American [[foreign policy]].

Stalin, throughout the war, had assured the United States through Ambassadors [[Averell Harriman]],<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 226.</ref> Pat Hurley,<ref> William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Truman and Roosevelt; Based on his Notes and Diaries Made at the Time; (NY:Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 147.</ref> and Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]]<ref>Cordell Hull, Memoirs (NY:Macmillian, 1948), Chapter 90, p. 1398.</ref> that he would enter the war against Japan. In 1943, to Hull, the promise had been made "without any strings to it." In 1944, when the matter was again discussed with Harriman, Stalin specified his conditions: "provided that the United States would assist in building up sixty divisions in Siberia" and "provided the political aspects of Russia's participation had been clarified."<ref> John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation with Russia (NY:Viking, 1947) p. 247.</ref> On the eve of [[Yalta conference]] the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo about the possibility of arranging for a settlement. Stalin did not communicate this to either Roosevelt of Churchill.<ref>''While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 168] pdf.</ref>

Soviet involvement was controversial. Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] assured Roosevelt on his way to the [[Yalta conference]] at a stopover in Hawaii that as soon as they took the Philippines and the Marianas, Japan would be hopelessly cut off from supplies and that she would have to surrender.<ref>I Was There, Admiral William D. Leahy, New York, 1950, pgs. 245-259.</ref> (It should be noted, however, that this assessment was given before the battles of [[Iwo Jima]] and [[Okinawa]].) General George Marshall insisted that the Soviet Union becoming involved in the war was necessary to fight the Kwantung army Japan had in [[Manchuria]], although this army was deteriorated by levies for use in other parts of the Pacific. In his biography, Admiral Leahy says that Marshall didn't seem to realize that the Navy had beaten Japan.<ref>I Was There, Leahy, New York, pgs. 245-259.</ref> In 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the position that Russian entry into the war against Japan was essential, and this was the prevailing view as late as February 1945, as evidenced by the concessions that Stalin won at Yalta. But by June, the Americans, shocked by Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and no longer interested in establishing B-29 bases in Siberia, were not so desirous of ensuring Russian participation at any cost. They still wanted Stalin to attack the Japanese forces in Manchuria, but Stalin hardly needed any encouragement in this regard.<ref>The West Point Atlas of War, World War II: The Pacific, ed. by Brig. Gen. Vincent J. Esposito, Tess Press, 1959</ref>

==Japanese capitulation==

On August 6, 1945, a B-29 Superfortress, the Enola Gay piloted by Paul Tibbet, dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. Then, on August 9, Bocks Car, a B-29 piloted by Frederick C. Bock dropped the second atomic bomb. On August 20 the Japanese government told the United States it was ready to accept the terms which the Allies proposed. The next day, the Allies replied, saying the authority of the emperor would be "subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." On August 14 the Japanese government agreed to this.

The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, in breach of the [[Matsuoka pact]] which was supposed to remain in force until April 1946.<ref>''The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History 1941-1945'', Boris Slavinsky, Nissan Institute Routledge Japanese Studies Series, 2003, pg. 1.</ref> Five days later, Soviet armies were in [[Korea]] with an force of 250,000 and weapons taken from the Japanese. An armed militia of 150,000 men was quickly organized.<ref>''Korea Today'', by George M. McCune, Cambridge, 1950, pgs. 178-179.</ref> Dr. [[Syngman Rhee]] who served as head of the Korean Provisional Government-in-Exile for many years, returned and set out to organize a republic in South Korea. He envisioned a unified republic, with a constitution and elections. But there was no wish for election or unity in the occupation zone of [[North Korea]].

Then, September 2, 1945, the Japanese government, along with all its military forces, formally surrendered to the United States. This happened in a ceremony aboard a United States battleship, the ''Missouri'', on [[Tokyo Bay]], where the [[Japanese Instrument of Surrender]] was signed. This was the ending of World War II, after six years almost to the day.

==Greek Civil War==
[[Greece]] sided with the [[Allies]] in World War II after [[Mussolini]]'s demands for surrender were met with the famous "[[Okhi]]" (''[[Greek]] for "no"'') statement of Greek Prime Minister [[Ioannis Metaxas]]. [[Italy]] invaded in October of 1940, and were repulsed by Greek troops in the [[Greco-Italian War]]. [[Germany|German]] and [[Bulgaria|Bulgarian]] troops joined their Italian allies in the fight, and overran the Greek, [[Great Britain|British]], [[Australia|Australian]], and [[New Zealand]] forces. The [[Nazi]] invasion during the [[Battle of Crete]] was delayed by fierce [[Crete|Cretan]] resistance, delaying the German [[Operation Barbarossa|invasion]] of the [[Soviet Union]] for over a month. Despite their efforts, the Nazi war machine was able to annex Greece. After liberation, Greece fell into [[Greek Civil War|civil war]] between [[communists]] and royalists. Lasting until 1949, the conflict resulted in a Royalist victory, preserving the Greek state, but at the cost of 40,000 lives.

==Chinese Civil War resumes==

When the Japanese surrendered, the Chinese Nationalist army far outnumbered the Red revolutionary army. Then appeared Stalin's army of 1,250,000 men armed with American guns, planes, tanks and munitions and other supplies and the balance began to alter. And the Maoists had immense quantities of munitions laid down by the Japanese in the Manchuria.

General [[George C. Marshall]] was sent by [[President Truman]] as his personal representative to China, arriving on December 20, 1945. His specific instructions from Secretary of State [[James Byrnes]] were to insist on a coalition government of "unity" as a condition for continued aid to the Nationalists.<ref>''George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959'', Forrest C. Pogue, New York, 1987, pg. 61.</ref> [[CCP]] leader [[Mao Zedong]] already said publicly in April 1945 that a coalition government with the Chinese Nationalists would result in the defeat of "reactionary American imperialism."<ref>"On Coalition Government," address to the April 1945 Seventh National Convention of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Anthony Kubek, ''How the Far East Was Lost'', Chicago 1963, pg. 238.</ref>

Marshall held several meetings with [[Chiang Kai-shek]] or his delegates and with Mao's representative, [[Zhou Enlai]], and twice arranged ceasefires, in January and June of 1946. When the ceasefires was ordered the Communists held 57 counties. A year later they had 310—a violation of the truce. The Bolton Congressional report compiled a catalogue of the bridges, railway stations and other installations destroyed by the Communists during the ceasefire.<ref>Bolton Report, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Sub-Committee No. 5) on Communism in China, 1948.</ref><ref>''History of the Chinese Communist Party'', Jacques Guillermaz, London, 1972, pg. 445.</ref><ref>''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Richard C. Thornton, Boulder, CO, 1982, pg. 192.</ref> Marshall however imposed an embargo on the [[Chinese Nationalist government]]. All aid of all sorts to the Kuomintang was discontinued until the summer of 1947 by which time the balance had shifted. Even then what the U.S. sent was insufficient to stem the Communist tide.

Gen. [[Douglas MacArthur]]'s Chief of Intelligence told the U.S. [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, "The real cause for the Communization of China is the long-range [[subversion|subversive]] operation, over the last two decades, conducted by professional Communists under orders of the [[Kremlin]]-controlled Third [[Comintern]]."<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,821608-3,00.html The Case Against '''[[I.P.R.]]'''], ''[[Time magazine]]'', September 03, 1951.</ref>

==Ukrainian Resistance==

==Fallout From World War II==

*[[Iron Curtain]]

*[[British Empire]]
The war effectively bankrupted Britain, which started the process of dismantling its empire. It was not until 2007 Britain finished paying off the loans to the USA which it had taken to fight Nazi Germany.

*the Netherlands and Indonesia
After the defeat of the Japanese empire, their army retired from the [[Dutch East Indies]] and the land was returned back to the Dutch. Quickly after that, the people of the islands revolted against the government on 17 August 1945 and declared themselves independent. The Dutch sent their “new” army to the colonies to restore order. The Dutch scored a number of victories, but after the political pressure from the USA and Australia the Dutch acknowledged in 27 December 1949 the sovereignty of [[Indonesia]]

*Supremacy of the USA in the Western World
Whilst most countries had seen their economies demolished by the war, the USA had industrialized heavily and made financial gains from sales of arms to other Allied countries. Prior to the war, one-third of Americans were employed in agriculture. The socioeconomic changes brought by returning soldiers, many of whom took advantage of a generous GI education benefits, precipitated the rise of the great American middle class.

*Supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

*[[Vietnam War]]
During the war the French lost their colony of Vietnam to the Japanese. At the end of the war they decided to reassert their colonial mastery, but the Vietnamese now had other ideas. The battle with the French would eventually lead into the Vietnam war after the French defeat and American intervention ensued to prevent the spread of Communism.

==See also==
*''Main article: [[Workers World Revolution]]
*[[Cairo conference]]
*[[Harry Dexter White]]
*[[Institute of Pacific Relations]]
*[[Lend-Lease Act]]

==Further reading==

*Gerhard L. Weinberg, ''Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939'', Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
* Gerhard L. Weinberg, ''A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II'', Cambridge: University Press, 1994.
*[http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~epf/1997/padilla.html Kursk: The Turning Point on the Eastern Front in World War II], by Roberto R. Padilla II

==References==
{{reflist|2}}

== External Links ==
* United States Department of the Navy/Navy Historical Center's [http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq36-4.htm Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz]
* [http://www.onpower.org/history_wwii.html/ World War II]
* [http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?issueID=12&articleID=139 "On the Brink of World War II: Justus Doenecke’s ''Storm on the Horizon''," by Ralph Raico]
* [http://www.independent.org/publications/working_papers/article.asp?id=1499 "Government and the Economy: The World Wars," by Robert Higgs]
* [http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=113 "How War Amplified Federal Power in the Twentieth Century," by Robert Higgs]
* [http://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=65 ''Depression, War and Cold War'', by Robert Higgs]
* [http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=138 "Wartime Prosperity?", by Robert Higgs]
* [http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=1431 Pearl Harbor]
[[Category:World War II| ]]
[[Category:Wars]]