Conservapedia - User contributions [en]

Battle of Darwin and Goose Green

2021-05-26T16:57:52Z

Magnifiko2: /* Condor Military Air Base ( the "White Flag" incident) */

Following [[Operation Rosario (Falklands/Malvinas War)]], the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in early April 1982, the 2nd and 3rd British Parachute Battalions (2 and 3 PARA) of the British 1st Parachute Regiment were deployed as part of Brigadier Julian Thompson's 3 Commando Brigade to retake the islands in [[Operation Corporate]].

==Argentinian garrison==

On April 4th, the first Argentinian unit arrived at Goose Green.
It was 27-year-old Senior Lieutenant Carlos Daniel Esteban's C Company of the 25th (Ranger-type) Infantry Regiment (''Regimiento de Infantería 'Especial' 25'' or RI 25) under 49-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín. Later, the Argentinian Army High Command (''Estado Mayor General del Ejército'' or EMGE) decided to reinforce the RI 25's C Company in the area and sent in 47-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Ángel Piaggi's 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment (Regimiento de Infanteria 12 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' or RI 12) along with other supporting units.

They arrived in helicopters between April 30th and May 21st. Then the troops responsible for the defences of Darwin-Goose Green were placed under joint command
and named Task Force 'Mercedes'. The main unit was the 12th Regiment, whose home base in Argentina was at Mercedes in Corrientes Province, hence the name of the task force. However, this regiment was incomplete; its B Company (named Combat Team 'Solari') remained on Mount Kent, from which it was sent by helicopters to Goose Green too late to have any real effect in the battle. Combat Team 'Güemes', which consisted of one rifle platoon of C Company from the 25th 'Special' Regiment and a heavy weapons platoon of A Company from RI 12 was helicoptered north of Goose Green to San Carlos on May 15th.

Private Esteban Roberto Avalos fought in the Falklands as a sniper in RI 12's B Company. In all, some fifty hand-picked 12th Regiment conscripts and NCOs had received ranger training from visiting ''Halcón 8'' (Falcon 8) army commandos in 1981, and then returned to their respective companies:

<blockquote>In my particular case, I ended up being a sharpshooter for which I had been preparing since the time we were out in the field, where I had the opportunity to shoot with a [[FN FAL|FAL]]. During the 45 days we spent there, we had to practice shooting three or four times a week, and those moments were taken advantage of to learn the shooting positions and familiarize ourselves with the weapon. The dealings with the superiors, in general, were excellent, although if somebody screwed up, we all paid the price. The most common punishments were taking us to the showers at night, forcing us to do push-ups or demand from us heaps of frog leaps and crawling. If someone took the wrong step, for example, it was reasonable to be pulled out of training, and they would make you 'dance' a little with push-ups on the thistles or the mud. Now, going back to the subject of instruction, I would say that it was generally satisfactory, at least as far as our group was concerned, since we had basic training in the use of explosives and we were even given some classes in self-defense."<ref>[http://laperlaaustral.com.ar/guerra-malvinas/esteban-roberto-avalos-clase-1962/ Esteban Roberto Avalos, clase 1962]</ref>
</blockquote>

==San Carlos==

3 Commando Brigade went ashore at San Carlos on the night of May 21/22. 2 PARA (Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones) established itself on Sussex Mountain protecting the south of the Bridgehead without opposition. 3 PARA landed in the near Port San Carlos driving off a platoon of 40 Argentinians, but not before shooting down 2 British Gazelle helicopter gunships.

On May 26, 2 PARA was ordered to move south and engage the Argentinian 12th 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' Infantry Regiment and 'Condor' Military Airbase on the Darwin/Goose Green Peninsula.

==Darwin Parks==

The attack began under the cover of darkness of 28 May with heavy naval and artillery support.

At 3.35 am, Major Dair Farrar-Hockley's A Company moved off on the left and attacked Burntside House believed to be occupied by the Argentinian 12th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon (Lieutenant Carlos Morales), but found no-one there other than four civilians. Major John Crosland's B Company started forward from the other side of Burntside Pond down the right flank with Major Philip Neame's D Company following them long the middle. With artillery support on both sides, B and D Companies were soon in close-quarter combat with the 12th Regiment's A Company (under Senior Lieutenant Jorge Antonio Manresa and Sergeant-Major Juan Carlos Coelho). Leaving No. 13 Platoon of A Company to provide covering fire from the north side of Darwin Bay, the remainder started to circle round to take Darwin Settlement.

The Argentine platoon under Lieutenant Roberto Néstor Estévez, from the 25th Infantry Regiment's C Company, received orders to counterattack at 07.30 local time. Ahead of them were 2 PARA's A and B Companies, advancing along both shorelines. The officer reached the frontline and was able to block the enemy by ordering his men to take up positions on Darwin Ridge, from which, although wounded, he started calling in artillery fire. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroopers, dispersing both companies, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment's A Company. Estévez fell, mortally wounded by enemy sniper fire, but not before winning posthumously the Heroic Valour Cross. His dying order was for Corporal Mario Rodolfo Castro to take charge, who continued to call for artillery support. Darwin Ridge was being riddled by British machine-gun and mortar fire, and the squad leader soon burnt to death from a phosphorus grenade.<ref>" El Tte. Estévez murió en la acción. El Cabo Castro se hizo cargo del equipo de comunicaciones y continuó trasmitiendo, pero al ser alcanzado por proyectiles rasantes que incendiaron su cuerpo, moría poco después." Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, Martín Antonio Balza, p. 31, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref>Private Fabricio Edgar Carrascul took over the radio and was also killed calling in fire support. But the sacrifice of these brave soldiers proved not to have been in vain. At 09.30 local time, Major John Crosland's B Company disengaged and began to withdraw
<ref>"The Argentine platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Estevez, which had fewer men than its British counterpart, entered the fray. Ahead of them was British Company B, advancing from the west. The lieutenant reached the first line and was able to block the enemy by penetrating to Boca Hill, from which, although wounded, he started calling his artillery's range. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroops, inflicting heavy casualties, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Estevez fell, mortally wounded by enemy fire, but not before he had proved himself in combat. His dying order was to his squad leader, who continued to call the artillery's range. The position was being riddled by British fire, and the squad leader soon succumed to the withering hail. A private took up the position and soon joined his companions. But the heroic sacrifice of these brave men proved not to have been in vain. At 0930 hours, the enemy broke off the attack and began to withdraw." The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, Rubén Oscar Moro, pp. 259-260, Praeger, 1989</ref>

==Darwin Ridge==

By daylight, however, the British attack was held up by Second Lieutenant Ernesto Orlando Peluffo's 12th Regiment platoon on Darwin Hill, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Ricardo Aliaga's 8th Regiment platoon (3rd Platoon, C Company) on Boca Hill and the British Commanding Officer (CO), 42-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel "H" Jones, was killed trying to take out a machine-gun post on Darwin Ridge. During this fighting, the British fired over 1,000 81mm mortar rounds to suppress Argentinian defenders, otherwise British casualties would have been horrendous.

Major Chris Keeble (2 ic) was called up from the rear, and leaving A Company to slowly wrestle control of Darwin Hill and pulling B Company back to Middle Hill, ordered D Company to move round Boca Hill, advancing from the nearby beach. Support Company used MILAN anti-tank missiles to destroy these trenches. Approximately, 6 hours after the start of the fighting on Darwin Ridge, the last Argentinian defenders on Boca Hill surrendered. Company Sergeant-Major Colin Price of 'A' Company, who was interviewed by BBC war correspondent Robert Fox soon after the fall of Darwin Ridge, is reported to have said he "admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought".<ref>"Price of 'A' Company, who had come down from Darwin Hill to fetch ammunition. He confirmed that the colonel had been killed and I taped a short interview with him. He said he admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought." Eyewitness Falklands, Robert Fox, p. 180, Methuen, 1982</ref>

In the meantime, the Argentinians helicoptered in their first reinforcements from Mount Kent, and the Malvinas Military Air Base near Port Stanley, flew in support missions. The first air strike took place in the morning when a ''Grupo 3'' Pucara was hit, probably by a Blowpipe shoulder-launched SAM, but the aircraft limped back to Stanley airbase. The next sortie by two more Pucaras caught two Royal Marine Scouts on their way in to evacuate Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. Captain Jeff Niblett managed to evade them, but Lieutenant Richard Nunn was killed by cannon fire and crashed down near Camilla Creek House. One of the Pucaras was later found to have crashed into high ground returning to Stanley after chasing Sea King Helicopters near San Carlos.

For exemplary leadership, Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross. The Argentine forces had courageously held the ridge for over six hours against a numerically superior British force. Lieutenant Roberto Nestor Estévez who was mortally wounded directing artillery fire in the battle, would later receive the Heroic Valour Cross.

==Condor Military Air Base ( the "White Flag" incident)==

At 2.15 pm the final British attacks began. Elements of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the Argentinian Air Force tried to defend ''Condor'' Military Airbase, but withdrew under intense British mortar fire. However, as Major Hugh Jenner's C Company moved down the forward slope of Darwin Ridge, Second Lieutenant Claudio Cesar Braghini brought his 35 mm anti-aircraft guns into action and they did some damage, killing one paratrooper, wounding eleven and destroying Darwin Schoolhouse.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20131029202548/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Goosegreen.htm Goose Green The Argentinian Story]</ref>

Still under fire, D and C Companies headed towards the Goose Green air base while B Company circled east to cut off Goose Green Settlement. During the attack, three Paratroopers were killed in an ambush involving 'Romeo' platoon under Second Lieutenant Juan José Gómez-Centurión (2nd Rifle Platoon, C Company, 25th Regiment).

According to Private Graham Carter from 12 Platoon, D Company, 2 PARA:{{cquote|We found the first enemy position when one of the lads actually fell into a trench. There were weapons and ammo all covered in mud, just left there. They'd all bugged out, so we never saw anybody. After an hour or so, we began getting effective fire on us. We started taking cover when we heard rounds whistling around us .... we saw who was firing at us and fired back .... the section commander [Corporal Paul Sullivan] who was behind me, was hit in the knee and screamed out, and then took two more straight through the head and was killed. I got on the radio to bring up some reserves into the dead ground to the left - to go through the enemy position. When they arrived back, the sergeant sent me back to see if Paul could be helped. It was no use. He'd gone.<ref>The Scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 125, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Private Carter led the dispersed paratroopers forward at bayonet point to clear the Argentinian positions, winning the [[Military Medal]] in the process. Second Lieutenant Gómez-Centurión disengaged, and covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García<ref>"'C' Company sustained heavy losses and 'D' Company also saw some extremely fierce fighting, particularly No. 12 Platoon of 'D' Company, who managed to fight off an ambush before Private Graham Carter led the men forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. The RI 25 Platoon fled, and, single-handedly covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García, managed to escape." Paratroopers, RW Press</ref>and Private Domingo Víctor Álamo<ref>[https://www.lv16.com.ar/sg/nota/96681/a-35-anos-de-malvinas-hay-que-transmitirle-a-los-jovenes-que-la-guerra-no-es-el-camino-correcto-sino-el-dialogo A 35 años de Malvinas: "Hay que transmitirle a los jóvenes que la guerra no es el camino correcto, sino el diálogo" ]</ref>, managed to escape. García was posthumously awarded the [[Gallantry In Combat Medal]]<ref>"Desempeñándose como Encargado de Sección en un contraataque y al quedar fuera de servicio una ametralladora, se hizo cargo de ella, abriendo el fuego con eficacia, provocando la detención del avance enemigo en su sector. Posteriormente, al efectuar una maniobra para silenciar las armas pesadas enemigas que lo batían y próximo a alcanzar el objetivo, ofrendó su vida." Informe Oficial del Ejército Argentino, p. 56, Ejército Argentino, 1983</ref>while Álamo won the Argentinian Military Commendation Medal (Medalla al Merito Militar).

In the late afternoon, combat aircraft from both sides intervened, starting with two [[Argentinian Navy]] MB-339's and two IA-58 Pucaras which attacked D Company. One of the Navy jets was brought down by a Royal Marine shoulder-launched Blowpipe, and minutes later the Pucaras dropped napalm with one shot down by small arms fire. Then three Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR.3's brought much needed relief by silencing the radar-guided 35mm anti-aircraft guns at Goose Green Point with cluster bombs and rockets.

The RAF Harriers had been misidentified by two patrolling Sea Harriers piloted by Lieutenant-Commander Nigel Ward and Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer of 801 Royal Navy Air Squadron (RNAS), and were very nearly shot down during their bombing run.

==Argentinian surrender==

The assault continued with some confused fighting and by last light the whole peninsula less the Goose Green Settlement was taken. With evening approaching and the Argentinians squeezed in towards Goose Green, Combat Team ''Solari'' (B Company, 12th Regiment) from Mount Kent arrived to the south via eight helicopters, while to the north, ''Juliet'' Company 42 Commando was flown in reinforce 2 PARA but too late to join in the fighting. Major Hugh Jenner's C Company brought down artillery fire on these enemy reinforcements and they sought refuge in Goose Green Settlement. The 12th Regiment platoon under 2d Lieutenant Carlos Francisco Tamini was dispersed and remained unaccounted for in the darkness.

Mindful of the possibility of being counterattacked, Major John Crosland decided to pull back B Company and go firm on high ground near Boca Hill. A fierce sniper battle ensued with 2d Lieutenant Orlando Lucero's 12th Regiment platoon, now dug in Goose Green Settlement's outskirt. There were some close calls, and Private John Burridge from 12 Platoon, D Company, was wounded and a Sea King helicopter was hit by machine-gun fire from Lucero's men.

Negotiations with the Argentinians produced their surrender the next day. The Argentinian troops had a short parade, burned their regimental flag and lay down their weapons. Around 50 Argentinians were killed and 140 wounded, with the ''The Official History of the Falklands Campaign'' reporting that 961 Argentinians were captured. The British Paratroopers at the time reported a much larger count of 250 Argentinians killed and 1,400 prisoners. British losses in 2 PARA were 15 killed and 64 wounded. A Sea Harrier pilot (Lieutenant Nick Taylor on 4 May), a Royal Engineer, a Scout pilot and a Gurkha (Lance-Corporal Budhaprasad Limbu) were also reported killed taking and clearing Goose Green.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Darwin and Goose Green was a resounding British military victory against a resolute and well dug-in enemy. But many within the Task Force and 2 PARA itself, questioned the need to fight a strong enemy force, which could have been isolated and bypassed. It also came as a profound shock that a largely conscript Army could fight so professionally and doggedly.<ref>"Despite their defeat, the conscripts at Goose Green had shown themselves willing and able to resist fiercely from fortified positions. In this, the Argentinians, so many of whom were of Italian stock, were fighting in the Italian way, so reminiscent of World War II." Fight for the Falklands!, John Laffin, p. 143, Chivers Press, 1982</ref>The skill and bravery of the Argentinian Air Force had already been proven and recognized, but the Argentinian defense of Darwin and Goose Green was a salutary experience.<ref>"His men had fought a battle with insufficient combat support and had forced 2 Para to fight a long battle by night and day, longer than any other Argentine commander would do ... Piaggi confounded Jones's theory 'Hit them really hard and they will fold', but he was forced to resign his commission. For the second time during the week Argentine troops had stood their ground and it was only when resistance was seen to be futile that withdrawal and surrender were contemplated." Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2018</ref>

The fighting showed that "H" Jones was a strict CO who had to have complete control over every aspect and demanded his company commanders to not stray from the battle plan. Major Neame was the only officer who commanded his company with flexibility and allowed initiative among his officers and NCOs, something which benefited his platoons greatly.<ref>To what extent does the Battle for Goose Green reveal command problems in the British army of the period?, James Wallis, University of Kent</ref>

History was not kind to Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi. Because he surrendered on National Army Day he was forced to resign from the Argentinian Army. And his military competence was called into question. After a long fight in the military and civilian courts, Piaggi had his retired military rank and pension reinstated. He died in 2012.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Battle of Darwin and Goose Green

2021-05-26T16:49:56Z

Magnifiko2: /* Argentinian garrison */

Following [[Operation Rosario (Falklands/Malvinas War)]], the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in early April 1982, the 2nd and 3rd British Parachute Battalions (2 and 3 PARA) of the British 1st Parachute Regiment were deployed as part of Brigadier Julian Thompson's 3 Commando Brigade to retake the islands in [[Operation Corporate]].

==Argentinian garrison==

On April 4th, the first Argentinian unit arrived at Goose Green.
It was 27-year-old Senior Lieutenant Carlos Daniel Esteban's C Company of the 25th (Ranger-type) Infantry Regiment (''Regimiento de Infantería 'Especial' 25'' or RI 25) under 49-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín. Later, the Argentinian Army High Command (''Estado Mayor General del Ejército'' or EMGE) decided to reinforce the RI 25's C Company in the area and sent in 47-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Ángel Piaggi's 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment (Regimiento de Infanteria 12 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' or RI 12) along with other supporting units.

They arrived in helicopters between April 30th and May 21st. Then the troops responsible for the defences of Darwin-Goose Green were placed under joint command
and named Task Force 'Mercedes'. The main unit was the 12th Regiment, whose home base in Argentina was at Mercedes in Corrientes Province, hence the name of the task force. However, this regiment was incomplete; its B Company (named Combat Team 'Solari') remained on Mount Kent, from which it was sent by helicopters to Goose Green too late to have any real effect in the battle. Combat Team 'Güemes', which consisted of one rifle platoon of C Company from the 25th 'Special' Regiment and a heavy weapons platoon of A Company from RI 12 was helicoptered north of Goose Green to San Carlos on May 15th.

Private Esteban Roberto Avalos fought in the Falklands as a sniper in RI 12's B Company. In all, some fifty hand-picked 12th Regiment conscripts and NCOs had received ranger training from visiting ''Halcón 8'' (Falcon 8) army commandos in 1981, and then returned to their respective companies:

<blockquote>In my particular case, I ended up being a sharpshooter for which I had been preparing since the time we were out in the field, where I had the opportunity to shoot with a [[FN FAL|FAL]]. During the 45 days we spent there, we had to practice shooting three or four times a week, and those moments were taken advantage of to learn the shooting positions and familiarize ourselves with the weapon. The dealings with the superiors, in general, were excellent, although if somebody screwed up, we all paid the price. The most common punishments were taking us to the showers at night, forcing us to do push-ups or demand from us heaps of frog leaps and crawling. If someone took the wrong step, for example, it was reasonable to be pulled out of training, and they would make you 'dance' a little with push-ups on the thistles or the mud. Now, going back to the subject of instruction, I would say that it was generally satisfactory, at least as far as our group was concerned, since we had basic training in the use of explosives and we were even given some classes in self-defense."<ref>[http://laperlaaustral.com.ar/guerra-malvinas/esteban-roberto-avalos-clase-1962/ Esteban Roberto Avalos, clase 1962]</ref>
</blockquote>

==San Carlos==

3 Commando Brigade went ashore at San Carlos on the night of May 21/22. 2 PARA (Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones) established itself on Sussex Mountain protecting the south of the Bridgehead without opposition. 3 PARA landed in the near Port San Carlos driving off a platoon of 40 Argentinians, but not before shooting down 2 British Gazelle helicopter gunships.

On May 26, 2 PARA was ordered to move south and engage the Argentinian 12th 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' Infantry Regiment and 'Condor' Military Airbase on the Darwin/Goose Green Peninsula.

==Darwin Parks==

The attack began under the cover of darkness of 28 May with heavy naval and artillery support.

At 3.35 am, Major Dair Farrar-Hockley's A Company moved off on the left and attacked Burntside House believed to be occupied by the Argentinian 12th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon (Lieutenant Carlos Morales), but found no-one there other than four civilians. Major John Crosland's B Company started forward from the other side of Burntside Pond down the right flank with Major Philip Neame's D Company following them long the middle. With artillery support on both sides, B and D Companies were soon in close-quarter combat with the 12th Regiment's A Company (under Senior Lieutenant Jorge Antonio Manresa and Sergeant-Major Juan Carlos Coelho). Leaving No. 13 Platoon of A Company to provide covering fire from the north side of Darwin Bay, the remainder started to circle round to take Darwin Settlement.

The Argentine platoon under Lieutenant Roberto Néstor Estévez, from the 25th Infantry Regiment's C Company, received orders to counterattack at 07.30 local time. Ahead of them were 2 PARA's A and B Companies, advancing along both shorelines. The officer reached the frontline and was able to block the enemy by ordering his men to take up positions on Darwin Ridge, from which, although wounded, he started calling in artillery fire. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroopers, dispersing both companies, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment's A Company. Estévez fell, mortally wounded by enemy sniper fire, but not before winning posthumously the Heroic Valour Cross. His dying order was for Corporal Mario Rodolfo Castro to take charge, who continued to call for artillery support. Darwin Ridge was being riddled by British machine-gun and mortar fire, and the squad leader soon burnt to death from a phosphorus grenade.<ref>" El Tte. Estévez murió en la acción. El Cabo Castro se hizo cargo del equipo de comunicaciones y continuó trasmitiendo, pero al ser alcanzado por proyectiles rasantes que incendiaron su cuerpo, moría poco después." Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, Martín Antonio Balza, p. 31, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref>Private Fabricio Edgar Carrascul took over the radio and was also killed calling in fire support. But the sacrifice of these brave soldiers proved not to have been in vain. At 09.30 local time, Major John Crosland's B Company disengaged and began to withdraw
<ref>"The Argentine platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Estevez, which had fewer men than its British counterpart, entered the fray. Ahead of them was British Company B, advancing from the west. The lieutenant reached the first line and was able to block the enemy by penetrating to Boca Hill, from which, although wounded, he started calling his artillery's range. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroops, inflicting heavy casualties, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Estevez fell, mortally wounded by enemy fire, but not before he had proved himself in combat. His dying order was to his squad leader, who continued to call the artillery's range. The position was being riddled by British fire, and the squad leader soon succumed to the withering hail. A private took up the position and soon joined his companions. But the heroic sacrifice of these brave men proved not to have been in vain. At 0930 hours, the enemy broke off the attack and began to withdraw." The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, Rubén Oscar Moro, pp. 259-260, Praeger, 1989</ref>

==Darwin Ridge==

By daylight, however, the British attack was held up by Second Lieutenant Ernesto Orlando Peluffo's 12th Regiment platoon on Darwin Hill, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Ricardo Aliaga's 8th Regiment platoon (3rd Platoon, C Company) on Boca Hill and the British Commanding Officer (CO), 42-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel "H" Jones, was killed trying to take out a machine-gun post on Darwin Ridge. During this fighting, the British fired over 1,000 81mm mortar rounds to suppress Argentinian defenders, otherwise British casualties would have been horrendous.

Major Chris Keeble (2 ic) was called up from the rear, and leaving A Company to slowly wrestle control of Darwin Hill and pulling B Company back to Middle Hill, ordered D Company to move round Boca Hill, advancing from the nearby beach. Support Company used MILAN anti-tank missiles to destroy these trenches. Approximately, 6 hours after the start of the fighting on Darwin Ridge, the last Argentinian defenders on Boca Hill surrendered. Company Sergeant-Major Colin Price of 'A' Company, who was interviewed by BBC war correspondent Robert Fox soon after the fall of Darwin Ridge, is reported to have said he "admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought".<ref>"Price of 'A' Company, who had come down from Darwin Hill to fetch ammunition. He confirmed that the colonel had been killed and I taped a short interview with him. He said he admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought." Eyewitness Falklands, Robert Fox, p. 180, Methuen, 1982</ref>

In the meantime, the Argentinians helicoptered in their first reinforcements from Mount Kent, and the Malvinas Military Air Base near Port Stanley, flew in support missions. The first air strike took place in the morning when a ''Grupo 3'' Pucara was hit, probably by a Blowpipe shoulder-launched SAM, but the aircraft limped back to Stanley airbase. The next sortie by two more Pucaras caught two Royal Marine Scouts on their way in to evacuate Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. Captain Jeff Niblett managed to evade them, but Lieutenant Richard Nunn was killed by cannon fire and crashed down near Camilla Creek House. One of the Pucaras was later found to have crashed into high ground returning to Stanley after chasing Sea King Helicopters near San Carlos.

For exemplary leadership, Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross. The Argentine forces had courageously held the ridge for over six hours against a numerically superior British force. Lieutenant Roberto Nestor Estévez who was mortally wounded directing artillery fire in the battle, would later receive the Heroic Valour Cross.

==Condor Military Air Base ( the "White Flag" incident)==

At 2.15 pm the final British attacks began. Elements of the 1st Anti Aircraft Group of the Argentinian Air Force tried to defend ''Condor'' Military Airbase, but withdrew under intense British mortar fire. However, as Major Hugh Jenner's C Company moved down the forward slope of Darwin Ridge, Second Lieutenant Claudio Cesar Braghini brought his 35 mm anti-aircraft guns into action and they did some damage, killing one paratrooper, wounding eleven and destroying Darwin Schoolhouse.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20131029202548/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Goosegreen.htm Goose Green The Argentinian Story]</ref>

Still under fire, D and C Companies headed towards the Goose Green air base while B Company circled east to cut off Goose Green Settlement. During the attack, three Paratroopers were killed in an ambush involving ''Romeo'' platoon under Second Lieutenant Juan José Gómez Centurión (2nd Rifle Platoon, C Company, 25th Regiment).

According to Private Graham Carter from 12 Platoon, D Company, 2 PARA{{cquote|We found the first enemy position when one of the lads actually fell into a trench. There were weapons and ammo all covered in mud, just left there. They'd all bugged out, so we never saw anybody. After an hour or so, we began getting effective fire on us. We started taking cover when we heard rounds whistling around us .... we saw who was firing at us and fired back .... the section commander [Corporal Paul Sullivan] who was behind me, was hit in the knee and screamed out, and then took two more straight through the head and was killed. I got on the radio to bring up some reserves into the dead ground to the left - to go through the enemy position. When they arrived back, the sergeant sent me back to see if Paul could be helped. It was no use. He'd gone.<ref>The Scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 125, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Private Carter led the dispersed paratroopers forward at bayonet point to clear the Argentinian positions, winning the [[Military Medal]] in the process. Second Lieutenant Gómez Centurión disengaged, and covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García<ref>"'C' Company sustained heavy losses and 'D' Company also saw some extremely fierce fighting, particularly No. 12 Platoon of 'D' Company, who managed to fight off an ambush before Private Graham Carter led the men forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. The RI 25 Platoon fled, and, single-handedly covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García, managed to escape." Paratroopers, RW Press</ref> and Private Víctor Álamo<ref>[https://www.lv16.com.ar/sg/nota/96681/a-35-anos-de-malvinas-hay-que-transmitirle-a-los-jovenes-que-la-guerra-no-es-el-camino-correcto-sino-el-dialogo A 35 años de Malvinas: "Hay que transmitirle a los jóvenes que la guerra no es el camino correcto, sino el diálogo" ]</ref>, managed to escape. García was posthumously awarded the [[Gallantry In Combat Medal]]<ref>"Desempeñándose como Encargado de Sección en un contraataque y al quedar fuera de servicio una ametralladora, se hizo cargo de ella, abriendo el fuego con eficacia, provocando la detención del avance enemigo en su sector. Posteriormente, al efectuar una maniobra para silenciar las armas pesadas enemigas que lo batían y próximo a alcanzar el objetivo, ofrendó su vida." Informe Oficial del Ejército Argentino, p. 56, Ejército Argentino, 1983</ref>while Álamo won the Argentinian Military Commendation Medal (Medalla al Merito Militar).

In the late afternoon, combat aircraft from both sides intervened, starting with two [[Argentinian Navy]] MB.339's and two IA.58 Pucaras which attacked D Company. One of the Navy jets was brought down by a Royal Marine shoulder-launched Blowpipe, and minutes later the Pucaras dropped napalm with one shot down by small arms fire. Then three Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR.3's brought much needed relief by silencing the radar-guided 35mm anti-aircraft guns at Goose Green Point with cluster bombs and rockets.

The RAF Harriers had been misidentified by two patrolling Sea Harriers piloted by Lieutenant-Commander Nigel Ward and Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer of 801 Royal Navy Air Squadron (RNAS), and were very nearly shot down during their bombing run.

==Argentinian surrender==

The assault continued with some confused fighting and by last light the whole peninsula less the Goose Green Settlement was taken. With evening approaching and the Argentinians squeezed in towards Goose Green, Combat Team ''Solari'' (B Company, 12th Regiment) from Mount Kent arrived to the south via eight helicopters, while to the north, ''Juliet'' Company 42 Commando was flown in reinforce 2 PARA but too late to join in the fighting. Major Hugh Jenner's C Company brought down artillery fire on these enemy reinforcements and they sought refuge in Goose Green Settlement. The 12th Regiment platoon under 2d Lieutenant Carlos Francisco Tamini was dispersed and remained unaccounted for in the darkness.

Mindful of the possibility of being counterattacked, Major John Crosland decided to pull back B Company and go firm on high ground near Boca Hill. A fierce sniper battle ensued with 2d Lieutenant Orlando Lucero's 12th Regiment platoon, now dug in Goose Green Settlement's outskirt. There were some close calls, and Private John Burridge from 12 Platoon, D Company, was wounded and a Sea King helicopter was hit by machine-gun fire from Lucero's men.

Negotiations with the Argentinians produced their surrender the next day. The Argentinian troops had a short parade, burned their regimental flag and lay down their weapons. Around 50 Argentinians were killed and 140 wounded, with the ''The Official History of the Falklands Campaign'' reporting that 961 Argentinians were captured. The British Paratroopers at the time reported a much larger count of 250 Argentinians killed and 1,400 prisoners. British losses in 2 PARA were 15 killed and 64 wounded. A Sea Harrier pilot (Lieutenant Nick Taylor on 4 May), a Royal Engineer, a Scout pilot and a Gurkha (Lance-Corporal Budhaprasad Limbu) were also reported killed taking and clearing Goose Green.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Darwin and Goose Green was a resounding British military victory against a resolute and well dug-in enemy. But many within the Task Force and 2 PARA itself, questioned the need to fight a strong enemy force, which could have been isolated and bypassed. It also came as a profound shock that a largely conscript Army could fight so professionally and doggedly.<ref>"Despite their defeat, the conscripts at Goose Green had shown themselves willing and able to resist fiercely from fortified positions. In this, the Argentinians, so many of whom were of Italian stock, were fighting in the Italian way, so reminiscent of World War II." Fight for the Falklands!, John Laffin, p. 143, Chivers Press, 1982</ref>The skill and bravery of the Argentinian Air Force had already been proven and recognized, but the Argentinian defense of Darwin and Goose Green was a salutary experience.<ref>"His men had fought a battle with insufficient combat support and had forced 2 Para to fight a long battle by night and day, longer than any other Argentine commander would do ... Piaggi confounded Jones's theory 'Hit them really hard and they will fold', but he was forced to resign his commission. For the second time during the week Argentine troops had stood their ground and it was only when resistance was seen to be futile that withdrawal and surrender were contemplated." Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2018</ref>

The fighting showed that "H" Jones was a strict CO who had to have complete control over every aspect and demanded his company commanders to not stray from the battle plan. Major Neame was the only officer who commanded his company with flexibility and allowed initiative among his officers and NCOs, something which benefited his platoons greatly.<ref>To what extent does the Battle for Goose Green reveal command problems in the British army of the period?, James Wallis, University of Kent</ref>

History was not kind to Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi. Because he surrendered on National Army Day he was forced to resign from the Argentinian Army. And his military competence was called into question. After a long fight in the military and civilian courts, Piaggi had his retired military rank and pension reinstated. He died in 2012.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Battle of Darwin and Goose Green

2021-05-26T16:34:58Z

Magnifiko2: /* San Carlos */

Following [[Operation Rosario (Falklands/Malvinas War)]], the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in early April 1982, the 2nd and 3rd British Parachute Battalions (2 and 3 PARA) of the British 1st Parachute Regiment were deployed as part of Brigadier Julian Thompson's 3 Commando Brigade to retake the islands in [[Operation Corporate]].

==Argentinian garrison==

On April 4th, the first Argentinian unit arrived at Goose Green.
It was 27-year-old Senior Lieutenant Carlos Daniel Esteban's C Company of the 25th Infantry Regiment (''Regimiento de Infantería 25'' or RI 25). Later, the Argentinian Army High Command (''Estado Mayor General del Ejército'' or EMGE) decided to reinforce the RI 25's C Company in the area and sent in 47-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Ángel Piaggi's 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment (Regimiento de Infanteria 12 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' or RI 12) along with other supporting units.

They arrived in helicopters between April 30th and May 21st. Then the troops responsible for the defences of Darwin-Goose Green were placed under joint command
and named Task Force 'Mercedes'. The main unit was the 12th Regiment, whose home base in Argentina was at Mercedes in Corrientes Province, hence the name of the task force. However, this regiment was incomplete; its B Company (named Combat Team 'Solari') remained on Mount Kent, from which it was sent by helicopters to Goose Green too late to have any real effect in the battle. Combat Team 'Güemes', which consisted of one rifle platoon of C Company from RI 25 and a heavy weapons platoon of A Company from RI 12 was helicoptered north of Goose Green to San Carlos on May 15th.

==San Carlos==

3 Commando Brigade went ashore at San Carlos on the night of May 21/22. 2 PARA (Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones) established itself on Sussex Mountain protecting the south of the Bridgehead without opposition. 3 PARA landed in the near Port San Carlos driving off a platoon of 40 Argentinians, but not before shooting down 2 British Gazelle helicopter gunships.

On May 26, 2 PARA was ordered to move south and engage the Argentinian 12th 'Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales' Infantry Regiment and 'Condor' Military Airbase on the Darwin/Goose Green Peninsula.

==Darwin Parks==

The attack began under the cover of darkness of 28 May with heavy naval and artillery support.

At 3.35 am, Major Dair Farrar-Hockley's A Company moved off on the left and attacked Burntside House believed to be occupied by the Argentinian 12th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon (Lieutenant Carlos Morales), but found no-one there other than four civilians. Major John Crosland's B Company started forward from the other side of Burntside Pond down the right flank with Major Philip Neame's D Company following them long the middle. With artillery support on both sides, B and D Companies were soon in close-quarter combat with the 12th Regiment's A Company (under Senior Lieutenant Jorge Antonio Manresa and Sergeant-Major Juan Carlos Coelho). Leaving No. 13 Platoon of A Company to provide covering fire from the north side of Darwin Bay, the remainder started to circle round to take Darwin Settlement.

The Argentine platoon under Lieutenant Roberto Néstor Estévez, from the 25th Infantry Regiment's C Company, received orders to counterattack at 07.30 local time. Ahead of them were 2 PARA's A and B Companies, advancing along both shorelines. The officer reached the frontline and was able to block the enemy by ordering his men to take up positions on Darwin Ridge, from which, although wounded, he started calling in artillery fire. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroopers, dispersing both companies, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment's A Company. Estévez fell, mortally wounded by enemy sniper fire, but not before winning posthumously the Heroic Valour Cross. His dying order was for Corporal Mario Rodolfo Castro to take charge, who continued to call for artillery support. Darwin Ridge was being riddled by British machine-gun and mortar fire, and the squad leader soon burnt to death from a phosphorus grenade.<ref>" El Tte. Estévez murió en la acción. El Cabo Castro se hizo cargo del equipo de comunicaciones y continuó trasmitiendo, pero al ser alcanzado por proyectiles rasantes que incendiaron su cuerpo, moría poco después." Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, Martín Antonio Balza, p. 31, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref>Private Fabricio Edgar Carrascul took over the radio and was also killed calling in fire support. But the sacrifice of these brave soldiers proved not to have been in vain. At 09.30 local time, Major John Crosland's B Company disengaged and began to withdraw
<ref>"The Argentine platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Estevez, which had fewer men than its British counterpart, entered the fray. Ahead of them was British Company B, advancing from the west. The lieutenant reached the first line and was able to block the enemy by penetrating to Boca Hill, from which, although wounded, he started calling his artillery's range. He thus succeeded in holding up the advance of the British paratroops, inflicting heavy casualties, as he covered the withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Regiment. Estevez fell, mortally wounded by enemy fire, but not before he had proved himself in combat. His dying order was to his squad leader, who continued to call the artillery's range. The position was being riddled by British fire, and the squad leader soon succumed to the withering hail. A private took up the position and soon joined his companions. But the heroic sacrifice of these brave men proved not to have been in vain. At 0930 hours, the enemy broke off the attack and began to withdraw." The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, Rubén Oscar Moro, pp. 259-260, Praeger, 1989</ref>

==Darwin Ridge==

By daylight, however, the British attack was held up by Second Lieutenant Ernesto Orlando Peluffo's 12th Regiment platoon on Darwin Hill, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Ricardo Aliaga's 8th Regiment platoon (3rd Platoon, C Company) on Boca Hill and the British Commanding Officer (CO), 42-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel "H" Jones, was killed trying to take out a machine-gun post on Darwin Ridge. During this fighting, the British fired over 1,000 81mm mortar rounds to suppress Argentinian defenders, otherwise British casualties would have been horrendous.

Major Chris Keeble (2 ic) was called up from the rear, and leaving A Company to slowly wrestle control of Darwin Hill and pulling B Company back to Middle Hill, ordered D Company to move round Boca Hill, advancing from the nearby beach. Support Company used MILAN anti-tank missiles to destroy these trenches. Approximately, 6 hours after the start of the fighting on Darwin Ridge, the last Argentinian defenders on Boca Hill surrendered. Company Sergeant-Major Colin Price of 'A' Company, who was interviewed by BBC war correspondent Robert Fox soon after the fall of Darwin Ridge, is reported to have said he "admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought".<ref>"Price of 'A' Company, who had come down from Darwin Hill to fetch ammunition. He confirmed that the colonel had been killed and I taped a short interview with him. He said he admired the way the enemy machine-gunners had fought." Eyewitness Falklands, Robert Fox, p. 180, Methuen, 1982</ref>

In the meantime, the Argentinians helicoptered in their first reinforcements from Mount Kent, and the Malvinas Military Air Base near Port Stanley, flew in support missions. The first air strike took place in the morning when a ''Grupo 3'' Pucara was hit, probably by a Blowpipe shoulder-launched SAM, but the aircraft limped back to Stanley airbase. The next sortie by two more Pucaras caught two Royal Marine Scouts on their way in to evacuate Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. Captain Jeff Niblett managed to evade them, but Lieutenant Richard Nunn was killed by cannon fire and crashed down near Camilla Creek House. One of the Pucaras was later found to have crashed into high ground returning to Stanley after chasing Sea King Helicopters near San Carlos.

For exemplary leadership, Majors Farrar-Hockley and Crosland each won the Military Cross. The Argentine forces had courageously held the ridge for over six hours against a numerically superior British force. Lieutenant Roberto Nestor Estévez who was mortally wounded directing artillery fire in the battle, would later receive the Heroic Valour Cross.

==Condor Military Air Base ( the "White Flag" incident)==

At 2.15 pm the final British attacks began. Elements of the 1st Anti Aircraft Group of the Argentinian Air Force tried to defend ''Condor'' Military Airbase, but withdrew under intense British mortar fire. However, as Major Hugh Jenner's C Company moved down the forward slope of Darwin Ridge, Second Lieutenant Claudio Cesar Braghini brought his 35 mm anti-aircraft guns into action and they did some damage, killing one paratrooper, wounding eleven and destroying Darwin Schoolhouse.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20131029202548/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Goosegreen.htm Goose Green The Argentinian Story]</ref>

Still under fire, D and C Companies headed towards the Goose Green air base while B Company circled east to cut off Goose Green Settlement. During the attack, three Paratroopers were killed in an ambush involving ''Romeo'' platoon under Second Lieutenant Juan José Gómez Centurión (2nd Rifle Platoon, C Company, 25th Regiment).

According to Private Graham Carter from 12 Platoon, D Company, 2 PARA{{cquote|We found the first enemy position when one of the lads actually fell into a trench. There were weapons and ammo all covered in mud, just left there. They'd all bugged out, so we never saw anybody. After an hour or so, we began getting effective fire on us. We started taking cover when we heard rounds whistling around us .... we saw who was firing at us and fired back .... the section commander [Corporal Paul Sullivan] who was behind me, was hit in the knee and screamed out, and then took two more straight through the head and was killed. I got on the radio to bring up some reserves into the dead ground to the left - to go through the enemy position. When they arrived back, the sergeant sent me back to see if Paul could be helped. It was no use. He'd gone.<ref>The Scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 125, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Private Carter led the dispersed paratroopers forward at bayonet point to clear the Argentinian positions, winning the [[Military Medal]] in the process. Second Lieutenant Gómez Centurión disengaged, and covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García<ref>"'C' Company sustained heavy losses and 'D' Company also saw some extremely fierce fighting, particularly No. 12 Platoon of 'D' Company, who managed to fight off an ambush before Private Graham Carter led the men forward at bayonet point to take the airfield. The RI 25 Platoon fled, and, single-handedly covered by Sergeant Sergio Ismael García, managed to escape." Paratroopers, RW Press</ref> and Private Víctor Álamo<ref>[https://www.lv16.com.ar/sg/nota/96681/a-35-anos-de-malvinas-hay-que-transmitirle-a-los-jovenes-que-la-guerra-no-es-el-camino-correcto-sino-el-dialogo A 35 años de Malvinas: "Hay que transmitirle a los jóvenes que la guerra no es el camino correcto, sino el diálogo" ]</ref>, managed to escape. García was posthumously awarded the [[Gallantry In Combat Medal]]<ref>"Desempeñándose como Encargado de Sección en un contraataque y al quedar fuera de servicio una ametralladora, se hizo cargo de ella, abriendo el fuego con eficacia, provocando la detención del avance enemigo en su sector. Posteriormente, al efectuar una maniobra para silenciar las armas pesadas enemigas que lo batían y próximo a alcanzar el objetivo, ofrendó su vida." Informe Oficial del Ejército Argentino, p. 56, Ejército Argentino, 1983</ref>while Álamo won the Argentinian Military Commendation Medal (Medalla al Merito Militar).

In the late afternoon, combat aircraft from both sides intervened, starting with two [[Argentinian Navy]] MB.339's and two IA.58 Pucaras which attacked D Company. One of the Navy jets was brought down by a Royal Marine shoulder-launched Blowpipe, and minutes later the Pucaras dropped napalm with one shot down by small arms fire. Then three Royal Air Force (RAF) Harrier GR.3's brought much needed relief by silencing the radar-guided 35mm anti-aircraft guns at Goose Green Point with cluster bombs and rockets.

The RAF Harriers had been misidentified by two patrolling Sea Harriers piloted by Lieutenant-Commander Nigel Ward and Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer of 801 Royal Navy Air Squadron (RNAS), and were very nearly shot down during their bombing run.

==Argentinian surrender==

The assault continued with some confused fighting and by last light the whole peninsula less the Goose Green Settlement was taken. With evening approaching and the Argentinians squeezed in towards Goose Green, Combat Team ''Solari'' (B Company, 12th Regiment) from Mount Kent arrived to the south via eight helicopters, while to the north, ''Juliet'' Company 42 Commando was flown in reinforce 2 PARA but too late to join in the fighting. Major Hugh Jenner's C Company brought down artillery fire on these enemy reinforcements and they sought refuge in Goose Green Settlement. The 12th Regiment platoon under 2d Lieutenant Carlos Francisco Tamini was dispersed and remained unaccounted for in the darkness.

Mindful of the possibility of being counterattacked, Major John Crosland decided to pull back B Company and go firm on high ground near Boca Hill. A fierce sniper battle ensued with 2d Lieutenant Orlando Lucero's 12th Regiment platoon, now dug in Goose Green Settlement's outskirt. There were some close calls, and Private John Burridge from 12 Platoon, D Company, was wounded and a Sea King helicopter was hit by machine-gun fire from Lucero's men.

Negotiations with the Argentinians produced their surrender the next day. The Argentinian troops had a short parade, burned their regimental flag and lay down their weapons. Around 50 Argentinians were killed and 140 wounded, with the ''The Official History of the Falklands Campaign'' reporting that 961 Argentinians were captured. The British Paratroopers at the time reported a much larger count of 250 Argentinians killed and 1,400 prisoners. British losses in 2 PARA were 15 killed and 64 wounded. A Sea Harrier pilot (Lieutenant Nick Taylor on 4 May), a Royal Engineer, a Scout pilot and a Gurkha (Lance-Corporal Budhaprasad Limbu) were also reported killed taking and clearing Goose Green.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Darwin and Goose Green was a resounding British military victory against a resolute and well dug-in enemy. But many within the Task Force and 2 PARA itself, questioned the need to fight a strong enemy force, which could have been isolated and bypassed. It also came as a profound shock that a largely conscript Army could fight so professionally and doggedly.<ref>"Despite their defeat, the conscripts at Goose Green had shown themselves willing and able to resist fiercely from fortified positions. In this, the Argentinians, so many of whom were of Italian stock, were fighting in the Italian way, so reminiscent of World War II." Fight for the Falklands!, John Laffin, p. 143, Chivers Press, 1982</ref>The skill and bravery of the Argentinian Air Force had already been proven and recognized, but the Argentinian defense of Darwin and Goose Green was a salutary experience.<ref>"His men had fought a battle with insufficient combat support and had forced 2 Para to fight a long battle by night and day, longer than any other Argentine commander would do ... Piaggi confounded Jones's theory 'Hit them really hard and they will fold', but he was forced to resign his commission. For the second time during the week Argentine troops had stood their ground and it was only when resistance was seen to be futile that withdrawal and surrender were contemplated." Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2018</ref>

The fighting showed that "H" Jones was a strict CO who had to have complete control over every aspect and demanded his company commanders to not stray from the battle plan. Major Neame was the only officer who commanded his company with flexibility and allowed initiative among his officers and NCOs, something which benefited his platoons greatly.<ref>To what extent does the Battle for Goose Green reveal command problems in the British army of the period?, James Wallis, University of Kent</ref>

History was not kind to Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi. Because he surrendered on National Army Day he was forced to resign from the Argentinian Army. And his military competence was called into question. After a long fight in the military and civilian courts, Piaggi had his retired military rank and pension reinstated. He died in 2012.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Argentinian occupation of the Falklands

2021-05-26T16:26:00Z

Magnifiko2:

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands was the 74-day military occupation of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic whose sovereignty has long been disputed by Argentina. The Argentinian seaborne landings on April 2nd 1982 and subsequent occupation signaled the start of the Falklands/Malvinas War, which finally resulted in the islands' returning to British rule on 14 June.

==Occupation==

Life under Argentinian occupation was full of anxiety for many of the Falklanders. They had no desire to be ruled by the Argentinians and found that many of their essential goods and services were under threat from the British naval blockade and requisitioning by the Argentinian garrison. Most Land Rovers and many tractors were requisitioned by the military and high powered radios were supposed to be handed over, although not all were.

Shortly after being appointed Miltary Governor of the Malvinas, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez had a meeting with around 40 locals that had formed part of the Fakland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) and that had been captured then released on 2 April. He warned them against taking part in any future attacks on the Argentinian garrison:{{cquote|I met some of them [members of the FIDF] and explained that if they did some wrong to the occupying troops, I would apply the laws of war against them. I also told them that there was a group of two or three youngsters that continuously were gesticulating or showed an aggressive attitude against the Argentine officers and NCOs. For instance, they used to approach at an excessive speed and pass our troops very closely. I told them that if they ran into one of them or threw them to the floor and somebody fired at them, although I did not like martyrs, I was going to justify what my men did.<ref>[https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74-days-under-the-Argentine-Flag%3A-The-Experiences-Corbacho/6b422ca0b75322965818a468fd2aff1d4185b6b4 74 days under the Argentine Flag: The Experiences of Occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War]
</ref>}}

There were further deportations of authority figures and Falklanders suspected as being resistance leaders were exiled to Fox Bay Settlement along with their families. Major Patricio Douglas Dowling took control of Argentinian military intelligence and soon gathered a reputation for harshness and threatening behaviour. Most of the 181st Military Police Company under Major Roberto Eduardo Berazay strained to maintain good relations with the Falkland Islanders and tried to treat them well although cold and hungry conscript soldiers did take to stealing food and break-and-enters became more frequent as the conflict dragged on and as the weather worsened. Military discipline was rigidly enforced in Port Stanley on the part of Major Berazay's military police unit in order to prevent break-in’s, robberies, vandalism and sexual assault, from soldiers from the frontlines that dared go Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and those caught were returned to their units where they were beaten, humiliated and staked in the freezing ground as part of field-punishment.

Argentinian Air Force Group Captain Carlos Bloomer-Reeve was given the job of acting as liaison officer between the local population and the military authorities. He had lived in the Falklands and was respected for the fair-mindedness and respect he showed to the locals.

The population at Goose Green had initially a very hard time when they were confined en masse in the Social Club in the aftermath of the deadlgy British air attacks on Goose Green airfield on May 1st 1982. Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Angel Piaggi, the 47-year-old Commanding Officer of the Argentinian 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment, said that the lockdown in Goose Green was necessary in order to protect the locals from ''"the rage of the air force men, who had lost so many colleagues."''<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/9369182/Making_Their_Dispositions_Accordingly_Civilian_Experiences_of_the_1982_Falklands_War Making Their Dispositions Accordingly: Civilian Experiences of the 1982 Falklands War]</ref>

The conditions improved when the Argentinians took pity on local women and children. According to local farm manager Eric Goss:{{cquote|Sanitation in the hall was grim. We ran out of water on the third day, the toilets were blocked and there was some dysentery. We persuaded the Argentinians to bring sea water in barrels for the toilets; and old chap, Mike Robson, did sterling work keeping them going. Two young men, Bob McLeod and Ray Robson, both radio hams, found an old broken radio, part of the club equipment, in a junk cupboard. They made this work and we listened each evening to the B.B.C. World Service; the others made noise at the windows to cover the crackling of the broadcast and we were never discovered.<ref>Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, Martin Middlebrook, p. 169, Viking, 1985</ref>}}

One local female resident reported that life in the Social Club was far from grim:{{cquote|After the first week the Argentines let two women go out each day to the galley in the cookhouse, where all the men would normally eat together. They were allowed to cook up a big meal, with bread and cakes, and bring it down to the hall. Considering we were all cramped together in a small place everybody got on very well. People were generally good-natured.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton & Peter Kosminsky, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>}}

The government authority did attempt to enforce a change in the road traffic code which had chaotic consequences. The authorities wanted everyone to drive on the right hand side of the road as in Argentina. It was thought that the Argentine military traffic would find this easier than remembering to drive on the left. Merely informing the local population was not enough to change the habits of a lifetime and the end result was chaos. Initial signs in Spanish did not help matters and in the end the authorities had to paint signs in English and write continued reminders in white paint on the roads themselves. It became a permanent reminder that the islands were occupied territory.

Other daily reminders of occupation included the numerous field artillery and anti-aircraft batteries in and around Port Stanley and large no-go areas to the civilian population like the gymnasium building that was commandeered by Argentinian Army Green Berets from Major Mario Luis Castagneto's 601st Commando Company. Children were taken out of school and sent to the interior for their safety. The local radio station was forced to play Argentinian official military communiques of the war. Fortunately, many islanders were able to pick up the BBC World Service and were encouraged by news of the British landings in San Carlos and the British victory at Goose Green.

There was some talk of evacuating the Falklands Islanders. The British government did not wish the Falklanders to abandon the islands as that would make their main argument of self-determination mute. It was only a small portion of the population who considered leaving but it was enough to concern the British government. They made it clear that the British would help anyone temporarily but that the expectation was that they would return once the fighting was over. As it transpired, few Falkland Islanders took this option and most remained in the Falklands. Tragically, three islanders would be killed when a British naval shell hit their house.

==Liberation==

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands ended on June 14th 1982. After 74 days, the islands came under British rule again. Unlike the Goose Green residents the Port Stanley citizens had been allowed much unrestricted freedom of movement. But there was a 16-hour night curfew. The British units took over the buildings commandeered by the Argentinians. Local fireman Lewis Clifton describes how the infrastructures of Port Stanley broke under the extra strain of accommodating the British troops and processing thousands of Argentine prisoners of war awaiting repatriation{{cquote|The place just couldn't take it. There was only sporadic electricity and water and the sanitation system collapsed. The streets were ankle-deep in human waste. The stench was awful, really awful, and we were all suffering from what we called Galtieri's revenge. He lost the war but left us ill.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120420135114/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/Britain_at_War_Readers__Memorie/9130824/The-Falklands-invasion-by-those-who-were-there.html The Falklands invasion, by those who were there]</ref>}}

There was much Argentinian criticism of the behaviour of British Paratroopers after the Argentinian surrender. Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, the commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in his book 'Malvinas: La Defensa de Puerto Argentino' (Editorial Sudamaricana, 1987) alleges that he complained to the British authorities and the Royal Marine Commandos took over and soon restored order in the Falklands capital. A staff officer of Commodore Michael Clapp wrote in his war diary:{{cquote|Utterly depressing. The troops are in a post war mood and very selfish. Grab, Grab - transport, houses, equipment, food, etc. - gone is the spirit of selflessness in the field. It will return but at present all is filth, squalor and (the) looting instinct prevails. Quite the worst aspect of the whole campaign.<ref>The Falklands War, D. George Boyce, p. 146, Macmillan International Higher Education, 2005</ref>}}

British SBS Commandos were helicoptered to Pebble Island on 15 June to accept the surrender of the local garrison and found that the two dozen local inhabitants had been confined to the farm manager's house. But the locals showed no hatred for the occupiers, and even insisted that one young English-speaking Argentinian conscript, Jorge Alberto Ortiz, from the 3rd Marine Battalion's 'H' Company whom they had befriended should have lunch with them before he was taken with the others to imprisonment in the sheep shearing sheds. Jorge in his perfect Californian accent told them he planned to come back in the near future as a civilian. Arina Bernstein, a cheerful read-headed woman in her mid-thirties told him he would be welcome, "But don't you come back planting you little flag here again, Jorge."<ref>The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings, Simon Jenkins, p.313, Pan, 1987</ref>}}

Claims that the Argentinian forces had behaved like savages throughout the occupation were investigated with British war correspondents Patrick Joseph Bishop and ‎John Witherow establishing they were mostly hearsay:{{cquote|They had certainly been responsible for smashing up the solid old post office, and the backstreets of the town were littered with excrement. But although fourteen local men were taken from their homes during the occupation and sent to West Falkland where they were put under house arrest, few inhabitants were ill-treated. It was an uncomfortable rather than brutal regime... There were stories of looting but on closer examination this tended to be troops stealing buns from the deep-freeze or sleeping in beds with muddy boots. Some valuables and souvenirs were stolen and houses vandalized but the details of the outrages were vague. Most of the serious damage was done by the British shelling. One islander said without rencour that the British had caused more of a mess in Stanley than the Argentinians.<ref>The Winter War: The Falklands, Patrick Joseph Bishop, John Witherow, p.143, Quartet Books, 1982</ref>}}

Captain Jeremy Larken of HMS Fearless confirms the view the Argentinian occupation foces had behaved appropriately:{{cquote|It was clear General Menendez had looked after things at Government House with almost loving care. Even the ornaments were still in their place. But once 3 Commando Brigade got in there and started using it as their headquarters, I think it suffered considerably. It's fair to say that the British were less careful with Port Stanley than had been the Argentine forces... In the early days, our control over our own people was not as good as it might have been. I won't say there was rape and pillage, but there was a great deal of acquisition of war materials.<ref>Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Hugh McManners, p. 433, Random House, 2008</ref>}}

Leftist anti-war veterans from the Buenos Aires-based Malvinas Islands Ex-Combatants Centre ('Centro Ex-Combatientes Islas Malvinas' or CECIM) tell of being tied and pinned to the frozen ground with tent pegs for hours or punched and kicked for stealing from the food depots or shooting and killing sheep for food in the minefields.

In a 2019 interview with ‘Radio Noticias’, former Private Gustavo Alberto Placente from the 181st Military Police Company explained that field punishments were absolutely necessary to keep the conscript soldiers in line.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Argentinian occupation of the Falklands

2021-05-26T16:23:10Z

Magnifiko2: /* Liberation */

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands was the 74-day military occupation of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic whose sovereignty has long been disputed by Argentina. The Argentinian seaborne landings on April 2nd 1982 and subsequent occupation signaled the start of the Falklands/Malvinas War, which finally resulted in the islands' returning to British rule on 14 June.

==Occupation==

Life under Argentinian occupation was full of anxiety for many of the Falklanders. They had no desire to be ruled by the Argentinians and found that many of their essential goods and services were under threat from the British naval blockade and requisitioning by the Argentinian garrison. Most Land Rovers and many tractors were requisitioned by the military and high powered radios were supposed to be handed over, although not all were.

Shortly after being appointed Miltary Governor of the Malvinas, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez had a meeting with around 40 locals that had formed part of the Fakland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) and that had been captured then released on 2 April. He warned them against taking part in any future attacks on the Argentinian garrison{{cquote|I met some of them [members of the FIDF] and explained that if they did some wrong to the occupying troops, I would apply the laws of war against them. I also told them that there was a group of two or three youngsters that continuously were gesticulating or showed an aggressive attitude against the Argentine officers and NCOs. For instance, they used to approach at an excessive speed and pass our troops very closely. I told them that if they ran into one of them or threw them to the floor and somebody fired at them, although I did not like martyrs, I was going to justify what my men did.<ref>[https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74-days-under-the-Argentine-Flag%3A-The-Experiences-Corbacho/6b422ca0b75322965818a468fd2aff1d4185b6b4 74 days under the Argentine Flag: The Experiences of Occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War]</ref>
</ref>}}

There were further deportations of authority figures and Falklanders suspected as being resistance leaders were exiled to Fox Bay Settlement along with their families. Major Patricio Douglas Dowling took control of Argentinian military intelligence and soon gathered a reputation for harshness and threatening behaviour. Most of the 181st Military Police Company under Major Roberto Eduardo Berazay strained to maintain good relations with the Falkland Islanders and tried to treat them well although cold and hungry conscript soldiers did take to stealing food and break-and-enters became more frequent as the conflict dragged on and as the weather worsened. Military discipline was rigidly enforced in Port Stanley on the part of Major Berazay's military police unit in order to prevent break-in’s, robberies, vandalism and sexual assault, from soldiers from the frontlines that dared go Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and those caught were returned to their units where they were beaten, humiliated and staked in the freezing ground as part of field-punishment.

Argentinian Air Force Group Captain Carlos Bloomer-Reeve was given the job of acting as liaison officer between the local population and the military authorities. He had lived in the Falklands and was respected for the fair-mindedness and respect he showed to the locals.

The population at Goose Green had initially a very hard time when they were confined en masse in the Social Club in the aftermath of the deadlgy British air attacks on Goose Green airfield on May 1st 1982. Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Angel Piaggi, the 47-year-old Commanding Officer of the Argentinian 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment, said that the lockdown in Goose Green was necessary in order to protect the locals from ''"the rage of the air force men, who had lost so many colleagues."''<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/9369182/Making_Their_Dispositions_Accordingly_Civilian_Experiences_of_the_1982_Falklands_War Making Their Dispositions Accordingly: Civilian Experiences of the 1982 Falklands War]</ref>

The conditions improved when the Argentinians took pity on local women and children. According to local farm manager Eric Goss{{cquote|Sanitation in the hall was grim. We ran out of water on the third day, the toilets were blocked and there was some dysentery. We persuaded the Argentinians to bring sea water in barrels for the toilets; and old chap, Mike Robson, did sterling work keeping them going. Two young men, Bob McLeod and Ray Robson, both radio hams, found an old broken radio, part of the club equipment, in a junk cupboard. They made this work and we listened each evening to the B.B.C. World Service; the others made noise at the windows to cover the crackling of the broadcast and we were never discovered.<ref>Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, Martin Middlebrook, p. 169, Viking, 1985</ref>
</ref>}}

One local female resident reported that life in the Social Club was far from grim{{cquote|After the first week the Argentines let two women go out each day to the galley in the cookhouse, where all the men would normally eat together. They were allowed to cook up a big meal, with bread and cakes, and bring it down to the hall. Considering we were all cramped together in a small place everybody got on very well. People were generally good-natured.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton & Peter Kosminsky, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>
</ref>}}

The government authority did attempt to enforce a change in the road traffic code which had chaotic consequences. The authorities wanted everyone to drive on the right hand side of the road as in Argentina. It was thought that the Argentine military traffic would find this easier than remembering to drive on the left. Merely informing the local population was not enough to change the habits of a lifetime and the end result was chaos. Initial signs in Spanish did not help matters and in the end the authorities had to paint signs in English and write continued reminders in white paint on the roads themselves. It became a permanent reminder that the islands were occupied territory.

Other daily reminders of occupation included the numerous field artillery and anti-aircraft batteries in and around Port Stanley and large no-go areas to the civilian population like the gymnasium building that was commandeered by Argentinian Army Green Berets from Major Mario Luis Castagneto's 601st Commando Company. Children were taken out of school and sent to the interior for their safety. The local radio station was forced to play Argentinian official military communiques of the war. Fortunately, many islanders were able to pick up the BBC World Service and were encouraged by news of the British landings in San Carlos and the British victory at Goose Green.

There was some talk of evacuating the Falklands Islanders. The British government did not wish the Falklanders to abandon the islands as that would make their main argument of self-determination mute. It was only a small portion of the population who considered leaving but it was enough to concern the British government. They made it clear that the British would help anyone temporarily but that the expectation was that they would return once the fighting was over. As it transpired, few Falkland Islanders took this option and most remained in the Falklands. Tragically, three islanders would be killed when a British naval shell hit their house.

==Liberation==

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands ended on June 14th 1982. After 74 days, the islands came under British rule again. Unlike the Goose Green residents the Port Stanley citizens had been allowed much unrestricted freedom of movement. But there was a 16-hour night curfew. The British units took over the buildings commandeered by the Argentinians. Local fireman Lewis Clifton describes how the infrastructures of Port Stanley broke under the extra strain of accommodating the British troops and processing thousands of Argentine prisoners of war awaiting repatriation{{cquote|The place just couldn't take it. There was only sporadic electricity and water and the sanitation system collapsed. The streets were ankle-deep in human waste. The stench was awful, really awful, and we were all suffering from what we called Galtieri's revenge. He lost the war but left us ill.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120420135114/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/Britain_at_War_Readers__Memorie/9130824/The-Falklands-invasion-by-those-who-were-there.html The Falklands invasion, by those who were there]</ref></ref>}}

There was much Argentinian criticism of the behaviour of British Paratroopers after the Argentinian surrender. Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, the commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in his book 'Malvinas: La Defensa de Puerto Argentino' (Editorial Sudamaricana, 1987) alleges that he complained to the British authorities and the Royal Marine Commandos took over and soon restored order in the Falklands capital. A staff officer of Commodore Michael Clapp wrote in his war diary{{cquote|Utterly depressing. The troops are in a post war mood and very selfish. Grab, Grab - transport, houses, equipment, food, etc. - gone is the spirit of selflessness in the field. It will return but at present all is filth, squalor and (the) looting instinct prevails. Quite the worst aspect of the whole campaign.<ref>The Falklands War, D. George Boyce, p. 146, Macmillan International Higher Education, 2005</ref></ref>}}

British SBS Commandos were helicoptered to Pebble Island on 15 June to accept the surrender of the local garrison and found that the two dozen local inhabitants had been confined to the farm manager's house. But the locals showed no hatred for the occupiers, and even insisted that one young English-speaking Argentinian conscript, Jorge Alberto Ortiz, from the 3rd Marine Battalion's 'H' Company whom they had befriended should have lunch with them before he was taken with the others to imprisonment in the sheep shearing sheds. Jorge in his perfect Californian accent told them he planned to come back in the near future as a civilian. Arina Bernstein, a cheerful read-headed woman in her mid-thirties told him he would be welcome, "But don't you come back planting you little flag here again, Jorge."<ref>The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings, Simon Jenkins, p.313, Pan, 1987</ref>}}

Claims that the Argentinian forces had behaved like savages throughout the occupation were investigated with British war correspondents Patrick Joseph Bishop and ‎John Witherow establishing they were mostly hearsay{{cquote|They had certainly been responsible for smashing up the solid old post office, and the backstreets of the town were littered with excrement. But although fourteen local men were taken from their homes during the occupation and sent to West Falkland where they were put under house arrest, few inhabitants were ill-treated. It was an uncomfortable rather than brutal regime... There were stories of looting but on closer examination this tended to be troops stealing buns from the deep-freeze or sleeping in beds with muddy boots. Some valuables and souvenirs were stolen and houses vandalized but the details of the outrages were vague. Most of the serious damage was done by the British shelling. One islander said without rencour that the British had caused more of a mess in Stanley than the Argentinians.<ref>The Winter War: The Falklands, Patrick Joseph Bishop, John Witherow, p.143, Quartet Books, 1982</ref>}}

Captain Jeremy Larken of HMS Fearless confirms the view the Argentinian occupation foces had behaved appropriately{{cquote|It was clear General Menendez had looked after things at Government House with almost loving care. Even the ornaments were still in their place. But once 3 Commando Brigade got in there and started using it as their headquarters, I think it suffered considerably. It's fair to say that the British were less careful with Port Stanley than had been the Argentine forces... In the early days, our control over our own people was not as good as it might have been. I won't say there was rape and pillage, but there was a great deal of acquisition of war materials.<ref>Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Hugh McManners, p. 433, Random House, 2008</ref>}}

Leftist anti-war veterans from the Buenos Aires-based Malvinas Islands Ex-Combatants Centre ('Centro Ex-Combatientes Islas Malvinas' or CECIM) tell of being tied and pinned to the frozen ground with tent pegs for hours or punched and kicked for stealing from the food depots or shooting and killing sheep for food in the minefields.

In a 2019 interview with ‘Radio Noticias’, former Private Gustavo Alberto Placente from the 181st Military Police Company explained that field punishments were absolutely necessary to keep the conscript soldiers in line.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Argentinian occupation of the Falklands

2021-05-26T16:22:11Z

Magnifiko2: created much needed page to do with the Falklands War

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands was the 74-day military occupation of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic whose sovereignty has long been disputed by Argentina. The Argentinian seaborne landings on April 2nd 1982 and subsequent occupation signaled the start of the Falklands/Malvinas War, which finally resulted in the islands' returning to British rule on 14 June.

==Occupation==

Life under Argentinian occupation was full of anxiety for many of the Falklanders. They had no desire to be ruled by the Argentinians and found that many of their essential goods and services were under threat from the British naval blockade and requisitioning by the Argentinian garrison. Most Land Rovers and many tractors were requisitioned by the military and high powered radios were supposed to be handed over, although not all were.

Shortly after being appointed Miltary Governor of the Malvinas, Brigadier-General Mario Benjamin Menéndez had a meeting with around 40 locals that had formed part of the Fakland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) and that had been captured then released on 2 April. He warned them against taking part in any future attacks on the Argentinian garrison{{cquote|I met some of them [members of the FIDF] and explained that if they did some wrong to the occupying troops, I would apply the laws of war against them. I also told them that there was a group of two or three youngsters that continuously were gesticulating or showed an aggressive attitude against the Argentine officers and NCOs. For instance, they used to approach at an excessive speed and pass our troops very closely. I told them that if they ran into one of them or threw them to the floor and somebody fired at them, although I did not like martyrs, I was going to justify what my men did.<ref>[https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74-days-under-the-Argentine-Flag%3A-The-Experiences-Corbacho/6b422ca0b75322965818a468fd2aff1d4185b6b4 74 days under the Argentine Flag: The Experiences of Occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War]</ref>
</ref>}}

There were further deportations of authority figures and Falklanders suspected as being resistance leaders were exiled to Fox Bay Settlement along with their families. Major Patricio Douglas Dowling took control of Argentinian military intelligence and soon gathered a reputation for harshness and threatening behaviour. Most of the 181st Military Police Company under Major Roberto Eduardo Berazay strained to maintain good relations with the Falkland Islanders and tried to treat them well although cold and hungry conscript soldiers did take to stealing food and break-and-enters became more frequent as the conflict dragged on and as the weather worsened. Military discipline was rigidly enforced in Port Stanley on the part of Major Berazay's military police unit in order to prevent break-in’s, robberies, vandalism and sexual assault, from soldiers from the frontlines that dared go Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and those caught were returned to their units where they were beaten, humiliated and staked in the freezing ground as part of field-punishment.

Argentinian Air Force Group Captain Carlos Bloomer-Reeve was given the job of acting as liaison officer between the local population and the military authorities. He had lived in the Falklands and was respected for the fair-mindedness and respect he showed to the locals.

The population at Goose Green had initially a very hard time when they were confined en masse in the Social Club in the aftermath of the deadlgy British air attacks on Goose Green airfield on May 1st 1982. Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Angel Piaggi, the 47-year-old Commanding Officer of the Argentinian 12th (Jungle) Infantry Regiment, said that the lockdown in Goose Green was necessary in order to protect the locals from ''"the rage of the air force men, who had lost so many colleagues."''<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/9369182/Making_Their_Dispositions_Accordingly_Civilian_Experiences_of_the_1982_Falklands_War Making Their Dispositions Accordingly: Civilian Experiences of the 1982 Falklands War]</ref>

The conditions improved when the Argentinians took pity on local women and children. According to local farm manager Eric Goss{{cquote|Sanitation in the hall was grim. We ran out of water on the third day, the toilets were blocked and there was some dysentery. We persuaded the Argentinians to bring sea water in barrels for the toilets; and old chap, Mike Robson, did sterling work keeping them going. Two young men, Bob McLeod and Ray Robson, both radio hams, found an old broken radio, part of the club equipment, in a junk cupboard. They made this work and we listened each evening to the B.B.C. World Service; the others made noise at the windows to cover the crackling of the broadcast and we were never discovered.<ref>Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, Martin Middlebrook, p. 169, Viking, 1985</ref>
</ref>}}

One local female resident reported that life in the Social Club was far from grim{{cquote|After the first week the Argentines let two women go out each day to the galley in the cookhouse, where all the men would normally eat together. They were allowed to cook up a big meal, with bread and cakes, and bring it down to the hall. Considering we were all cramped together in a small place everybody got on very well. People were generally good-natured.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton & Peter Kosminsky, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>
</ref>}}

The government authority did attempt to enforce a change in the road traffic code which had chaotic consequences. The authorities wanted everyone to drive on the right hand side of the road as in Argentina. It was thought that the Argentine military traffic would find this easier than remembering to drive on the left. Merely informing the local population was not enough to change the habits of a lifetime and the end result was chaos. Initial signs in Spanish did not help matters and in the end the authorities had to paint signs in English and write continued reminders in white paint on the roads themselves. It became a permanent reminder that the islands were occupied territory.

Other daily reminders of occupation included the numerous field artillery and anti-aircraft batteries in and around Port Stanley and large no-go areas to the civilian population like the gymnasium building that was commandeered by Argentinian Army Green Berets from Major Mario Luis Castagneto's 601st Commando Company. Children were taken out of school and sent to the interior for their safety. The local radio station was forced to play Argentinian official military communiques of the war. Fortunately, many islanders were able to pick up the BBC World Service and were encouraged by news of the British landings in San Carlos and the British victory at Goose Green.

There was some talk of evacuating the Falklands Islanders. The British government did not wish the Falklanders to abandon the islands as that would make their main argument of self-determination mute. It was only a small portion of the population who considered leaving but it was enough to concern the British government. They made it clear that the British would help anyone temporarily but that the expectation was that they would return once the fighting was over. As it transpired, few Falkland Islanders took this option and most remained in the Falklands. Tragically, three islanders would be killed when a British naval shell hit their house.

==Liberation==

The Argentinian occupation of the Falklands ended on June 14th 1982. After 74 days, the islands came under British rule again. Unlike the Goose Green residents the Port Stanley citizens had been allowed much unrestricted freedom of movement. But there was a 16-hour night curfew. The British units took over the buildings commandeered by the Argentinians. Local fireman Lewis Clifton describes how the infrastructures of Port Stanley broke under the extra strain of accommodating the British troops and processing thousands of Argentine prisoners of war awaiting repatriation{{cquote|The place just couldn't take it. There was only sporadic electricity and water and the sanitation system collapsed. The streets were ankle-deep in human waste. The stench was awful, really awful, and we were all suffering from what we called Galtieri's revenge. He lost the war but left us ill.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120420135114/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/Britain_at_War_Readers__Memorie/9130824/The-Falklands-invasion-by-those-who-were-there.html The Falklands invasion, by those who were there]</ref></ref>}}

There was much Argentinian criticism of the behaviour of British Paratroopers after the Argentinian surrender. Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, the commander of the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in his book 'Malvinas: La Defensa de Puerto Argentino' (Editorial Sudamaricana, 1987) alleges that he complained to the British authorities and the Royal Marine Commandos took over and soon restored order in the Falklands capital. A staff officer of Commodore Michael Clapp wrote in his war diary{{cquote|Utterly depressing. The troops are in a post war mood and very selfish. Grab, Grab - transport, houses, equipment, food, etc. - gone is the spirit of selflessness in the field. It will return but at present all is filth, squalor and (the) looting instinct prevails. Quite the worst aspect of the whole campaign.<ref>The Falklands War, D. George Boyce, p. 146, Macmillan International Higher Education, 2005</ref></ref>}}

British SBS Commandos were helicoptered to Pebble Island on 15 June to accept the surrender of the local garrison and found that the two dozen local inhabitants had been confined to the farm manager's house. But the locals showed no hatred for the occupiers, and even insisted that one young English-speaking Argentinian conscript, Jorge Alberto Ortiz, from the 3rd Marine Battalion's 'H' Company whom they had befriended should have lunch with them before he was taken with the others to imprisonment in the sheep shearing sheds. Jorge in his perfect Californian accent told them he planned to come back in the near future as a civilian. Arina Bernstein, a cheerful read-headed woman in her mid-thirties told him he would be welcome, "But don't you come back planting you little flag here again, Jorge."<ref>The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings, Simon Jenkins, p.313, Pan, 1987</ref></ref>}}

Claims that the Argentinian forces had behaved like savages throughout the occupation were investigated with British war correspondents Patrick Joseph Bishop and ‎John Witherow establishing they were mostly hearsay{{cquote|They had certainly been responsible for smashing up the solid old post office, and the backstreets of the town were littered with excrement. But although fourteen local men were taken from their homes during the occupation and sent to West Falkland where they were put under house arrest, few inhabitants were ill-treated. It was an uncomfortable rather than brutal regime... There were stories of looting but on closer examination this tended to be troops stealing buns from the deep-freeze or sleeping in beds with muddy boots. Some valuables and souvenirs were stolen and houses vandalized but the details of the outrages were vague. Most of the serious damage was done by the British shelling. One islander said without rencour that the British had caused more of a mess in Stanley than the Argentinians.<ref>The Winter War: The Falklands, Patrick Joseph Bishop, John Witherow, p.143, Quartet Books, 1982</ref></ref>}}

Captain Jeremy Larken of HMS Fearless confirms the view the Argentinian occupation foces had behaved appropriately{{cquote|It was clear General Menendez had looked after things at Government House with almost loving care. Even the ornaments were still in their place. But once 3 Commando Brigade got in there and started using it as their headquarters, I think it suffered considerably. It's fair to say that the British were less careful with Port Stanley than had been the Argentine forces... In the early days, our control over our own people was not as good as it might have been. I won't say there was rape and pillage, but there was a great deal of acquisition of war materials.<ref>Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Hugh McManners, p. 433, Random House, 2008</ref></ref>}}

Leftist anti-war veterans from the Buenos Aires-based Malvinas Islands Ex-Combatants Centre ('Centro Ex-Combatientes Islas Malvinas' or CECIM) tell of being tied and pinned to the frozen ground with tent pegs for hours or punched and kicked for stealing from the food depots or shooting and killing sheep for food in the minefields.

In a 2019 interview with ‘Radio Noticias’, former Private Gustavo Alberto Placente from the 181st Military Police Company explained that field punishments were absolutely necessary to keep the conscript soldiers in line.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]

Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House

2021-05-26T15:37:10Z

Magnifiko2: /* Bluff Cove Peak */

On May 27, 1982, the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) and 45 Commando (45 CDO), Royal Marines had left the British beachhead at San Carlos for Estancia Mountain and Bluff Cove Peak. The 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) were ordered to attack the Argentinian Task Force ''Mercedes'' on May 28 located on Darwin Isthmus during the [[Battle of Darwin and Goose Green]], eliminating any future threat from the Argentinian garrison. Major [[Cedric Delves]]' D Squadron, [[22nd Special Air Service Regiment]], embarked in Sea King helicopters would seize Mount Kent, while 19 Royal Marine Commandos from the [[Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre]] (M&AWC) under Major [[Rod Boswell]], embarked in a Wessex helicopter, would capture and clear the forward Argentinian Special Forces patrol located at Top Malo House, allowing the 600 Paratroopers from 3 PARA to capture Estancia Mountain and Estancia House. Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 Commando (42 CDO) was expected to land on Mount Kent on the night of May 29. Delays and snow blizzards meant these helicopter-borne reinforcements would only arrive on the night May 31, perilously close to a firefight.

==Key ground==

Mount Kent with its surrounding hills is an area of high ground on East Falkland, approximately five miles west of Port Stanley. It rises to just under 1,100 feet and it dominated the central axis of advance from San Carlos to Stanley. Given its dominance and proximity to the capital of the Falkland Islands, the mountain was an area of special interest to both British and Argentinian Special Forces.

==First contact==

The first engagement during the Battles of Mount Kent and Top Malo House occurred during 27 May, when ''Subteniente'' Marcelo Llambías Pravaz, Sergeant Ramón Valdez, Corporal Walter Pintos and Private Daniel Castillo from the 4th Regiment's C Company, while patrolling the western slopes under the cover of darkness and heavy rain, were overflown by a British helicopter. After radioing this information to regimental headquarters, the small squad soon after detected a British hide and opened fire. The next day, they closely inspected the scene but only found empty British rations that had to be dug out of the ground.<ref>[http://www.malvinasenlaradio.com/desajoomla/test/category/118-mcp-2017 Marcelo Llambias Pravaz (Malvinas Corazón De Mi Patria)]</ref>

The next day, Lieutenant Guillermo Enrique Anaya from the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion visited Estancia House Farm and his Bell UH-1H helicopter landed twice on May 28th. Lieutenant Anaya thought there were British commandos hiding in a cow shed, so he machine-gunned it.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3JpnPMsuMA Entrevista a Guillermo Anaya, Top Gun de los helicopteristas]</ref>

In the days that followed there were a number of brief but extremely violent clashes between the Special Forces of both sides.

==Argentinian commando incursion==

About 40 men of 39-year-old Major [[Aldo Rico]]'s [[602nd Commando Company (Argentinian Army)]], were originally scheduled to make an assault landing in six Bell UH-1H helicopters of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. A follow-up force, the 65-man 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron under Major [[José Ricardo Spadaro]], would reinforce the Mount Kent position. Argentinian maps had confirmed the overland route was obstructed with minefields and booby-traps. This meant the National Gendarmerie Special Forces would have to arrive in a Puma helicopter the next day, exposed to Royal Air Force GR-3 Harriers in their morning bomb runs. There was additional delay when the Marine Special Forces from Major [[Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots]] 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping in the lead C-130 Hercules aircraft from [[Comodoro Rivadavia]] on the Argentinian mainland, had to abort landing on Stanley Airport. A snow blizzard added to the confusion as the Argentinian Special Forces hurriedly prepared their backpacks and gear for the insertions.

On Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak, Major Cedric Delves' thinly spread out D Squadron, received no warning of Operation ''Autoimpuesta'' and were momentarily caught off guard when they heard the sound of Argentinian Army helicopters approaching from Murrell River, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in 29 Argentinian Army Green Berets consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's 5-man HQ Section and Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd and Captain Andrés Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both 12-man patrols.<ref>''On Mount Kent D Squadron, thinly spread out, received no warning of Operation Autoimpuesta and were unprepared for the sound, at about 6pm, of helicopters approaching from the east, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in twenty-nine commandos consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's five-strong HQ Section and Captain Tomas Fernandez's 2nd and Captain Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both twelve-strong.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

==Mount Kent==

On the night of May 29th 1982, Captain Andres Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section from the 602nd Commando Company ran into Boat Troop from D Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service on the eastern slopes of the mountain.<ref>''Ferrero's section landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and were soon engaged in a confusing close-quarter night battle with Boat Troop of exploding grenades, sudden firefights at close rage and the abrupt scuttle of boots over rocks.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>The British took control of the situation, but at the cost of two badly wounded SAS troopers (Carl Rhodes and Richard Palmer). Captain Andres Ferrero remembers:{{cquote|The Malvinas War is all so long ago now that it is difficult to recall it, even more to sort out the details sufficiently to compare one's experience there with Comandos en Accion. However, reading Isidoro Ruiz-Moreno's official history, again and again, to refresh myflagging memory has proved a salutary experience. Our mission briefing told us little more than we were to get on the ground, deal with any opposition as best we could and wait for the National Gendarmerie Commandos. Our task was to block the advance of 3 Commando Brigade.

We'd been divided into two waves. I didn't like the idea of being split from the rest of the Commandos, but I could see why we had to do it. To fly in the turbulence between the peaks was a sure way to lose further helicopters. Bad weather had been forcast. Dark clouds on the horizon were blowing in Puerto Argentino's direction. To add to the problem, only four helicopters were available. Major Aldo Rico had agreed that the second wave should be postponed until the next day and since he and others in the company had failed to hitch a helicopter lift, to pass the time that night, he achieved his goal to learn to ride a motorbike. Rico had asked Major Mario Castagneto if he thought Mount Kent could be reached by foot but, because of the new minefields, he realized it would not be possible. In any case, it was too late to do anything by land that day.

We were issued grenades, bandoliers and ammunition, and two MAG machineguns, along with anti-tank rocket launchers and ratpacks. We were tired after a sleepless night. First Lieutenant Horacio Fernando Lauria, a charismatic engineer-commando in his early thirties, in an attempt to take his mind of what lay ahead had been studying Mount Kent zone maps and intelligence reports ... We boarded a Unimog, which Captain Fernando de la Serna told us would be taking us to our helicopter. We were dressed in reversible white camouflage suits. The helmets came off, the berets on, and the 602nd was driven to the Soccer Field. It was around 4 in the evening and darker than usual because the sky was overcast. Journalist Eduardo Rotondo was filming us and taking pictures. This was a unique period for the Army; to be in a war zone accompanied by journalists.

It was Argentinian Army Day. A day to be proud of our Army. It was even more important for Major Rico as it was his son's birthday. The helicopter we boarded - Huey AE 418 - was stripped bare inside and we sat on the floor ... At last, at about 5 in the evening came the order to go. Captains Eduardo Villarruel and Jorge Duran were coming too. The pilot lifted his helicopter into a low hover, about 3 feet off the ground. The whine of the engines was deafening. We were in the air, and this time it wasn't a training exercise. The pilot, lowered the helicopter's nose and picked up airspeed. It was a 6 or 7 minute flight - something like that. As we started to approach the noise was incredible. When we landed, I could not get off fast enough. As soon as we got off clear of the blades we began to off-load the weapons and equipment. The helicopter was loaded to the roof with spareammunition, Instalaza missiles and medical packs. We watched the ascent of the helicopter until it disappeared.

Not surprisingly, some insertions were badly scattered: Captain Eduardo Villarruel's headquarters group was so thoroughly lost that they did not rejoin the 602nd until the next day. We had landed 500 metres off course - northeast of Mount Kent. The night had fallen like ice into a glass, sharp and cold. With First Lieutenant Francisco Maqueda, an experienced mountaineer, leading, we moved higher up the mountain. It was awful terrain, with rocky outcrops all over the place. It was extremely difficult going for, while the sides of the mountain were not sheer, they were very steep and made up of boulders. One thing all of us had in common was that we were in reasonable shape.

The average age in the 602nd was between 28 and 33. Otherwise my combat patrol couldn't have undertaken the six grueling patrol missions that lay ahead. The thought of bumping into a British patrol, or even worse, walking into an ambush, was uppermost in my mind. This was the Lion's den. We'd gone 500 metres when, I signaled a stop. 'I can hear water, ' I said. I got edgy. I turned to Lauria who caught up with me when I stopped and he asked, 'Why not let Mucked and me go on a reconnaissance, to see what's around?' I thought for a moment, then said, 'Okay, but that I along with Maqueda would be going, with Oviedo.' The rest were to stay behind some boulders and wait for us to signal with the torch ... When we had gone about 50 metres all hell broke out. The rest of the patrol under Lauria, came under accurate machine-gun and mortar fire.

Only one man was wounded though - First Sergeant Raimundo Maximiliano Viltes. He received a bullet through a heel. For a few seconds, pandemonium reigned. Only a few managed to get rounds off. Lauria thought they were part of Combat Team Solari that was known to have been dug in the area. When he explained to me what happened, it was obvious he was very shocked. Returning fire with his FAL rifle, Lauria managed to hit some Special Air Service Commandos ... By now it was about 7 in the evening and I heard two helicopters flying over head, returning with the 601st's 2nd Assault Section from Big Mountain, but saw nothing because of the low clouds. I had to make myself calm down. I had already experienced combat, being under fire from People's Revolutionary Army guerrillas. I had been a Commando since 1975 and had served in Tucuman Province. I tried to work out how to hit back. We crawled towards them, heard they were British and decided to take them ourselves. The problem was that we had to sprint over the top, World War One style. I had little hope that anyone could have survived that ambush. I was filled with confusion as well as desperate with anxiety. By this time mortar flares were up, illuminating portions of the area. Later I learned that at the first sound of mortar fire most had run away. It wasn't exactly the reaction Lauria had wanted. Lauria and Viltes, who were last away, had a grim withdrawal under mortar fire all the way. First Sergeant Jose Nunez helped Viltes.

That night Lauria lay listening to the storm of fire as the Kent ridgeline blazed under the fire of 'D' Squadron of the Special Air Service Regiment. I started to pray. I put myself in God's hands and I know this is going to sound corny, but it started snowing very hard. We didn't dare wait too long. The signal we'd agreed on was one, two, then go. When finally we were calm enough, I put up one finger, then two, and we made our move. We were now scrambling downhill. It was slippery, dangerous. We slid down the mountainside on our backs and bottoms, sending small avalanches of grey stone, cascading down the mountain. During the getaway we lost Oviedo. The British Commandos did not follow up. There were about 20 of them with two machineguns but they also fled. This is not uncommon in war. It was later learned that the British Commandos, thinking that they were on the point of being outflanked by Maqueda, Oviedo and me, decided to retire. Realizing their mistake, they returned to the Kent ridgeline just as Captain Tomas Fernandez's patrol closed on Bluff Cove Peak.<ref>See ''Comandos en Acción: El Ejercito en Malvinas, Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, Emecé, 1986''</ref>}}

Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel had also landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the northern rocks. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of holding Mount Kent and the option of retreating to Estancia House Farm, Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, instructed Major Cedric Delves that it was critical to maintain the position and instructed him to gather the lead elements of 3 PARA until 42 Commando arrived.<ref>''Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Villarruel had also landed on Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the high ground north of the hill. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of seizing Mount Kent and disadvantage of regrouping at Estancia, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the SAS, instructed Major Delves that it was critical to hold it and put him in command of all forces in the area until 42 Commando arrived.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 148, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

3 PARA had captured Teal Inlet Settlement on May 29 in their march to Estancia House, one of the British paratroopers in Captain Matthew Selfridge's D Company had been evacuated suffering from a self-inflicted wound.<ref>Unfortunately, this was a 'negligent discharge' originating from one of the most dangerous weapons in the British military inventory, the 9 mm sub-machine gun. He was rather unwell as Nick Morgan, John Williams and Malcolm Jowitt got to work. Later, this patient would complain about the three tubes inserted into his chest, but those drainage routes did a vital job in carrying away the blood leaking from the bullet's long track. He was a rather lucky boy – another survivor, and very much against the odds. Doctor for Friend and Foe: Britain's Frontline Medic in the Fight for the Falklands, Rick Jolly, p. 89, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012</ref>

==Bluff Cove Peak==

In the meantime, the 602nd Commando Company's 2nd Assault Section, commanded by ''Capitán'' Tomás Victor Fernández, after a brief pause, continued its advance up [[Bluff Cove Peak]]. It was here that ''Teniente 1º'' Rubén Eduardo Márquez and ''Sargento 1º'' Oscar Humberto Blas won posthumously the ''Medalla Heroico Valor en Combate'' (Gallantry in Combat Medal) in a patrol clash in which they wounded two Special Air Service Commandos with hand grenades (Ewen Pearcy and Don Masters).<ref>''Two more men were wounded, but the SAS remained in control of its main positions by the morning of 30 May.'' Twilight Warriors: Inside the World's Special Forces, Martin C. Arostegui, pg 181, St. Martin's Press, 1997</ref><ref>''Fernandez's section spent the night extricating themselves from the ambush and although two more SAS were wounded, he lost Sergeant Alfredo Flores, who was knocked out when he fell and was taken prisoner.''Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>There was nothing for it but to squeeze as many as possible into caves near the top of Bluff Cove Peak," admits Captain Fernández.

That same morning, before dawn, as Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel led his headquarters group back to Argentinian lines, he ran into a heavily armed British patrol on the foggy slopes of Mount Kent heading to Estancia House. The Argentinian Special Forces went to ground and took up ambush positions. Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero, had the 7.62 millimetre belt-fed machine-gun and was ready to open fire. Villarruel, for some reason told Cisnero to hold his fire. It was a serious misjudgment and probably cost the Argentinians the battle for Mount Kent. It later transpired that the British patrol were members of 'D' Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment retreating with their two badly wounded in the Mount Kent action. Unfortunately because of the blizzard, communications were lost on both sides. But for the first time Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment was in control of the situation after the initial SAS retreat. By 1700 local time on May 30 when Captain Tomás Fernández's radio operator, Senior Sergeant Alfredo Flores, at last came on air, he passed the dramatic message, ''"We are in trouble" and 40 minutes later, "there are English all around us...you had better hurry up."''<ref>[https://www.wearethemighty.com/popular/that-time-two-countries-special-forces-squared-off-in-combat/ That time two countries’ Special Forces squared off in combat]</ref>

The Argentinian helicopter-borne offensive had been checked, with the Special Air Service successfully maintaining their positions on Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak. Major Aldo Rico was placed in charge of all further Special Forces operations. He reluctantly cancelled the deployment of Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commando Company and instructed Castagneto to rescue the 602nd Commando Company, who were to assemble on Estancia Mountain.<ref>''Operation Autoimpuesta, so far, was not going well and with the British now occupying Mount Kent, Major Rico was given command of Special Forces operations. He cancelled the deployment of 601 Commando Company and instructed Major Castagneto to rescue 602 Commando, who were to assemble on Mount Estancia.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

Captain Andres Ferrero regrouped his men on Estancia Mountain and awaited reinforcements. Around 1100 local time on May 30th, the Argentinian patrol commander watched in horror as two Royal Air Force Harriers (XZ963 and XZ789) made a pass over the Puma carrying reinforcements from the 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron (''Escuadrón de Fuerzas Especiales 601 de la Gendarmería Nacional'' or EFE601GN), firing as they went. The Puma crashed in the ground and started a fire in which six Gendarmerie Commandos from Captain Jorge San Emeterio's combat patrol were killed: Lieutenant Ricardo Julio Sánchez, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Nasif, Corporals Marciano Veron, Víctor Samuel Guerrero, Carlos Ismael Pereyra and Lance-Corporal Juan Carlos Treppo. Those Gendarmerie Commandos who could jumped out, some of them braving the fire and exploding ammunition to rescue eight injured colleagues.

The Argentinian Special Forces nearby, in the form of Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero ―armed with a 7.62 mm machinegun― from Captain Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section, or Sergeant Luis Alberto Kovalski (also armed with a machinegun)<ref>[https://www.stopenlinea.com.ar/noticias/2019/06/06/45005-el-alacran-kovalski-participo-de-la-evocacion-del-bautismo-de-fuego-de-gendarmeria-nacional El alacrán Kovalski participó de la evocación del bautismo de fuego de Gendarmería Nacional]</ref>from EFE601GN however, exacted rapid revenge and one of the Royal Air Force Harriers involved, XZ-963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook was shot down.<ref>''En medio de lo que parecia un corredor de aviones, aparecieron dos Harrier. El Perro, ni corto ni perezoso, volvio a dispararles. -¡Perro, dejáte de boludear y no les tires más porque van a saber dónde estamos y nos van a hacer pelota!, le pidieron sus compañeros a los gritos.'' Malvinas: 20 Años, 20 Héroes, p. 204, Fundación Soldados, 2002</ref>

==Royal Marine reinforcements==

The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 CDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions, meant it took five nights to airlift in the 120 Royal Marines of Babbington.

The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines.

Brigadier [[Julian Thompson]], who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentine patrols ''"would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."''<ref>[http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/heritage/key-battles-at-top-malo-and-mount-kent-1-1272106 Key battles at Top Malo and Mount Kent]</ref>

When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS ambush Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak.

Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, ''Bravo November''. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms fire) soon after:{{cquote|We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers] of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvring to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.<ref>16 Air Assault Brigade: The History of Britain's Rapid Reaction Force, Tim Ripley, pp. 45-46, Casemate Publishers, 2008</ref>}}

==Top Malo House==

On May 27th, a four-man patrol of the Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) under Sergeant Chris Stone were manning an Observation Post (OP) on Bull Hill. They heard two UH-1 Huey helicopters approach their position and fearing that they would be attacked radioed that this might be their last transmission and that they would try to fight their way out. Fortunately after circling their position the Hueys set off towards Mount Simon (which was covered in mist) and deposited on the lower slopes what the British Mountain Commandos estimated to be a 17-man Special Forces patrol. This was worrying news for the British as the strong enemy patrol flanked 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters at Teal Inlet and the British helicopters supplying 42 Commando's 'Kilo' Company on Mount Kent.

The Argentinian remote outpost was reported to Captain Rod Boswell, the M&AWC commander at San Carlos. Top Malo House was beyond the range of British Artillery and no Royal Air Force Harriers were available for an air strike, so Brigadier Julian Thompson agreed that Boswell's unit should eliminate the Argentinian patrol. Captain Boswell gathered together nineteen Mountain Commandos and were flown forward by a Sea King helicopter piloted by Lieutenant John Miller the next morning.

Having surrounded Top Malo House, Captain Rod Boswell ordered his 12-man assault group patrol to fix bayonets and fire a green flare, the signal for the 7-man fire support group (under Lieutenant Callum Murray) on a nearby hillock to unleash a volley of six anti-tank rockets at the remote farmhouse.

Senior Lieutenant [[Ernesto Emilio Espinosa]] on sentry duty on the top stairs window raised the alarm and was shot and killed by Corporal Steve Groves armed with a sniper rifle, but not before shooting in the hand Sergeant Mac Mclean from the support group.

As Boswell and his assault group charged forward, two more 66mm rockets smashed into the house and the Argentinian Army Special Forces who had taken cover there overnight fled to Mullow Stream 200 metres away. The ammunition stacked in the farmhouse exploded as the British Mountain Commandos ran forward, forcing them to retreat in the initial attack, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the Argentinian Green Berets lying in the stream firing at them.<ref>''The enemy ran out of the house into a small stream bed about 50 metres away, firing as they ran. Sergeant Doyle fell, hit through the shoulder and then Corporal Groves also fell, hit in the chest. The ammunition stacked in the house exploded as the assault group ran forward, causing them to recoil for a moment, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the enemy lying in the stream firing at them.'' No Picnic, Julian Thompson, Pen & Sword, 2008</ref>

In the fierce firefight, Senior Sergeant [[Mateo Domingo Sbert]] was killed while covering along with Captain José Arnobio Vercesi and Senior Lieutenant Juan José Gatti, the Argentinian retreat to the stream and the Argentinian second-in-command, Senior Lieutenant [[Horacio Losito]], had an enemy Mountain Commando fixed in his sights when he lost consciousness through loss of blood before Senior Sergeants Miguel Ángel Castillo and Omar Medina reluctantly threw down their weapons and surrendered with the remainder of the patrol. In the confusion of surrender, a number of British Commandos kept firing and Medina was badly wounded in the left leg and Corporal Raúl Valdivieso was also shot.

The battle of Top Malo House had lasted about forty-five minutes and cost the lives of two members of Captain [[José Arnobio Vercesi]]'s 1st Assault Section of the 602nd Commando Company. The 10 Argentinian survivors, six of them wounded, were taken prisoner.

Four Royal Marine Commandos (Sergeants Taff Doyle, Steve Groves, Mac McLean and Corporal Chris Stone) were wounded<ref>[http://www.forces.net/news/remembering-falklands-day-day Remembering The Falklands Day By Day]</ref><ref>''"Sergeant McLean was wounded in the hand when a round hit the 66mm LAW he was about to fire."'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref><ref>''"The fire group quickly destroyed the target house, but the Argentinians stormed out, firing back and very quickly two Marines, Sergeant Terry Doyle in the assault group and Sergeant Rocky Stone of the fire group, had been shot and injured. Then Corporal Steve Groves was shot in the chest. The assault group had almost charged down on to Top Malo, blazing firepower from the hip and with Boswell leading."'' Commando, David Reynolds, p. 146, Sutton, 2001</ref>, a testament to the bravery and skill of the Argentinian Commandos.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House in late May 1982 cost the lives of eleven members of Argentina's Special Forces. Ten British M&AWC and SAS special forces were wounded/injured, but five British Commandos were soon killed as a result of [[Friendly fire]] on the lower slopes of Mount Kent.

Unknown to Vercesi's men, however, the 45-minute fight at Top Malo House had tied down a significant part of the available British Mountain Commandos, leaving only a handful of Boswell's men on Mount Smoko to keep watch of the Argentinian outpost guarding the bridge connecting Bluff Cove and Fitzroy Settlements.<ref>By Sea, By Land The Royal Marines, 1919-1997, James D. Ladd, p. 385, HarperCollins, 1998</ref>As a result of the British delay, Senior Lieutenant Darío Horacio Blanco and his platoon of engineers from the 601st Combat Engineer Battalion were able to blow up part of the bridge unmolested on 2 June<ref>[http://laperlaaustral.com.ar/guerra-malvinas/voladura-del-puente-fitz-roy-en-la-campana-de-malvinas/ Voladura del Puente Fitz Roy en la Campaña de Malvinas]</ref>, resulting in 50 British killed and 200 wounded<ref>The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War, Alistair Finlan, p. 78, Routledge, 2004</ref>during the [[Bluff Cove/Fitzroy Air Attacks]] on 8 June when the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and attached units aboard the troopships 'Sir Galahad' and 'Sir Tristram' arrived overnight only to discover their advance route by land severed forcing them to remain aboard ships the following day.<ref>[https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/malvinas-identificaron-mateo-sbert-sargento-murio-historica-nid2186555/ Malvinas: identificaron a Mateo Sbert, el sargento que murió en la histórica batalla de "Top Malo House"]</ref>

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Battles]]
[[Category:1980s]]
[[Category:United Kingdom]]
[[Category:Argentina]]

Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House

2021-05-26T15:36:09Z

Magnifiko2: /* Bluff Cove Peak */

On May 27, 1982, the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) and 45 Commando (45 CDO), Royal Marines had left the British beachhead at San Carlos for Estancia Mountain and Bluff Cove Peak. The 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) were ordered to attack the Argentinian Task Force ''Mercedes'' on May 28 located on Darwin Isthmus during the [[Battle of Darwin and Goose Green]], eliminating any future threat from the Argentinian garrison. Major [[Cedric Delves]]' D Squadron, [[22nd Special Air Service Regiment]], embarked in Sea King helicopters would seize Mount Kent, while 19 Royal Marine Commandos from the [[Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre]] (M&AWC) under Major [[Rod Boswell]], embarked in a Wessex helicopter, would capture and clear the forward Argentinian Special Forces patrol located at Top Malo House, allowing the 600 Paratroopers from 3 PARA to capture Estancia Mountain and Estancia House. Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 Commando (42 CDO) was expected to land on Mount Kent on the night of May 29. Delays and snow blizzards meant these helicopter-borne reinforcements would only arrive on the night May 31, perilously close to a firefight.

==Key ground==

Mount Kent with its surrounding hills is an area of high ground on East Falkland, approximately five miles west of Port Stanley. It rises to just under 1,100 feet and it dominated the central axis of advance from San Carlos to Stanley. Given its dominance and proximity to the capital of the Falkland Islands, the mountain was an area of special interest to both British and Argentinian Special Forces.

==First contact==

The first engagement during the Battles of Mount Kent and Top Malo House occurred during 27 May, when ''Subteniente'' Marcelo Llambías Pravaz, Sergeant Ramón Valdez, Corporal Walter Pintos and Private Daniel Castillo from the 4th Regiment's C Company, while patrolling the western slopes under the cover of darkness and heavy rain, were overflown by a British helicopter. After radioing this information to regimental headquarters, the small squad soon after detected a British hide and opened fire. The next day, they closely inspected the scene but only found empty British rations that had to be dug out of the ground.<ref>[http://www.malvinasenlaradio.com/desajoomla/test/category/118-mcp-2017 Marcelo Llambias Pravaz (Malvinas Corazón De Mi Patria)]</ref>

The next day, Lieutenant Guillermo Enrique Anaya from the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion visited Estancia House Farm and his Bell UH-1H helicopter landed twice on May 28th. Lieutenant Anaya thought there were British commandos hiding in a cow shed, so he machine-gunned it.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3JpnPMsuMA Entrevista a Guillermo Anaya, Top Gun de los helicopteristas]</ref>

In the days that followed there were a number of brief but extremely violent clashes between the Special Forces of both sides.

==Argentinian commando incursion==

About 40 men of 39-year-old Major [[Aldo Rico]]'s [[602nd Commando Company (Argentinian Army)]], were originally scheduled to make an assault landing in six Bell UH-1H helicopters of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. A follow-up force, the 65-man 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron under Major [[José Ricardo Spadaro]], would reinforce the Mount Kent position. Argentinian maps had confirmed the overland route was obstructed with minefields and booby-traps. This meant the National Gendarmerie Special Forces would have to arrive in a Puma helicopter the next day, exposed to Royal Air Force GR-3 Harriers in their morning bomb runs. There was additional delay when the Marine Special Forces from Major [[Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots]] 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping in the lead C-130 Hercules aircraft from [[Comodoro Rivadavia]] on the Argentinian mainland, had to abort landing on Stanley Airport. A snow blizzard added to the confusion as the Argentinian Special Forces hurriedly prepared their backpacks and gear for the insertions.

On Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak, Major Cedric Delves' thinly spread out D Squadron, received no warning of Operation ''Autoimpuesta'' and were momentarily caught off guard when they heard the sound of Argentinian Army helicopters approaching from Murrell River, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in 29 Argentinian Army Green Berets consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's 5-man HQ Section and Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd and Captain Andrés Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both 12-man patrols.<ref>''On Mount Kent D Squadron, thinly spread out, received no warning of Operation Autoimpuesta and were unprepared for the sound, at about 6pm, of helicopters approaching from the east, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in twenty-nine commandos consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's five-strong HQ Section and Captain Tomas Fernandez's 2nd and Captain Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both twelve-strong.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

==Mount Kent==

On the night of May 29th 1982, Captain Andres Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section from the 602nd Commando Company ran into Boat Troop from D Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service on the eastern slopes of the mountain.<ref>''Ferrero's section landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and were soon engaged in a confusing close-quarter night battle with Boat Troop of exploding grenades, sudden firefights at close rage and the abrupt scuttle of boots over rocks.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>The British took control of the situation, but at the cost of two badly wounded SAS troopers (Carl Rhodes and Richard Palmer). Captain Andres Ferrero remembers:{{cquote|The Malvinas War is all so long ago now that it is difficult to recall it, even more to sort out the details sufficiently to compare one's experience there with Comandos en Accion. However, reading Isidoro Ruiz-Moreno's official history, again and again, to refresh myflagging memory has proved a salutary experience. Our mission briefing told us little more than we were to get on the ground, deal with any opposition as best we could and wait for the National Gendarmerie Commandos. Our task was to block the advance of 3 Commando Brigade.

We'd been divided into two waves. I didn't like the idea of being split from the rest of the Commandos, but I could see why we had to do it. To fly in the turbulence between the peaks was a sure way to lose further helicopters. Bad weather had been forcast. Dark clouds on the horizon were blowing in Puerto Argentino's direction. To add to the problem, only four helicopters were available. Major Aldo Rico had agreed that the second wave should be postponed until the next day and since he and others in the company had failed to hitch a helicopter lift, to pass the time that night, he achieved his goal to learn to ride a motorbike. Rico had asked Major Mario Castagneto if he thought Mount Kent could be reached by foot but, because of the new minefields, he realized it would not be possible. In any case, it was too late to do anything by land that day.

We were issued grenades, bandoliers and ammunition, and two MAG machineguns, along with anti-tank rocket launchers and ratpacks. We were tired after a sleepless night. First Lieutenant Horacio Fernando Lauria, a charismatic engineer-commando in his early thirties, in an attempt to take his mind of what lay ahead had been studying Mount Kent zone maps and intelligence reports ... We boarded a Unimog, which Captain Fernando de la Serna told us would be taking us to our helicopter. We were dressed in reversible white camouflage suits. The helmets came off, the berets on, and the 602nd was driven to the Soccer Field. It was around 4 in the evening and darker than usual because the sky was overcast. Journalist Eduardo Rotondo was filming us and taking pictures. This was a unique period for the Army; to be in a war zone accompanied by journalists.

It was Argentinian Army Day. A day to be proud of our Army. It was even more important for Major Rico as it was his son's birthday. The helicopter we boarded - Huey AE 418 - was stripped bare inside and we sat on the floor ... At last, at about 5 in the evening came the order to go. Captains Eduardo Villarruel and Jorge Duran were coming too. The pilot lifted his helicopter into a low hover, about 3 feet off the ground. The whine of the engines was deafening. We were in the air, and this time it wasn't a training exercise. The pilot, lowered the helicopter's nose and picked up airspeed. It was a 6 or 7 minute flight - something like that. As we started to approach the noise was incredible. When we landed, I could not get off fast enough. As soon as we got off clear of the blades we began to off-load the weapons and equipment. The helicopter was loaded to the roof with spareammunition, Instalaza missiles and medical packs. We watched the ascent of the helicopter until it disappeared.

Not surprisingly, some insertions were badly scattered: Captain Eduardo Villarruel's headquarters group was so thoroughly lost that they did not rejoin the 602nd until the next day. We had landed 500 metres off course - northeast of Mount Kent. The night had fallen like ice into a glass, sharp and cold. With First Lieutenant Francisco Maqueda, an experienced mountaineer, leading, we moved higher up the mountain. It was awful terrain, with rocky outcrops all over the place. It was extremely difficult going for, while the sides of the mountain were not sheer, they were very steep and made up of boulders. One thing all of us had in common was that we were in reasonable shape.

The average age in the 602nd was between 28 and 33. Otherwise my combat patrol couldn't have undertaken the six grueling patrol missions that lay ahead. The thought of bumping into a British patrol, or even worse, walking into an ambush, was uppermost in my mind. This was the Lion's den. We'd gone 500 metres when, I signaled a stop. 'I can hear water, ' I said. I got edgy. I turned to Lauria who caught up with me when I stopped and he asked, 'Why not let Mucked and me go on a reconnaissance, to see what's around?' I thought for a moment, then said, 'Okay, but that I along with Maqueda would be going, with Oviedo.' The rest were to stay behind some boulders and wait for us to signal with the torch ... When we had gone about 50 metres all hell broke out. The rest of the patrol under Lauria, came under accurate machine-gun and mortar fire.

Only one man was wounded though - First Sergeant Raimundo Maximiliano Viltes. He received a bullet through a heel. For a few seconds, pandemonium reigned. Only a few managed to get rounds off. Lauria thought they were part of Combat Team Solari that was known to have been dug in the area. When he explained to me what happened, it was obvious he was very shocked. Returning fire with his FAL rifle, Lauria managed to hit some Special Air Service Commandos ... By now it was about 7 in the evening and I heard two helicopters flying over head, returning with the 601st's 2nd Assault Section from Big Mountain, but saw nothing because of the low clouds. I had to make myself calm down. I had already experienced combat, being under fire from People's Revolutionary Army guerrillas. I had been a Commando since 1975 and had served in Tucuman Province. I tried to work out how to hit back. We crawled towards them, heard they were British and decided to take them ourselves. The problem was that we had to sprint over the top, World War One style. I had little hope that anyone could have survived that ambush. I was filled with confusion as well as desperate with anxiety. By this time mortar flares were up, illuminating portions of the area. Later I learned that at the first sound of mortar fire most had run away. It wasn't exactly the reaction Lauria had wanted. Lauria and Viltes, who were last away, had a grim withdrawal under mortar fire all the way. First Sergeant Jose Nunez helped Viltes.

That night Lauria lay listening to the storm of fire as the Kent ridgeline blazed under the fire of 'D' Squadron of the Special Air Service Regiment. I started to pray. I put myself in God's hands and I know this is going to sound corny, but it started snowing very hard. We didn't dare wait too long. The signal we'd agreed on was one, two, then go. When finally we were calm enough, I put up one finger, then two, and we made our move. We were now scrambling downhill. It was slippery, dangerous. We slid down the mountainside on our backs and bottoms, sending small avalanches of grey stone, cascading down the mountain. During the getaway we lost Oviedo. The British Commandos did not follow up. There were about 20 of them with two machineguns but they also fled. This is not uncommon in war. It was later learned that the British Commandos, thinking that they were on the point of being outflanked by Maqueda, Oviedo and me, decided to retire. Realizing their mistake, they returned to the Kent ridgeline just as Captain Tomas Fernandez's patrol closed on Bluff Cove Peak.<ref>See ''Comandos en Acción: El Ejercito en Malvinas, Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, Emecé, 1986''</ref>}}

Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel had also landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the northern rocks. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of holding Mount Kent and the option of retreating to Estancia House Farm, Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, instructed Major Cedric Delves that it was critical to maintain the position and instructed him to gather the lead elements of 3 PARA until 42 Commando arrived.<ref>''Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Villarruel had also landed on Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the high ground north of the hill. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of seizing Mount Kent and disadvantage of regrouping at Estancia, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the SAS, instructed Major Delves that it was critical to hold it and put him in command of all forces in the area until 42 Commando arrived.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 148, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

3 PARA had captured Teal Inlet Settlement on May 29 in their march to Estancia House, one of the British paratroopers in Captain Matthew Selfridge's D Company had been evacuated suffering from a self-inflicted wound.<ref>Unfortunately, this was a 'negligent discharge' originating from one of the most dangerous weapons in the British military inventory, the 9 mm sub-machine gun. He was rather unwell as Nick Morgan, John Williams and Malcolm Jowitt got to work. Later, this patient would complain about the three tubes inserted into his chest, but those drainage routes did a vital job in carrying away the blood leaking from the bullet's long track. He was a rather lucky boy – another survivor, and very much against the odds. Doctor for Friend and Foe: Britain's Frontline Medic in the Fight for the Falklands, Rick Jolly, p. 89, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012</ref>

==Bluff Cove Peak==

In the meantime, the 602nd Commando Company's 2nd Assault Section, commanded by ''Capitán'' Tomás Victor Fernández, after a brief pause, continued its advance up [[Bluff Cove Peak]]. It was here that ''Teniente 1º'' Rubén Eduardo Márquez and ''Sargento 1º'' Oscar Humberto Blas won posthumously the ''Medalla Heroico Valor en Combate'' (Gallantry in Combat Medal) in a patrol clash in which they wounded two Special Air Service Commandos with hand grenades (Ewen Pearcy and Don Masters).<ref>''Two more men were wounded, but the SAS remained in control of its main positions by the morning of 30 May.'' Twilight Warriors: Inside the World's Special Forces, Martin C. Arostegui, pg 181, St. Martin's Press, 1997</ref><ref>''Fernandez's section spent the night extricating themselves from the ambush and although two more SAS were wounded, he lost Sergeant Alfredo Flores, who was knocked out when he fell and was taken prisoner.''Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>There was nothing for it but to squeeze as many as possible into caves near the top of Bluff Cove Peak," admits Captain Fernández.

That same morning, before dawn, as Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel led his headquarters group back to Argentinian lines, he ran into a heavily armed British patrol on the foggy slopes of Mount Kent heading to Estancia House. The Argentinian Special Forces went to ground and took up ambush positions. Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero, had the 7.62 millimetre belt-fed machine-gun and was ready to open fire. Villarruel, for some reason told Cisnero to hold his fire. It was a serious misjudgment and probably cost the Argentinians the battle for Mount Kent. It later transpired that the British patrol were members of 'D' Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment retreating with their two badly wounded in the Mount Kent action. Unfortunately because of the blizzard, communications were lost on both sides. But for the first time Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment was in control of the situation after the initial SAS retreat. By 1700 local time on May 30 when Captain Tomás Fernández's radio operator, Senior Sergeant Alfredo Flores, at last came on air, he passed the dramatic message, ''"We are in trouble" and 40 minutes later, "there are English all around us...you had better hurry up."''<ref>[https://www.wearethemighty.com/popular/that-time-two-countries-special-forces-squared-off-in-combat/ That time two countries’ Special Forces squared off in combat]</ref>

The Argentinian helicopter-borne offensive had been checked, with the Special Air Service successfully maintaining their positions on Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak. Major Aldo Rico was placed in charge of all further Special Forces operations. He reluctantly cancelled the deployment of Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commando Company and instructed Castagneto to rescue the 602nd Commando Company, who were to assemble on Estancia Mountain.<ref>''Operation Autoimpuesta, so far, was not going well and with the British now occupying Mount Kent, Major Rico was given command of Special Forces operations. He cancelled the deployment of 601 Commando Company and instructed Major Castagneto to rescue 602 Commando, who were to assemble on Mount Estancia.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

Captain Andres Ferrero regrouped his men on Estancia Mountain and awaited reinforcements. Around 1100 local time on May 30th, the Argentinian patrol commander watched in horror as two Royal Air Force Harriers (XZ963 and XZ789) made a pass over the Puma carrying reinforcements from the 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron ('Escuadrón de Fuerzas Especiales 601 de la Gendarmería Nacional' or EFE601GN), firing as they went. The Puma crashed in the ground and started a fire in which six Gendarmerie Commandos from Captain Jorge San Emeterio's combat patrol were killed: Lieutenant Ricardo Julio Sánchez, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Nasif, Corporals Marciano Veron, Víctor Samuel Guerrero, Carlos Ismael Pereyra and Lance-Corporal Juan Carlos Treppo. Those Gendarmerie Commandos who could jumped out, some of them braving the fire and exploding ammunition to rescue eight injured colleagues.

The Argentinian Special Forces nearby, in the form of Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero ―armed with a 7.62 mm machinegun― from Captain Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section, or Sergeant Luis Alberto Kovalski (also armed with a machinegun)<ref>[https://www.stopenlinea.com.ar/noticias/2019/06/06/45005-el-alacran-kovalski-participo-de-la-evocacion-del-bautismo-de-fuego-de-gendarmeria-nacional El alacrán Kovalski participó de la evocación del bautismo de fuego de Gendarmería Nacional]</ref>from EFE601GN however, exacted rapid revenge and one of the Royal Air Force Harriers involved, XZ-963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook was shot down.<ref>''En medio de lo que parecia un corredor de aviones, aparecieron dos Harrier. El Perro, ni corto ni perezoso, volvio a dispararles. -¡Perro, dejáte de boludear y no les tires más porque van a saber dónde estamos y nos van a hacer pelota!, le pidieron sus compañeros a los gritos.'' Malvinas: 20 Años, 20 Héroes, p. 204, Fundación Soldados, 2002</ref>

==Royal Marine reinforcements==

The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 CDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions, meant it took five nights to airlift in the 120 Royal Marines of Babbington.

The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines.

Brigadier [[Julian Thompson]], who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentine patrols ''"would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."''<ref>[http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/heritage/key-battles-at-top-malo-and-mount-kent-1-1272106 Key battles at Top Malo and Mount Kent]</ref>

When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS ambush Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak.

Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, ''Bravo November''. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms fire) soon after:{{cquote|We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers] of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvring to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.<ref>16 Air Assault Brigade: The History of Britain's Rapid Reaction Force, Tim Ripley, pp. 45-46, Casemate Publishers, 2008</ref>}}

==Top Malo House==

On May 27th, a four-man patrol of the Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) under Sergeant Chris Stone were manning an Observation Post (OP) on Bull Hill. They heard two UH-1 Huey helicopters approach their position and fearing that they would be attacked radioed that this might be their last transmission and that they would try to fight their way out. Fortunately after circling their position the Hueys set off towards Mount Simon (which was covered in mist) and deposited on the lower slopes what the British Mountain Commandos estimated to be a 17-man Special Forces patrol. This was worrying news for the British as the strong enemy patrol flanked 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters at Teal Inlet and the British helicopters supplying 42 Commando's 'Kilo' Company on Mount Kent.

The Argentinian remote outpost was reported to Captain Rod Boswell, the M&AWC commander at San Carlos. Top Malo House was beyond the range of British Artillery and no Royal Air Force Harriers were available for an air strike, so Brigadier Julian Thompson agreed that Boswell's unit should eliminate the Argentinian patrol. Captain Boswell gathered together nineteen Mountain Commandos and were flown forward by a Sea King helicopter piloted by Lieutenant John Miller the next morning.

Having surrounded Top Malo House, Captain Rod Boswell ordered his 12-man assault group patrol to fix bayonets and fire a green flare, the signal for the 7-man fire support group (under Lieutenant Callum Murray) on a nearby hillock to unleash a volley of six anti-tank rockets at the remote farmhouse.

Senior Lieutenant [[Ernesto Emilio Espinosa]] on sentry duty on the top stairs window raised the alarm and was shot and killed by Corporal Steve Groves armed with a sniper rifle, but not before shooting in the hand Sergeant Mac Mclean from the support group.

As Boswell and his assault group charged forward, two more 66mm rockets smashed into the house and the Argentinian Army Special Forces who had taken cover there overnight fled to Mullow Stream 200 metres away. The ammunition stacked in the farmhouse exploded as the British Mountain Commandos ran forward, forcing them to retreat in the initial attack, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the Argentinian Green Berets lying in the stream firing at them.<ref>''The enemy ran out of the house into a small stream bed about 50 metres away, firing as they ran. Sergeant Doyle fell, hit through the shoulder and then Corporal Groves also fell, hit in the chest. The ammunition stacked in the house exploded as the assault group ran forward, causing them to recoil for a moment, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the enemy lying in the stream firing at them.'' No Picnic, Julian Thompson, Pen & Sword, 2008</ref>

In the fierce firefight, Senior Sergeant [[Mateo Domingo Sbert]] was killed while covering along with Captain José Arnobio Vercesi and Senior Lieutenant Juan José Gatti, the Argentinian retreat to the stream and the Argentinian second-in-command, Senior Lieutenant [[Horacio Losito]], had an enemy Mountain Commando fixed in his sights when he lost consciousness through loss of blood before Senior Sergeants Miguel Ángel Castillo and Omar Medina reluctantly threw down their weapons and surrendered with the remainder of the patrol. In the confusion of surrender, a number of British Commandos kept firing and Medina was badly wounded in the left leg and Corporal Raúl Valdivieso was also shot.

The battle of Top Malo House had lasted about forty-five minutes and cost the lives of two members of Captain [[José Arnobio Vercesi]]'s 1st Assault Section of the 602nd Commando Company. The 10 Argentinian survivors, six of them wounded, were taken prisoner.

Four Royal Marine Commandos (Sergeants Taff Doyle, Steve Groves, Mac McLean and Corporal Chris Stone) were wounded<ref>[http://www.forces.net/news/remembering-falklands-day-day Remembering The Falklands Day By Day]</ref><ref>''"Sergeant McLean was wounded in the hand when a round hit the 66mm LAW he was about to fire."'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref><ref>''"The fire group quickly destroyed the target house, but the Argentinians stormed out, firing back and very quickly two Marines, Sergeant Terry Doyle in the assault group and Sergeant Rocky Stone of the fire group, had been shot and injured. Then Corporal Steve Groves was shot in the chest. The assault group had almost charged down on to Top Malo, blazing firepower from the hip and with Boswell leading."'' Commando, David Reynolds, p. 146, Sutton, 2001</ref>, a testament to the bravery and skill of the Argentinian Commandos.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House in late May 1982 cost the lives of eleven members of Argentina's Special Forces. Ten British M&AWC and SAS special forces were wounded/injured, but five British Commandos were soon killed as a result of [[Friendly fire]] on the lower slopes of Mount Kent.

Unknown to Vercesi's men, however, the 45-minute fight at Top Malo House had tied down a significant part of the available British Mountain Commandos, leaving only a handful of Boswell's men on Mount Smoko to keep watch of the Argentinian outpost guarding the bridge connecting Bluff Cove and Fitzroy Settlements.<ref>By Sea, By Land The Royal Marines, 1919-1997, James D. Ladd, p. 385, HarperCollins, 1998</ref>As a result of the British delay, Senior Lieutenant Darío Horacio Blanco and his platoon of engineers from the 601st Combat Engineer Battalion were able to blow up part of the bridge unmolested on 2 June<ref>[http://laperlaaustral.com.ar/guerra-malvinas/voladura-del-puente-fitz-roy-en-la-campana-de-malvinas/ Voladura del Puente Fitz Roy en la Campaña de Malvinas]</ref>, resulting in 50 British killed and 200 wounded<ref>The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War, Alistair Finlan, p. 78, Routledge, 2004</ref>during the [[Bluff Cove/Fitzroy Air Attacks]] on 8 June when the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and attached units aboard the troopships 'Sir Galahad' and 'Sir Tristram' arrived overnight only to discover their advance route by land severed forcing them to remain aboard ships the following day.<ref>[https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/malvinas-identificaron-mateo-sbert-sargento-murio-historica-nid2186555/ Malvinas: identificaron a Mateo Sbert, el sargento que murió en la histórica batalla de "Top Malo House"]</ref>

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Battles]]
[[Category:1980s]]
[[Category:United Kingdom]]
[[Category:Argentina]]

Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House

2021-05-26T15:32:19Z

Magnifiko2: /* Bluff Cove Peak */

On May 27, 1982, the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) and 45 Commando (45 CDO), Royal Marines had left the British beachhead at San Carlos for Estancia Mountain and Bluff Cove Peak. The 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) were ordered to attack the Argentinian Task Force ''Mercedes'' on May 28 located on Darwin Isthmus during the [[Battle of Darwin and Goose Green]], eliminating any future threat from the Argentinian garrison. Major [[Cedric Delves]]' D Squadron, [[22nd Special Air Service Regiment]], embarked in Sea King helicopters would seize Mount Kent, while 19 Royal Marine Commandos from the [[Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre]] (M&AWC) under Major [[Rod Boswell]], embarked in a Wessex helicopter, would capture and clear the forward Argentinian Special Forces patrol located at Top Malo House, allowing the 600 Paratroopers from 3 PARA to capture Estancia Mountain and Estancia House. Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 Commando (42 CDO) was expected to land on Mount Kent on the night of May 29. Delays and snow blizzards meant these helicopter-borne reinforcements would only arrive on the night May 31, perilously close to a firefight.

==Key ground==

Mount Kent with its surrounding hills is an area of high ground on East Falkland, approximately five miles west of Port Stanley. It rises to just under 1,100 feet and it dominated the central axis of advance from San Carlos to Stanley. Given its dominance and proximity to the capital of the Falkland Islands, the mountain was an area of special interest to both British and Argentinian Special Forces.

==First contact==

The first engagement during the Battles of Mount Kent and Top Malo House occurred during 27 May, when ''Subteniente'' Marcelo Llambías Pravaz, Sergeant Ramón Valdez, Corporal Walter Pintos and Private Daniel Castillo from the 4th Regiment's C Company, while patrolling the western slopes under the cover of darkness and heavy rain, were overflown by a British helicopter. After radioing this information to regimental headquarters, the small squad soon after detected a British hide and opened fire. The next day, they closely inspected the scene but only found empty British rations that had to be dug out of the ground.<ref>[http://www.malvinasenlaradio.com/desajoomla/test/category/118-mcp-2017 Marcelo Llambias Pravaz (Malvinas Corazón De Mi Patria)]</ref>

The next day, Lieutenant Guillermo Enrique Anaya from the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion visited Estancia House Farm and his Bell UH-1H helicopter landed twice on May 28th. Lieutenant Anaya thought there were British commandos hiding in a cow shed, so he machine-gunned it.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3JpnPMsuMA Entrevista a Guillermo Anaya, Top Gun de los helicopteristas]</ref>

In the days that followed there were a number of brief but extremely violent clashes between the Special Forces of both sides.

==Argentinian commando incursion==

About 40 men of 39-year-old Major [[Aldo Rico]]'s [[602nd Commando Company (Argentinian Army)]], were originally scheduled to make an assault landing in six Bell UH-1H helicopters of the 601st Combat Aviation Battalion. A follow-up force, the 65-man 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron under Major [[José Ricardo Spadaro]], would reinforce the Mount Kent position. Argentinian maps had confirmed the overland route was obstructed with minefields and booby-traps. This meant the National Gendarmerie Special Forces would have to arrive in a Puma helicopter the next day, exposed to Royal Air Force GR-3 Harriers in their morning bomb runs. There was additional delay when the Marine Special Forces from Major [[Guillermo Sánchez-Sabarots]] 1st Amphibious Commando Grouping in the lead C-130 Hercules aircraft from [[Comodoro Rivadavia]] on the Argentinian mainland, had to abort landing on Stanley Airport. A snow blizzard added to the confusion as the Argentinian Special Forces hurriedly prepared their backpacks and gear for the insertions.

On Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak, Major Cedric Delves' thinly spread out D Squadron, received no warning of Operation ''Autoimpuesta'' and were momentarily caught off guard when they heard the sound of Argentinian Army helicopters approaching from Murrell River, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in 29 Argentinian Army Green Berets consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's 5-man HQ Section and Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd and Captain Andrés Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both 12-man patrols.<ref>''On Mount Kent D Squadron, thinly spread out, received no warning of Operation Autoimpuesta and were unprepared for the sound, at about 6pm, of helicopters approaching from the east, in fact a Puma and four Huey helicopters bringing in twenty-nine commandos consisting of Captain Eduardo Villarruel's five-strong HQ Section and Captain Tomas Fernandez's 2nd and Captain Ferrero's 3rd Assault Sections, both twelve-strong.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

==Mount Kent==

On the night of May 29th 1982, Captain Andres Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section from the 602nd Commando Company ran into Boat Troop from D Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service on the eastern slopes of the mountain.<ref>''Ferrero's section landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and were soon engaged in a confusing close-quarter night battle with Boat Troop of exploding grenades, sudden firefights at close rage and the abrupt scuttle of boots over rocks.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 147, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>The British took control of the situation, but at the cost of two badly wounded SAS troopers (Carl Rhodes and Richard Palmer). Captain Andres Ferrero remembers:{{cquote|The Malvinas War is all so long ago now that it is difficult to recall it, even more to sort out the details sufficiently to compare one's experience there with Comandos en Accion. However, reading Isidoro Ruiz-Moreno's official history, again and again, to refresh myflagging memory has proved a salutary experience. Our mission briefing told us little more than we were to get on the ground, deal with any opposition as best we could and wait for the National Gendarmerie Commandos. Our task was to block the advance of 3 Commando Brigade.

We'd been divided into two waves. I didn't like the idea of being split from the rest of the Commandos, but I could see why we had to do it. To fly in the turbulence between the peaks was a sure way to lose further helicopters. Bad weather had been forcast. Dark clouds on the horizon were blowing in Puerto Argentino's direction. To add to the problem, only four helicopters were available. Major Aldo Rico had agreed that the second wave should be postponed until the next day and since he and others in the company had failed to hitch a helicopter lift, to pass the time that night, he achieved his goal to learn to ride a motorbike. Rico had asked Major Mario Castagneto if he thought Mount Kent could be reached by foot but, because of the new minefields, he realized it would not be possible. In any case, it was too late to do anything by land that day.

We were issued grenades, bandoliers and ammunition, and two MAG machineguns, along with anti-tank rocket launchers and ratpacks. We were tired after a sleepless night. First Lieutenant Horacio Fernando Lauria, a charismatic engineer-commando in his early thirties, in an attempt to take his mind of what lay ahead had been studying Mount Kent zone maps and intelligence reports ... We boarded a Unimog, which Captain Fernando de la Serna told us would be taking us to our helicopter. We were dressed in reversible white camouflage suits. The helmets came off, the berets on, and the 602nd was driven to the Soccer Field. It was around 4 in the evening and darker than usual because the sky was overcast. Journalist Eduardo Rotondo was filming us and taking pictures. This was a unique period for the Army; to be in a war zone accompanied by journalists.

It was Argentinian Army Day. A day to be proud of our Army. It was even more important for Major Rico as it was his son's birthday. The helicopter we boarded - Huey AE 418 - was stripped bare inside and we sat on the floor ... At last, at about 5 in the evening came the order to go. Captains Eduardo Villarruel and Jorge Duran were coming too. The pilot lifted his helicopter into a low hover, about 3 feet off the ground. The whine of the engines was deafening. We were in the air, and this time it wasn't a training exercise. The pilot, lowered the helicopter's nose and picked up airspeed. It was a 6 or 7 minute flight - something like that. As we started to approach the noise was incredible. When we landed, I could not get off fast enough. As soon as we got off clear of the blades we began to off-load the weapons and equipment. The helicopter was loaded to the roof with spareammunition, Instalaza missiles and medical packs. We watched the ascent of the helicopter until it disappeared.

Not surprisingly, some insertions were badly scattered: Captain Eduardo Villarruel's headquarters group was so thoroughly lost that they did not rejoin the 602nd until the next day. We had landed 500 metres off course - northeast of Mount Kent. The night had fallen like ice into a glass, sharp and cold. With First Lieutenant Francisco Maqueda, an experienced mountaineer, leading, we moved higher up the mountain. It was awful terrain, with rocky outcrops all over the place. It was extremely difficult going for, while the sides of the mountain were not sheer, they were very steep and made up of boulders. One thing all of us had in common was that we were in reasonable shape.

The average age in the 602nd was between 28 and 33. Otherwise my combat patrol couldn't have undertaken the six grueling patrol missions that lay ahead. The thought of bumping into a British patrol, or even worse, walking into an ambush, was uppermost in my mind. This was the Lion's den. We'd gone 500 metres when, I signaled a stop. 'I can hear water, ' I said. I got edgy. I turned to Lauria who caught up with me when I stopped and he asked, 'Why not let Mucked and me go on a reconnaissance, to see what's around?' I thought for a moment, then said, 'Okay, but that I along with Maqueda would be going, with Oviedo.' The rest were to stay behind some boulders and wait for us to signal with the torch ... When we had gone about 50 metres all hell broke out. The rest of the patrol under Lauria, came under accurate machine-gun and mortar fire.

Only one man was wounded though - First Sergeant Raimundo Maximiliano Viltes. He received a bullet through a heel. For a few seconds, pandemonium reigned. Only a few managed to get rounds off. Lauria thought they were part of Combat Team Solari that was known to have been dug in the area. When he explained to me what happened, it was obvious he was very shocked. Returning fire with his FAL rifle, Lauria managed to hit some Special Air Service Commandos ... By now it was about 7 in the evening and I heard two helicopters flying over head, returning with the 601st's 2nd Assault Section from Big Mountain, but saw nothing because of the low clouds. I had to make myself calm down. I had already experienced combat, being under fire from People's Revolutionary Army guerrillas. I had been a Commando since 1975 and had served in Tucuman Province. I tried to work out how to hit back. We crawled towards them, heard they were British and decided to take them ourselves. The problem was that we had to sprint over the top, World War One style. I had little hope that anyone could have survived that ambush. I was filled with confusion as well as desperate with anxiety. By this time mortar flares were up, illuminating portions of the area. Later I learned that at the first sound of mortar fire most had run away. It wasn't exactly the reaction Lauria had wanted. Lauria and Viltes, who were last away, had a grim withdrawal under mortar fire all the way. First Sergeant Jose Nunez helped Viltes.

That night Lauria lay listening to the storm of fire as the Kent ridgeline blazed under the fire of 'D' Squadron of the Special Air Service Regiment. I started to pray. I put myself in God's hands and I know this is going to sound corny, but it started snowing very hard. We didn't dare wait too long. The signal we'd agreed on was one, two, then go. When finally we were calm enough, I put up one finger, then two, and we made our move. We were now scrambling downhill. It was slippery, dangerous. We slid down the mountainside on our backs and bottoms, sending small avalanches of grey stone, cascading down the mountain. During the getaway we lost Oviedo. The British Commandos did not follow up. There were about 20 of them with two machineguns but they also fled. This is not uncommon in war. It was later learned that the British Commandos, thinking that they were on the point of being outflanked by Maqueda, Oviedo and me, decided to retire. Realizing their mistake, they returned to the Kent ridgeline just as Captain Tomas Fernandez's patrol closed on Bluff Cove Peak.<ref>See ''Comandos en Acción: El Ejercito en Malvinas, Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, Emecé, 1986''</ref>}}

Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel had also landed on the eastern slopes of Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the northern rocks. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of holding Mount Kent and the option of retreating to Estancia House Farm, Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, instructed Major Cedric Delves that it was critical to maintain the position and instructed him to gather the lead elements of 3 PARA until 42 Commando arrived.<ref>''Meanwhile, according to his patrol report, Villarruel had also landed on Mount Kent and, avoiding contact, withdrew to the high ground north of the hill. After discussing with Brigadier Thompson the importance of seizing Mount Kent and disadvantage of regrouping at Estancia, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Rose, who commanded the SAS, instructed Major Delves that it was critical to hold it and put him in command of all forces in the area until 42 Commando arrived.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 148, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

3 PARA had captured Teal Inlet Settlement on May 29 in their march to Estancia House, one of the British paratroopers in Captain Matthew Selfridge's D Company had been evacuated suffering from a self-inflicted wound.<ref>Unfortunately, this was a 'negligent discharge' originating from one of the most dangerous weapons in the British military inventory, the 9 mm sub-machine gun. He was rather unwell as Nick Morgan, John Williams and Malcolm Jowitt got to work. Later, this patient would complain about the three tubes inserted into his chest, but those drainage routes did a vital job in carrying away the blood leaking from the bullet's long track. He was a rather lucky boy – another survivor, and very much against the odds. Doctor for Friend and Foe: Britain's Frontline Medic in the Fight for the Falklands, Rick Jolly, p. 89, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012</ref>

==Bluff Cove Peak==

In the meantime, the 602nd Commando Company's 2nd Assault Section, commanded by ''Capitán'' Tomás Victor Fernández, after a brief pause, continued its advance up [[Bluff Cove Peak]]. It was here that ''Teniente 1º'' Rubén Eduardo Márquez and ''Sargento 1º'' Oscar Humberto Blas won posthumously the ''Medalla Heroico Valor en Combate'' (Gallantry in Combat Medal) in a patrol clash in which they wounded two Special Air Service Commandos with hand grenades (Ewen Pearcy and Don Masters).<ref>''Two more men were wounded, but the SAS remained in control of its main positions by the morning of 30 May.'' Twilight Warriors: Inside the World's Special Forces, Martin C. Arostegui, pg 181, St. Martin's Press, 1997</ref><ref>''Fernandez's section spent the night extricating themselves from the ambush and although two more SAS were wounded, he lost Sergeant Alfredo Flores, who was knocked out when he fell and was taken prisoner.''Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>There was nothing for it but to squeeze as many as possible into caves near the top of Bluff Cove Peak," admits Captain Fernández.

That same morning, before dawn, as Captain Eduardo Marcelo Villarruel led his headquarters group back to Argentinian lines, he ran into a heavily armed British patrol on the foggy slopes of Mount Kent heading to Estancia House. The Argentinian Special Forces went to ground and took up ambush positions. Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero, had the 7.62 millimetre belt-fed machine-gun and was ready to open fire. Villarruel, for some reason told Cisnero to hold his fire. It was a serious misjudgment and probably cost the Argentinians the battle for Mount Kent. It later transpired that the British patrol were members of 'D' Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment retreating with their two badly wounded in the Mount Kent action. Unfortunately because of the blizzard, communications were lost on both sides. But for the first time Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment was in control of the situation after the initial SAS retreat. By 1700 local time on May 30 when Captain Tomás Fernández's radio operator, Senior Sergeant Alfredo Flores, at last came on air, he passed the dramatic message, ''"We are in trouble" and 40 minutes later, "there are English all around us...you had better hurry up."''<ref>[https://www.wearethemighty.com/popular/that-time-two-countries-special-forces-squared-off-in-combat/ That time two countries’ Special Forces squared off in combat]</ref>

The Argentinian helicopter-borne offensive had been checked, with the Special Air Service successfully maintaining their positions on Mount Kent and Bluff Cove Peak. Major Aldo Rico was placed in charge of all further Special Forces operations. He reluctantly cancelled the deployment of Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commando Company and instructed Castagneto to rescue the 602nd Commando Company, who were to assemble on Estancia Mountain.<ref>''Operation Autoimpuesta, so far, was not going well and with the British now occupying Mount Kent, Major Rico was given command of Special Forces operations. He cancelled the deployment of 601 Commando Company and instructed Major Castagneto to rescue 602 Commando, who were to assemble on Mount Estancia.'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, pg. 149, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref>

Captain Andres Ferrero regrouped his men on Estancia Mountain and awaited reinforcements. Around 1100 local time on May 30th, the Argentinian patrol commander watched in horror as two Royal Air Force Harriers (XZ963 and XZ789) made a pass over the Puma carrying reinforcements from the 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron, firing as they went. The Puma crashed in the ground and started a fire in which six Gendarmerie Commandos from Captain Jorge San Emeterio's combat patrol were killed: Lieutenant Ricardo Julio Sánchez, Second Lieutenant Guillermo Nasif, Corporals Marciano Veron, Víctor Samuel Guerrero, Carlos Ismael Pereyra and Lance-Corporal Juan Carlos Treppo. Those Gendarmerie Commandos who could jumped out, some of them braving the fire and exploding ammunition to rescue eight injured colleagues.

The Argentinian Special Forces nearby, in the form of Sergeant Mario Antonio Cisnero ―armed with a 7.62 mm machinegun― from Captain Antonio Ferrero's 3rd Assault Section, or Sergeant Luis Alberto Kovalski<ref>[https://www.stopenlinea.com.ar/noticias/2019/06/06/45005-el-alacran-kovalski-participo-de-la-evocacion-del-bautismo-de-fuego-de-gendarmeria-nacional El alacrán Kovalski participó de la evocación del bautismo de fuego de Gendarmería Nacional]</ref>from EFE601GN however, exacted rapid revenge and one of the Royal Air Force Harriers involved, XZ-963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook was shot down.<ref>''En medio de lo que parecia un corredor de aviones, aparecieron dos Harrier. El Perro, ni corto ni perezoso, volvio a dispararles. -¡Perro, dejáte de boludear y no les tires más porque van a saber dónde estamos y nos van a hacer pelota!, le pidieron sus compañeros a los gritos.'' Malvinas: 20 Años, 20 Héroes, p. 204, Fundación Soldados, 2002</ref>

==Royal Marine reinforcements==

The job of seizing the 1,300ft mountain fell to Captain Peter Babbington's ''Kilo'' Company of 42 CDO, who would be flown in by helicopters. Major Cedric Delves' D Squadron was told to locate and secure a suitable landing zone below the Mount Kent summit, but the lack of helicopters, coupled with blizzard conditions, meant it took five nights to airlift in the 120 Royal Marines of Babbington.

The British High Command 8,000 miles away in Northwood, impatient for victories, questioned the need to use up valuable time on reconnaissance. Fortunately the British commander in the Falklands ignored their orders, because when the Royal Marines did land on the lower slopes of Mount Kent they discovered that strong enemy special forces patrols were still trying to penetrate the British lines.

Brigadier [[Julian Thompson]], who commanded 3 Commando Brigade, wrote later that without the SAS presence on Mount Kent, the Argentine patrols ''"would have had a turkey shoot on the vulnerable helicopters and the troops as they jumped out, temporarily disorientated in the darkness; the operation would have been a disaster."''<ref>[http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/heritage/key-battles-at-top-malo-and-mount-kent-1-1272106 Key battles at Top Malo and Mount Kent]</ref>

When the 42 CDO spearhead flew in on the night of May 30/31 they witnessed the SAS ambush Captain Tomás Fernández's 2nd Assault Section near the landing site. Fortunately for the Royal Marine reinforcements, though, the Argentinian patrol withdrew after having earlier lost two killed on Bluff Cove Peak.

Also heavily involved in this action was the Task Force’s only surviving Chinook helicopter, ''Bravo November''. Flight-Lieutenant Andy Lawless, co-pilot of the Chinook took part in the mission to deliver artillery guns and ammunition to the SAS and describes the crash of the helicopter (possibly as a result of small-arms fire) soon after:{{cquote|We knew the SAS were outgunned. Our job was to land 105-mm howitzers] of 29 Regiment Royal Artillery. Rose (Loadmaster) told me the landing site was flat and secure. The mission was to be flown all at night with night-vision goggles. We had three 105—mm guns inside and ammunition pallets under-slung. Then the fog of war intervened. The ground was not flat and covered in boulders. We could not find anywhere to land and we spent time manoeuvring to drop off the under-slung loads. We had to put them exactly where the gunners wanted because they could not roll the guns very far across the terrible terrain. I can distinctly remember troops moving under the rotor disking firing their guns – this was not part of the plan. There were incoming artillery rounds. Once we dropped off the guns we went straight back to San Carlos to bring in more guns and ammo. Then we hit water. We were lucky because if we had hit solid ground we would have been dead. We hit at 100 knots. The bow wave came over the cockpit window as we settled and the engines partially flamed out. I knew we had ditched but I was not sure if we had been hit. Dick (Pilot) said he thought we had been hit by ground fire. As the helicopter settled the bow wave reduced. We had the collective still up and the engine wound up as we came out of the water like a cork out of a bottle. We were climbing.<ref>16 Air Assault Brigade: The History of Britain's Rapid Reaction Force, Tim Ripley, pp. 45-46, Casemate Publishers, 2008</ref>}}

==Top Malo House==

On May 27th, a four-man patrol of the Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre (M&AWC) under Sergeant Chris Stone were manning an Observation Post (OP) on Bull Hill. They heard two UH-1 Huey helicopters approach their position and fearing that they would be attacked radioed that this might be their last transmission and that they would try to fight their way out. Fortunately after circling their position the Hueys set off towards Mount Simon (which was covered in mist) and deposited on the lower slopes what the British Mountain Commandos estimated to be a 17-man Special Forces patrol. This was worrying news for the British as the strong enemy patrol flanked 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters at Teal Inlet and the British helicopters supplying 42 Commando's 'Kilo' Company on Mount Kent.

The Argentinian remote outpost was reported to Captain Rod Boswell, the M&AWC commander at San Carlos. Top Malo House was beyond the range of British Artillery and no Royal Air Force Harriers were available for an air strike, so Brigadier Julian Thompson agreed that Boswell's unit should eliminate the Argentinian patrol. Captain Boswell gathered together nineteen Mountain Commandos and were flown forward by a Sea King helicopter piloted by Lieutenant John Miller the next morning.

Having surrounded Top Malo House, Captain Rod Boswell ordered his 12-man assault group patrol to fix bayonets and fire a green flare, the signal for the 7-man fire support group (under Lieutenant Callum Murray) on a nearby hillock to unleash a volley of six anti-tank rockets at the remote farmhouse.

Senior Lieutenant [[Ernesto Emilio Espinosa]] on sentry duty on the top stairs window raised the alarm and was shot and killed by Corporal Steve Groves armed with a sniper rifle, but not before shooting in the hand Sergeant Mac Mclean from the support group.

As Boswell and his assault group charged forward, two more 66mm rockets smashed into the house and the Argentinian Army Special Forces who had taken cover there overnight fled to Mullow Stream 200 metres away. The ammunition stacked in the farmhouse exploded as the British Mountain Commandos ran forward, forcing them to retreat in the initial attack, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the Argentinian Green Berets lying in the stream firing at them.<ref>''The enemy ran out of the house into a small stream bed about 50 metres away, firing as they ran. Sergeant Doyle fell, hit through the shoulder and then Corporal Groves also fell, hit in the chest. The ammunition stacked in the house exploded as the assault group ran forward, causing them to recoil for a moment, while smoke from the burning building shielded them from the enemy lying in the stream firing at them.'' No Picnic, Julian Thompson, Pen & Sword, 2008</ref>

In the fierce firefight, Senior Sergeant [[Mateo Domingo Sbert]] was killed while covering along with Captain José Arnobio Vercesi and Senior Lieutenant Juan José Gatti, the Argentinian retreat to the stream and the Argentinian second-in-command, Senior Lieutenant [[Horacio Losito]], had an enemy Mountain Commando fixed in his sights when he lost consciousness through loss of blood before Senior Sergeants Miguel Ángel Castillo and Omar Medina reluctantly threw down their weapons and surrendered with the remainder of the patrol. In the confusion of surrender, a number of British Commandos kept firing and Medina was badly wounded in the left leg and Corporal Raúl Valdivieso was also shot.

The battle of Top Malo House had lasted about forty-five minutes and cost the lives of two members of Captain [[José Arnobio Vercesi]]'s 1st Assault Section of the 602nd Commando Company. The 10 Argentinian survivors, six of them wounded, were taken prisoner.

Four Royal Marine Commandos (Sergeants Taff Doyle, Steve Groves, Mac McLean and Corporal Chris Stone) were wounded<ref>[http://www.forces.net/news/remembering-falklands-day-day Remembering The Falklands Day By Day]</ref><ref>''"Sergeant McLean was wounded in the hand when a round hit the 66mm LAW he was about to fire."'' Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick Van Der Bijl, Pen & Sword, 2014</ref><ref>''"The fire group quickly destroyed the target house, but the Argentinians stormed out, firing back and very quickly two Marines, Sergeant Terry Doyle in the assault group and Sergeant Rocky Stone of the fire group, had been shot and injured. Then Corporal Steve Groves was shot in the chest. The assault group had almost charged down on to Top Malo, blazing firepower from the hip and with Boswell leading."'' Commando, David Reynolds, p. 146, Sutton, 2001</ref>, a testament to the bravery and skill of the Argentinian Commandos.

==Aftermath==

The Battle of Mount Kent and Top Malo House in late May 1982 cost the lives of eleven members of Argentina's Special Forces. Ten British M&AWC and SAS special forces were wounded/injured, but five British Commandos were soon killed as a result of [[Friendly fire]] on the lower slopes of Mount Kent.

Unknown to Vercesi's men, however, the 45-minute fight at Top Malo House had tied down a significant part of the available British Mountain Commandos, leaving only a handful of Boswell's men on Mount Smoko to keep watch of the Argentinian outpost guarding the bridge connecting Bluff Cove and Fitzroy Settlements.<ref>By Sea, By Land The Royal Marines, 1919-1997, James D. Ladd, p. 385, HarperCollins, 1998</ref>As a result of the British delay, Senior Lieutenant Darío Horacio Blanco and his platoon of engineers from the 601st Combat Engineer Battalion were able to blow up part of the bridge unmolested on 2 June<ref>[http://laperlaaustral.com.ar/guerra-malvinas/voladura-del-puente-fitz-roy-en-la-campana-de-malvinas/ Voladura del Puente Fitz Roy en la Campaña de Malvinas]</ref>, resulting in 50 British killed and 200 wounded<ref>The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War, Alistair Finlan, p. 78, Routledge, 2004</ref>during the [[Bluff Cove/Fitzroy Air Attacks]] on 8 June when the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards and attached units aboard the troopships 'Sir Galahad' and 'Sir Tristram' arrived overnight only to discover their advance route by land severed forcing them to remain aboard ships the following day.<ref>[https://www.lanacion.com.ar/sociedad/malvinas-identificaron-mateo-sbert-sargento-murio-historica-nid2186555/ Malvinas: identificaron a Mateo Sbert, el sargento que murió en la histórica batalla de "Top Malo House"]</ref>

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:Battles]]
[[Category:1980s]]
[[Category:United Kingdom]]
[[Category:Argentina]]

Battles of Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge

2021-05-26T15:25:53Z

Magnifiko2:

Following [[Operation Rosario (Falklands/Malvinas War)]], the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands in April 1982, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions from the British Parachute Regiment (2 and 3 PARA) were deployed as part of [[3 Commando Brigade]] to retake the Islands in [[Operation Corporate]].

==No Man's Land==

Having landed at Port San Carlos on May 21, 3 PARA (under Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike) marched across the East Falkland via Teal Inlet to the sheep farm settlement of Estancia House from where they began to send out patrols to harass the defenders and map out the area around Mount Longdon situated to the north west of [[Port Stanley]], the capital of the Islands.

The 7th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez, had been sent to dig in on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. More specifically, the regiment was supposed to counter a British force coming from Berkeley Sound. The garrison on Mount Longdon was made up of the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company. 34-year-old Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores had been selected to command all the Argentinian forces on Mount Longdon. He seemed an excellent choice when taking into account his aggressive nature as a parachute officer that had served as a company commander in the 17th Airborne Infantry Regiment in Catamarca Province.

Second Lieutenant Juan Domingo Baldini's 1st Platoon was positioned on the rocky outcrops running west of 'Fly Half', the western peak of Mount Longdon. To the south of 'Fly Half' Senior Lieutenant Enrique Eneas Neirotti's 3rd Platoon was placed. First Sergeant Raul Roberto Gonzalez's 2nd was placed to the north of Baldini and his platoon. The Argentinian command post and Lieutenant Hugo Aníbal Quiroga's engineer platoon which was acting as the local reserve were on 'Full Back', the eastern summit of Longdon. There was also a platoon of Marine Captain Sergio Andrés Dachary's Machine-Gun Company of 136 Marines which took an important part in nearly every major engagement until the end of the campaign. This 24-man platoon used their six Browning 12.7 mm machineguns protected by Marine riflemen, very effectively during the night of battle. Contrary to British reports, there were no 'Buzos Tacticos' or Army snipers from the 601st Commando Company present.

Major Carrizo-Salvadores would later be at special pains to explain that he did his best to arrange some measure of comfort for his men on Mount Longdon:{{cquote|We took good care of the personnel. We did what we could do to set an example. Captain Eduardo Lopez was there with the platoons, with news-updates and nougat bars. The soldiers had everything you can imagine in their kitbags, including thermos flasks and transistor radios. Some of the soldiers heard that the British had disembarked at San Carlos and captured Goose Green by tuning radios on to the BBC. In the mornings the soldiers had a mug of the green Guarani herb 'mate' which contains around the same amount of caffeine as a cup of coffee; it is stimulating and helps register a feeling of fullness. Meals were served in the open and consumed in mugs. I remember that mutton and pasta figured largely on the menu. There was a strict ration of one ratpack per man per week, eaten slowly to make it last.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120220160416/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm Mount Longdon: The Argentinian Story]</ref>}}

Sergeant Rolando Mario Spizuocco also refutes the charge that he left the 1st Platoon conscript to fend for themselves: ''"I saw to it that they were not cheated of their ratpacks, that they had chocolate bars, balaclavas and the best possible warm-up tents."''<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120220160416/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm Mount Longdon: The Argentinian Story]</ref>

Brigadier Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade and its supporting Parachute battalions, now had a firm footing on Mount Kent, an important position on the road to Stanley. For the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company, the initial contact came as a series of probing patrols. The Rasit ground surveillance radar operator, Sergeant Roque Antonio Nista, on the night of June 4–5, spotted a 3 PARA patrol northwest of Longdon. The 3rd Artillery Group artillerymen on Stanley's outskirts took up position and with the forward artillery observation officer (Lieutenant Alberto Rolando Ramos) on Mount Longdon correcting the artillery fire, the Parachute patrol abandoned the beaten zone.

On the night of June 8–9, Sergeant Nista operating the Rasit ground surveillance radar on the western end of Longdon detected the presence of 100 Paras and Royal Marine Commandos near Murrell River. Machinegun, mortar and artillery fire dispersed the British force that had planned to surprise the defenders on Mount Longdon and Two Sisters Mountain.<ref>''El mayor Carlos Carrizo Salvadores en Longdon dice: «La noche del 8 al 9, nuevamente el Sargento Nista (operador del radar) me informó sobre la presencia del enemigo, quien estaba ubicado en el mismo lugar que la vez anterior, pero ahora, separados en grupos: a 1.500 m el primero, 2.000 m el segundo, 3.000 m el tercero y 4.000 m el cuarto, tomadas estas distancias desde la posición del radar''. Martín Antonio Balza, Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, p. 80, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref><ref>''It was unfortunate that the previous night's patrol carried out by two troops, one each from Z and Y Companies, had been forced back by a heavy artillery barrage.'' The Falklands War: The Day by Day Record from Invasion to Victory, p. 314, Marshall Cavendish Limited, 1983</ref><ref>''On the evening of 8 June 3 PARA dispatched three large fighting patrols to Mount Longdon. Each comprised a half-platoon; one was accompanied by a guide from D (Patrols) Company and the other two by Falklands islanders Terry Peck and Vernon Steen. The patrols' mission was to locate suitable approaches to the objective and to test enemy reactions to probing. Unfortunately, however, the combination of a fine night and bright moonlight prevented them from penetrating enemy positions." Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War, David Reynolds, p. 179, Sutton, 2002</ref><ref>''But perhaps his greatest single asset was the RASIT radar set, with which he could scan the countryside at night to reveal any hostile troop movement within several thousand metres. It proved extremely effective in pinpointing Para patrols as they probed the defences during the nights prior to the attack." The Last Eleven: Winners of the Victoria Cross since the Second World War, Mark Adkin, p. 196, Pen & Sword, 1991</ref>

The Mount Longdon defenders waited in a complex of bunkers. On the night of June 11, 3 PARA assaulted these bunkers and for the next 12 hours were involved in desperate close-quarter-combat and the Argentinians counterattacked them time and again. Instead of the hasty field fortifications that the Royal Marine Commandos faced on the 'Monte Caseros' Line, they came against a strongly entrenched company.

==Mount Longdon==

On June 10, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike gave his orders in the Regimental Headquarters at Estancia House for the attack on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. They were told to expect around 300 Argentinian soldiers from Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez's 7th 'La Plata' Mechanized Infantry Regiment defending the positions who were well dug in and provided with artillery cover from 18 Argentine 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from Lieutenant-Colonel Martín Antonio Balza's 3rd Artillery Group and a further 18 Oto Melaras near Government House from Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Alberto Quevedo's 4th Airborne Artillery Group. In addition, the area had been heavily mined. British sappers later counted 1,500 frozen anti-personnel mines on the western lower slopes of Mount Longdon. Miraculously all but two mines failed to detonate.<ref>[https://www.sunderlandecho.com/news/feature-sunderland-falklands-veterans-remember-the-battle-of-mount-longdon-1-4623600 Sunderland Falklands veterans remember the Battle of Mount Longdon]</ref>

At 2015 local time on Friday June 11, 1982, the 3rd Battalion (3 PARA) from the British Parachute Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike began to advance to Mount Longdon. At the same time, 42 Commando Battalion was advancing towards Mount Harriet, whilst 45 Commando Battalion was heading for Two Sisters Mountain. The objective of the night attack of June 11 were three rocky peaks in the area west of Port Stanley: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters Mountain and Mount Harriet.

Pike's plan was for Major Mike Argue, commanding 'B' Company, 3 PARA to capture Mount Longdon ('Fly Half' and 'Full Back') while Major David Collett's 'A' Company seized the hill running north ('Wing Forward'). 'C' Company would attack the hill north of the Argentinian Command Post, nicknamed 'Rough Diamond'. The apparent ease with which the British Paratroopers got right up to Mount Longdon was lost when Corporal Brian Milne of 4 Platoon 'B' Company stepped on an anti-personnel mine and this alerted the Argentinian 1st Platoon. Corporal Gustavo Osvaldo Pedemonte deployed one of the 7.62mm belt-fed machineguns higher up 'Fly Half', and he engaged the Paras, holding up the British advance. Only after an hour or two, perhaps more, a couple of Paras blasted his machinegun out of action in the darkness.

One Para nearly succeeded in bayoneting Marine Corporal Carlos Rafael Colemil, literally falling at the feet of the Argentinian NCO. The fighting was that close. Lieutenant Jonathan Shaw's 6 Platoon, tasked with clearing the southern half of Mount Longdon where First Lieutenant Neirotti's 3rd Platoon was located, for a time was on a roll with their successful battle against the Argentinian soldiers until a navigational error in a maze of rocks in the dark, left Shaw's advance shattered. In fact, it later transpired that 6 Platoon had run into a dead end among the boulders. It was here that 6 Platoon came under fire from half-a-dozen conscripts under Captain López, armed with automatic rifles, which fatally wounded four Paras in quick succession.

The fighting had now lasted for about an hour. It appeared that the attack on Longdon might be the only action of the night and Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, commander of the 10th 'Nicolás Levalle' Mechanized Infantry Brigade asked Lieutenant-Colonel David Ubaldo Comini for a company from the 3rd 'La Tablada' Mechanized Infantry Regiment with a major to help Carrizo-Salvadores to make a major counterattack on the British. The 3rd Regiment's 'A' Company (under Captain Rubén Oscar Zunino), overlooking Eliza Cove, was ordered to move in Unimog lorries to the foot of Mount Longdon. Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay, went with the company to take charge:{{cquote|We were in the Command Post when Jofre told Lieutenant-Colonel Comini to prepare A Company for a special mission and that he wanted an officer of at least 'jefe' rank to lead it. The Colonel said he could send two such officers; which one was to go? Jofre said to send the Operations Officer - that was me! I called the commander of A Company, which was our reserve company. He and I went to Stanley House where Jofre was. He showed me a map and told me that things were difficult and that he wanted me to take the company and go up to Tumbledown Mountain. A guide from the 5th Marines would then show us exactly where to place the company.

We were ready to move at about 3.00 a.m., but it was a very frosty morning, and a lot of the trucks we needed were soon in difficulties. Some found it hard to start; others were breaking down or had difficulty with the ground in the dark, and it took a long time to organize the convoy. We could hear the firing, away to the west, but could not see anything because it was too misty. The Colonel gave me his jeep, and we started to move out of Stanley on the road towards Moody Brook. But the road out of the town was steep, and the vehicles all started skidding. I told my driver to swing into the fence on the left, otherwise we would be in the sea. I heard the lorries behind us hitting each other. I ordered the men to get out of the lorries and be ready to march, but their boots were slipping as well, and that slowed us down. It was starting to get light by then, and as soon as we passed the last houses the British started shelling us. The men all took cover. That was the first time I had been under fire. After about five minutes the firing stopped, and we met the guide from the 5th Marines. I got the men moving again, and we got into
position just north and north-west of Tumbledown.<ref>The Fight for the Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War, Martin Middlebrook, pp. 244-245, Viking, 1989</ref>}}

Despite moving in all-terrain lorries, Captain Zunino's company took about 5 hours to cover just four miles. The 3rd Regiment had been conditioned to rely heavily on armoured personnel carriers to wage a war. Before long 2d Lieutenant Baldini and his platoon were surrounded by more than 100 Paras and he asked for assistance and Major Carrizo-Salvadores soon despatched the 1st Engineer Platoon under Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga.

Uptill 2130 local time the night of June 11 had been like many other nights for the Argentinians on Mount Longdon. Major Carlos Eduardo Carrizo-Salvadores:{{cquote|I recall that, that evening, with a small reciever, we were listening to the Mass that his Holiness the Pope was saying from the Basilica of Lujan. Just as he was giving the blessing - night had already closed in - the Platoon Commanders telephoned me to let me know that, apart from the shelling, there was nothing to report.

Through all the vivid events that week we knew that even with the efforts that had been made to achieve peace, the enemy attack was imminent and it would happen at any time. I therefore ordered all personnel to get ready for action, foreseeing necessary rest periods by reason of our having had a week of permanent readiness because of the events already related, and of what happened during the 4th and 8th days respectively. At about 2030 hours I got in touch with the Commanding Officer to tell him the latest developments up to that time. An hour later Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez called me, since a somewhat confused situation had arisen due to a message sent out by Lieutenant [Alberto Rolando] Ramos, who was my artillery forward observation officer - a message which never could be cleared up, because the officer was dying moments later occasioned by enemy fire [Lieutenant Alberto Ramos was the first to raise the alarm]. To obtain the greatest detail on what had happened I established telephone contact with Second Lieutenant Baldini, the 1st Platoon Commander and responsible for the western sector. It was 2200 hours. At that very moment an anti-personnel mine exploded to the northwest of the position and that in practice, marked the beginning of the action which would last until the following day.

When this latest event happened, Second Lieutenant Baldini told me that fighting was going on in his area of responsability, and furthermore, because fighting was also going on in his position, he informed me that he would call me later to transmit more details of what was happening there. Moments later he called me, telling me, that infiltration had occurred, and that it was very difficult to appreciate the real magnitude ... and at that point communication was broken off as a consequence of the impact of an enemy shell on the telephone wire.

On an alternative line belonging to the Marines, who came under my subsector, I re-established communication with Second Lieutenant Baldini who informed that the situation was grave, that the enemy was in great strength and that, in some sectors, hand-to-hand fighting was going on; that he intended to push them back to regain command of the situation. This was the last conversation I held with Second Lieutenant Baldini, as, when trying to carry out what he had told me, he fell mortally wounded. Through a later account when I was in the continent, I learned that the brave officer was killed when he was trying to take over a machinegun whose aimer had been put out of action. This weapon was important to the defence of the position. [Baldini was stripped off his boots by the Paras] Corporal Rios had the same luck when he tried to realise what the second lieutenant intended doing.Thus in a demonstration of fearlessness and courage, both offered up their lives to their country in the execution of their duty.<ref>The Other Side of the Hill, Hew Pike, p. 141, Pegasus: Journal of the Parachute Regiment, April 1988 Issue</ref>}}

Kneeling, Private Victor José Bruno from 1st Platoon fired a 7.62mm machinegun steadily but found the weapon jamming. Baldini took a knife to pry out the jammed belt, but seeing a group of Paras jump appear of the darkness, and charge him, he abandoned the machinegun and drew his sidearm. After several shots, aimed wildly, he needed to reload, but by then the Paras had shot him dead.

Carrizo-Salvadores made an official submission to the commander-in-chief of the Argentinian Army, Lieutenant-General Cristino Nicolaides, when the war was over recommending Baldini for the highest military decoration. He was in fact put up for the Heroic Valour Cross, the Argentinian equivalent of the British Victoria Cross and the 7th Regiment's officers and NCOs to a man believed he deserved it. But he was awarded the lesser decoration of the Gallantry in Combat Medal.

The Gallantry in Combat Medal also went to Sergeant Rolando Spizuocco who displayed great heroism by rescuing most of the 1st Platoon wounded conscripts in the forward tents and carrying them back through a nightmare of shot and shell to a place of safety.

Major Carrizo-Salvadores could hear shots where 1st Platoon was fighting but around his command bunker it was quiet. But as dawn arrived his command platoon was firing like mad. The local Argentinian reserve in the form of a platoon of engineers under Lieutenant Hugo Aníbal Quiroga had reinforced 3rd Platoon and were all the time shooting at any one that moved forward.<ref>[https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ejercito/malvinas/defensa/montelongdon Hasta el último hombre – Combate de Monte Longdon]</ref>Lance-Corporal James Murdoch was mortally wounded, and Private Stewart Laing went forward to drag him into safety, he in turn also being mortally wounded by the engineers using head-mounted nightsights. Under increasing pressure from Quiroga, the British in the southern sector pulled back.

On the northern sector, a marine heavy machinegun position was causing considerable problems for Lieutenant Ian Bickerdicke's No. 4 Platoon who took the brunt of the enemy fire, with several killed and wounded, including the platoon commander and platoon sergeant Ian McKay. It was whilst attempting to destroy this position with a hand grenade that McKay was killed in action. Sergeant-Major Sammy Dougherty, was first to reach Ian. In 2012, he revealed: ''"Ian’s right hand had practically gone. He must have had a grenade in his hand and been shot and killed before releasing it."''<ref>[https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/the-falklands-untold-story-of-the-hero-para-795309 McKay VC: Untold story of the hero Para who sacrificed his life to help free the Falklands... and earned the last Victoria Cross of the 20th Century]</ref> For his act Sergeant McKay was awarded the [[Victoria Cross]]. Sergeant Des Fuller, therefore, took command of the remnants of 4 Platoon and moved forward to attack the Marine heavy machine gun position on the northern slopes. Unfortunately the enemy heavy machine-gun wasn't knocked out.

A heavy bombardment now fell on 1st Platoon, and shortly before 0130 on June 12, 4 and 5 Platoons had forced their way between 2d Lieutenant Baldini's men and the Marine Corps machine-gunners and riflemen present.

As Major Mike Argue's 4 and 5 Platoons moved over the top of 'Fly Half' on to more open ground sloping away to 'Full Back', however, they were counterattacked by Senior Lieutenant Raúl Fernando Castañeda's 1st Platoon of 'C' Company 7th Regiment, which had just arrived to reinforce the positions there. Back in the main 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters, Brigadier Julian Thompson, could see it was going to be a very long night. Meanwhile, 'A' Company commanded by Major David Collett, was on 'Wing Forward', the subsidiary hill north of 'Fly Half', and came under accurate rifle and automatic fire as it advanced along a series of peat banks. One member of the company, Private Timothy Jenkins was killed and Corporal Stephen Hope was seriously wounded, and would die many hours later. It later transpired that Castañeda's platoon had had head-mounted night sights issued when ordered to move up Mount Longdon. Castañeda―later promoted to full colonel in the 1990s―found Private Leonardo Rondi a most inspiring soldier. Private Leonardo Hector Rondi seeing the radio operator die in the course of his duties, jumped into the middle of the fray and began organizing the defences of the platoon, running to the rifle sections, dodging enemy groups, to report to the section commanders on the fighting. Rondi seemed to be everywhere, using his rifle and hand grenades at close quarters and caring for the wounded. For his bravery he was awarded a Gallantry in Combat Medal.

The reservists in Castañeda's platoon all knew each other well. Having been conscripted from the Lanus and Bandfield suburbs of Buenos Aires, many of the conscripts indulged a taste for Hollywood action movies and American swearing. This 46-man platoon, came in at the critical moment and showed themselves to be willing to fight at close quarters. The platoon fought bitterly on the northern sector of Mount Longdon and not altogether without success. Castañeda's men made grenade and bayonet attacks on the advancing British Paratroopers, compelling them to eventually withdraw after 2 hours of brutal boulder-to-boulder fighting.<ref>"Under covering fire, Numbers 4 and 5 Platoons, withdrew, but another man was killed and others wounded in the process." Para!: Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment, Peter Harclerode, p. 354, Brian Trodd, Arms & Armour Press, 1992</ref>

It was almost 0530 local time before the fighting resumed. Major Argue now dispatched the remnants of 4 and 5 Platoons commanded by Lieutenant Mark Cox, to carry out a flanking attack from the north, but this proved unsuccessful as Castañeda and his platoon had the approach well covered. As soon as Private Horacio Alejandro Cañeque saw the remnants of 4 and 5 Platoons advancing towards Major Carrizo-Salvadores' command bunker he was out in a flash firing like mad and started to shout insults to the Paras in English. The Argentinian fire was very accurate and Private John Crow was killed.

At that point Lieutenant-Colonel Pike, on learning of the situation ordered 'A' Company to take 'Full Back'. Major David Collett soon encountered strong opposition from the Argentinians, particularly at the command post of Carrizo-Salvadores where the second-in-command of the 7th Regiment was asking for reinforcements.

The battle was now approaching its closing stages. Major Carrizo-Salvadores told Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre in Stanley House that he wished to arrange a truce with the British for the evacuation of all the wounded, but despite this the conscripts around him vowed that that they would rather shoot it out to the bitter end.

By now Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike had brought Sergeant Graham Colbeck, the man in charge of the Anti-Tank Platoon to the western summit of Longdon. It was here at the Argentinian command post that Private Horacio Alejandro Cañeque had a lucky escape. Suddenly there was a blast that sent him tumbling spreadeagled into the ground. ''"Best guess was that it was a Milan"'', said Cañeque, remembering. Private Fernando Gabriel Magno could see through his night sight 3 PARA's Machine-Gun Platoon in position. He began spotting targets and relaying the position to Private Ricardo Rosas and Corporal Oscar Rafael Mussi and they grabbed a machinegun and opened up on the summit.

On the summit was Lance-Corporal Vincent Bramley, firing. The Paras' Milan teams on 'Fly Half' were bringing down fire on the Argentinian command post and Castañeda called up Corporal Manuel Adan Medina to deal with the Milan platoon. Medina of Castañeda's platoon, who was later awarded the Gallantry in Combat Medal, personally hunted down an Argentinian Czekalski 105 millimetre anti-tank gun and he knocked out one Milan team with a direct hit at approximately 0600 local time.

At the time another rifle platoon from the 7th Regiment's 'A' Company on 'Apple Pie' was on standby in reserve. There was no evidence of hesitancy or lack of aggression when they were called into the fight. But Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, in a decision that has been argued ever since, cancelled the move. This fresh platoon could have made such a difference, and even turned the battle.

In the first glimmer of dawn Major Collett's company resumed its advance. The Paras got very close to the Argentine command post and the second in command of the 7th Regiment was ordered to conduct a fighting withdrawal, but despite this Major Carrizo-Salvadores refused to give in, and it was not until 0632 that morning that he abandoned his command post and the surviving defenders escaped under cover of mist.

As A Company was clearing the final positions, Corporal Stewart McLaughlin was wounded by a Czekalski recoilless rifle round fired from the 7th Regiment's Reconnaissance Platoon under 2d Lt Francisco Ramón Galíndez-Matienzo on 'Rough Diamond', McLaughlin was subsequently killed by a mortar bomb fired from the 7th Regiment's Company on Wireless Ridge as he made his way to the British aid post.

Mount Longdon was secure by 09.30 am on June 12. By this time, 3 PARA had been fighting for 12 hours and they would remain under heavy fire for a further 48 hours from Marine Artillery Observation Officers and Mortar Fire Controllers (MFCs) on Mount Tumbledown. During this period an additional four British Paratroopers were killed in action and several more wounded or injured.

The Argentinians lost thirty-one dead, 120 wounded and fifty prisoners. The night battle, previous patrol actions and retaliatory artillery bombardment cost 3 PARA 23 killed and about 70 wounded.<ref>''"We'd lost something like twenty-two guys up to that point, dead, but three times more than that were wounded."'' Bloody Hell: The Price Soldiers Pay, Daniel Hallock, pg. 60, Plough Publishing House, 1999</ref><ref>''"Our battalion had lost twenty-three men there, with more than sixty wounded."'' Forward Into Hell, Vincent Bramley, John Blake Publishing</ref>

The failure on the part of 3 PARA's C Company to secure the nearby 'Rough Diamond' strongpoint, was not considered too serious. Brigadier Julian Thompson has written that:{{cquote|A feature north-east of Longdon thought to be held by 3 Para seemed to be occupied by the enemy. A short altercation took place between 2 and 3 Para about who did hold the feature and was settled by 2 Para having it comprehensively shelled without complaint from 3 Para.<ref>Ready for Anything: The Parachute Regiment at War, Julian Thompson, p. 452, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1989</ref>}}

Several Paras unwilling to believe that the Argentinian conscripts could be capable of fighting so fiercely thought the Argentinians might have hired American mercenaries in the form of Vietnam Veterans. 19-year-old Private Grant Grinham, badly wounded in the action, in an interview with the ''Leicester Mercury'' in 2017, reported that the Argentinian conscripts had indeed fought well:{{cquote|Those Argentinian lads on Mount Longdon fought their hearts out. They were determined defenders. The battle was in the balance. We fought for every inch of ground. The Heavy Machine Gunners were regular Marines and their confidence was high. They were armed with .50-cal machine guns which would stop a car, and were well up for the fight. They're a big heavy weapon, mostly used in an anti-aircraft role. It was a formidable defensive weapon for us to engage. They also had snipers all along Mount Longdon who were very accurate. They had night sights and were far superior to anything we had - contrary to reports. It was a very difficult battle.<ref>[http://www.leicestermercury.co.uk/the-falklands-war-paratrooper-lost-a-leg-and-saw-friends-killed-but-would-do-it-all-again/story-30241617-detail/story.html The Falklands War: Paratrooper 'lost a leg and saw friends killed but would do it all again']</ref>}}

Kenneth M. Pollack, former CIA intelligence officer and expert on military affairs, in his research of the Falklands War concluded:{{cquote|Despite the unfavorable force ratio, the Argentine defenders were clever and active and had fortified their positions well. They forced the British to advance through a narrow killing zone, ambushing and counterattacking the Paras repeatedly, and inflicting heavy casualties on them. Eventually, the British took the position only by employing Milans, LAWs, artillery and mortars.<ref>Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness, By Kenneth M. Pollack, p. 212, Oxford University Press, 2019</ref>}}

In a fine soldier's tribute to the men he commanded in the Falklands, Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores wrote:{{cquote|I can say that I have seen young men of 20 carry out their duty beyond the call of duty, exposing their lives regardless of the cold, the rain or the gunfire. And that was general among those who occupied the frontlines, just as it was among the stretcher bearers, medics and medical orderlies who ran into the middle of the explosions in order to save the life of a wounded comrade, and among the soldiers of the Command Platoon [Private Horacio Caneque, Private Carlos Connell, Private Fernando Magno, Private Luis Cunningham, Private Gabriel Crespo, Private Daniel Cesar Maltagliatti and Private Ricardo Rosas] who in the middle of the bombardment, went out to repair the telephone lines so that my Command Post could keep in touch with the frontline troops whenever an artillery shell cut those wires.<ref>The Other Side of the Hill, Hew Pike, p. 141, Pegasus: Journal of the Parachute Regiment, April 1988 Issue</ref>}}

==Wireless Ridge==

Briefly under command of Brigadier Tony Wilon's 5 Infantry Brigade, elements of 2 PARA conducted a helicopter insertion deep behind forward [[Argentinian Army]] Special Forces patrols and [[Argentinian Air Force]]'s Observation Posts (OPs) on June 2. They liberated the settlements of Bluff Cove and Fitzroy, opening a southern flank of operations.

On the morning of June 12, it became clear that the attacks on Mount Longdon had been successful. 2 PARA marched around the back of Longdon to take up their positions for the assault on Wireless Ridge. As the action was expected to be concluded quickly, they took only their weapons and as much ammunition as possible, leaving most other gear behind in the camp. On Bluff Cove Peak, the 2 PARA's mortars and heavy machine guns were attacked by Argentinian A-4 Skyhawks, which delayed their planned move forward, although the British paratroopers suffered no casualties.

On the night of June 13/14, 2 PARA deployed 3 PARA and, supported by British light tanks and [[Royal Navy warships]], attacked Wireless Ridge. During the attack British artillery fired 6,000 rounds with their 105 mm guns and as the British Paratroopers began their final push, they were further backed by naval fire and the 76mm and 30mm guns mounted on the light tanks.<ref>«During the course of the battle British field artillery pumped 6,000 105mm shells onto Wireless Ridge, while two frigates lobbed about 600 4.5in shells on to the eastern slopes.» The Falklands War 1982, Duncan Anderson, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014</ref>After their heavy losses at Goose Green, the Paras were taking no chances.

By the time 2 PARA reached their first objective, 'Rough Diamond', the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's C Company survivors under Company Sergeant-Major Raúl Esteban Ibáñez<ref>[http://www.lavoz.com.ar/malvinas/intimidades-batalla-final Intimidades de la batalla final]</ref> had withdrawn. As a result, A and B Companies were convinced the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's A Company on the 'Apple Pie' objective had been defeated, and began to advance confidently, but they encountered heavy fire when they left their trenches. It later emerged that Private Roberto Arturo Sañisky had been instrumental in rousing the exhausted conscripts sheltering from the British bombardment.<ref>Malvinas: La guerra íntima (2005 TV Documentary directed by Ricardo Kon)</ref> With the Argentinian conscripts manning the defences on 'Apple Pie', the British Paratroopers retreated back to their positions and ordered massive retaliation from the British machine-gunners and the guns of the 'Blues and Royals' light tanks. As a result, 'A' and 'B' Companies were able to advance again and this time take 'Apple Pie'.

Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company then began the final assault from the western end of Wireless Ridge, under the cover of heavy fire from the British warship HMS 'Ambuscade', the light tanks, twelve 105 mm artillery pieces, several mortars and anti-tank rockets.

In spite of the British Artillery's sustained barrage the remaining Argentinians put up resistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez had now barely 100 men left, including a signals platoon under the wounded Senior Lieutenant Jorge Alberto Guidobono. The signallers were ordered to prepare for hand-to-hand combat. Guidobono shouted encouragement to his men. The signallers fought in little groups from boulders, shooting at enemy flashes.

'D' Company took the first half of the objective after a hard fight with Guidobono's signallers and 30 Argentinian paratroopers (armed with ten 7.62 mm belt-fed machine-guns) under 2d Lieutenant Gustavo Alberto Aimar (wounded in action) from the Córdoba-based 2nd 'General Balcarce' Airborne Infantry Regiment<ref>«...habian llegado la noche anterior. Una sección de ametralladoras no es un elemento que figure en las organizaciones comunes, fue constituido a propósito para esta oportunidad: eran 30 hombres con diez ametralladoras. La puse a disposición de Jofre para reforzar el 7.» Malvinas: Testimonio de Su Gobernador, Mario Benjamín Menéndez, Carlos M. Túrolo, p. 278, Editorial Sudamericana, 1983 </ref>that had arrived in a Hercules C-130 transport on the night of June 11-12th.<ref>«In believing that Menendez could hold out for at least ten days and since the Air Bridge was still open, the Joint Operations Group authorized the continued piecemeal reinforcement of Army Group Falklands with the despatch of 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment. The weather and the speed of the British advance prevented its full deployment and only a platoon arrived in time to join 7th Infantry Regiment on Wireless Ridge.» Nine Battles to Stanley, Nick van der Bijl, p. 224, Leo Cooper, 1999</ref>Private Guillermo Alberto Vélez recalls:{{cquote|They were guys from Córdoba, they had just arrived in the islands from Comodoro Rivadavia ... they had never heard a bomb, and they had been put there, in the middle of hell. We, theoretically, were going to receive, by radio, the orders. There were two signals, one to attack, and another to retreat, but in the middle of that mess we never received any order. We could not hear anything other than the bombs ... The A, B and C companies of the 7th had already retreated and we, as a result, ended up being the front line ... We were doing what we could; We could barely protect ourselves and occasionally answer the fire. We joined together in groups, and in front of us placed a defence line of MAG machine guns."<ref>Crónica Documental de las Malvinas: Testimonios y Documentos de la Guerra, Hugo Gambini, P. 885, Biblioteca de Redacción, 1982</ref>}}

At about 06.00 local time on June 14, Guidobono's signallers and Aimar's paratroopers were hit by a company-sized attack. The Argentinian paratroopers communicated to he signallers that the British were about to get up and charge. Then with a hallow roar of a football crowd they were on the Argentinian defenders. The rest was confusion. The British Paras were moving as close as possible to the Argentinians to avoid the Argentinian Artillery fire. Preceded by a field artillery and naval bombardment, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company, after suffering its ninth and last dead (Private Francis Slough) in the Falklands War, broke the ring of steel around Lieutenant-Colonel Giménez's command bunker. The Argentinian platoon of paratroopers, although nearly having lost half its strength captured or wounded/injured, moved back grudgingly.

Soon there was a lot of action going above and around Moody Brook. Major Oscar Ramón Jaimet's 'B' Company, from the 6th 'Mercedes' Mechanized Infantry Regiment, on the northern slopes of Tumbledown Mountain, were busy shooting at Major Philip Neame's men, and them too, shooting back at the Argentinians.

Argentinian artillery responded vigorously and the Argentinian Land Forces Commander, Brigadier-General [[Oscar Luis Jofré]] sent Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay's A Company west of Stanley Racecourse to counterattack. Private Horacio Javier Benítez:{{cquote| I was behind a rock. They were shooting at me. Under the light of the star-shell I saw this guy and I shot at him. He must have been hit because I poured a whole magazine into him and he fell. But others were coming at me. I kept on shooting but they kept coming. Some who fell got up again and kept charging on, shooting at us. By this time they were all around me ... A sergeant was wounded. He shouted that he had been hit in the stomach. Another soldier was crying out for help but you couldn't help him. A grenade fell near him and it lifted him up in the air and he fell down again. He stood up and shouted: I'm hit, and he was swearing but he was still walking. He went round several soldiers and to one he said: I'm leaving you my rifle and to another: I'm leaving you my magazine, and then he started shouting: I'm leaving, I'm leaving, I'm leaving as if it was all over. As he was walking away he was hit by a phosphorus grenade; his clothes caught fire and he started screaming. But he was also lighting up our positions because he was like a human torch and we were waving him away so that he wouldn't show up our positions in the dark. At that moment we were not really interested whether he died or not. I had eight magazines with me but I had just run out of ammunition and had used all my grenades. I wasn't thinking straight any longer. The only thought in my head was to grab more ammunition and continue fighting. Something was forcing me to do it. Perhaps deep down I was even enjoying it because that's a primal instinct. I found more ammunition but as I was reloading I saw an English soldier in front of me. As I lifted my rifle I was shot in the head. I seemed to fall in slow motion. I was left there. The shot had been deflected by the helmet and had hit me in the neck. I couldn't move my head but I could still think. I can remember wondering whether I still had my arms. I tried to move my legs and I realised I had all my limbs. I thought: I'm alive. I tried to crawl back. I couldn't stand ... Finally I passed out because I had lost so much blood. I couldn't move but I could still think. When we reached the command post they told the captain: Here's Benitez - he's dead. They wrapped me up in a blanket and put me on top of a pile of corpses. A sergeant came along, he was writing down the names of the dead. He was crying. I must have blinked or moved or something because he realised I was still alive. He pulled me out, they gave me some morphine and took me to hospital.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 189, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>}}

According to Private Patricio Gustavo Pérez:{{cquote| I was carrying two rifles and I noticed that there was a sniper who was pinning me down. I wanted to come out of the rock and kill him but I couldn't because the firing was so intense. At that moment I heard somebody shout that he had seen the sniper. I came out, saw that he was leaning over the rock and shot at him and his gun fell silent. I saw him fall but I don't know whether he was wounded or dead. That kind of combat among the rocks is like a Western, but it all happens so fast that you don't quite realise what is going on ... What I felt at that moment was mostly hatred. I wanted revenge. I had forgotten fear by then, what sort of risk I was taking; the only thing I wanted to do, my obsession, was to avenge my fallen comrades. Whenever I saw one of my friends hit it was worse, it just made me want to continue fighting, it didn't matter for how long or at what cost. I didn't care about death at that time, the main thing was revenge ... We sent the wounded down and returned to the battle and fought on for four hours. Luckily after the surrender I found out that Horacio had survived. People greeted the surrender with relief. They were all crying. That wasn't how I reacted. I had been fighting for many hours and I was not prepared to give up my rifle until forced to do so. It's different for those who had been in actual combat. I couldn't give my rifle back until they took it away from me, and when I did give it back I made sure it was completely unusable.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 192, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>}}

Private Graham Carter of 'D' Company, 2 PARA, came within a whisker of death in this close-quarter battle:{{cquote|I had a bullet bounce off my helmet, then when our artillery shells came in on us, one landed 15 feet away-but thankfully was a dud. It could have killed at least three of us.<ref>The scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 325, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Major Neame's officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui (wounded in action) and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez (wounded in action) having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.

At dawn, another platoon of Argentinian conscripts under Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores attacked 2 PARA's 'D' Company, but were driven off with the help of mortars and British Artillery. Private Gabriel Ricardo Sagastume from the 7th Regiment's A Company recalls:{{cquote|Coming down from Moody Brook we found Carrizo, who wanted to recover that position. We had walked through the ruins of the barracks, bombarded by the English, and we knew that it was impossible to take it again. In those circumstances, Carrizo grouped us, asked what weapons we had and in what conditions they were in and ordered us to follow him to climb the hill. A few meters from the start-line projectiles of all caliber were raining all around us. We fell back, almost in complete disorder.<ref>[https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-230881-2013-10-09.html El cobarde Carrizo]</ref>}}

2 PARA had suffered three dead and 11 wounded. Four of the paratroopers on the mortar line also required CASEVAC (evacuation of casualties by air), having broken their ankles. The Argentinians suffered approximately 25 dead and about 125 wounded, about 50 were taken prisoner. In the final stages of the battle, the Argentinian commander, Brigadier-General Jofré had been offered the use of Skyhawks to bomb Wireless Ridge with napalm but he declined, believing that the British response would be equally violent and the chances of a surrender being accepted, non-existent.

==Cortley Ridge==

The Special Air Service, along with men from the Special Boat Squadron, attempted to carry out a diversionary amphibious raid on Cortley Ridge on the night of June 13. The plan was, as 2 PARA attacked Wireless Ridge, 4 rigid raiders, piloted by Royal Marines and carrying SAS soldiers (15 men from D Squadron) and 6 SBS men (No. 3 Section) would speed across Stanley Harbour and attack the oil storage facilities. The assault force was illuminated by a spotlight on the Argentinian hospital ship 'Almirante Irizar' before it could reach its objective. A massive volley of fire from the 101st Anti Aircraft Artillery Regiment's B Company (under Major Jorge Alberto Monge) arced down onto the SAS/SBS force from positions along the shore, causing the raiding party to withdraw. The Rigid Raiders were badly shot up and abandoned, but miraculously none of the men involved had been killed.

The wisdom of this attack was later questioned as it was seen by some as a reckless operation with little strategic benefit.

==Aftermath==

The Battles of Mount Longdon, Wireless Ridge and Cortley Ridge cost the British 1st Parachute Regiment and supporting Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Squadron (SBS) 26 dead and 85 wounded. Argentinean casualties were fifty-six killed, 245 wounded a 100 taken prisoner.

==References==
{{reflist}}

[[Category:War]]
[[Category:Argentina]]
[[Category:British History]]
[[Category:1980s]]