Conservapedia - User contributions [en]

Fabio Grobart

2008-07-21T20:19:10Z

Jigue: Charged with black division of Cuban communist party

{{merge|Cuba}}

Fabio Grobart (Abraham (Yunger) Semjovitch,), was starting from about 1924 to well into the Castro regime, the principal communist agent in Cuba. He was a founding member of the (Stalinist) Cuban Communist Party. Generally considered the principal Stalinist Agent in Cubam and was said charged with the "black" (covert) section of the Cuban communist party.<ref>Alexander, Robert Jackson 2002 A History of Organized Labor in Cuba, Praeger Publishers ISBN-10 027597703X
ISBN-13: 978-0275977030 on Page 109: "Louis (B.) Serrano Tamayo, a one time Communist trade union leader in Oriente Province, who after 1940 became and Auténtico and ultimately became a secretary general of the Tobacco Workers Federation, claimed that the change in name (to Partido Socialista Popular L.D) did not change the nature of the Cuban communist Party. He argued that the Popular Socialist Party existed for “electoral purposes: and that “anyone could join it,” while there continued to exist a clandestine Partido Comunista de Cuba, headed like the PSP by Blas Roca as secretary general, in which Fabio Grobart, a European who did not become a Cuban citizen, played a major role. It was the clandestine party that in fact determined the policies of the legal one."
</ref> He was expelled from Cuba several times,<ref>Garcia Montes, Jorge and Antonio Alonso Avila, 1970 Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba Ediciones Universal, 1970, Miami p. 116 Free translation: XII Deportion of Fabio
Grobart and Dora Vainstock. Fabio Grobart and Dora Vainstock had been arrested several times (towards the end of Machado rule) on charges of conspiracy against the constitutional order. For one reason or the other the Cuban courts had freed them. This situation went on until the government decided to expel them. On October first 1932 both were placed on the Holand American Line Steam vessel Leederman, which took them to Holand. Dora Vainstock was only out of Cuba for a few months. As soon as she arrived in Europe she went to Paris. In Paris she obtained a irregular Cuban passport which she obtained through the “cultivation” of sexual intimacy with the son of an important person in the Machado cabinet (other sources mention Ricardo Herrera, former secretary of state and then Minister, e.g. Ambassador of Cuba in Paris) She left for Cuba arriving in March of 1933 (before Machado fell). Fabio Grobart remained out of Cuba until after Machado was forced to leave Cuba.
</ref> but returned to Cuba early in 1959 said to be at the request of [[Raul Castro]] and Ernesto [[Che Guevara]]. He is believed to have advised [[Fidel Castro]] on the means and methods of achieving absolute and lifetime power. Grobart died 1994 <ref>Times staff 1994 (accessed 3-19-08) Fabio Grobart, Veteran Cuban Communist, 89. New York Times October 24, 1994 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D01E0D8173FF937A15753C1A962958260 Fabio Grobart, a founder of Cuba's Communist Party, has died, state news organizations reported. He was 89 years old.
The report from the state news agency A.I.N. did not say when he died or the cause of death, but it said he was buried on Saturday. Mr. Grobart, who emigrated from Poland to Cuba when he was 19, was a founding member of the Cuban Communist Party in 1925. At one time he owned a tailor shop in Havana. In the years after the 1959 revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power, Mr. Grobart served on the party's Central Committee and as a member of Parliament. In his later years he was considered the party's historian. In the 1960's he was listed as a director of the influential magazine Cuba Socialista and was considered a top planner in guiding Cuba's revolution ideologically. </ref>

Fabio Grobart

2008-07-20T15:49:27Z

Jigue: another reference

{{merge|Cuba}}

Fabio Grobart (Abraham (Yunger) Semjovitch,), was starting from about 1924 to well into the Castro regime, the principal communist agent in Cuba. He was a founding member of the (Stalinist) Cuban Communist Party. Generally considered the principal Stalinist Agent in Cuba. He was expelled from Cuba several times,<ref>Garcia Montes, Jorge and Antonio Alonso Avila, 1970 Historia del Partido Comunista de Cuba Ediciones Universal, 1970, Miami p. 116 Free translation: XII Deportion of Fabio
Grobart and Dora Vainstock. Fabio Grobart and Dora Vainstock had been arrested several times (towards the end of Machado rule) on charges of conspiracy against the constitutional order. For one reason or the other the Cuban courts had freed them. This situation went on until the government decided to expel them. On October first 1932 both were placed on the Holand American Line Steam vessel Leederman, which took them to Holand. Dora Vainstock was only out of Cuba for a few months. As soon as she arrived in Europe she went to Paris. In Paris she obtained a irregular Cuban passport which she obtained through the “cultivation” of sexual intimacy with the son of an important person in the Machado cabinet (other sources mention Ricardo Herrera, former secretary of state and then Minister, e.g. Ambassador of Cuba in Paris) She left for Cuba arriving in March of 1933 (before Machado fell). Fabio Grobart remained out of Cuba until after Machado was forced to leave Cuba.
</ref> but returned to Cuba early in 1959 said to be at the request of [[Raul Castro]] and Ernesto [[Che Guevara]]. He is believed to have advised [[Fidel Castro]] on the means and methods of achieving absolute and lifetime power. Grobart died 1994 <ref>Times staff 1994 (accessed 3-19-08) Fabio Grobart, Veteran Cuban Communist, 89. New York Times October 24, 1994 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D01E0D8173FF937A15753C1A962958260

Fabio Grobart, a founder of Cuba's Communist Party, has died, state news organizations reported. He was 89 years old.

The report from the state news agency A.I.N. did not say when he died or the cause of death, but it said he was buried on Saturday.

Mr. Grobart, who emigrated from Poland to Cuba when he was 19, was a founding member of the Cuban Communist Party in 1925. At one time he owned a tailor shop in Havana.

In the years after the 1959 revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power, Mr. Grobart served on the party's Central Committee and as a member of Parliament. In his later years he was considered the party's historian.

In the 1960's he was listed as a director of the influential magazine Cuba Socialista and was considered a top planner in guiding Cuba's revolution ideologically.
</ref>

Talk:Fabio Grobart

2008-07-20T15:45:46Z

Jigue:

In my opinion Fabio Grobart should have link in the Cuban page, but a full and separate bio. El Jigue 7-20-06

Have inserted a few details excerpted from an exhaustive study in progress. Tell me what else you need. El Jigue 7-20-08

Fabio Grobart

2008-07-20T15:41:03Z

Jigue: Tune Obit inserted as reference

Talk:Fabio Grobart

2008-07-20T15:29:17Z

Jigue: New page: In my opinion Fabio Grobart should have link in the Cuban page, but a full and separate bio. El Jigue 7-20-06

In my opinion Fabio Grobart should have link in the Cuban page, but a full and separate bio. El Jigue 7-20-06

Fabio Grobart

2008-07-20T15:27:31Z

Jigue: A few details

Cuba

2008-07-17T16:56:08Z

Jigue: /* Economy */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
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|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
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|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==

Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino]] nations such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce. Labor is an economic input that is entirely under the control of the government to the point that Cubans have been sent overseas, so that their labor can be used to repay debt, while workers are kept secluded and paid a typical Cuban wage of $18 a month.<ref>Robles, Frances 2008 (accessed 7-8-08) Cuba paid debts with forced labor, lawsuit says. Miami Herald Thu, Jul. 17, 2008 http://www.miamiherald.com/business/story/607434.html </ref>

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-17T15:51:47Z

Jigue: /* Economy */ syntax correction

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|tld =
}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==

Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino]] nations such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce. Labor is an economic input that is entirely under the control of the government to the point that Cubans have been sent overseas, so that their labor can be used to repay debt, while workers are kept in secluded and paid a typical Cuban wage of $18 a month.<ref>Robles, Frances 2008 (accessed 7-8-08) Cuba paid debts with forced labor, lawsuit says. Miami Herald Thu, Jul. 17, 2008 http://www.miamiherald.com/business/story/607434.html </ref>

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-17T15:49:10Z

Jigue: /* Economy */ Labor relations

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==

Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino]] nations such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce. Labor is an economic input that is entirely under the control of the government to the point that Cubans have been sent overseas, so that their labor can be used to repay debt, while workers are, kept in guarded barracks and paid Cuban style at $18 a month.<ref>Robles, Frances 2008 (accesed 7-8-08) Cuba paid debts with forced labor, lawsuit says. Miami Herald Thu, Jul. 17, 2008 http://www.miamiherald.com/business/story/607434.html </ref>

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T19:03:53Z

Jigue: /* People and Religion */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==

Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino]] nations such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:59:29Z

Jigue: /* People and Religion */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==

Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino nations]] such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:57:36Z

Jigue: /* People and Religion */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
|tld =
}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. Recent [[mitochondrial DNA]] evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino nations]] such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:56:10Z

Jigue: /* People and Religion */ Neo-taino contributions to population

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
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|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. REcen mitochondrial DNA evidence indicates that genetic contributions of peoples of the [[neo-Taino nations]] such as the Siboney, is not negligible. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:51:07Z

Jigue: /* 1912 Race War */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
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|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
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|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
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|language =Spanish
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
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|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accounts, was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:43:03Z

Jigue: /* Batista's coup */ technical correction this was Batista's second coup

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
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|language =Spanish
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's March 10th 1952 coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:39:44Z

Jigue: /* Cuba 1924-1933 */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
|tld =
}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===Cuba 1933-1940===

This is commonly considered to the time of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship, in which he supressed
most opposition; however the Cuban communist party arrived a modus vivendi, with his government.

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:36:27Z

Jigue: /* Cuba 1924-1933 */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
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|language =Spanish
|king =
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters were [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:35:30Z

Jigue: /* Cuba 1924-1933 */

{{Country
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|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
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|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
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|language =Spanish
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
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|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
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'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters are [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref> in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:34:42Z

Jigue: /* Cuba 1924-1933 */

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
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|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters are [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mentioning that this expedition, which had been funed and planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York," had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959</ref>in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-16T18:28:25Z

Jigue: /* Cuba 1924-1933 */ Ceja del Negro and Gibara

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
|tld =
}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans (lead by Independence general and ex-expresident Mario G. Menocal and others; however, they were defeated in 1931 primarily due to informants (said by some to have included the Cuban communist party) and the employment of government aviation. The principal encounters are [[Ceja del Negro]]<ref>Time staff, 1931 War for Machado. Time Aug, 24 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,752982,00.html?promoid=googlep </ref> in Western Cuba and [[Gibara]] <ref>Time staff, 1931 Gibara Time Aug, 31 1931 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,929773,00.html This account is somewhat superficial, and avoids mention that this expedition, which had been planned by the mainly conservative menocalist "Junta de New York", had been in essence hijacked by marxist activistm who proved more adept at betrayal and take over than at military strategy. The leftist leadership refused to follow the advice of Menocalist veteran Manuel Balan whose forces included a young Cornelio Rojas "the man with the hat" who would die so bravely in front of Che Guevara's execution squads in January 1959 </ref>in Eastern Cuba. After the defeat of the old Independence fighters other groups formed covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Neo-Taino

2008-07-11T14:48:51Z

Jigue: /* neo-Taíno nations */ List and brief description of each nation

=neo-Taíno nations=

One way of looking at the diverse nations of the Caribbean, is to view it as rooted in two ethnic groups: The [[Arawak]] (from aruaco the eaters of yuca meal the name given to them by the Caribs) and the [[Carib]] (in Arawak myth the children of the rotten anaconda). The Arawak may be subdivided into two groups the main land Arawak, and the Island Arawak or Taino. If one considers the high Taino to be limited to island [[Arawak]] who resided in Puerto-Rico, then the indigenous Taíno nations were found in Cuba, the Lucaya of the Bahamas, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent from Haiti and Quisqueya (approximately the Dominican Republic) can be referred to as neo-Taíno nations.

‘’’Ciboney’’’ (or Siboney) Cuba

‘‘’Ciguayo’’’ from ‘Quisqueya’ now the Dominican Republic <ref> Wilson, 1990</ref>) circa 1500 AD this was the kingdom Cacigazgo of Cacique Guacangarí. Language and customs differed from high Taíno who lived on the eastern part of the same island of Hispaniola.

‘’’Lucaya’’’ were from what was Bimini and now are islands of the Bahamas. Also lived in the small Jardines de la Reina islands south and close to Cuba from here they raided the main island of Cuba. Cuban neo-Taíno leader Cacique Bayamo and Spanish Conquistador Diego Velaquez united to drive them out.

‘’’Macorix’’ Also from Quisquaya and now the Dominican Republic. They used a language aid mutually unintelligible with Taíno, requiring bilingual abilities, may have been related to the Ciguayo tongue. <ref>Wilson, 1990 </ref>

‘’’Guanahatabey’’ At the time of the Spanish conquest found only in the most western tip of Cuba, from where that peninsula gets its name. There style of living was apparently much simpler than that of the Siboney; however, they could have been refugees with a degraded lifestyle due to pressures caused by intrusions by the latter.

‘’’Eyeri/Kaliphuna’’’ The captured neo Taina women held by the Carib, and their descends Eyeri a language similar Taíno; <ref>Breton,1665 http://www.centrelink.org/General.html<r/ef>. The Adult Carib spoke the Carib language and used a variant of Carib for trade and ceremony <ref> Wilson, 1990; Rouse, 1992</ref>. It is possible to speculate, that because the Carib stole women from the neo-Taino nations and incorporated them into their culture. The Carib advance from the South American mainland through the minor Antilles, never resulted in permanent settlements of Caribs, since they were being assimilated in this fashion by their captured neo-Taina women. It is said that Hatuey, the first known Cuban Island rebel was part Carib. ...

The literature on the Taino and related nations is quite large and includes:

Albury, Paul 1975 The Story of the Bahamas. MacMillan Education Limited, London and Basingstoke. p. 19 “After the first screams of despair, terror took such sole possession of the Lucayan’s mind and body that it robbed him of the ability to defend himself. He became a jellied mass of sweating, trembling, helpless flesh. Men, women, and children were bound with ropes, stacked in the cane and taken to Carib land. There the males were mutilated, tortured and finally eaten.”

Alonso José Ramón 2004 (accessed 11/7/2005). Panorama histórico-crítico sobre el estudio del arte rupestre de Punta del Este, Cuba. http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/puntadeleste.html

Alvarez Chanca, Diego. La Carta del Doctor Chanca, que escribió a la Ciudad de Sevilla. Collección de los viages y descubrimientos. Martin Fernández de Navarrete. Madrid, 1825 Atl atl? “Los desta isla pelean con unas varas agudas, las cuales tiran con unas tiranderas como las que tiran los mochachos las varillas en Castilla, con las cuales tiran muy lejos asaz certero. ”

Álvarez Conde, José 1956. Arqueología Indocubana. Junta Nacional de Arqueología y Etnología Impresores Úcar, García, S. A. Havana.

Álvarez Nazario, Manuel 1996. Arqueología Lingüística. Estudios modernos dirigidos al rescate y reconstrucción del arahuaco taíno. Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Arciniegas, Germán (editor) 1999. Historiadores de las Indias. Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes. Editorial Océano de México S.A.

Arrom, Jose Juan 2000 “Estudios de Lexicologia Antillana.” Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. San Juan, Puerto Rico

Azcárate Rosell, Rafael 1937. Historia de los Indios de Cuba. Editorial Tropical, Havana.

Barreiro, José 1989. Indians in Cuba. Cultural Survival Quarterly 13 (3) 56-60.

Barreiro, José 1990 A Note on Tainos: Whither Progress? Northeast Indian Quarterly Fall, 1990, pp. 66-77. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/013.html http://www.uctp.org/ANoteonTainos.html

Barreiro, José 2005 In Cuba the cry was for water. Indian Country Today part one October 13, part two October 20, 2005. (accessed October 25, 2005) http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411742 http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411782

Bercht, Fatima Estrellita Brodsky, John Alan Farmer, Dicey Taylor, (eds) 1997. Taino: Pre-Columbian Art and Culture from the Caribbean. Museo Del Barrio Monacelli Press, New York.

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 1999. 2. Taino Sun Symbols Taíno Forum #25 http://members.aol.com/STaino/forum_25.htm, rixturey@netscape.net rixturey@netscape.net

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 2003 Taíno Short Dictionary http://www.biaraku.com/taino_short_dictionary.pdf

Beltran, Juan. 1924. Bojeo de Cuba por Sebastian de O’Campo. El Universal, Havana p. 9 paragraph 3 "Vista de los Azules y aun tal vez vagamente presentada al misterioso reflejo de los lambentes, que andando los días había de servir de base a la poética y sentimental Luz de Yara..."

Black, Clinton V. 1965. History of Jamaica. 3rd edition Collins Clear Type Press, London and Glasgow.

Breton, Raymond 1665. Dictionnaire caraïbe-français (El caribe insular del siglo XVII Tratado sobre la lengua y la cultura de los Callínago) Translated to Spanish by Duna Troiani CELIA-CNRS / París ( Centro de estudios de las lenguas indígenas de América, Centre national de la recherche scientifique.) Link found at http://www.centrelink.org/General.html

Bueno, Salvador (ed.) 2003. Cuban Leyends (SeigfriedKaden illustrator, Christine R. Ayorinde translator). Markus Weiner Publishers, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.

Carrada, Alfred 2003 (Accessed 11/5/2005) Dictionary of the Taino language http://www.alfredcarrada.org/dictionary.html

de las Casas, Bartolomé (circa 1474-1566, 1995 reprinting). "Historia de las Indias" Cultura Economica, Mexico City (Casas vol. 2, p. 521-522).

Castellanos, Juan de. 1874 Elegia VI. Elegías de varones ilustres de Indias. Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, pp. 14-17.

Castellanos Garcia, Gerardo 1927. "Tierras y Glorias de Oriente (Calixto Garcia Iñiguez)" Editorial Hermes Havana p. 155.

Cienfuegos page (sampled September 9, 2004) Leyendas de Cienfuegos, Las Mulatas. http://www.cienfuegoscuba.galeon.com/lasmulatas.htm

Cohen, J. M (editor and translator) 1969. The Four Voyages of Christopher Columbus. Being His Own Log-Book, Letters and Dispatches. Penguin Books, London, New York and Victoria Australia.
Pages195-196 “He therefore went to the island of Guadalupe, anchored there and sent boats ashore well armed. But, before they arrived, a number of women came out of the woods carrying bows and arrows, and with feathers on their heads, apparently resolved to defend the island……to northern islands…When the ships came very close to shore, they saw many Indian men coming out on to the beach with bows and arrows, which they shot at our men with great daring and great shouts. But they shot in vain, for their arrows fell short… The houses were square not round like on the islands, and in one of them a human arm was found cooking in a stew pot.”

Coll y Toste, Cayetano 1972. Vocabulario indo-antillano. In: Clásicos de Puerto Rico segunda edición, Ediciones Latinoamericanas. Found at:
http://www.angelfire.com/de2/bohemia/diccionario.html
http://members.dandy.net/~orocobix/terms1.htm

de Cora, Maria Manuela 1972. Kuai-Mare. Mitos Aborígenes de Venezuela. Monte Avila Editores Caracas.

Crespo, George 1993. How the Sea Began. A Taino Myth Retold and Illustrated. Clarion Books, New York.

Curet L.A. 2002 The Chief Is Dead, Long Live… Who? Descent and Succession in the Protohistoric Chiefdoms of the Greater Antilles. Ethnohistory 49(2)259-280.

Dacal Moure, Ramon, Manuel Rivero De La Calle, Daniel H. Sandweiss 1996 Art and Archaeology of Pre-Columbian Cuba (Pitt Latin American Series) University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg.

DeSola, C. Ralph 1932. Fishing with the fisherman fish in West Indian waters. Bull. N.Y. Zool. Soc. 35(3) 74-92.

Drummond, Lee. 1981 "The serpent's children: semiotics of cultural genesis in Arawak and Trobriand myth." - American ethnologist (Washington) 8 (3): 633-660. “Drummond tells us in his study of Arawak myth (1981), the action of celebrating the myth of Arawak origins actually creates the distinction between the Arawak and the Carib. It renders the Arawak people real.” http://www.uwm.edu/~wash/mirror13.htm

Erdman, D.S. 1983. Nombres vulgares de peces de Puerto Rico. Common names of fishes in Puerto Rico CODREMAR. Inf. Téc. 3(2): 1-44 (not yet obtained).

Estefanía, Carlos Manuel 2005 Así nació Cuba In: Cuba Nuestra digital (accessed 11/5/2005) http://www.cubanuestra.nu/web/article.asp?artID=2330

D’ Estéfano Pisani, Miguel A. 1943. La Delincuencia de los Indios de Cuba. Jesus Montero (Editor), La Habana. (Note: this book shows a strong biased against the Tainos, and yet it provides useful insights into Taino word usage)

Fajardo, Juan Cristobal Nápoles (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition 1999.

Fernández de Oviedo, Gonzalo (República Dominicana, Puerto Rico, Cuba, 1478-1557). Libro doceno. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias. Segundo libro. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias.
Fergus, Claudius 2003. The 'Carib' Work Stones of Chateaubelair: curio or calendar system? St Vincent and the Grenadines Country Conference Pre-Prints University of the West Indies. St Vincent and the Grenadines. http://www.uwichill.edu.bb/bnccde/svg/conference/papers/fergus.html

Figueroa, Ivonne 2004 Taínos El Boricua. Edited by Barbara Yañez, Assistant WebSite Editor http://www.elboricua.com/history.html accessed 2/15/04

Florida Fish and Wild Life Commission (Division of Marine Fisheries) 2002 Land Crabs (Cardisoma guanhumi). September 2002 http://www.floridaconservation.org/commission/2002/sept/LANDCRABS.pdf

Gautier Benítez, José. Romance. El Progreso (Periódico), 24 de agosto de 1873. p. 3.

Gomez de la Maza y Jimenez, Manuel and Juan Tomas Roig y Mesa 1914. Flora de Cuba (Datos para su estudio) Rambla, Bouza y Cia, Havana.

Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1996 Taino-Maya Contacts. Taino-L Taino Forum The retrospective history of the Native Caribbean World History Archives Hartford Web Publishing http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/238.html

Grondine, E.P. (accessed 11/5/2005) Going into the water: A survey of impact events and the coastal peoples of south-east North America, the Caribbean, and Central America http://abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/ccc/ce010702.html

Guanikeyu, Cacique Peter. circa 1999. Taino Words. The Taino InterTribal Council torresp@algorithms.com http://www.hartfordhwp.com/taino/

Guitar, Lynne (2002). Documentando el mito de la extinción de la cultura Taína. KACIKE: Revista de la historia y antropología de los indígenas del Caribe Revista electrónica, Edición Especial, Lynne Guitar, redactora. Disponible en: http://www.kacike.org/GuitarEspanol.html Accessed 05/11/2005
Gulf States Maine Fisheries Commission 2003 Cairina moschata Linnaeus,

Granberry, Julian, and Gary Vescelius 2004 Languages of the Pre-Columbian Antilles University Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, ISBN: 081735123X

Haslip-Viera, Gabriel (Editor) 2001 Taíno Revival: Critical Perspectives on Puerto Rican Identity and Cultural Politics. Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton N.J. ISBN: 1558762590

Herbold, Stacey. Jamaican Patois and the Power of Language in Reggae Music http://debate.uvm.edu/dreadlibrary/herbold.html The only evidence of the Arawak dialect in Jamaica today is a few loan words, place names, food, natural objects, and events (hurricane) (Lalla and D’Costa, 1990). Xaymaca is actually an Arawak word meaning "island of springs", which is where the name Jamaica is derived from (Pryce, 1997). It is possible that the first contact of the Arawaks and the Spaniards may have led to an early pidgin or bilingualism among the first generation of mixed blood.”

Hernández Aquino, Luis. 1993. Diccionario de voces indígenas de Puerto Rico. Tercera edición, Editorial Cultural, Esmaco, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico.

Hill, Jonathan D. and Fernando Santos-Granero (eds.). 2002. Comparative Arawakan Histories. Rethinking Language Family and Cultural Area in Amazonia. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.

Jiménez, Mariano II and Mariano G. Jiménez 2003 El Güije. Cuentos de Antaño http://www.guije.com/index.htm

Johnson, Kim (accessed 5/3/2005) The story of the 'Caribs and Arawaks' http://www.raceandhistory.com/Taino/Caribs.htm

López de Gómara, Francisco. Primera Parte. La historia general de las Indias. Historiadores primitivos de Indias. Enrique de Vedia, ed. Madrid: Imprenta de M. Ribadeneyra, 1877.

Maciques Sánchez, Esteban 2004. El arte rupestre del Caribe insular: estilo y cronología in Rupestreweb, http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/maciques.html

Martinez Arango, Felipe, 1997. “Los Aborigines de la Cuenca de Santiago de Cuba.” Ediciones Universal, Miami.

Mendez, Eugenio Fernandez 1981. Cronicas de Puerto Rico, Desde la Conquista Hasta Nuestros Dias (1493-1955) Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras.

Miner Solá, Edwin 2002 Diccionario Taino Ilustrado. Ediciones Servilibros (Serie Puerto Rico Prehistórico, 1). San Juan, Indigenous language dictionary arranged thematically with numerous illustrations, many in color.

Nápoles Fajardo, Juan Cristobal (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition1999.

Nicholson, Desmond V. 1983. The Story of the Arawaks in Antigua and Bermuda. Antigua Archeological Society. Antigua West Indies.

Olsen, Fred 1974. On the Trail of the Arawaks. Civilization of the American Indian, v 129. University of Oklahoma Press. Norman. Oklahoma.

Pané, Fray Ramón (circa 1475-circa 1498) An Account of the Antiquities of the Indians: Chronicles of the New World Encounter (Latin America in Translation/En Traduccion/En Traducao) Jose Juan Arom (Editor), Susan C. Griswold (translator). Duke University Press, Durham and London. (1999 edition).

Pané, Fray Ramón. Relación de Fray Ramon de las antigüedades de los indios. Cuba primitiva. Habana: Miguel de Villa, 1883.

Papá Lino 2002 "¡Qué Te Parece, Boricua" Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas, 2nd ed. "El dios taíno Yuquiyú es el mismo 'Loukuo' de la mitología escandinava." Cited from http://groups.msn.com/CarlitosWay/triviadeborinquen.msnw

Puerto Rico, Commonwealth. 1998 Reglamento de Pesca de Puerto Rico Departamento de Recursos Naturales y Ambientales. Salvador Salas Quintana (Secretario). http://www.drna.gobierno.pr/reglamentospdf/DRNA/Reglamento%20de%20Pesca.pdf
Rivas, Anthony T. 2000 Enigmas of Cuban Spanish Proteus, Newsletter of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators Vol. IX, No. 3 Summer 2000 http://www.najit.org/proteus/v9n3/rivas_v9n3.htm “While lacking conclusive proof, some linguists believe that the marked intonation pattern exhibited by some natives of the former Oriente province originates in Arawak, a language spoken by the indigenous Taíno people, who survived for a limited time just in this province.”

Robineau, Lionel (editor) 1991. Towards a Caribbean Pharmacopoeia. End-Caribe, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

Robiou La Marche, Sebastián 2003. Taínos and Caribes. Las culturas aborígenes antillanas. Editorial Punto y Coma, San Juan Puerto Rico.

Ross, Ann H. 2004 Cranial evidence of pre-contact multiple population expansions in the Caribbean Caribbean Journal of Science. 40(3). 2004. 291-298. “The most recognized Caribbean population dispersal hypothesis is a direct jump from South America followed by dispersal into the Lesser Antilles and westward. This evidence primarily comes from the archaeological record, as skeletal material is scarce in the Caribbean due to generally poor preservation. This study evaluated the direct jump hypothesis along with other possible migration routes using cranial landmark data. A study of three-dimensional facial shape variation among pre-Contact Taino groups from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, and pre-Contact groups from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Florida was conducted. Cuban Tainos differed from other Caribbean Taino groups, suggesting a dissimilar ancestry. No significant difference between the Caribbean Taino (excluding Cuba) groups and the South American groups was observed, a result that was consistent with the archaeological record for dispersal from South America into the Lesser Antilles. Cuba was also very distinct from the Florida series, a finding that contradicts hypotheses of possible migrations across the Straits of Florida. The differentiation of the Cuban Tainos from the rest of the American and Caribbean series suggests another source of population influx.”

Rouse, Irving 1992. The Tainos. Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

de la Sagra, Ramón 1843. Historia física, política y natural de la Isla de Cuba, Libreria de Arthus Bertrand, Paris.

Schwartz, Marion. 1997. A History of Dogs in the Early Americas. Yale University Press, New Haven pp. 76-78.

Sears, William H. 1977. Seaborne contacts between early cultures in the lower southeastern United States and Middle (-) through South America. In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 1-15.

Suarez, Constantino 1921 Vocabulario Cubano, Libreria Cervantes, Havana and Perlado, Páez y Cía, Madrid.

Sued Badillo, Jalil. 1985. Las Cacicas Indoantillanas, Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña 87, 1-26.

UCTP (United Confederation of Taíno People) 2002. Diccionario de Voces Taína’ (Taíno Dictionary) http://www.uctp.org/VocesIndigena.html

Vela, Enrique (editor). 1988. La navegación entre los Mayas. Arqueología Mexicana 6 (number 33, September October 1988) 4-5.

Vespucio, Américo (circa 1454-1512), Fragments and Letters found at: http://www.e-libro.net/E-libro-viejo/gratis/nvomundo.pdf http://www.unsl.edu.ar/librosgratis/gratis/nvomundo.pdf
http://www.banrep.gov.co/blaavirtual/credencial/hamerica.htm
Wilbert, Johannes1977. Navigators of the Winter Sun In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 16-44.

Vazquez Doris M. 1993 (accessed 11/7/2005) Puerto Rican Folktales
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1993/2/93.02.12.x.html#top

Wilson, Samuel M. 1990 Hispaniola Caribbean Cheifdoms in the Age of Columbus. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa and London. ISBN: 0817304622

Zayas y Alfonso, Alfredo 1914. “Lexografía Antillana” El Siglo XX Press, Havana.

Neo-Taino

2008-07-09T14:34:31Z

Jigue: Links to large ethnic divisions

=neo-Taíno nations=

One way of looking at the diverse nations of the Caribbean, is to view it as rooted in two ethnic groups: The [[Arawak]] (from aruaco the eaters of yuca meal the name given to them by the Caribs) and the [[Carib]] (in Arawak myth the children of the rotten anaconda). The Arawak may be subdivided into two groups the main land Arawak, and the Island Arawak or Taino. If one considers the high Taino to be limited to island [[Arawak]] who resided in Puerto-Rico, then the indigenous Taíno nations were found in Cuba, the Lucaya of the Bahamas, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent from Haiti and Quisqueya (approximately the Dominican Republic) can be referred to as neo-Taíno nations.

The literature on the Taino and related nations is quite large and includes:

Albury, Paul 1975 The Story of the Bahamas. MacMillan Education Limited, London and Basingstoke. p. 19 “After the first screams of despair, terror took such sole possession of the Lucayan’s mind and body that it robbed him of the ability to defend himself. He became a jellied mass of sweating, trembling, helpless flesh. Men, women, and children were bound with ropes, stacked in the cane and taken to Carib land. There the males were mutilated, tortured and finally eaten. The females were kept for breeding purposes. And, it is said, their male offspring, sired by Caribs, were also eaten.”

Alonso José Ramón 2004 (accessed 11/7/2005). Panorama histórico-crítico sobre el estudio del arte rupestre de Punta del Este, Cuba. http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/puntadeleste.html

Alvarez Chanca, Diego. La Carta del Doctor Chanca, que escribió a la Ciudad de Sevilla. Collección de los viages y descubrimientos. Martin Fernández de Navarrete. Madrid, 1825 Atl atl? “Los desta isla pelean con unas varas agudas, las cuales tiran con unas tiranderas como las que tiran los mochachos las varillas en Castilla, con las cuales tiran muy lejos asaz certero. ”

Álvarez Conde, José 1956. Arqueología Indocubana. Junta Nacional de Arqueología y Etnología Impresores Úcar, García, S. A. Havana.

Álvarez Nazario, Manuel 1996. Arqueología Lingüística. Estudios modernos dirigidos al rescate y reconstrucción del arahuaco taíno. Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Arciniegas, Germán (editor) 1999. Historiadores de las Indias. Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes. Editorial Océano de México S.A.

Arrom, Jose Juan 2000 “Estudios de Lexicologia Antillana.” Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. San Juan, Puerto Rico

Azcárate Rosell, Rafael 1937. Historia de los Indios de Cuba. Editorial Tropical, Havana.

Barreiro, José 1989. Indians in Cuba. Cultural Survival Quarterly 13 (3) 56-60.

Barreiro, José 1990 A Note on Tainos: Whither Progress? Northeast Indian Quarterly Fall, 1990, pp. 66-77. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/013.html http://www.uctp.org/ANoteonTainos.html

Barreiro, José 2005 In Cuba the cry was for water. Indian Country Today part one October 13, part two October 20, 2005. (accessed October 25, 2005) http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411742 http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411782

Bercht, Fatima Estrellita Brodsky, John Alan Farmer, Dicey Taylor, (eds) 1997. Taino: Pre-Columbian Art and Culture from the Caribbean. Museo Del Barrio Monacelli Press, New York.

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 1999. 2. Taino Sun Symbols Taíno Forum #25 http://members.aol.com/STaino/forum_25.htm, rixturey@netscape.net rixturey@netscape.net

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 2003 Taíno Short Dictionary http://www.biaraku.com/taino_short_dictionary.pdf

Beltran, Juan. 1924. Bojeo de Cuba por Sebastian de O’Campo. El Universal, Havana p. 9 paragraph 3 "Vista de los Azules y aun tal vez vagamente presentada al misterioso reflejo de los lambentes, que andando los días había de servir de base a la poética y sentimental Luz de Yara..."

Black, Clinton V. 1965. History of Jamaica. 3rd edition Collins Clear Type Press, London and Glasgow.

Breton, Raymond 1665. Dictionnaire caraïbe-français (El caribe insular del siglo XVII Tratado sobre la lengua y la cultura de los Callínago) Translated to Spanish by Duna Troiani CELIA-CNRS / París ( Centro de estudios de las lenguas indígenas de América, Centre national de la recherche scientifique.) Link found at http://www.centrelink.org/General.html

Bueno, Salvador (ed.) 2003. Cuban Leyends (SeigfriedKaden illustrator, Christine R. Ayorinde translator). Markus Weiner Publishers, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.

Carrada, Alfred 2003 (Accessed 11/5/2005) Dictionary of the Taino language http://www.alfredcarrada.org/dictionary.html

de las Casas, Bartolomé (circa 1474-1566, 1995 reprinting). "Historia de las Indias" Cultura Economica, Mexico City (Casas vol. 2, p. 521-522).

Castellanos, Juan de. 1874 Elegia VI. Elegías de varones ilustres de Indias. Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, pp. 14-17.

Castellanos Garcia, Gerardo 1927. "Tierras y Glorias de Oriente (Calixto Garcia Iñiguez)" Editorial Hermes Havana p. 155.

Cienfuegos page (sampled September 9, 2004) Leyendas de Cienfuegos, Las Mulatas. http://www.cienfuegoscuba.galeon.com/lasmulatas.htm

Cohen, J. M (editor and translator) 1969. The Four Voyages of Christopher Columbus. Being His Own Log-Book, Letters and Dispatches. Penguin Books, London, New York and Victoria Australia.
Pages195-196 “He therefore went to the island of Guadalupe, anchored there and sent boats ashore well armed. But, before they arrived, a number of women came out of the woods carrying bows and arrows, and with feathers on their heads, apparently resolved to defend the island……to northern islands…When the ships came very close to shore, they saw many Indian men coming out on to the beach with bows and arrows, which they shot at our men with great daring and great shouts. But they shot in vain, for their arrows fell short… The houses were square not round like on the islands, and in one of them a human arm was found cooking in a stew pot.”

Coll y Toste, Cayetano 1972. Vocabulario indo-antillano. In: Clásicos de Puerto Rico segunda edición, Ediciones Latinoamericanas. Found at:
http://www.angelfire.com/de2/bohemia/diccionario.html
http://members.dandy.net/~orocobix/terms1.htm

de Cora, Maria Manuela 1972. Kuai-Mare. Mitos Aborígenes de Venezuela. Monte Avila Editores Caracas.

Crespo, George 1993. How the Sea Began. A Taino Myth Retold and Illustrated. Clarion Books, New York.

Curet L.A. 2002 The Chief Is Dead, Long Live… Who? Descent and Succession in the Protohistoric Chiefdoms of the Greater Antilles. Ethnohistory 49(2)259-280.

Dacal Moure, Ramon, Manuel Rivero De La Calle, Daniel H. Sandweiss 1996 Art and Archaeology of Pre-Columbian Cuba (Pitt Latin American Series) University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg.

DeSola, C. Ralph 1932. Fishing with the fisherman fish in West Indian waters. Bull. N.Y. Zool. Soc. 35(3) 74-92.

Drummond, Lee. 1981 "The serpent's children: semiotics of cultural genesis in Arawak and Trobriand myth." - American ethnologist (Washington) 8 (3): 633-660. “Drummond tells us in his study of Arawak myth (1981), the action of celebrating the myth of Arawak origins actually creates the distinction between the Arawak and the Carib. It renders the Arawak people real.” http://www.uwm.edu/~wash/mirror13.htm

Erdman, D.S. 1983. Nombres vulgares de peces de Puerto Rico. Common names of fishes in Puerto Rico CODREMAR. Inf. Téc. 3(2): 1-44 (not yet obtained).

Estefanía, Carlos Manuel 2005 Así nació Cuba In: Cuba Nuestra digital (accessed 11/5/2005) http://www.cubanuestra.nu/web/article.asp?artID=2330

D’ Estéfano Pisani, Miguel A. 1943. La Delincuencia de los Indios de Cuba. Jesus Montero (Editor), La Habana. (Note: this book shows a strong biased against the Tainos, and yet it provides useful insights into Taino word usage)

Fajardo, Juan Cristobal Nápoles (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition 1999.

Fernández de Oviedo, Gonzalo (República Dominicana, Puerto Rico, Cuba, 1478-1557). Libro doceno. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias. Segundo libro. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias.
Fergus, Claudius 2003. The 'Carib' Work Stones of Chateaubelair: curio or calendar system? St Vincent and the Grenadines Country Conference Pre-Prints University of the West Indies. St Vincent and the Grenadines. http://www.uwichill.edu.bb/bnccde/svg/conference/papers/fergus.html

Figueroa, Ivonne 2004 Taínos El Boricua. Edited by Barbara Yañez, Assistant WebSite Editor http://www.elboricua.com/history.html accessed 2/15/04

Florida Fish and Wild Life Commission (Division of Marine Fisheries) 2002 Land Crabs (Cardisoma guanhumi). September 2002 http://www.floridaconservation.org/commission/2002/sept/LANDCRABS.pdf

Gautier Benítez, José. Romance. El Progreso (Periódico), 24 de agosto de 1873. p. 3.

Gomez de la Maza y Jimenez, Manuel and Juan Tomas Roig y Mesa 1914. Flora de Cuba (Datos para su estudio) Rambla, Bouza y Cia, Havana.

Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1996 Taino-Maya Contacts. Taino-L Taino Forum The retrospective history of the Native Caribbean World History Archives Hartford Web Publishing http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/238.html

Grondine, E.P. (accessed 11/5/2005) Going into the water: A survey of impact events and the coastal peoples of south-east North America, the Caribbean, and Central America http://abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/ccc/ce010702.html

Guanikeyu, Cacique Peter. circa 1999. Taino Words. The Taino InterTribal Council torresp@algorithms.com http://www.hartfordhwp.com/taino/

Guitar, Lynne (2002). Documentando el mito de la extinción de la cultura Taína. KACIKE: Revista de la historia y antropología de los indígenas del Caribe Revista electrónica, Edición Especial, Lynne Guitar, redactora. Disponible en: http://www.kacike.org/GuitarEspanol.html Accessed 05/11/2005
Gulf States Maine Fisheries Commission 2003 Cairina moschata Linnaeus,

Granberry, Julian, and Gary Vescelius 2004 Languages of the Pre-Columbian Antilles University Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, ISBN: 081735123X

Haslip-Viera, Gabriel (Editor) 2001 Taíno Revival: Critical Perspectives on Puerto Rican Identity and Cultural Politics. Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton N.J. ISBN: 1558762590

Herbold, Stacey. Jamaican Patois and the Power of Language in Reggae Music http://debate.uvm.edu/dreadlibrary/herbold.html The only evidence of the Arawak dialect in Jamaica today is a few loan words, place names, food, natural objects, and events (hurricane) (Lalla and D’Costa, 1990). Xaymaca is actually an Arawak word meaning "island of springs", which is where the name Jamaica is derived from (Pryce, 1997). It is possible that the first contact of the Arawaks and the Spaniards may have led to an early pidgin or bilingualism among the first generation of mixed blood.”

Hernández Aquino, Luis. 1993. Diccionario de voces indígenas de Puerto Rico. Tercera edición, Editorial Cultural, Esmaco, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico.

Hill, Jonathan D. and Fernando Santos-Granero (eds.). 2002. Comparative Arawakan Histories. Rethinking Language Family and Cultural Area in Amazonia. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.

Jiménez, Mariano II and Mariano G. Jiménez 2003 El Güije. Cuentos de Antaño http://www.guije.com/index.htm

Johnson, Kim (accessed 5/3/2005) The story of the 'Caribs and Arawaks' http://www.raceandhistory.com/Taino/Caribs.htm

López de Gómara, Francisco. Primera Parte. La historia general de las Indias. Historiadores primitivos de Indias. Enrique de Vedia, ed. Madrid: Imprenta de M. Ribadeneyra, 1877.

Maciques Sánchez, Esteban 2004. El arte rupestre del Caribe insular: estilo y cronología in Rupestreweb, http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/maciques.html

Martinez Arango, Felipe, 1997. “Los Aborigines de la Cuenca de Santiago de Cuba.” Ediciones Universal, Miami.

Mendez, Eugenio Fernandez 1981. Cronicas de Puerto Rico, Desde la Conquista Hasta Nuestros Dias (1493-1955) Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras.

Miner Solá, Edwin 2002 Diccionario Taino Ilustrado. Ediciones Servilibros (Serie Puerto Rico Prehistórico, 1). San Juan, Indigenous language dictionary arranged thematically with numerous illustrations, many in color.

Nápoles Fajardo, Juan Cristobal (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition1999.

Nicholson, Desmond V. 1983. The Story of the Arawaks in Antigua and Bermuda. Antigua Archeological Society. Antigua West Indies.

Olsen, Fred 1974. On the Trail of the Arawaks. Civilization of the American Indian, v 129. University of Oklahoma Press. Norman. Oklahoma.

Pané, Fray Ramón (circa 1475-circa 1498) An Account of the Antiquities of the Indians: Chronicles of the New World Encounter (Latin America in Translation/En Traduccion/En Traducao) Jose Juan Arom (Editor), Susan C. Griswold (translator). Duke University Press, Durham and London. (1999 edition).

Pané, Fray Ramón. Relación de Fray Ramon de las antigüedades de los indios. Cuba primitiva. Habana: Miguel de Villa, 1883.

Papá Lino 2002 "¡Qué Te Parece, Boricua" Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas, 2nd ed. "El dios taíno Yuquiyú es el mismo 'Loukuo' de la mitología escandinava." Cited from http://groups.msn.com/CarlitosWay/triviadeborinquen.msnw

Puerto Rico, Commonwealth. 1998 Reglamento de Pesca de Puerto Rico Departamento de Recursos Naturales y Ambientales. Salvador Salas Quintana (Secretario). http://www.drna.gobierno.pr/reglamentospdf/DRNA/Reglamento%20de%20Pesca.pdf
Rivas, Anthony T. 2000 Enigmas of Cuban Spanish Proteus, Newsletter of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators Vol. IX, No. 3 Summer 2000 http://www.najit.org/proteus/v9n3/rivas_v9n3.htm “While lacking conclusive proof, some linguists believe that the marked intonation pattern exhibited by some natives of the former Oriente province originates in Arawak, a language spoken by the indigenous Taíno people, who survived for a limited time just in this province.”

Robineau, Lionel (editor) 1991. Towards a Caribbean Pharmacopoeia. End-Caribe, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

Robiou La Marche, Sebastián 2003. Taínos and Caribes. Las culturas aborígenes antillanas. Editorial Punto y Coma, San Juan Puerto Rico.

Ross, Ann H. 2004 Cranial evidence of pre-contact multiple population expansions in the Caribbean Caribbean Journal of Science. 40(3). 2004. 291-298. “The most recognized Caribbean population dispersal hypothesis is a direct jump from South America followed by dispersal into the Lesser Antilles and westward. This evidence primarily comes from the archaeological record, as skeletal material is scarce in the Caribbean due to generally poor preservation. This study evaluated the direct jump hypothesis along with other possible migration routes using cranial landmark data. A study of three-dimensional facial shape variation among pre-Contact Taino groups from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, and pre-Contact groups from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Florida was conducted. Cuban Tainos differed from other Caribbean Taino groups, suggesting a dissimilar ancestry. No significant difference between the Caribbean Taino (excluding Cuba) groups and the South American groups was observed, a result that was consistent with the archaeological record for dispersal from South America into the Lesser Antilles. Cuba was also very distinct from the Florida series, a finding that contradicts hypotheses of possible migrations across the Straits of Florida. The differentiation of the Cuban Tainos from the rest of the American and Caribbean series suggests another source of population influx.”

Rouse, Irving 1992. The Tainos. Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

de la Sagra, Ramón 1843. Historia física, política y natural de la Isla de Cuba, Libreria de Arthus Bertrand, Paris.

Schwartz, Marion. 1997. A History of Dogs in the Early Americas. Yale University Press, New Haven pp. 76-78.

Sears, William H. 1977. Seaborne contacts between early cultures in the lower southeastern United States and Middle (-) through South America. In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 1-15.

Suarez, Constantino 1921 Vocabulario Cubano, Libreria Cervantes, Havana and Perlado, Páez y Cía, Madrid.

Sued Badillo, Jalil. 1985. Las Cacicas Indoantillanas, Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña 87, 1-26.

UCTP (United Confederation of Taíno People) 2002. Diccionario de Voces Taína’ (Taíno Dictionary) http://www.uctp.org/VocesIndigena.html

Vela, Enrique (editor). 1988. La navegación entre los Mayas. Arqueología Mexicana 6 (number 33, September October 1988) 4-5.

Vespucio, Américo (circa 1454-1512), Fragments and Letters found at: http://www.e-libro.net/E-libro-viejo/gratis/nvomundo.pdf http://www.unsl.edu.ar/librosgratis/gratis/nvomundo.pdf
http://www.banrep.gov.co/blaavirtual/credencial/hamerica.htm translated '.. the women go naked and are libidinous, lewd, and lustful but despite this their bodies are beautiful and clean...."

Wilbert, Johannes1977. Navigators of the Winter Sun In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 16-44.

Vazquez Doris M. 1993 (accessed 11/7/2005) Puerto Rican Folktales
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1993/2/93.02.12.x.html#top

Wilson, Samuel M. 1990 Hispaniola Caribbean Cheifdoms in the Age of Columbus. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa and London. ISBN: 0817304622

Zayas y Alfonso, Alfredo 1914. “Lexografía Antillana” El Siglo XX Press, Havana.

Neo-Taino

2008-07-09T14:28:19Z

Jigue: /* neo-Taíno nations */ giving context and expanding

=neo-Taíno nations=

One way of looking at the diverse nations of the Caribbean, is to view it as rooted in two ethnic groups: The Arawak (from aruaco the eaters of yuca meal the name given to them by the Caribs) and the Caribs (in Arawak myth the children of the rotten anaconda). The Arawak may be subdivided into two groups the main land Arawak, and the Island Arawak or Taino. If one considers the high Taino to be limited to island [[Arawak]] who resided in Puerto-Rico, then the indigenous Taíno nations were found in Cuba, the Lucaya of the Bahamas, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent from Haiti and Quisqueya (approximately the Dominican Republic) can be referred to as neo-Taíno nations.

The literature on the Taino and related nations is quite large and includes:

Albury, Paul 1975 The Story of the Bahamas. MacMillan Education Limited, London and Basingstoke. p. 19 “After the first screams of despair, terror took such sole possession of the Lucayan’s mind and body that it robbed him of the ability to defend himself. He became a jellied mass of sweating, trembling, helpless flesh. Men, women, and children were bound with ropes, stacked in the cane and taken to Carib land. There the males were mutilated, tortured and finally eaten. The females were kept for breeding purposes. And, it is said, their male offspring, sired by Caribs, were also eaten.”

Alonso José Ramón 2004 (accessed 11/7/2005). Panorama histórico-crítico sobre el estudio del arte rupestre de Punta del Este, Cuba. http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/puntadeleste.html

Alvarez Chanca, Diego. La Carta del Doctor Chanca, que escribió a la Ciudad de Sevilla. Collección de los viages y descubrimientos. Martin Fernández de Navarrete. Madrid, 1825 Atl atl? “Los desta isla pelean con unas varas agudas, las cuales tiran con unas tiranderas como las que tiran los mochachos las varillas en Castilla, con las cuales tiran muy lejos asaz certero. ”

Álvarez Conde, José 1956. Arqueología Indocubana. Junta Nacional de Arqueología y Etnología Impresores Úcar, García, S. A. Havana.

Álvarez Nazario, Manuel 1996. Arqueología Lingüística. Estudios modernos dirigidos al rescate y reconstrucción del arahuaco taíno. Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Arciniegas, Germán (editor) 1999. Historiadores de las Indias. Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes. Editorial Océano de México S.A.

Arrom, Jose Juan 2000 “Estudios de Lexicologia Antillana.” Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. San Juan, Puerto Rico

Azcárate Rosell, Rafael 1937. Historia de los Indios de Cuba. Editorial Tropical, Havana.

Barreiro, José 1989. Indians in Cuba. Cultural Survival Quarterly 13 (3) 56-60.

Barreiro, José 1990 A Note on Tainos: Whither Progress? Northeast Indian Quarterly Fall, 1990, pp. 66-77. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/013.html http://www.uctp.org/ANoteonTainos.html

Barreiro, José 2005 In Cuba the cry was for water. Indian Country Today part one October 13, part two October 20, 2005. (accessed October 25, 2005) http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411742 http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096411782

Bercht, Fatima Estrellita Brodsky, John Alan Farmer, Dicey Taylor, (eds) 1997. Taino: Pre-Columbian Art and Culture from the Caribbean. Museo Del Barrio Monacelli Press, New York.

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 1999. 2. Taino Sun Symbols Taíno Forum #25 http://members.aol.com/STaino/forum_25.htm, rixturey@netscape.net rixturey@netscape.net

Biarakú (a Taino Cultural Interest Group) 2003 Taíno Short Dictionary http://www.biaraku.com/taino_short_dictionary.pdf

Beltran, Juan. 1924. Bojeo de Cuba por Sebastian de O’Campo. El Universal, Havana p. 9 paragraph 3 "Vista de los Azules y aun tal vez vagamente presentada al misterioso reflejo de los lambentes, que andando los días había de servir de base a la poética y sentimental Luz de Yara..."

Black, Clinton V. 1965. History of Jamaica. 3rd edition Collins Clear Type Press, London and Glasgow.

Breton, Raymond 1665. Dictionnaire caraïbe-français (El caribe insular del siglo XVII Tratado sobre la lengua y la cultura de los Callínago) Translated to Spanish by Duna Troiani CELIA-CNRS / París ( Centro de estudios de las lenguas indígenas de América, Centre national de la recherche scientifique.) Link found at http://www.centrelink.org/General.html

Bueno, Salvador (ed.) 2003. Cuban Leyends (SeigfriedKaden illustrator, Christine R. Ayorinde translator). Markus Weiner Publishers, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.

Carrada, Alfred 2003 (Accessed 11/5/2005) Dictionary of the Taino language http://www.alfredcarrada.org/dictionary.html

de las Casas, Bartolomé (circa 1474-1566, 1995 reprinting). "Historia de las Indias" Cultura Economica, Mexico City (Casas vol. 2, p. 521-522).

Castellanos, Juan de. 1874 Elegia VI. Elegías de varones ilustres de Indias. Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, pp. 14-17.

Castellanos Garcia, Gerardo 1927. "Tierras y Glorias de Oriente (Calixto Garcia Iñiguez)" Editorial Hermes Havana p. 155.

Cienfuegos page (sampled September 9, 2004) Leyendas de Cienfuegos, Las Mulatas. http://www.cienfuegoscuba.galeon.com/lasmulatas.htm

Cohen, J. M (editor and translator) 1969. The Four Voyages of Christopher Columbus. Being His Own Log-Book, Letters and Dispatches. Penguin Books, London, New York and Victoria Australia.
Pages195-196 “He therefore went to the island of Guadalupe, anchored there and sent boats ashore well armed. But, before they arrived, a number of women came out of the woods carrying bows and arrows, and with feathers on their heads, apparently resolved to defend the island……to northern islands…When the ships came very close to shore, they saw many Indian men coming out on to the beach with bows and arrows, which they shot at our men with great daring and great shouts. But they shot in vain, for their arrows fell short… The houses were square not round like on the islands, and in one of them a human arm was found cooking in a stew pot.”

Coll y Toste, Cayetano 1972. Vocabulario indo-antillano. In: Clásicos de Puerto Rico segunda edición, Ediciones Latinoamericanas. Found at:
http://www.angelfire.com/de2/bohemia/diccionario.html
http://members.dandy.net/~orocobix/terms1.htm

de Cora, Maria Manuela 1972. Kuai-Mare. Mitos Aborígenes de Venezuela. Monte Avila Editores Caracas.

Crespo, George 1993. How the Sea Began. A Taino Myth Retold and Illustrated. Clarion Books, New York.

Curet L.A. 2002 The Chief Is Dead, Long Live… Who? Descent and Succession in the Protohistoric Chiefdoms of the Greater Antilles. Ethnohistory 49(2)259-280.

Dacal Moure, Ramon, Manuel Rivero De La Calle, Daniel H. Sandweiss 1996 Art and Archaeology of Pre-Columbian Cuba (Pitt Latin American Series) University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg.

DeSola, C. Ralph 1932. Fishing with the fisherman fish in West Indian waters. Bull. N.Y. Zool. Soc. 35(3) 74-92.

Drummond, Lee. 1981 "The serpent's children: semiotics of cultural genesis in Arawak and Trobriand myth." - American ethnologist (Washington) 8 (3): 633-660. “Drummond tells us in his study of Arawak myth (1981), the action of celebrating the myth of Arawak origins actually creates the distinction between the Arawak and the Carib. It renders the Arawak people real.” http://www.uwm.edu/~wash/mirror13.htm

Erdman, D.S. 1983. Nombres vulgares de peces de Puerto Rico. Common names of fishes in Puerto Rico CODREMAR. Inf. Téc. 3(2): 1-44 (not yet obtained).

Estefanía, Carlos Manuel 2005 Así nació Cuba In: Cuba Nuestra digital (accessed 11/5/2005) http://www.cubanuestra.nu/web/article.asp?artID=2330

D’ Estéfano Pisani, Miguel A. 1943. La Delincuencia de los Indios de Cuba. Jesus Montero (Editor), La Habana. (Note: this book shows a strong biased against the Tainos, and yet it provides useful insights into Taino word usage)

Fajardo, Juan Cristobal Nápoles (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition 1999.

Fernández de Oviedo, Gonzalo (República Dominicana, Puerto Rico, Cuba, 1478-1557). Libro doceno. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias. Segundo libro. Primera Parte. Historia General y Natural de las Indias.
Fergus, Claudius 2003. The 'Carib' Work Stones of Chateaubelair: curio or calendar system? St Vincent and the Grenadines Country Conference Pre-Prints University of the West Indies. St Vincent and the Grenadines. http://www.uwichill.edu.bb/bnccde/svg/conference/papers/fergus.html

Figueroa, Ivonne 2004 Taínos El Boricua. Edited by Barbara Yañez, Assistant WebSite Editor http://www.elboricua.com/history.html accessed 2/15/04

Florida Fish and Wild Life Commission (Division of Marine Fisheries) 2002 Land Crabs (Cardisoma guanhumi). September 2002 http://www.floridaconservation.org/commission/2002/sept/LANDCRABS.pdf

Gautier Benítez, José. Romance. El Progreso (Periódico), 24 de agosto de 1873. p. 3.

Gomez de la Maza y Jimenez, Manuel and Juan Tomas Roig y Mesa 1914. Flora de Cuba (Datos para su estudio) Rambla, Bouza y Cia, Havana.

Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1996 Taino-Maya Contacts. Taino-L Taino Forum The retrospective history of the Native Caribbean World History Archives Hartford Web Publishing http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/238.html

Grondine, E.P. (accessed 11/5/2005) Going into the water: A survey of impact events and the coastal peoples of south-east North America, the Caribbean, and Central America http://abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/ccc/ce010702.html

Guanikeyu, Cacique Peter. circa 1999. Taino Words. The Taino InterTribal Council torresp@algorithms.com http://www.hartfordhwp.com/taino/

Guitar, Lynne (2002). Documentando el mito de la extinción de la cultura Taína. KACIKE: Revista de la historia y antropología de los indígenas del Caribe Revista electrónica, Edición Especial, Lynne Guitar, redactora. Disponible en: http://www.kacike.org/GuitarEspanol.html Accessed 05/11/2005
Gulf States Maine Fisheries Commission 2003 Cairina moschata Linnaeus,

Granberry, Julian, and Gary Vescelius 2004 Languages of the Pre-Columbian Antilles University Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, ISBN: 081735123X

Haslip-Viera, Gabriel (Editor) 2001 Taíno Revival: Critical Perspectives on Puerto Rican Identity and Cultural Politics. Markus Wiener Publishers, Princeton N.J. ISBN: 1558762590

Herbold, Stacey. Jamaican Patois and the Power of Language in Reggae Music http://debate.uvm.edu/dreadlibrary/herbold.html The only evidence of the Arawak dialect in Jamaica today is a few loan words, place names, food, natural objects, and events (hurricane) (Lalla and D’Costa, 1990). Xaymaca is actually an Arawak word meaning "island of springs", which is where the name Jamaica is derived from (Pryce, 1997). It is possible that the first contact of the Arawaks and the Spaniards may have led to an early pidgin or bilingualism among the first generation of mixed blood.”

Hernández Aquino, Luis. 1993. Diccionario de voces indígenas de Puerto Rico. Tercera edición, Editorial Cultural, Esmaco, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico.

Hill, Jonathan D. and Fernando Santos-Granero (eds.). 2002. Comparative Arawakan Histories. Rethinking Language Family and Cultural Area in Amazonia. University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago.

Jiménez, Mariano II and Mariano G. Jiménez 2003 El Güije. Cuentos de Antaño http://www.guije.com/index.htm

Johnson, Kim (accessed 5/3/2005) The story of the 'Caribs and Arawaks' http://www.raceandhistory.com/Taino/Caribs.htm

López de Gómara, Francisco. Primera Parte. La historia general de las Indias. Historiadores primitivos de Indias. Enrique de Vedia, ed. Madrid: Imprenta de M. Ribadeneyra, 1877.

Maciques Sánchez, Esteban 2004. El arte rupestre del Caribe insular: estilo y cronología in Rupestreweb, http://rupestreweb.tripod.com/maciques.html

Martinez Arango, Felipe, 1997. “Los Aborigines de la Cuenca de Santiago de Cuba.” Ediciones Universal, Miami.

Mendez, Eugenio Fernandez 1981. Cronicas de Puerto Rico, Desde la Conquista Hasta Nuestros Dias (1493-1955) Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras.

Miner Solá, Edwin 2002 Diccionario Taino Ilustrado. Ediciones Servilibros (Serie Puerto Rico Prehistórico, 1). San Juan, Indigenous language dictionary arranged thematically with numerous illustrations, many in color.

Nápoles Fajardo, Juan Cristobal (known as Cucalambé 1829 - 1862?). Cucalambé (Décimas Cubanas. Selección de Rumores del Hórmigo) Ediciones Universal Miami 2nd Edition1999.

Nicholson, Desmond V. 1983. The Story of the Arawaks in Antigua and Bermuda. Antigua Archeological Society. Antigua West Indies.

Olsen, Fred 1974. On the Trail of the Arawaks. Civilization of the American Indian, v 129. University of Oklahoma Press. Norman. Oklahoma.

Pané, Fray Ramón (circa 1475-circa 1498) An Account of the Antiquities of the Indians: Chronicles of the New World Encounter (Latin America in Translation/En Traduccion/En Traducao) Jose Juan Arom (Editor), Susan C. Griswold (translator). Duke University Press, Durham and London. (1999 edition).

Pané, Fray Ramón. Relación de Fray Ramon de las antigüedades de los indios. Cuba primitiva. Habana: Miguel de Villa, 1883.

Papá Lino 2002 "¡Qué Te Parece, Boricua" Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas, 2nd ed. "El dios taíno Yuquiyú es el mismo 'Loukuo' de la mitología escandinava." Cited from http://groups.msn.com/CarlitosWay/triviadeborinquen.msnw

Puerto Rico, Commonwealth. 1998 Reglamento de Pesca de Puerto Rico Departamento de Recursos Naturales y Ambientales. Salvador Salas Quintana (Secretario). http://www.drna.gobierno.pr/reglamentospdf/DRNA/Reglamento%20de%20Pesca.pdf
Rivas, Anthony T. 2000 Enigmas of Cuban Spanish Proteus, Newsletter of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators Vol. IX, No. 3 Summer 2000 http://www.najit.org/proteus/v9n3/rivas_v9n3.htm “While lacking conclusive proof, some linguists believe that the marked intonation pattern exhibited by some natives of the former Oriente province originates in Arawak, a language spoken by the indigenous Taíno people, who survived for a limited time just in this province.”

Robineau, Lionel (editor) 1991. Towards a Caribbean Pharmacopoeia. End-Caribe, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

Robiou La Marche, Sebastián 2003. Taínos and Caribes. Las culturas aborígenes antillanas. Editorial Punto y Coma, San Juan Puerto Rico.

Ross, Ann H. 2004 Cranial evidence of pre-contact multiple population expansions in the Caribbean Caribbean Journal of Science. 40(3). 2004. 291-298. “The most recognized Caribbean population dispersal hypothesis is a direct jump from South America followed by dispersal into the Lesser Antilles and westward. This evidence primarily comes from the archaeological record, as skeletal material is scarce in the Caribbean due to generally poor preservation. This study evaluated the direct jump hypothesis along with other possible migration routes using cranial landmark data. A study of three-dimensional facial shape variation among pre-Contact Taino groups from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, and pre-Contact groups from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Florida was conducted. Cuban Tainos differed from other Caribbean Taino groups, suggesting a dissimilar ancestry. No significant difference between the Caribbean Taino (excluding Cuba) groups and the South American groups was observed, a result that was consistent with the archaeological record for dispersal from South America into the Lesser Antilles. Cuba was also very distinct from the Florida series, a finding that contradicts hypotheses of possible migrations across the Straits of Florida. The differentiation of the Cuban Tainos from the rest of the American and Caribbean series suggests another source of population influx.”

Rouse, Irving 1992. The Tainos. Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus. Yale University Press. New Haven and London.

de la Sagra, Ramón 1843. Historia física, política y natural de la Isla de Cuba, Libreria de Arthus Bertrand, Paris.

Schwartz, Marion. 1997. A History of Dogs in the Early Americas. Yale University Press, New Haven pp. 76-78.

Sears, William H. 1977. Seaborne contacts between early cultures in the lower southeastern United States and Middle (-) through South America. In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 1-15.

Suarez, Constantino 1921 Vocabulario Cubano, Libreria Cervantes, Havana and Perlado, Páez y Cía, Madrid.

Sued Badillo, Jalil. 1985. Las Cacicas Indoantillanas, Revista del Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña 87, 1-26.

UCTP (United Confederation of Taíno People) 2002. Diccionario de Voces Taína’ (Taíno Dictionary) http://www.uctp.org/VocesIndigena.html

Vela, Enrique (editor). 1988. La navegación entre los Mayas. Arqueología Mexicana 6 (number 33, September October 1988) 4-5.

Vespucio, Américo (circa 1454-1512), Fragments and Letters found at: http://www.e-libro.net/E-libro-viejo/gratis/nvomundo.pdf http://www.unsl.edu.ar/librosgratis/gratis/nvomundo.pdf
http://www.banrep.gov.co/blaavirtual/credencial/hamerica.htm translated '.. the women go naked and are libidinous, lewd, and lustful but despite this their bodies are beautiful and clean...."

Wilbert, Johannes1977. Navigators of the Winter Sun In: The Sea in the pre-Colombian World. Elizabeth P. Benson, editor. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collections, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington, D.C. pp. 16-44.

Vazquez Doris M. 1993 (accessed 11/7/2005) Puerto Rican Folktales
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1993/2/93.02.12.x.html#top

Wilson, Samuel M. 1990 Hispaniola Caribbean Cheifdoms in the Age of Columbus. University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa and London. ISBN: 0817304622

Zayas y Alfonso, Alfredo 1914. “Lexografía Antillana” El Siglo XX Press, Havana.

Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T18:53:48Z

Jigue:

=neo-Taíno nations=

If one considers the high Taino to be limited to island [[Arawak]] who resided in Puerto-Rico, then the indigenous Taíno nations were found in Cuba, the Lucaya of the Bahamas, Jamaica, and to a lesser extent from Haiti and Quisqueya (approximately the Dominican Republic) can be referred to as neo-Taíno nations.

Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T17:37:43Z

Jigue: Stubb

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T17:36:06Z

Jigue: Roots of my interest in Cuban matters

This is a re-write of my own work and is the most complete on line summary of the Neo-Taino I know of; the citations to books are taken from my own very complete library on the topic. El Jigue 7-7-08

This subject is near to my heart my grandfather who fought in the 1895-1898 Cuban War of Independence had considerable neo-Taino ancestry. El Jigue 7-7-08

:You need to prove your authorship, otherwise it looks like plagiarism from Wikipedia - we can't use their free-licensed text here. --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] [[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]] 19:24, 7 July 2008 (EDT)

Ed to prove who I am see:

Publications

http://hort.oregonstate.edu/files/Faculty_Staff/Emeritus/Daley/DaleyPublications.html

http://hort.oregonstate.edu/files/Faculty_Staff/Emeritus/Daley/DaleyHomePage.html

Larry Daley Professor Emeritus

To prove I am El Jigue read one of my papers at:

http://hort.oregonstate.edu/files/Faculty_Staff/Emeritus/Daley/DaleyHomePage.html

To prove I wrote the article

go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neo-Taino_nations

then go to history

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Neo-Taino_nations&dir=prev&action=history

In this history section you will see all the nonsense I had to put up with "overthere"

If you want to know the roots of my interest and long ago experience in Cuba, you might read "Narrations of War" in Cuba preliminary and old drafts are found at:

http://narrations-of-war-in-cuba.blogspot.com/2006/09/index-narrations-of-war-in-cuba.html
n

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T16:35:32Z

Jigue: Proof 8

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T16:23:35Z

Jigue: Proof 6

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T16:21:12Z

Jigue: Proof4

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T16:17:47Z

Jigue: Proof 3

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-08T16:15:03Z

Jigue: Proof2

Fabio Grobart

2008-07-07T23:01:24Z

Jigue: stubb

Stubb:

Fabio Grobart, was starting from about 1924 to well into the Castro regime, the principal communist agent in Cuba.

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-07T22:52:28Z

Jigue:

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-07T22:51:59Z

Jigue: Explanation

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-07T22:41:58Z

Jigue: Explanation

This is a re-write of my own work and is the most complete on line summary of the Neo-Taino I know of; the citations to books are taken from my own very complete library on the topic. El Jigue 7-7-08

Talk:Neo-Taino

2008-07-07T22:30:42Z

Jigue: Explanation

This is a re-write of my own work. El Jigue

Cuba

2008-07-07T21:11:11Z

Jigue: /* As part of Spain */ /evaluating Gott reference

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
|map =Cuba rel94.jpg
|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
|arms =Arms of Cuba.PNG
|capital =Havana
|capital-raw =
|government =Communist
|government-raw =
|language =Spanish
|king =
|queen =
|monarch-raw =
|president =Raul Castro
|president-raw =
|chancellor =
|chancellor-raw =
|pm =
|pm-raw =
|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
|pop-basis =
|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
|currency =peso
|idd =
|tld =
}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13. Gott's history aside from ideological inferences, is generally accurate for this time period. However, for more recent events in Cuba the classical reference Thomas, Hugh (1998) Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press; Updated edition (April, 1998) ISBN 0-306-80827-7 is far more reliable and accurate</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans, and later by covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Cuba

2008-07-07T20:47:44Z

Jigue: /* As part of Spain */ NeoTaino link

{{Country
|name =''República de Cuba''
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|flag =Flag of Cuba.png
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|capital =Havana
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|government =Communist
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|language =Spanish
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|president =Raul Castro
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|area =42,803 sq mi
|pop =11,382,820 (2006)
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|gdp =
|gdp-year =$44.54 billion (2006)
|gdp-pc =$3,900 (2006)
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}}
'''Cuba''' is an island located in the [[Caribbean Sea]], 90 miles south of [[Florida]]. It is the only [[Communist]] country in the Western Hemisphere.

==People and Religion==
Cuba is a multiracial society with a population of mainly [[Spanish]] and [[African]] origins. The largest organized religion is the [[Roman Catholic Church]], but evangelical [[Protestantism|Protestant]] denominations continue to grow rapidly. Afro-Cuban religions, a blend of native African religions and Roman Catholicism, are widely practiced in Cuba. Officially, Cuba has been an [[atheist]] state for most of the Castro era. In 1962, the government of [[Fidel Castro]] seized and shut down more than 400 Catholic schools, charging that they spread dangerous beliefs among the people. In 1991, however, the [[Communist]] Party lifted its prohibition against religious believers seeking membership, and a year later the constitution was amended to characterize the state as secular instead of atheist.

While the Cuban constitution recognizes the right of citizens to [[freedom of religion]], the government de facto restricts that freedom. Twenty-two denominations, including [[Presbyterian]]s, [[Episcopalian]]s, and [[Methodist]]s, are members of the Cuban Council of Churches (CCC). Most CCC members are officially recognized by the State, though several, including the [[Evangelical Lutheran Church]], are not registered and are recognized only through their membership in the CCC. Another 31 officially recognized denominations, including [[Jehovah's Witnesses]] and the small [[Jewish]] community, do not belong to the CCC. The government does not favor any one particular religion or church; however, the government appears to be most tolerant of those churches that maintain close relations to the State through the CCC. Unregistered religious groups experience various degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. The Ministry of Interior engages in active efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including through surveillance, infiltration and [[harassment]] of religious professionals and practitioners. The most independent religious organizations--including the Catholic Church, the largest independent institution in Cuba today--continue to operate under significant restrictions and pressure imposed on them by the Cuban regime. The Cuban Government continues to refuse to allow the church to have independent [[printing press]] capabilities, full access to the [[media]], the ability to train enough [[priest]]s for its needs or allow adequate numbers of foreign priests to work in the country, or the ability to establish socially useful institutions, including schools and universities, hospitals and clinics, and nursing homes. All registered denominations must report to the Ministry of Interior's Office of Religious Affairs.

The visit of Pope [[John Paul II]] in January 1998 was seen as an important, positive event for bringing a message of hope and the need for respect of human rights. Unfortunately, these improvements did not continue once the Pope left the island. While some visas were issued for additional priests to enter Cuba around the time of the visit, the regime has again sharply restricted issuance of visas. Moreover, despite explicit regime guarantees and repeated follow-up requests, the regime has refused to permit the Catholic Church to establish [[Internet]] connections or an intranet among [[diocese]]s on the Island. In a pastoral letter entitled "There is No Country Without Virtue" ("No Hay Patria Sin Virtud"), the Cuban Conference of Catholic Bishops in February 2003 openly criticized the government's strict control over the activities of the Catholic Church, especially state restrictions on religious education and Church access to mass media, as well as the increasingly [[amoral]] and irreligious character of Cuban society under Communist rule.

Other Cuban religious groups--including [[evangelical Christians]], whose numbers continue to grow rapidly--also have benefited from the relative relaxation of official restrictions on religious organizations and activities. Although particularly hard hit by emigration, Cuba's small Jewish community continues to hold services in Havana and has members in Santiago, Camaguey, and other parts of the island. See also the Department's report on international religious freedom for further information.

==Government==
Cuba is a totalitarian state formerly controlled by Fidel Castro, who is chief of state, head of government, First Secretary of the PCC, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Castro seeks to control most aspects of Cuban life through the Communist Party and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, and the state security apparatus. In March 2003, Castro announced his intention to remain in power for life, but has since ceded power to his brother, [[Raul Castro]]. The Ministry of Interior is the principal organ of state security and control.

According to the [[Soviet]]-style Cuban constitution of 1976, the National Assembly of People's Power, and its Council of State when the body is not in session, has supreme authority in the Cuban system. Since the National Assembly meets only twice a year for a few days each time, the 31-member Council of State wields power. The Council of Ministers, through its 9-member executive committee, handles the administration of the economy, which is state-controlled except for a tiny and shriveling open-market sector. Fidel Castro is President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers and his brother Raul serves as First Vice President of both bodies as well as Minister of Defense.

Although the constitution theoretically provides for independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and to the Council of State. The People's Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. [[Due process]] is routinely denied to Cuban citizens, particularly in cases involving [[political]] offenses. The constitution states that all legally recognized [[civil liberties]] can be denied to anyone who opposes the "decision of the Cuban people to build socialism." Citizens can be and are jailed for terms of 3 years or more for simply criticizing the communist system or Fidel Castro.

The Communist Party is constitutionally recognized as Cuba's only legal political party. The party monopolizes all government positions, including judicial offices. Though not a formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official positions and professional advancement in most areas, although a tiny number of non-party members have on extremely rare occasions been permitted by the controlling Communist authorities to serve in the National Assembly. The Communist Party or one of its front organizations approves candidates for any elected office. Citizens do not have the right to change their government. In March 2003, the government carried out one of the most brutal crackdowns on peaceful opposition in the history of Cuba when it arrested 75 [[human rights]] activists, independent journalists and opposition figures on various charges, including aiding a foreign power and violating national security laws. Authorities subjected the detainees to summary trials and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Amnesty International identified all 75 as "prisoners of conscience." The European Union (EU) condemned their arrests and in June 2003, it announced its decision to implement the following actions: limit bilateral high-level governmental visits, reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events, reduce economic assistance and invite Cuban dissidents to national-day celebrations. See also the Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Cuba.

Although the constitution allows legislative proposals backed by at least 10,000 citizens to be submitted directly to the National Assembly, in 2002 the government rejected a petition known as the Varela Project, supporters of which submitted 11,000 signatures calling for a national referendum on political and economic reforms. Many of the 75 activists arrested in March 2003 participated in the Varela Project. In October 2003, Project Varela organizers submitted a second petition to the National Assembly with an additional 14,000 signatures. Since April 2004, some prisoners of conscience have been released, seven of whom were in the group of 75; all suffered from moderate to severe medical conditions and many of them continue to be harassed by state security even after their release from prison. Moreover, in response to a planned protest by activists at the French Embassy in Havana in late July 2005, Cuban security forces detained 33 opposition members, three of whom had been released on medical grounds. At least 16 other activists were either arrested or sentenced to prison since 2004 for opposing the Cuban Government. There has also been a resurgence of harassment of various activist groups, most notably the "Damas en Blanca," a group of wives of political prisoners.

On July 31, 2006 the Castro regime announced a "temporary" transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who until that time served as head of the Cuban armed forces and second-in-command of the government and the Communist Party. It was the first time in the 47 years of Fidel Castro’s rule that power had been transferred. The transfer took place due to intestinal surgery of an undetermined nature.

On February 19, 2008, Fidel Castro announced that he would officially step down as leader of Cuba. Five days later, on February 24, Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, was elected the new President of Cuba.

===Foreign Relations===
Cuba's once-ambitious foreign policy has been scaled back and redirected as a result of economic hardship and the end of the Cold War. Cuba aims to find new sources of trade, aid, and foreign investment and to promote opposition to U.S. policy, especially the trade embargo and the 1996 Libertad Act. Cuba has relations with over 160 countries and has civilian assistance workers--principally physicians and nurses--in more than 20 nations.

Since the end of Soviet backing, Cuba appears to have largely abandoned monetary support for guerrilla movements that typified its involvement in regional politics in Latin America and Africa, though it maintains relations with several guerrilla and terrorist groups and provides refuge for some of their members in Cuba. Cuba's support for Latin guerrilla movements, its Marxist-Leninist government, and its alignment with the U.S.S.R. led to its isolation in the hemisphere. Cuba is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), although its present government has been excluded from participation since 1962 for incompatibility with the principles of the inter-American system. Cuba hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in September 2006 and will hold the NAM presidency until 2009. In the context of the NAM and its ordinary diplomacy, Cuba has developed friendly relations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba expanded its military presence abroad, spending millions of dollars in exporting revolutions; deployments reached 50,000 troops in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia, 1,500 in Nicaragua, and hundreds more elsewhere. In Angola, Cuban troops, supported logistically by the U.S.S.R., backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its effort to take power after Portugal granted Angola its independence. Cuban forces played a key role in Ethiopia's war against Somalia and remained there in substantial numbers as a garrison force for a decade. Cubans served in a non-combat advisory role in Mozambique and the Congo. Cuba also used the Congo as a logistical support center for Cuba's Angola mission. In the late 1980s, Cuba began to pull back militarily. Cuba unilaterally removed its forces from Ethiopia, met the timetable of the 1988 Angola-Namibia accords by completing the withdrawal of its forces from Angola before July 1991, and ended military assistance to Nicaragua following the Sandinistas' 1990 electoral defeat.

EU-Cuban diplomatic relations have suffered as a result of the March 2003 crackdown on dissidents. In June 2004, EU members imposed restrictive measures on Cuba including inviting dissidents to national day celebrations and suspending high-level meetings between EU members and the Cuban Government. In January 2005, though, the restrictions were suspended in an effort to re-engage the regime as a means of advancing the EU’s policy of encouraging reform while preparing for the transition.

Spain is among the most important foreign investors in Cuba. The ruling Zapatero government continues Spain’s longstanding policy of encouraging further investment and trade with Cuba. Cuba imports more goods from Spain (almost 13% of total imports) than from any other country. Spanish economic involvement with Cuba is exclusively centered on joint venture enterprises that provide financial benefit to the Cuban Government through state-owned firms. Spain’s desire to provide support to its business community often impedes its willingness to pressure the Cuban Government on political reform and human rights issues.

Cuba’s bilateral relationship with Venezuela has helped keep the Cuban economy afloat. The "Integral Cooperation Accord" signed by Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in October 2000 laid the groundwork for a quasi-barter exchange of Venezuelan oil for Cuban goods and services that has since become a lifeline for Cuba. For Cuba, the benefits of the cooperation accord are subsidized petroleum and increased hard currency flows. The original agreement allowed for the sale, at market prices, of up to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil and derivatives (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc.) by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company, to its Cuban counterpart, CUPET. The number of barrels of oil Venezuela began selling to Cuba has risen to over 90,000 barrels daily. Under the accord, PDVSA extended preferential payment terms to CUPET, including 90-day short-term financing instead of the 30 days offered to its other customers and, in lieu of a standard letter of credit backed by an international bank, PDVSA accepted IOUs from Cuba's Banco Nacional, the central banking entity responsible for servicing Havana's foreign debt. In August 2001, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez amended the 2000 accord to allow Venezuela to compensate the Cuban Government in hard currency for any and all Cuban products and services originally intended as in-kind payment for Venezuelan oil. As a result, Cuban exports of goods and services to Venezuela climbed from $34 million in 2001 to more than $150 million in 2003. Venezuelan ministries are contracting with Cuba for everything from generic pharmaceuticals to pre-fabricated housing and dismantled sugar mill equipment. On April 28, 2005, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic agreements in Havana, covering areas as diverse as oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, electricity, transportation, health, and education. Venezuela is also committed to sending more than $400 million in various products duty free to Cuba and plans to open an office of state-owned commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to finance imports and exports between the two countries, while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de Cuba in Caracas. Increased economic engagement along with the rapid growth in Cuban sales to Caracas has established Venezuela as one of the island's largest export markets.

A series of recent economic agreements between Cuba and China have strengthened trade between the two countries. Sino-Cuban trade totaled more than $525 million in 2004, according to China Customs statistics. This represents an increase of more than 47% over 2003. Most of China’s aid involves in-kind supply of goods or technical assistance. During President Hu-Jintao’s visit to Cuba in November 2004, China signed investment-related memorandums of understanding (MOUs) estimated at more than $500 million, according to press reports. If these MOUs are fully realized, they would represent a sharp increase in known Chinese investments in Cuba. In addition to these MOUs, a number of commercial accords were signed at the first-ever Cuba-China Investment and Trade Forum. China also plans to invest approximately $500 million in a nickel operation in Moa in the eastern province of Holguin. According to the MOU, Cuba will own 51% of the enterprise and Chinese-owned Minmetals the remaining 49%. Chinese and Venezuelan economic support, including investment and direct aid, have given Cuba the space to eliminate many of the tentative open market reforms Cuba put in place during the depth of its mid-1990s economic crisis.

The Russian prime minister visited Cuba in October 2006, signaling a new effort to expand trade and investment, albeit financed by Russian credit. Russia set aside, for the moment, more than USD 20 billion in Soviet-era debt, restructured post-1991 debt, and extended a new credit line to Cuba. The new credit line is for USD 355 million repayable over 10 years at an interest rate of five percent. The new credit is conditioned in that it must be used to purchase Russian cars, trucks, planes, as well as to finance Cuban energy and transport infrastructure projects, including air navigation systems. Russia further agreed to restructure USD 166 million in debt accumulated since 1993. Both nations also signed an agreement on military equipment and technical services.

==Defense==
Under Castro, Cuba is a highly militarized society. From 1975 until the late 1980s, massive Soviet military assistance enabled Cuba to upgrade its military capabilities and project power abroad. The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba throughout most of the 1980s exceeded deliveries in any year since the military build-up during the 1962 missile crisis.

With the loss of Soviet-era subsidies in the early 1990s, Cuba's armed forces have shrunk considerably, both in terms of numbers and assets. Combined active duty troop strength for all three services is estimated at 50,000 to 55,000 personnel (compared to some 235,000 on active duty 10 years ago) and much of Cuba's weaponry appears to be in storage. Cuba's air force, once considered among the best equipped in Latin America, no longer merits that distinction, though it still possesses advanced aircraft and weapons systems; the navy has become primarily a coastal defense force with no blue water capability. The Cuban army is still one of the region's more formidable, but it also is much reduced and no longer has the considerable resources necessary to project power abroad.

The military plays a growing role in the economy and manages a number of hotels in the tourist sector. The country's two paramilitary organizations, the Territorial Militia Troops and the Youth Labor Army, have a reduced training capability. Cuba also adopted a "war of the people" strategy that highlights the defensive nature of its capabilities. The government continues to maintain a large state security apparatus under the Ministry of Interior to repress dissent within Cuba, and in the last decade has formed special forces units to confront indications of popular unrest.

==Human Rights Issues==
Cuba’s totalitarian regime controls all aspects of life through the Communist Party (CP) and its affiliated mass organizations, the government bureaucracy and the Department of State Security. The latter is tasked with monitoring, infiltrating and tormenting the country’s beleaguered human rights community. The government continues to commit serious abuses, and denies citizens the right to change their government.

The government incarcerates people for their peaceful political beliefs or activities. The total number of political prisoners and detainees is unknown, because the government does not disclose such information and keeps its prisons off-limits to human rights organizations. As of July 1, 2006, at least 316 Cubans were being held behind bars for political crimes, according to the independent Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

The government places severe limitations on freedom of speech and press. Reporters Without Borders calls Cuba the world’s second biggest jailer of journalists. The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press insofar as they "conform to the aims of a socialist society." The government considers the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and foreign mainstream magazines and newspapers to be enemy propaganda. Access to the Internet is strictly controlled and given only to those deemed ideologically trustworthy.

Freedom of assembly is not a right in today’s Cuba. The law punishes any unauthorized assembly of more than three persons. The government also restricts freedom of movement and prevents some citizens from emigrating because of their political views. Cubans need explicit "exit permission" from their government to leave their country, and many people are effectively held hostage by the Cuban government, despite the fact that they have received travel documents issued by other countries.

The government does not tolerate dissent. It targets dissenters by directing militants from the CP, the Communist Youth League, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Association of Veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and other groups to stage a public protest against the dissenter, usually in front of his/her house. These protests, called "acts of repudiation," involve the shouting of insults and the occasional use of violence. The events generate intense fear and are aimed at ostracizing and intimidating those who question the government’s policies.

Prison conditions are harsh and life-threatening. Although physical torture is rare, cruel treatment of prisoners – particularly political prisoners and detainees – is common. Prison authorities frequently beat, neglect, isolate and deny medical treatment to inmates. Authorities often deny family visits, adequate nutrition, exposure to sunshine, and pay for work. Overcrowding is rife. Inmates friendly with prison guards often receive preferential treatment. This leads to abuse, whereby connected inmates assault others with impunity. Desperation inside the country’s estimated 200 prisons and work camps is at high levels and suicides and acts of self-mutilation occur. Thousands of Cubans are currently imprisoned for "dangerousness," in the absence of any crime.

Worker rights are largely denied. The law does not allow Cuban workers to form and join unions of their choice. The government-approved unions do not act as trade unions, promote worker rights or protect the right to strike; rather, they are geared toward ensuring that production goals are met. Some workers lose their jobs because of their political beliefs. Salaries are not high enough to meet food and clothing costs; consequently, many Cubans are forced into small-scale embezzlement or pilfering from their employers.

==Economy==
The Cuban Government continues to adhere to socialist principles in organizing its state-controlled economy. Most of the means of production are owned and run by the government and, according to Cuban Government statistics, about 75% of the labor force is employed by the state. The actual figure is closer to 93%, with some 150,000 small farmers and another 150,000 "cuentapropistas," or holders of licenses for self-employment, representing a mere 2.1% of the nearly 4.7 million-person workforce.

The Cuban economy is still recovering from a decline in gross domestic product of at least 35% between 1989 and 1993 as the loss of Soviet subsidies laid bare the economy's fundamental weaknesses. To alleviate the economic crisis, in 1993 and 1994 the government introduced a few market-oriented reforms, including opening to tourism, allowing foreign investment, legalizing the dollar, and authorizing self-employment for some 150 occupations. These measures resulted in modest economic growth; the official statistics, however, are deficient and as a result provide an incomplete measure of Cuba's real economic situation. Living conditions at the end of the decade remained well below the 1989 level. Lower sugar and nickel prices, increases in petroleum costs, a post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism, devastating hurricanes in November 2001 and August 2004, and a major drought in the eastern half of the island caused severe economic disruptions. Growth rates continued to stagnate in 2002 and 2003, while 2004 and 2005 showed some renewed growth. Moreover, the gap in the standard of living has widened between those with access to dollars and those without. Jobs that can earn dollar salaries or tips from foreign businesses and tourists have become highly desirable. It is not uncommon to see doctors, engineers, scientists, and other professionals working in restaurants or as taxi drivers.

Castro’s regime has pulled back on earlier market reforms and is seeking tighter state control over the economy. The Cuban Government is aggressively pursuing a policy of recentralization, making it increasingly difficult for foreigners to conduct business on the island. Likewise, Cuban citizens are adversely affected by reversion to a peso economy.

Prolonged austerity and the state-controlled economy's inefficiency in providing adequate goods and services have created conditions for a flourishing informal economy in Cuba. As the variety and amount of goods available in state-run peso stores has declined, Cubans have turned increasingly to the black market to obtain needed food, clothing, and household items. Pilferage of items from the work place to sell on the black market or illegally offering services on the sidelines of official employment is common, and Cuban companies regularly figure 15% in losses into their production plans to cover this. Recognizing that Cubans must engage in such activity to make ends meet and that attempts to shut the informal economy down would be futile, the government concentrates its control efforts on ideological appeals against theft and shutting down large organized operations. A report by an independent economist and opposition leader speculates that more than 40% of the Cuban economy operates in the informal sector. Since 2005, the government has carried out a large anti-corruption campaign as it continues efforts to recentralize much of the economy under the regime's control.

Sugar, which has been the mainstay of the island's economy for most of its history, has fallen upon troubled times. In 1989, production was more than 8 million tons, but by the mid-1990s, it had fallen to around 3.5 million tons. Inefficient planting and cultivation methods, poor management, shortages of spare parts, and poor transportation infrastructure combined to deter the recovery of the sector. In June 2002, the government announced its intention to implement a "comprehensive transformation" of this declining sector. Almost half the existing sugar mills were closed, and more than 100,000 workers were laid off. The government has promised that these workers will be "retrained" in other fields, though it is unlikely they will find new jobs in Cuba's stagnant economy. Moreover, despite such efforts, the sugar harvest continued to decline, falling to 2.1 million tons in 2003, the smallest since 1933. The harvest was not much better in 2004, with 2.3 million tons, and even worse in 2005, with 1.3 million tons.

In the mid-1990s, tourism surpassed sugar as the primary source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for development, and a top official cast it as at the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism sector. Roughly 1.7 million tourists visited Cuba in 2001, generating about $1.85 billion in gross revenues; in 2003, the number rose to 1.9 million tourists, predominantly from Canada and the European Union, generating revenue of $2.1 billion. The number of tourists to Cuba in 2004 crossed the 2 million mark (2.05 million), including the so-called "medical tourists" from other Latin American countries seeking free medical treatment at Cuban facilities. In 2005 the number of tourists increased to 2.32 million.

Nickel is now the biggest earner among Cuba's goods exports. The nickel industry has been operating close to full capacity and therefore currently stagnant, but it is benefiting from unprecedented increases in world market prices. Revenues have more than doubled from $450 million in 2001 to $1 billion in 2005. The government is making attempts to increase extraction capacity.

Remittances also play a large role in Cuba's economy. Cuba does not publish accurate economic statistics, but academic sources estimate that remittances total from $600 million to $1 billion per year, with most coming from families in the United States. U.S. regulation changes announced in June 2004 allow remittances to be sent only to the remitter's immediate family; they cannot be remitted to certain Cuban Government officials and members of the Cuban Communist party; and the total amount of family remittances that an authorized traveler may carry to Cuba is now $300, reduced from $3,000. (See also the Commission on Assistance to a Free Cuba report at www.cafc.gov, cited below.) The Cuban Government captures these dollar remittances by allowing Cuban citizens to shop in state-run "dollar stores," which sell food, household, and clothing items at a high mark-up averaging over 240% of face value.

Beginning in November 2004, Castro mandated that U.S. dollars be exchanged for "convertible pesos"--a local currency that can be used in special shops on the island but has no value internationally--for a 10% charge. The 10% conversion fee disproportionately affects Cubans who receive remittances from relatives in the U.S.

To help keep the economy afloat, Cuba has actively courted foreign investment, which often takes the form of joint ventures with the Cuban Government holding half of the equity, management contracts for tourism facilities, or financing for the sugar harvest. A new legal framework laid out in 1995 allowed for majority foreign ownership in joint ventures with the Cuban Government. In practice, majority ownership by the foreign partner is nonexistent. Of the 540 joint ventures formed since the Cuban Government issued the first legislation on foreign investment in 1982, 397 remained at the end of 2002, and 287 at the close of 2005. Due in large part to Castro’s recentralization efforts, it is estimated that one joint venture and two small cooperative production ventures have closed each week since 2000. Responding to this decline in the number of joint ventures, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Investment explained that foreign investment is not a pillar of development in and of itself. Moreover, the hostile investment climate, characterized by inefficient and overpriced labor imposed by the communist government, dense regulations, and an impenetrable bureaucracy, continue to deter foreign investment. Foreign direct investment flows decreased from $448 million in 2000 to $39 million in 2001 and were at zero in 2002. In July 2002, the European Union, through its embassies in Havana, transmitted to the Cuban Government a document that outlined the problems encountered in operating joint ventures in Cuba. Titled "The Legal and Administrative Framework for Foreign Trade and Investment by European Companies in Cuba," the paper noted the difficulty in obtaining such basic necessities as work and residence permits for foreign employees--even exit visas and drivers licenses. It complained that the Government of Cuba gave EU joint venture partners little or no say in hiring Cuban staff, often forced the joint venture to contract employees who were not professionally suitable, and yet reserved to itself the right to fire any worker at any time without cause. It noted administrative difficulties in securing financing and warned that "the difficulties of state firms in meeting their payment obligations are seriously threatening some firms and increasing the risk premium which all operators have to pay for their operations with Cuba." The Cuban Government offered no response.

Investors are also constrained by the U.S.-Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act that provides sanctions for those who "traffic" in property expropriated from U.S. citizens. More than a dozen companies have pulled out of Cuba or altered their plans to invest there due to the threat of action under the Libertad Act.

In an attempt to provide jobs for workers laid off due to the economic crisis and bring some forms of black market activity into more controllable channels, the Cuban Government in 1993 legalized self-employment for some 150 occupations. This small private sector is tightly controlled and regulated. Set monthly fees must be paid regardless of income earned, and frequent inspections yield stiff fines when any of the many self-employment regulations are violated. Rather than expanding private sector opportunities, in recent years, the government has been attempting to squeeze more of these private sector entrepreneurs out of business and back to the public sector. Many have opted to enter the informal economy or black market, and others have closed. These measures have reduced private sector employment from a peak of 209,000 to less than 100,000 now. Moreover, a large number of those people who nominally are self-employed in reality are well-connected fronts for military officials. No recent figures have been made available, but the Government of Cuba reported at the end of 2001 that tax receipts from the self-employed fell 8.1% due to the decrease in the number of these taxpayers. Since October 1, 2004, the Cuban Government no longer issues new licenses for 40 of the approximately 150 categories of self-employment, including for the most popular ones, such as private restaurants.

In June 2005, 2,000 more licenses were revoked from self-employed workers as a means to reassert government control over the economy and to stem growing inequalities associated with self-employment. The licenses for self-employed workers were typically for service-oriented work, allowing the Cuban people to eke out a small living in an otherwise impoverished state. Moreover, workers in Cuba’s tourist sector--at resorts where native Cubans are prohibited unless they are on the job--have been prohibited by a Ministry of Tourism regulation from accepting gifts, tips, or even food from foreigners, in a further attempt at increasing the tourist apartheid that exists on the island.

A 2004 UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report recommends that Cuba "redesign the parameters of competition in the public, private and cooperative sectors [and] redefine the role of the state in the economy." It recommends more flexibility in self-employment regulations, property diversification, economic decentralization, and a role for the market. The Cuban Government, however, is today reversing the economic liberalization of the 90s and re-centralizing its economy. Evidence of this is found in the decline in the number of firms participating in the perfeccionamiento empresarial, or entrepreneurial improvement (EI), program, which is based on capitalist management techniques. EI was instituted in the 1980s as a military-led pilot project, and in 1998, the Cuban Government extended it from military to civilian "parastatals," reportedly to foster capitalist competitiveness. At first, the government highlighted participating companies' achievements in cutting costs and boosting profitability and quality and suggested that the increased autonomy of state managers under EI was producing an efficient form of socialism with a strong link between pay and performance. However, many in the Communist Party, even Castro himself, resisted EI. Many of the original participants have since left the program and participating firms have seen little growth in revenue. The EI program has fallen far short of expectations and the Cuban Government no longer heralds its successes or its future prospects. In 2003 the Cuban Government also tightened foreign exchange controls, requiring that state companies hold money in convertible pesos and obtain special authorization from the central bank before making hard currency transactions. Practically speaking, this restricted companies from using the dollar for internal trade. Following this, in 2004 the government announced that all state entities must stop charging in U.S. dollars and charge only in pesos for any products and services not considered a part of a company’s "fundamental social objective." It also recently implemented new requirements to channel imports through monopolistic Soviet-style wholesale distribution companies.

Cuba's precarious economic position is complicated by the high price it must pay for foreign financing. The Cuban Government defaulted on most of its international debt in 1986 and does not have access to credit from international financial institutions like the World Bank, which means Havana must rely heavily on short-term loans to finance imports, chiefly food and fuel. Because of its poor credit rating, an $11 billion hard currency debt, and the risks associated with Cuban investment, interest rates have reportedly been as high as 22%. In 2002, citing chronic delinquencies and mounting short-term debts, Moody's lowered Cuba's credit rating to Caa1 -- "speculative grade, very poor." Dunn and Bradstreet rate Cuba as one of the riskiest economies in the world.

===Health-care===
Health care in Cuba follows the model of [[socialized medicine]]; all doctors are employees of the government, and the government does not charge citizens for health care, though many believe the services provided are alarmingly inferior for anyone but the party elite. [[Fred Thompson]] wrote:
:''"Castro won't allow observers in to monitor his nation's true state, but defectors tell us that many Cubans live with permanent malnutrition and long waits for even basic medical services. Many treatments we take for granted aren't available at all -- except to the Communist elite or foreigners with dollars. For them, Castro keeps "show" clinics equipped with the best medicines and technologies available."''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/05/03/the_myth_of_cuban_health_care&Comments=true|title=The myth of Cuban health care|author=Fred Thompson|date=2007-05-03|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML|work=Townhall.com}}</ref>

The country's chief neurosurgeon, [[Hilda Morina]], publicly protested the government's role in the deterioration of the health care system.

===Education===
According to the CIA World Factbook, the education system has achieved a 97% [[literacy]] rate on the island.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html|work=Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook|title=Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|date=2007-07-19|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref>

Assistance at universities even in the provinces, while nominally free, requires demonstration of loyalty to the government, such as belonging to the informer network ''Comités de Defensa de la Revolución,'' the Militias, and assistance at pro-government demonstrations.<ref>González Leiva, Juan Carlos 2008 (accessed 8-10-08) EXPULSAN DE UNIVERSIDAD A ESTUDIANTE POR MOTIVOS POLÍTICOS. Revista de Asignaturas Cubanas. La Habana, 10 de junio de 2008 http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=15728</ref> In pre-Castro times university fees were waved on presentation of proof of lack of means,

==History==
===As part of Spain===
In 1492, Cuba was [[Christopher Columbus]]'s first sight in his first and most famous voyage to the Americas.<ref>Gott, Richard, Cuba A New History. Yale University Press. 13</ref> Spain took control from a series of [[Neo-Taino]] chiefdoms in 1511.

Over three hundred years later, in 1868, a Creole farmer, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, started a revolution for independence from Spain. Spain put down the insurgency after a ten-year struggle.

Under Spanish rule, Cuba relied on [[slavery]] longer than all nations in the Western Hemisphere except [[Brazil]]. Cuba had a slave trade from 1521 to 1886. In 1880, the Spanish Cortes approved the [[abolition]] law, which provided for an eight-year period of ''patronato'' (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This only amounted to indentured servitude {{who says}} as slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1884, slavery was finally abolished in Cuba by a Royal Decree that also made the patronato illegal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/funfacts/slavery.htm Abolition of Slavery - History of Cuba|author=J.A. Sierra|title=Abolition of Slavery in Cuba|accessdate=2007-08-14|language=English|format=HTML}}</ref> In 1893, Cuba granted equal rights to all.

===Treaty of Paris===
Cuban natives revolted against Spanish rule fighting for 10 years from 1868 to 1878. Discontent again came to a head when on February 23rd, 1895 constitutional guarantees were suspended. Open revolt ensued which led to stringent, but unsuccesful measures taken by the Spanish to stop the rebellion. The Spanish had 200,000 men on the island to keep order.<ref>Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, 1979, Pg 908</ref> After initial Spanish efforts to stop the fighting by fencing in the insurgent areas with barbed wire and entrenchments didn't work, General Valeriano Weyler established what are now known as concentration camps, where noncombatants were swept up from their homes and confinded under abominable conditions. Americans were shocked to hear of the loss of life at these camps through disease or starvation. America demanded that Weyler be recalled. Spain acquiesced in October 1897, but tensions between the two countries still ran high. When the USS Maine blew up while docked in Havana Harbor in Cuba on February 15, 1898, Spain was blamed and the United States declared the war. President McKinley approved this Resolution of Congress:

:Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured ...

:Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives ... That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free.

The [[Spanish American War]] began on April 25, 1898. Spain's defeat led to Spain relinquishing Cuba to United States jurisdiction on December 10, 1898 at the Treaty of Paris.<ref>"...the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States" [http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html]</ref>

* The result was Cuba's freedom, under temporary U.S. occupation. [http://www.csamerican.com/doc.asp?doc=paristreaty2 Treaty of Paris]

====Early Republic====

'''Tomás Estrada Palma''' Cuba's first elected president took office in 1902. Tomas Estrada Palma was reelected in 1906, but this time against violent opposition by the Liberals. US troops were not needed put down the Liberal revolt, since the military leaders of the successful revolt [http://www.spanamwar.com/delcastillo.htm], negotiated nominally with [[William H. Taft]] and Robert Bacon [http://www.m-g.com/156princestreet/history.htm] but in reality with US General [[Frederick Funston]] who had also been a Mambi, took their “borrowed” horses and went home. Soon Estrada Palma resigned, against the wishes of Roosevelt, and another American government was established in Cuba under [[Charles Magoon]].<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/charles_magoon.html</ref>

In 1908, U.S. intervention ended when '''[[José Miguel Gómez]]''' was elected President, but the U.S. retained its Platt Amendment right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

====1912 Race War====

In 1912 Partido Independiente de Color attempted to establish a separate black republic in Oriente Province. Perhaps because the group lacked sufficient weaponry the main tactic was to set businesses and private residences on fire.<ref># ^ Sources include Portuondo Linares, Serafin 1950 Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Direccion de Cultura. Havana. (Fermoselle Lopez, Rafael 1974. Politica y Color in Cuba, La Guerrita de 1912. Ediciones Geminis Montevideo. Other sources give peripheral mention to burning of property at that time
there are the physical acts of arson, in intent and action indistiguishable from the recent Balkan ethnic cleansing. Take for example the incident a La Maya (Fermoselle pp. 243-245) where the town was Take for example the incident a La Maya (Portuondo pp. 243-245) where the town was burned including houses bought by Mambi "de color" using their pensions. Officially the PIC wanted merely an armed protest to remove La Ley Morua. However, Fermoselle ( p. 199) has a cryptic sentence at the end of his book."Seria interesante saber si el PIC fue influido por ideas nationalistas generadas en otras islas del Caribe." However, there it the famous letter of Evaristo Estenoz "Todo hombre de color que no mate instaneamente al cobarde agresor que lo veje en un establecimineto publico, es un miserable indigno de ser hombre, que deshonra a su patria y a su raza" (Portuondo p. 56)</ref> The movement was a failure and General Monteagudo suppressed the rebels with considerable bloodshed. Historians differ on the interpretation of this circumstance. Some view it as suppression of Black rights, others as an attempt at racial cleansing and secession on part of the Black activists. The level of blood shed,according to some contemporary accountsm was far less than some present academics sustain.<ref>Ferrer, Horacio (Preface by Miguel Ángel Carbonell) 1950 Con el rifle al hombro. El Siglo XX Havana.</ref>

====World War I====

During WW I elected president Mario Menocal, a [[Cuban War of Independence hero]], was serving his disputed second term after his military victory over the Liberales in the [[Chambelona War]]. Contemporary accounts mention putative links between Liberales and Germany, U.S. President [[Woodrow Wilson]] declined to intervene in the Chambelona conflict which can, although it is not a popular view in Liberal circles, be considered part of WW I. At that time the [[New York Times]] was carrying reports that suggested German U-boat resupply from Cuba.

Some Cubans flew combat for France notable Captain Francisco Terry Sanchez and Lieutenant Santiago Campuzano <ref>This matter and the errors in Wikipedia on topic are discussed in tne Aerodrome Forum http://www.theaerodrome.com/forum/other-wwi-aviation/35187-cuban-pilots-france.html#post373719</ref>

Cuba shipped considerable sugar to Britain, via smuggling which avoided U-boat attack by the subterfuge of shipping sugar to Sweden (this operation was managed by Cuban Ambassador Carlos Garcia Velez, General Calixto Garcia's eldest surviving son). During the unsuccessful revolt (the Chambelona War) against the Menocal government in 1917, the government attributed this in part to pro-German sentiment on part of the "Liberales." However, this was not proven to most historians' satisfaction. The Menocal government declared war on Germany very soon after the U.S. did, and as a result the Mexican government broke off relations with Cuba

[[Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso]] (1861 - 1934) was a Cuban lawyer, poet and [[political figure]]. He served as prosecutor, judge, mayor of Havana, Senator 1905, President of the Senate 1906, Vice-President 1908-13 and [[President of Cuba]] and elected president served from May 20, 1921 to May 20, 1925.

===Cuba 1924-1933===
[[Gerardo Machado]], at first an elected president took power in 1924. Machado was a Cuban nationalist and his regime had considerable local support despite its violent suppression of critics. However, it was during this period that [[Soviet]] intrusion into Cuban affairs began with the arrival in Cuba of [[Fabio Grobart]]. During Machado's tenure, Cubans gained greater control over their own economy and major national development projects were undertaken. His hold on power was weakened, by the lowering demand of exported agricultural produce due to the [[Great Depression]], the attacks first by War of Independence Veterans, and later by covert terrorist organizations principally the ABC <ref> Dutcher, Rodney (NEA) 1933 Machado Fights Terrorists With Terror To Hold Iron-Handed Foes: of "ABC” Copy Gangster Methods to Rid Island of Despot Who Has Ruled Since-1924 Syracuse Herald Friday evening, April 28, 1933. Front Page “Terrorism has been met "with terrorism in this unique outbreak waged mostly by students and young Intellectuals who brand Machado as a tyrant. On one side is the "ABC," secret terrorist, organization that has copied the methods ol gangsters in the fine art of assassination. On the other side are Machado's strong-armed and equally, ruthless secret police. Murder has followed murder in a series of spectacular killings. The Law of Flight Typical were assassinations of Dr. Clemente Vasquez Bella, president of the Cuban Senate and political ally of Machedo, and Capt. Miguel Calvo former head of the secret police Both were slain on busy throughfares, in daylight, by men who dashed past in autos firing shot guns. Many members, or suspected members of the "ABC" have been slain by the secret police in equally ruthless manner. Often, those killings have been defended on the ground that the victims preferred death to capture, though the evidence. In many cases Is not convincing. One police official alone is accused of 40 official assassinations. Police have also defended killings on the ground that the ley de fuga (law of flight) recognized the right of an officer to shoot an escaping prisoner. But, according to witnesses, prisoners have been released told to flee and then shot down they ran. Bombing has been common. Incendiary fires have destroyed much property. Great numbers of political prisoners have been jailed. President Machado, whose life has been threatened many times, is heavily guarded by soldiers and machine gun crews in his palace. He rides to and from his country estate in a bullet-proof auto, under escort of soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns. NEXT: Cuba economic distress and America's vast stake on the Island</ref>

Then during a general strike in which the communist party took the side of Machado <ref> Argote-Freyre, Frank, 2006 Fulgencio Batista: Volume 1, From Revolutionary to Strongman. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey ISBN 978-0813537010 p. 50 and later explained by the communists themselves in: Massón Sena, Caridad 2004 (accessed 6-9-07) Dos visiones sobre el nacionalismo y las alianzas: Mella y Villena. Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Cubana “Juan Marinello”. La Habana, Cuba. http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/cuba/marin/nacion.rtf. “ Según explicara Fabio Grobart a posteriori: “ Esta miopía política se reflejó también en una errónea conclusión que los dirigentes del Partido sacaron, de la justa apreciación de que sustituir a Machado por un gobierno de la oposición burgués-terrateniente significaba dejar a Cuba en su estado de semicolonia y a las masas populares en la misma miseria y esclavitud y que únicamente un gobierno de trabajadores podía producir los cambios radicales que el país necesitaba /.../Dicha a conclusión fue profundamente falsa por ser mecánica, por no basarse en un análisis correcto del desarrollo dialéctico de la situación y, esencialmente, por no tener en cuenta que las masas revolucionarias, enardecidas por la victoria sobre Machado y orientadas en su acción por una justa política de su vanguardia marxista-leninista, sí podría asegurar los cambios profundos, es decir, la realización del programa agrario-antimperialista, por el cual abogaba y luchaba desde su fundación el Partido Comunista.(22)” Reference 22 is Fabio Grobart, 1985, p. 93, This author also refers in this regard to Leonel Soto, 1977, vol. II, p. 8 </ref> the Senior elements of the Cuban army forced Machado into exile and installed [[Carlos Manuel de Céspedes]], son of Cuba's founding father, as President. In September, 4th-5th 1933) however, a second coup (led by sergeants, most notably [[Fulgencio Batista]], overthrew Céspedes leading to the formation of the first [[Ramón Grau San Martín]] government. This government lasted just 100 days, but engineered radical liberal changes in Cuban society and a rejection of the [[Platt amendment]].

===1940-1952===
In 1940 after a series of defacto presidents more or less under his control since 1933, [[Fulgencio Batista]] ran for presidency and won. A year later, Batista's administration formally took Cuba into World War II as a U.S. ally, declaring war on Japan on December 9, 1941, then on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941. At the end of his term in 1944, Batista stepped down and Ramón Grau San Martin was elected to succeed him.

While Cuba, although supplying vast quantities of sugar, and strategic manganese metal, was not greatly involved combat in WWII; although, U.S. air bases were established, Cuban freighters were sunk, a German spy was discovered and executed, and a German submarine was sunk by the Cuban Navy. During WWII the Nazis counterfeited vast sums of U.S, currency which was sent via the Dozenberg group to Cuba and other parts of Latin America; Soviet directions to the Cuban communist party, seem to have been sent via radio from Switzerland by the Alexander Foote Network <ref>Dallin, David J 1955 Soviet espionage, Yale University Press New Haven ASIN B0007DVJ8M pp. 394 and 198-203 </ref>

A second elected president [[Antonio Prio Socarras]] took office in 1948.

===Batista's coup===
In 1952, Batista again ran for office, when it became apparent to Batista that he could not win, he staged a [[coup]], whereby he again took office. In 1954, due to United States pressure, Batista agreed to hold elections, however ex-President Grau, withdrew from the race amid allegations that Batista was rigging the elections. In April 1956, Batista gave orders for Ramon Barquin to become General and Chief of the Army, however Barquin had already planned another coup to overthrow Batista. The coup was overthrown, and the officers were sentenced to the maximum terms allowed by Cuban Martial Law. Barquin was sentenced to solitary confinement for 8 years.

===Communist Revolution===
In 1956, a party of rebels led by [[Fidel Castro]], landed in a yacht from [[Mexico]] and tried to start an armed resistance movement. In Mexico, the army was strengthened by the cooperation of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]], who later became one of the most important people in the Cuban revolution. Throughout 1957 and 1958, opposition to Batista grew. However, during this process overt communists in the 26-July movement (such [[Ernesto Guevara]], [[Raul Castro]] and [[Vilma Espin]]), employed a process of infiltration, false accusations, betrayals and executions that eliminated many non-communist insurgents.<ref>Alvarez, Jose 2008 Principio y Fin del Mito Fidelista. Trafford Publishing, Victoria, BC Canada ISBN-10 1425154042 ISBN-13: 978-1425154042 http://www.amazon.com/Principio-fin-del-mito-fidelista/dp/1425154042 This is the most up to date description of the crucial role that the non-communist militia of Frank Pais played in the "War Against Batista." Without Frank Pais there would not have been a "Fidel Castro." This book describes in detail and with dispassionate analysis how Frank Pais supported the Castro effort and how he was betrayed, and killed. It is a sad and only too real description of the hijacking of the resistance against Batista by communist activists including Castro himself</ref> In response to Batista's plea to purchase better arms from the U.S. in order to root out the insurgents in the mountains, the United States government imposed an arms embargo on the Cuban government on March 14, 1958. Later in 1958, the rebels achieve significant victories, and Batista fled the country. Castro’s rebel forces entered the capital on January 8, 1959. As soon as the rebel troops loyal to Castro reached Havana the masked purges of non-communist rebels were again implemented,<ref>e.g. Matos, Huber, 2002. Como llego la Noche. Tusquet Editores, SA, Barcelona. ISBN 8483109441 </ref> and following that rural armed resistance to Castro, sometimes called [[War Against the Bandits]] became apparent.<ref>Encinosa, Enrique G. l989 La Guerra Olvidada Un Libro Historico De Los Combatientes Anticastristas En Cuba (1960-1966). Editorial SIBI, Miami</ref>Shortly after Dr. Manuel Leo Urrutia assumed power, to be followed by the February election of Castro to Prime Minister. Later in April, seeking to end the embargo as the new government had taken over, Castro, then despite his radical background and Spanish loyalist roots, played the role of a staunch United States supporter, flew to the United States to meet with President Eisenhower, however rather than meet with Castro, Eisenhower decided to play in a golf match.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.princeton.edu/plas/publications/Essays/castro.html|title=Dr. Castro's Princeton Visit, April 20-21, 1959|author=Thomas E. Bogenschild|accessdate=2007-08-14|format=HTML|language=English|work=Princeton|date=1998}}</ref> He did meet with then vice president [[Richard Nixon]] who reported that Castro probably was naive or a \a communist.<ref>Horowitz, Irving Louis, and Jaime Suchlicki (Editors) 2003 Cuban Communism 1958-2001 Transaction Publishers, Edison NJ ISBN-10 0765805200
ISBN-13: 978-0765805201 p. 88 “In it I stated flatly that I was convinced Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that we would have to ...”
</ref> The action marked the beginning of deteriorating relations between the two countries. In 1960, Castro officially declared Cuba communist.
during the administration of President [[John F. Kennedy]]. They argued that the missiles were fair ground due to the United States having placed missiles in Turkey in a previous year. The high-pressure controversy that resulted quickly subsided when both sides withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm|work=The National Security Archive - George Washington University|title=Anatomy of a Controversey|author=Jim Hershberg|date=Spring 1995|language=English|format=HTML|accessdate=2007-08-14}}</ref>

The [[USSR]] provided $11 million in aid per day to Cuba, which, in turn, served as a Soviet [[client state]] to advance revolution in [[Nicaragua]] and [[El Salvador]]. [http://www.causainternational.org/advancecom2.html#chap1a]

== References ==
<references/>

{{License|license = This work is in the [[public domain]] in the United States because it is a work of the United States Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.| source = [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm]}}

==External links==
*[http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagaq001.php Cuba: A US Colony?]

[[Category:Caribbean Countries]]
[[Category:Islands]]
[[Category:Communist States]]
[[Category:Cuba]]

Roland Masferrer

2008-06-17T22:49:06Z

Jigue: /* Rolando Masferrer */

===Rolando Masferrer===

Rolando "Tigre" Masferrer Rojas was a very complex person. One of his grand nephews. Marc Masferrer, writes:

"... my great-uncle Rolando Masferrer.(:) Lawyer. Poet. Journalist. Communist Party member. Spanish Civil War veteran. Expelled Communist Party member. Enemy of [[Fidel Castro]]. Senator. Fighter. That’s him. I’m sure some, including the folks in charge in Havana, have a few other choice ways to describe Rolando. Thief. Gangster. Murderer. ..." <ref>Masferrer, Marc 2006 Rolando Masferrer, the man from Holguín. Uncommon sense Monday, October 30, 2006 http://marcmasferrer.typepad.com/uncommon_sense/2006/10/rolando_masferr.html</ref>

Masferrer, after he was wounded in battle during the [[Spanish Civil War]], became an famous assassin in Spain.<ref>Rolando Masferrer was wounded twice in Spain, (de la Cova, Antonio Rafael 2007 The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution. University of South Carolina Press ISBN-10: 1570036721ISBN-13 978-1570036729 Page 287-288) “then having his heel blown away in a mortar attack, leaving him with a permanent limp and the moniker “El Cojo.” </ref> He was brave, ruthless, and corrupt. <ref>To give a measure of Masferrer’s bravery is this report: U.P. 1952 Cuban Congressmen Kills Two Gunmen Wisconsin State Journal. Friday. February 22, 1952 Page 8, Section 4</ref> It was said that his victims last memories were hearing a lame man following them dragging his feet. After he came back from Spain he made a public break with the Cuban communist party at a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Havana while talking to [[Ernest Hemingway]]. [[Fabio Grobart]] --[[Joseph Stalin]]'s man in Havana-- tried to get him to rejoin the communist party, but who could trust Grobart, who is widely believed linked to a number of murders of defectors such as [[Julio Antonio Mella]] and left wing rivals such as [[Sandalio Junco]]. Masferrer participated in the "student" action group struggles that destabilized [[Cuba]] in the democratic Autentico Years, on one occasion after Fidel Castro, who then belonged to a different action group,<ref>Ros, Enrique 2003 Fidel Castro y El Gatillo Alegre: Sus A~nos Universitarios (Coleccion Cuba y Sus Jueces) Ediciones Universal Miami ISBN 1593880065</ref> tried to kill him he remarked in words to the effect that he recognized Castro by his rapidly retreating fat posterior. In 1947 he participated in the massive, but frustrated attempt by the [[Caribbean Legion]] to overthrow [[Rafael L. Trujillo]], the Dictator of the [[Dominican Republic]]. After the March 10th 1952 Batista coup, he first thought to fight [[Fulgencio Batista]], then decided to join him. He developed a murderous repressive force "Los Tigres de Masferrer," and yet he was not right wing for his instance his plan to suppress the guerrillas of [[Fidel Castro]] was to buy the huge Sevilla Hacienda in the heights of the [[Sierra Maestra]] mountains and divide up among the local montunos so as to give a base to resist the Castro Forces.

After Masferrer fled Cuba in January 1959, he made several attempts to overthrow Castro. These attempts failed because his misdeeds plus virulent pro-Castro propaganda had left him with the most unsavory of reputations. In Halloween 1975 he was blown up in Miami. As usual in these cases it is not known precisely who did it, some say it was disgruntled criminal rivals, although it is common and most logical to blame Castro.<ref>Pardo Llada, Jose (accessed 6-10-08) Radio WRHC November 1975 http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/interviews/Jose-Pardo-Llada-Masferrer-nov-1975.mp3</ref>

Adaptations of the Masferrer's persona are also found in the literature <ref>Rolando Massferrer even left a trace in literature see: Ruiz Zafón, Carlos 2001 La sombra del viento Editorial Planeta Barcelona http://www.lasombradelviento.net/INLAY.pdf. describes a figure “Inspector Fumero” lame turn coat assassin who clearly seems based on Rolando Masferrer. E.g. p. 237 “Un florista ambulante que vendía manojos de rosas y claveles en la esquina opuesta nos dijo que sólo recordaba a una persona que se hubiese acercado a la casa recientemente, pero era un hombre mayor, casi anciano y algo cojo. .Muy mala leche tenía, la verdad. Le quise vender un clavel para el ojal y me envió a la mierda, diciendo que había una guerra y que no estaba el horno para flores. No había visto a nadie más. Miquel le compró unas rosas mustias y, por si acaso, le dejó el teléfono de la redacción del Diario de Barcelona para que le dejase recado allí si por ventura alguien que encajase con la figura de Carax se dejaba ver. De allí, nuestra siguiente parada fue el colegio de San Gabriel, donde Miquel se reencontró con Fernando Ramos, su antiguo compañero de estudios. Fernando era ahora profesor de latín y griego y vestía el hábito. Al ver a Miquel en tan precario estado de salud se le cayó el alma a los pies. Nos dijo que no había recibido la visita de Julián, pero prometió ponerse en contacto con nosotros si lo hacía, e intentar retenerle. Fumero había estado allí antes que nosotros, nos confesó con temor. Ahora se hacía llamar inspector Fumero y le había dicho que, en tiempos de guerra, más le valía andarse con ojo. .Mucha gente iba a morir muy pronto, y los uniformes, de de cura o de soldado, no paraban las balas. Page 253 “Supimos que Fumero había traicionado a todos aquellos que le habían encumbrado durante la guerra y que ahora estaba al servicio de los vencedores. Se decía que él estaba ajusticiando personalmente volándoles la cabeza de un tiro en la boca. a sus principales aliados y protectores en los calabozos del castillo de Montjuïc.” Ruiz Zafon, Carlos (Lucia Graves translator) 2005 The Shadow of the Wind (La Sombra del Viento). Phoenix (Orion Publishing Group Ltd, Penguin Group) ISBN-10 0753820250 ISBN-13 978-075382025 Page 28 "... and the name of the man who had killed my father in the moat of Montjuïc Castle. His name was Fumero, Javier Fumero. We were told that this individual started off as a hired gunman with the FAI anarchist syndicate and then flirted with the communists and the fascists, tricking them all, selling his services to the highest bidder. After the fall of Barcelona, he had gone over to the winning side and joined the police force. Now he is a famous bemedaled inspector. “ page 37 "... A motionless figure stood outside in a patch of shadow on the cobbled street. The flickering amber glow of a cigarette was reflected in his eyes. He wore dark clothes. With one hand buried in the pocket of his jacket … his eyes fixed on mine … I wanted to return the greeting but was paralyzed. The figure turned, and I saw the man walking away, with a slight limp. ..." Page 387 "... Francisco Javier Fumero had joined the army, attaining the rank of lieutenant. There were many who envisaged him as a future general, but ..." “Page 400: "... seeing one person approaching the house recently, but this was almost an old man, with a bit of a limp. "Frankly, he seemed pretty nasty. ..." “Page 428: "... We lived on rumors, secluded. We heard that Fumero had betrayed all the people who had helped him advance during the war and was now in the service of the victors. It was said that he was personally executing his main allies and protectors in the cells of Montjuïc Castel – his preferred method of a pistol shot in the mouth ..." Cuba is mentioned albeit out of this context on pages 64, 149, 232, and 321.</ref>

==References==
<references/>

Roland Masferrer

2008-06-17T22:47:31Z

Jigue: /* Rolando Masferrer */ details of his life and reputation

===Rolando Masferrer===

Rolando "Tigre" Masferrer Rojas was a very complex person. One of his grand nephews. Marc Masferrer, writes:

"... my great-uncle Rolando Masferrer.(:) Lawyer. Poet. Journalist. Communist Party member. Spanish Civil War veteran. Expelled Communist Party member. Enemy of [[Fidel Castro]]. Senator. Fighter. That’s him. I’m sure some, including the folks in charge in Havana, have a few other choice ways to describe Rolando. Thief. Gangster. Murderer. ..." <ref>Masferrer, Marc 2006 Rolando Masferrer, the man from Holguín. Uncommon sense Monday, October 30, 2006 http://marcmasferrer.typepad.com/uncommon_sense/2006/10/rolando_masferr.html</ref>

Masferrer, after he was wounded in battle during the [[Spanish Civil War]], became an famous assassin in Spain.<ref>he real life “Fumero” Rolando Masferrer was wounded twice in Spain, (de la Cova, Antonio Rafael 2007 The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution. University of South Carolina Press ISBN-10: 1570036721ISBN-13 978-1570036729 Page 287-288) “then having his heel blown away in a mortar attack, leaving him with a permanent limp and the moniker “El Cojo.” </ref> He was brave, ruthless, and corrupt. <ref>To give a measure of Masferrer’s bravery is this report: U.P. 1952 Cuban Congressmen Kills Two Gunmen Wisconsin State Journal. Friday. February 22, 1952 Page 8, Section 4</ref> It was said that his victims last memories were hearing a lame man following them dragging his feet. After he came back from Spain he made a public break with the Cuban communist party at a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Havana while talking to [[Ernest Hemingway]]. [[Fabio Grobart]] --[[Joseph Stalin]]'s man in Havana-- tried to get him to rejoin the communist party, but who could trust Grobart, who is widely believed linked to a number of murders of defectors such as [[Julio Antonio Mella]] and left wing rivals such as [[Sandalio Junco]]. Masferrer participated in the "student" action group struggles that destabilized [[Cuba]] in the democratic Autentico Years, on one occasion after Fidel Castro, who then belonged to a different action group,<ref>Ros, Enrique 2003 Fidel Castro y El Gatillo Alegre: Sus A~nos Universitarios (Coleccion Cuba y Sus Jueces) Ediciones Universal Miami ISBN 1593880065</ref> tried to kill him he remarked in words to the effect that he recognized Castro by his rapidly retreating fat posterior. In 1947 he participated in the massive, but frustrated attempt by the [[Caribbean Legion]] to overthrow [[Rafael L. Trujillo]], the Dictator of the [[Dominican Republic]]. After the March 10th 1952 Batista coup, he first thought to fight [[Fulgencio Batista]], then decided to join him. He developed a murderous repressive force "Los Tigres de Masferrer," and yet he was not right wing for his instance his plan to suppress the guerrillas of [[Fidel Castro]] was to buy the huge Sevilla Hacienda in the heights of the [[Sierra Maestra]] mountains and divide up among the local montunos so as to give a base to resist the Castro Forces.

After Masferrer fled Cuba in January 1959, he made several attempts to overthrow Castro. These attempts failed because his misdeeds plus virulent pro-Castro propaganda had left him with the most unsavory of reputations. In Halloween 1975 he was blown up in Miami. As usual in these cases it is not known precisely who did it, some say it was disgruntled criminal rivals, although it is common and most logical to blame Castro.<ref>Pardo Llada, Jose (accessed 6-10-08) Radio WRHC November 1975 http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/interviews/Jose-Pardo-Llada-Masferrer-nov-1975.mp3</ref>

Adaptations of the Masferrer's persona are also found in the literature <ref>Rolando Massferrer even left a trace in literature see: Ruiz Zafón, Carlos 2001 La sombra del viento Editorial Planeta Barcelona http://www.lasombradelviento.net/INLAY.pdf. describes a figure “Inspector Fumero” lame turn coat assassin who clearly seems based on Rolando Masferrer. E.g. p. 237 “Un florista ambulante que vendía manojos de rosas y claveles en la esquina opuesta nos dijo que sólo recordaba a una persona que se hubiese acercado a la casa recientemente, pero era un hombre mayor, casi anciano y algo cojo. .Muy mala leche tenía, la verdad. Le quise vender un clavel para el ojal y me envió a la mierda, diciendo que había una guerra y que no estaba el horno para flores. No había visto a nadie más. Miquel le compró unas rosas mustias y, por si acaso, le dejó el teléfono de la redacción del Diario de Barcelona para que le dejase recado allí si por ventura alguien que encajase con la figura de Carax se dejaba ver. De allí, nuestra siguiente parada fue el colegio de San Gabriel, donde Miquel se reencontró con Fernando Ramos, su antiguo compañero de estudios. Fernando era ahora profesor de latín y griego y vestía el hábito. Al ver a Miquel en tan precario estado de salud se le cayó el alma a los pies. Nos dijo que no había recibido la visita de Julián, pero prometió ponerse en contacto con nosotros si lo hacía, e intentar retenerle. Fumero había estado allí antes que nosotros, nos confesó con temor. Ahora se hacía llamar inspector Fumero y le había dicho que, en tiempos de guerra, más le valía andarse con ojo. .Mucha gente iba a morir muy pronto, y los uniformes, de de cura o de soldado, no paraban las balas. Page 253 “Supimos que Fumero había traicionado a todos aquellos que le habían encumbrado durante la guerra y que ahora estaba al servicio de los vencedores. Se decía que él estaba ajusticiando personalmente volándoles la cabeza de un tiro en la boca. a sus principales aliados y protectores en los calabozos del castillo de Montjuïc.” Ruiz Zafon, Carlos (Lucia Graves translator) 2005 The Shadow of the Wind (La Sombra del Viento). Phoenix (Orion Publishing Group Ltd, Penguin Group) ISBN-10 0753820250 ISBN-13 978-075382025 Page 28 "... and the name of the man who had killed my father in the moat of Montjuïc Castle. His name was Fumero, Javier Fumero. We were told that this individual started off as a hired gunman with the FAI anarchist syndicate and then flirted with the communists and the fascists, tricking them all, selling his services to the highest bidder. After the fall of Barcelona, he had gone over to the winning side and joined the police force. Now he is a famous bemedaled inspector. “ page 37 "... A motionless figure stood outside in a patch of shadow on the cobbled street. The flickering amber glow of a cigarette was reflected in his eyes. He wore dark clothes. With one hand buried in the pocket of his jacket … his eyes fixed on mine … I wanted to return the greeting but was paralyzed. The figure turned, and I saw the man walking away, with a slight limp. ..." Page 387 "... Francisco Javier Fumero had joined the army, attaining the rank of lieutenant. There were many who envisaged him as a future general, but ..." “Page 400: "... seeing one person approaching the house recently, but this was almost an old man, with a bit of a limp. "Frankly, he seemed pretty nasty. ..." “Page 428: "... We lived on rumors, secluded. We heard that Fumero had betrayed all the people who had helped him advance during the war and was now in the service of the victors. It was said that he was personally executing his main allies and protectors in the cells of Montjuïc Castel – his preferred method of a pistol shot in the mouth ..." Cuba is mentioned albeit out of this context on pages 64, 149, 232, and 321.</ref>

==References==
<references/>

Roland Masferrer

2008-06-17T22:44:35Z

Jigue: Literature

===Rolando Masferrer===

Rolando "Tigre" Masferrer Rojas was a very complex person. One of his grand nephews. Marc Masferrer, writes:

"... my great-uncle Rolando Masferrer.(:) Lawyer. Poet. Journalist. Communist Party member. Spanish Civil War veteran. Expelled Communist Party member. Enemy of [[Fidel Castro]]. Senator. Fighter. That’s him. I’m sure some, including the folks in charge in Havana, have a few other choice ways to describe Rolando. Thief. Gangster. Murderer. ..." <ref>Masferrer, Marc 2006 Rolando Masferrer, the man from Holguín. Uncommon sense Monday, October 30, 2006 http://marcmasferrer.typepad.com/uncommon_sense/2006/10/rolando_masferr.html</ref>

Masferrer, after he was wounded in battle during the [[Spanish Civil War]], became an famous assassin in Spain. It was said that his victims last memories were hearing a lame man following them dragging his feet. After he came back from Spain he made a public break with the Cuban communist party at a meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Havana while talking to [[Ernest Hemingway]]. [[Fabio Grobart]] --[[Joseph Stalin]]'s man in Havana-- tried to get him to rejoin the communist party, but who could trust Grobart, who is widely believed linked to a number of murders of defectors such as [[Julio Antonio Mella]] and left wing rivals such as [[Sandalio Junco]]. Masferrer participated in the "student" action group struggles that destabilized [[Cuba]] in the democratic Autentico Years, on one occasion after Fidel Castro, who then belonged to a different action group,<ref>Ros, Enrique 2003 Fidel Castro y El Gatillo Alegre: Sus A~nos Universitarios (Coleccion Cuba y Sus Jueces) Ediciones Universal Miami ISBN 1593880065</ref> tried to kill him he remarked in words to the effect that he recognized Castro by his rapidly retreating fat posterior. In 1947 he participated in the massive, but frustrated attempt by the [[Caribbean Legion]] to overthrow [[Rafael L. Trujillo]], the Dictator of the [[Dominican Republic]]. After the March 10th 1952 Batista coup, he first thought to fight [[Fulgencio Batista]], then decided to join him. He developed a murderous repressive force "Los Tigres de Masferrer," and yet he was not right wing for his instance his plan to suppress the guerrillas of [[Fidel Castro]] was to buy the huge Sevilla Hacienda in the heights of the [[Sierra Maestra]] mountains and divide up among the local montunos so as to give a base to resist the Castro Forces.

After Masferrer fled Cuba in January 1959, he made several attempts to overthrow Castro. These attempts failed because his misdeeds plus virulent pro-Castro propaganda had left him with the most unsavory of reputations. In Halloween 1975 he was blown up in Miami. As usual in these cases it is not known precisely who did it, some say it was disgruntled criminal rivals, although it is common and most logical to blame Castro.<ref>Pardo Llada, Jose (accessed 6-10-08) Radio WRHC November 1975 http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/interviews/Jose-Pardo-Llada-Masferrer-nov-1975.mp3</ref>

Adaptations of the Masferrer's persona are also found in the literature <ref>Rolando Massferrer even left a trace in literature see: Ruiz Zafón, Carlos 2001 La sombra del viento Editorial Planeta Barcelona http://www.lasombradelviento.net/INLAY.pdf. describes a figure “Inspector Fumero” lame turn coat assassin who clearly seems based on Rolando Masferrer. E.g. p. 237 “Un florista ambulante que vendía manojos de rosas y claveles en la esquina opuesta nos dijo que sólo recordaba a una persona que se hubiese acercado a la casa recientemente, pero era un hombre mayor, casi anciano y algo cojo. .Muy mala leche tenía, la verdad. Le quise vender un clavel para el ojal y me envió a la mierda, diciendo que había una guerra y que no estaba el horno para flores. No había visto a nadie más. Miquel le compró unas rosas mustias y, por si acaso, le dejó el teléfono de la redacción del Diario de Barcelona para que le dejase recado allí si por ventura alguien que encajase con la figura de Carax se dejaba ver. De allí, nuestra siguiente parada fue el colegio de San Gabriel, donde Miquel se reencontró con Fernando Ramos, su antiguo compañero de estudios. Fernando era ahora profesor de latín y griego y vestía el hábito. Al ver a Miquel en tan precario estado de salud se le cayó el alma a los pies. Nos dijo que no había recibido la visita de Julián, pero prometió ponerse en contacto con nosotros si lo hacía, e intentar retenerle. Fumero había estado allí antes que nosotros, nos confesó con temor. Ahora se hacía llamar inspector Fumero y le había dicho que, en tiempos de guerra, más le valía andarse con ojo. .Mucha gente iba a morir muy pronto, y los uniformes, de de cura o de soldado, no paraban las balas. Page 253 “Supimos que Fumero había traicionado a todos aquellos que le habían encumbrado durante la guerra y que ahora estaba al servicio de los vencedores. Se decía que él estaba ajusticiando personalmente volándoles la cabeza de un tiro en la boca. a sus principales aliados y protectores en los calabozos del castillo de Montjuïc.” Ruiz Zafon, Carlos (Lucia Graves translator) 2005 The Shadow of the Wind (La Sombra del Viento). Phoenix (Orion Publishing Group Ltd, Penguin Group) ISBN-10 0753820250 ISBN-13 978-075382025 Page 28 "... and the name of the man who had killed my father in the moat of Montjuïc Castle. His name was Fumero, Javier Fumero. We were told that this individual started off as a hired gunman with the FAI anarchist syndicate and then flirted with the communists and the fascists, tricking them all, selling his services to the highest bidder. After the fall of Barcelona, he had gone over to the winning side and joined the police force. Now he is a famous bemedaled inspector. “ page 37 "... A motionless figure stood outside in a patch of shadow on the cobbled street. The flickering amber glow of a cigarette was reflected in his eyes. He wore dark clothes. With one hand buried in the pocket of his jacket … his eyes fixed on mine … I wanted to return the greeting but was paralyzed. The figure turned, and I saw the man walking away, with a slight limp. ..." Page 387 "... Francisco Javier Fumero had joined the army, attaining the rank of lieutenant. There were many who envisaged him as a future general, but ..." “Page 400: "... seeing one person approaching the house recently, but this was almost an old man, with a bit of a limp. "Frankly, he seemed pretty nasty. ..." “Page 428: "... We lived on rumors, secluded. We heard that Fumero had betrayed all the people who had helped him advance during the war and was now in the service of the victors. It was said that he was personally executing his main allies and protectors in the cells of Montjuïc Castel – his preferred method of a pistol shot in the mouth ..." Cuba is mentioned albeit out of this context on pages 64, 149, 232, and 321.</ref>

==References==
<references/>

Cuban Missile Crisis

2008-06-12T21:30:40Z

Jigue:

[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR -- which had agents in [[Cuba]] since the arrival of [[Fabio Grobart]], who arrived in the 1920s and was Stalin's man when the Moscow loyal Cuban communist party was founded a few years afterwards -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime. Expelled by the democratically elected Prio government (1948-1852) Grobart returned to Cuba in early 1959 at the request of Castro's new government and spent most of the rest of his life there; in later years [[Raul Castro]] would refer to him as El Maestro, the master. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. The crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>

==Photography==
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
Many reports of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken, At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

==Photographic Interpretation==
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

==Low Level Photography==
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==ExComm==
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
*Charles "Chip" Bohlen'', Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France''
*McGeorge Bundy'', Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs''
*C. Douglas Dillon'', Secretary of the Treasury''
*William C. Foster'', Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency''
*Roswell Gilpatrick'', Deputy Secretary of Defense''
*U. Alexis Johnson'', Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department''
*[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'', Vice President''
*[[John F. Kennedy]]'', President''
*Robert F. Kennedy'', Attorney General''
*Edwin M. Martin'', Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department''
*John A. McCone'', Director - Central Intelligence Agency''
*Robert S. McNamara'', Secretary of Defense''
*Paul H. Nitze'', Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense''
*Kenneth O'Donnell'', Special Assistant to the President''
*Dean Rusk'', Secretary of State''
*Bramley Smith'', Executive Secretary''
*Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President''
*Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations''
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations==
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

<blockquote>
"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==
[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]
Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

==U-2 Shot Down==
[[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

==Final Negotiations==

The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>

==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

==Further reading==
*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy
*Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
*The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

==References==
<references/>
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]

Cuban Missile Crisis

2008-06-12T19:39:40Z

Jigue: /* Photography */ was for verification of repeated reports

[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR -- which had agents in [[Cuba]] since the arrival of [[Fabio Grobart]], who arrived in the 1920s and was Stalin's man when the Moscow loyal Cuban communist party was founded a few years afterwards -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime. Expelled by the democratically elected Prio government (1948-1852) Grobart returned to Cuba in early 1959 at the request of that government and in later years [[Raul Castro]] would refer to him as El Maestro, the master. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. The crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>

==Photography==
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
Many reports of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken, At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

==Photographic Interpretation==
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

==Low Level Photography==
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==ExComm==
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
*Charles "Chip" Bohlen'', Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France''
*McGeorge Bundy'', Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs''
*C. Douglas Dillon'', Secretary of the Treasury''
*William C. Foster'', Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency''
*Roswell Gilpatrick'', Deputy Secretary of Defense''
*U. Alexis Johnson'', Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department''
*[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'', Vice President''
*[[John F. Kennedy]]'', President''
*Robert F. Kennedy'', Attorney General''
*Edwin M. Martin'', Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department''
*John A. McCone'', Director - Central Intelligence Agency''
*Robert S. McNamara'', Secretary of Defense''
*Paul H. Nitze'', Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense''
*Kenneth O'Donnell'', Special Assistant to the President''
*Dean Rusk'', Secretary of State''
*Bramley Smith'', Executive Secretary''
*Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President''
*Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations''
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations==
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

<blockquote>
"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==
[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]
Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

==U-2 Shot Down==
[[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

==Final Negotiations==

The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>

==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

==Further reading==
*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy
*Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
*The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

==References==
<references/>
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]

Cuban Missile Crisis

2008-06-12T19:33:50Z

Jigue: Historical Background

[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR -- which had agents in [[Cuba]] since the arrival of [[Fabio Grobart]], who arrived in the 1920s and was Stalin's man when the Moscow loyal Cuban communist party was founded a few years afterwards -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime. Expelled by the democratically elected Prio government (1948-1852) Grobart returned to Cuba in early 1959 at the request of that government and in later years [[Raul Castro]] would refer to him as El Maestro, the master. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. The crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>

==Photography==
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

==Photographic Interpretation==
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

==Low Level Photography==
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==ExComm==
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
*Charles "Chip" Bohlen'', Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France''
*McGeorge Bundy'', Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs''
*C. Douglas Dillon'', Secretary of the Treasury''
*William C. Foster'', Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency''
*Roswell Gilpatrick'', Deputy Secretary of Defense''
*U. Alexis Johnson'', Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department''
*[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'', Vice President''
*[[John F. Kennedy]]'', President''
*Robert F. Kennedy'', Attorney General''
*Edwin M. Martin'', Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department''
*John A. McCone'', Director - Central Intelligence Agency''
*Robert S. McNamara'', Secretary of Defense''
*Paul H. Nitze'', Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense''
*Kenneth O'Donnell'', Special Assistant to the President''
*Dean Rusk'', Secretary of State''
*Bramley Smith'', Executive Secretary''
*Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President''
*Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations''
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations==
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

<blockquote>
"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==
[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]
Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

==U-2 Shot Down==
[[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

==Final Negotiations==

The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>

==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

==Further reading==
*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy
*Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
*The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

==References==
<references/>
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]

Cuban Missile Crisis

2008-06-12T19:28:45Z

Jigue: Countries act in perception of their own interest

[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR -- which had agents in [[Cuba]] since the arrival of [[Fabio Grobart]], who arrived in the 1920s -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. These two superpowers would make one last attempt at negotiating the placement of these missiles. While the entire crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>

==Photography==
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

==Photographic Interpretation==
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

==Low Level Photography==
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==ExComm==
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
*Charles "Chip" Bohlen'', Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France''
*McGeorge Bundy'', Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs''
*C. Douglas Dillon'', Secretary of the Treasury''
*William C. Foster'', Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency''
*Roswell Gilpatrick'', Deputy Secretary of Defense''
*U. Alexis Johnson'', Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department''
*[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'', Vice President''
*[[John F. Kennedy]]'', President''
*Robert F. Kennedy'', Attorney General''
*Edwin M. Martin'', Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department''
*John A. McCone'', Director - Central Intelligence Agency''
*Robert S. McNamara'', Secretary of Defense''
*Paul H. Nitze'', Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense''
*Kenneth O'Donnell'', Special Assistant to the President''
*Dean Rusk'', Secretary of State''
*Bramley Smith'', Executive Secretary''
*Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President''
*Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations''
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations==
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

<blockquote>
"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==
[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]
Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

==U-2 Shot Down==
[[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

==Final Negotiations==

The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>

==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

==Further reading==
*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy
*Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
*The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

==References==
<references/>
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]

Cuban Missile Crisis

2008-06-12T19:21:22Z

Jigue: Gratitude is not a hallmark of the Castro regime

[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.

The USSR had befriended the newly reformed [[Cuba]], and had been giving aid to them. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to begin placing nuclear missiles on their island. These two superpowers would make one last attempt at negotiating the placement of these missiles. While the entire crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>

==Photography==
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

==Photographic Interpretation==
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

==Low Level Photography==
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==ExComm==
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
*Charles "Chip" Bohlen'', Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France''
*McGeorge Bundy'', Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs''
*C. Douglas Dillon'', Secretary of the Treasury''
*William C. Foster'', Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency''
*Roswell Gilpatrick'', Deputy Secretary of Defense''
*U. Alexis Johnson'', Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department''
*[[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'', Vice President''
*[[John F. Kennedy]]'', President''
*Robert F. Kennedy'', Attorney General''
*Edwin M. Martin'', Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department''
*John A. McCone'', Director - Central Intelligence Agency''
*Robert S. McNamara'', Secretary of Defense''
*Paul H. Nitze'', Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense''
*Kenneth O'Donnell'', Special Assistant to the President''
*Dean Rusk'', Secretary of State''
*Bramley Smith'', Executive Secretary''
*Theodore C. Sorensen'', Special Counsel to the President''
*Adlai E. Stevenson'', United States Ambassador to the United Nations''
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.

==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations==
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].

During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:

<blockquote>
"Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==
[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]
Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

==U-2 Shot Down==
[[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.

When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.

(Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)

==Final Negotiations==

The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over!<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>

==Soviet military doctrine==
In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

==Further reading==
*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.
*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy
*Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni
*The Kennedy Tapes - Ernest May & Phillip Zelikow

==References==
<references/>
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]

Bay of Pigs invasion

2008-06-12T19:19:42Z

Jigue: minor word changes

The '''Bay of Pigs''' was the failed liberation landing on [[Cuba]] in April 1961. A group of over 1,500 Cuban patriots landed in the Bay of Pigs in the island of Cuba to liberate the nation from Castro's communist government. The idea was to repeat the same landing that Castro had done in the past.

The planning for this liberation landing started under the [[Eisenhower]] presidency, but his term ended before it was put into action. Kennedy inherited the project, and kept it going. The landing occurred three months after Kennedy's inauguration.

In Miami, the [[CIA]] was organizing the new government comprised of already existing exile organizations. The training for the freedom fighters took place n in Guatemala.

The landing was hurried, a second pre-attack air strike was withheld. The idea was that the people in Cuba would join the fight against Castro once they learned about the liberation forces landing. The resistance in the Escambray mountains and else where was blocked by massive militia encirclement (see [[War Against the Bandits]]); mass arrests of the order of 300,000 disrupted anti-Castro urban resistance(details below).

While militia and police were sacrificed in bloody charges, and died by the hundreds in burning buses along the swamp causways, Castro quickly moved artillery and tanks (supplied by the [[Soviet Union]]) and planes (inherited from the previous regime) to the landing site. Although the Cuban patriots fought heroically and far more skillfully than the communist Cubans, the far greater numbers of Castro government troops and loss of air cover to protect supply lines brought an end to the invasion. Kennedy, and his advisors lost confidence and forbade direct American intervention by US Navy carriers already in the area. Within two days, over 100 of the anti-Castro Cubans were killed and over a thousand were captured. Castro government troops had far greater losses a matter still veiled by the present Cuban government (see below).

This incident led to the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].
[[Category:United States History]]
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===Details===

Time: April 15 - April 19, 1961

Place: [[Bay of Pigs]], South of Matanzas Province [[Cuba]]

Result: Victory for the Castro leadership of Cuba

Castro government commanders: [Fidel Castro]],[[Jose Ramon Fernandez]]and Hispano Soviet [[Francisco Ciutat de Miguel]]

Invader leadership CIA:
[[Grayston Lynch]]; Cuban exile:[[Pepe San Roman]] [[Erneido Oliva]]

Strength Castro forces: 51,000
Strength invading forces: 1,500

Casualties Castro forces various estimates; over 1,600 dead (Triay p. 81) to 5,000 total estimated (Grayston)

Casualties Invading forces 115 dead and 1,189 captured

The 1961 '''Bay of Pigs Invasion''' (also known in Cuba as the '''Playa Girón''' after the beach in the [[Bay of Pigs]] where the landing took place) was an unsuccessful [[United States]]-planned and funded attempted invasion by armed [[Cuban exile]]s in southwest [[Cuba]]. An attempt to overthrow the government of [[Fidel Castro]], this action accelerated a rapid deterioration in [[Cuban-American relations]], worsened by the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] the following year. The name Bay of Pigs comes from Bahia de Cochinos, where in all probability "Cochino" refers to a species of [[Triggerfish]] (Balistes vetula) [http://www.invemar.org.co/redcostera1/invemar/docs/Vol33/BIMC_33_03_Claro.pdf], rather than pigs [[Sus scrofa]].

==Background and preparation==
Tensions between [[The United States]] and [[Cuba]] had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. The [[Dwight Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administrations had judged that Castro's policies, including the [[expropriation]] of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated.

On March 17, 1960, the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] administration agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand"> ''A Thousand days:John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965 </ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the [[Sierra Madre de Chiapas|Sierra Madre]] mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>

The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran|Iranian]] prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president [[Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán]] in 1954. [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.]], one of [[Allen Dulles]]'s three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."

The original plan called for landing the [[Brigade 2506|exile brigade]] in the vicinity of the old colonial city of [[Trinidad, Cuba]], in the central province of [[Sancti Spiritus]] approximately 400 km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the [[Escambray Mountains|Escambray mountains]]. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter. Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in [[Guatemala]] for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat.

On [[February 17]] [[1961]], Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of [[A-26 Invader|B-26]] medium bombers, [[Hawker Sea Fury|Hawker Sea Furies]] (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven [[fighter-bomber]]) and [[T-33]] jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref>

As Washington's plans evolved, critical details were changed that were to hamper chances of a successful mission without direct U.S. help. These revised details included changing the landing area for Brigade 2506 to two points in [[Matanzas Province]], 202 km southeast of [[Havana]] on the eastern edge of the Zapata peninsula at the [[Bay of Pigs|Bahía de Cochinos]] (Bay of Pigs). The landings would now take place on the Girón and Playa Larga beaches. This change effectively cut off contact with the rebels in the Escambray "[[War Against the Bandits]]". The Castro government also had been warned by senior [[KGB]] agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who respectively died violently before and after the invasion. 

==Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces==

Cuban militia, artillery, and intelligence are necessary to field a regular army. Foreign advisors were brought from "Eastern Block" countries; the most senior of these were Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, [[Enrique Lister]], and [[Alberto Bayo]]<ref>(Paz-Sanchez, 2001, pp 189-199) </ref>. Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pablovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as [[La Coubre explosion]]; he was wounded in the foot during the [[War Against the Bandits]], the type of wound that is common to senior officers observing combat at the edge of effective rifle range. Date of wound is not given in references cited [http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Personajes/Militares/Militares1.htm], [http://lateclaconcafe.blogia.com/2006/120501].

==Invasion==
On the morning of [[April 15]], [[1961]], three flights of [[Douglas Aircraft Company|Douglas]] [[A-26 Invader|B-26B Invader]] light bomber aircraft displaying Cuban Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR - Revolutionary Air Force) markings bombed and strafed the Cuban airfields of [[San Antonio de Los Baños]], Antonio Maceo International Airport, and the airfield at Ciudad Libertad. Operation Puma, the code name given to the [[offensive counter air attack]]s against the [[Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces]], called for 48 hours of air strikes across the island to effectively eliminate the Cuban air force, ensuring Brigade 2506 complete air superiority over the island prior to the actual landing at the Bay of Pigs. This failed because the airstrikes were not continued, as was originally planned - limited by decisions at the highest level of US government. Castro also had prior knowledge of the invasion and had moved the airplanes out of harm's way.

Of the Brigade 2506 aircraft that sortied on the morning of [[April 15]], one was tasked with establishing the CIA cover story for the invasion. The slightly modified two-seat B-26B used for this mission was piloted by [[Captain]] Mario Zuniga. Prior to departure, the engine cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by maintenance personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. Captain Zuniga departed from the exile base in [[Nicaragua]] on a solo, low-level mission that would take him over the westernmost province of [[Pinar del Río|Pinar del Rio]], Cuba, and then northeast toward [[Key West, Florida]]. Once across the island, Captain Zuniga climbed steeply away from the waves of the [[Florida Straits]] to an altitude where he would be detected by US radar installations to the north of Cuba. At altitude and a safe distance north of the island, Captain Zuniga feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the engine cowling, radioed a mayday call, and requested immediate permission to land at Boca Chica Naval Air Station a few kilometers northeast of [[Key West, Florida]]. This account is at apparent variance with Cuban government reports that [[Sea Fury]], [[B-26]] fighter bombers and [[T-33]] trainers flown by the few Cuban (notable Rafael del Pino, (Lagas, 1964)) and some left-wing Chilean and Nicaraguan pilots (Lagas, 1964; Somoza-Debayle and Jack Cox, 1980), loyal to Castro attacked the older slower B-26s flown by the invading force.<ref>http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/ArticGiron1-e.html</ref>

By the time of Captain Zuniga's announcement to the world mid-morning on the 15th, all but one of the Brigade's Douglas bombers were back over the Caribbean on the three and a half hour return leg to their base in Nicaragua to re-arm and refuel. Upon landing, however, the flight crews were met with a cable from Washington ordering the indefinite stand-down of all further combat operations over Cuba.

On [[April 17]], four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the ''Houston'', ''Río Escondido'', ''Caribe'', and ''Atlántico'') transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the Southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI's), called the ''Blagar'' and ''Barbara J'', containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to [[Havana]]. The CIA assumed that the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the
Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel (see Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces above). By the time the Invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and [[William Alexander Morgan]]<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/morgan/Morgan-03-13-6]<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html</ref> ) Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano a catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundreds of thousands were imprisoned the others before, during and after the invasion (Priestland, 2003).

After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles (see much detail in printed references section below) involving heavy USSR equipment.<ref name="SPlister.htm">http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPlister.htm</ref> Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support (though four US pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban Airforce, which might have crippled the Cuban Airforce and given air superiority to the invaders. [[U.S. Marines]] were not sent in.

==Air action==

Aviation is commonly considered the deciding factor during the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first airplane of the Cuban Armed forces was obtained in 1913; Cuban pilots, such as Francisco Terry Sánchez and Santiago Campuzano fought combat missions as early as WW I [http://www.nocastro.com/documents/aviacion/aviacion1.htm]. The 1931 Gibara landing against Machado was defeated in great part by Cuban Aviation [http://www.nocastro.com/documents/aviacion/aviacion2.htm]. However, by the end of January 1959 most Cuban pilots and support technicians from the Batista era were in jail [http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/80.81sp/Cuba4677.htm] or in exile.

During the Bay of Pigs invasion, the first Cuban exile attack with B-26 left Cuban forces with "two [[B-26]]s, two [[Sea Fury|Sea Furies]], and two [[T-33]]As at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase, and only one Sea Fury at the [[Antonio Maceo Airport]]" and two of the attacking bombers were damaged [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm] April 17 Cuban exile pilots and copilots/navigators: Matias Farias, Eddy Gonzalez, Osvaldo Piedra, Jose Fernandez, Raul Vianello, Jose, A. Crespo, Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo, Crispin Garcia, and Juan Mata Gonzalez are killed. April 19 US aviators Riley Shamburger, Wade Gray, Thomas W. Ray and Leo Baker, replacing exhausted Cuban exile fliers, die in action.

Cuban pilots Alvaro Galo and Willy Figueroa were jailed for cowardice, for not flying B-26; Captain Evans was accused of poisoning crews and also jailed.

Cuban Air Force pilots included Carlos Ulloa Rauz who was Nicaraguan; Jaques Lagas who flew a B-26 and survived is from Chile' Alfredo Noa died in battle in a plane piloted by Luis A. Silva Tablada also killed. Rafael del Pino. de Varens died in a B-26 accident in Camaguey. Laga lists dead Castro fliers as: Noa, Silva, Ulloa, Martin Torres, Reinaldo Gonzalez Calainada, and Orestes Acosta. On page 81 Lagas mentions Enrique Carrera Rola and Gustavo Borzac.

On page 82 Lagas mentions 16 exile planes in first attack, presumable B-26 bombers. Kraus mentions eight B-26 piloted by Cuban exiles [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm]. Lagas mentions Cuban pilot Alberto Fernandez. Juan Suarez Plaza Ernesto Carrera is mentioned as flying a Seafury, and another Nicaraguan; Seafuries were also flown by Cuban pilots including Douglas Rood and Sanchez de Mola. Lagas states he was the only B-26 pilot left on the 19th of April. By April 21 ten of twelve exile B-26B had been destroyed [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm]. Eight Cuban pilots survived, only one from the B-26.

==Land action==

The land action was very bloody. Carlos Franqui writes: “We lost a lot of men. This frontal attack of men against machines (the enemy tanks) had nothing to do with guerrilla war; in fact it was a Russian tactic, probably the idea of the two Soviet generals, both of Spanish origin (they fought for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War and fled to the Soviet Union to later fight in World War II. One of them was a veteran, a fox named Ciutah. He (Ciutah) was sent by the Red Army and the Party as an advisor and was the father of the new Cuban army. He was the only person who could have taken charge of the Girón campaign. The other Hispano-Russian general was an expert in antiguerrilla war who ran the Escambray cleanup. But the real factor in our favor at Girón was the militias: Almejeira’s column embarked on a suicide mission, they were massacred but they reached the beach.”

==Casualties==
By the time fighting ended on [[April 21]], 68 exiles were dead and the rest were captured. Estimates of Cuban forces killed vary with the source, but were generally far higher.

The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for [[treason]]. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.

It is generally assumed by some that during the Bay of Pigs Invasion Cuba's losses were high. Triay (2001 p. 110) mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch (p. 148) 50X or about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting.

In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by [[napalm]].<ref>http://www.serendipity.li/cia/bay-of-pigs.htm</ref><ref>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/EJR.htm</ref><ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/articles/bayofpigs.htm</ref>

The Cuban government initially reported their army losses as 87 dead with many more wounded. The number of those killed in action in Cuba's army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action.

The total casualties for the brigade were 104 members killed, and a few hundred more were wounded. Of those killed, ten died trying to escape Cuba in a boat (Celia), nine asphyxiated in a sealed truck on the way to Havana,<ref>http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15933592.htm</ref> five were executed after the invasion, five were executed after being captured infiltrating Cuba, five died in training at their base and two died in a Cuban prison camp.

In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain {Pilot} Thomas Willard Ray who was executed after capture was returned
to his family from Cuba; the CIA eventually ("in the late 90's") admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him their highest award the [[Intelligence Star]].<ref>Thomas, Eric 2007 (accessed 2-22-07) Local Man Forever Tied To Cuban Leader Father Frozen, Displayed By Fidel Castro KGO ABC7/KGO-TV/DT. ABC San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=assignment_7&id=5056129</ref>

==Release of most captive prisoners==
In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for five hundred bulldozers. The trade soon rose to $28 million [[United States dollars]].<ref name="thousand"/> Negotiations were non-productive until after the [[Cuban missile crisis]]. On December 21, 1962 Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for $53 million U.S. dollars in food and medicine, the money being raised by private donations.<ref>http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr60/fcuba1961.htm</ref> On December 29, 1962 Kennedy met with the returning brigade at [[Palm Beach]], [[Florida]].<ref name="thousand"/>

==Aftermath, reactions and re-evaluations==

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA director]] [[Allen Dulles]], [[Deputy Director of Central Intelligence|deputy CIA director]] [[Charles Cabell]], and Deputy Director of Operations [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.|Richard Bissell]] were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA. Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching [[the Cuban Project]] to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.

The CIA, apparently under a Presidential directive, wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. No blame was placed where it probably belonged, President Kennedy's most trusted advisers. Thus the report only mentions a number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

*The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.
*They believed that the involvement of the US in the incident could be denied.
*They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000).

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref> [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.

An [[April 29]] [[2000]] ''[[Washington Post]]'' article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the [[Soviet Union]] knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. [[Radio Moscow]] actually broadcast an English-language newscast on [[April 13]], [[1961]] predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister [[David Ormsby-Gore]], British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, showed that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion.<ref name="thousand"/>

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "[[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]]". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] a year and a half later.

There are still yearly nation-wide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion.

An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp. 287-298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains.

==Notes==
<div class="references-small">
<references/>
</div>

==Bibliography==
*Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7
*Corzo, Pedro 2003 Cuba Cronología de la lucha contra el totalitarismo. Ediciones Memorias, Miami. ISBN 1890829242
*Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111-128
*Grayston, Lynch L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6
*Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN-10 0870002287 ISBN-13: 978-0870002281
*Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4
*Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile.
*Lazo, Mario 1968, 1970 Dagger in the heart: American policy failures in Cuba. Twin Circle. New York. I968 edition Library of Congress number 6831632, 1970 edition, ASIN B0007DPNJS
*Lynch L. Grayston (see Grayston, Lynch L)
*de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960-1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644
*Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959-1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4
*[[Jean Edward Smith]], "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," ''The Nation'', (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360-363.
*Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169-180 ISBN 088279235
*Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5
*Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7
*Triay, Victor 2001 Andres Bay of Pigs. University Press of Florida, Gainesville ISBN 0-8130-2090-5
*Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
*Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40

==External links==
*[http://www.parascope.com/articles/1296/bayofpigs.htm Detail Information on the Bay of Pigs Invasion] — Includes maps of the Invasion and Documents.
*[http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/baypigs/pigs.htm History of Cuba] — Bay of Pigs Invasion.
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html National Security Archive chronology]
*[http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/ArticGiron1-e.html The Sea Fury aircraft at Bay of Pigs]
*[http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-BayPigsI.html Reference on Bay of Pigs Invasion at Encylopedia.com]
*[http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-150695778.html?refid=hbw_rd Bay of pigs betrayal the betrayal of the Cuban people by the CIA, State Department, and staff members of the New York Times ranks as one of America's darkest foreign-policy moments]

Talk:Bay of Pigs invasion

2008-06-11T23:52:17Z

Jigue:

I've largely cleaned up and rewritten this article, but I think it should be renamed to Bay of Pigs Invasion. [[User:Arctic Nation|Arctic Nation]] 16:21, 17 May 2007 (EDT)

I have placed most of my contribution to the Wikipedia page here. At present I am banned from Wikipedia apparently because extreme left wing contributers were unable to refute factual data presented. Not yet satisfied with presentation here so will continue to edit, El Jigue 6-10-08

Kendra if you wish to deleted documented evidence could be so kind as to explain why. El [User:Jigue|Jigue]] 19:51, 11 June 2008 (EDT)

Talk:Bay of Pigs invasion

2008-06-11T23:51:37Z

Jigue:

Bay of Pigs invasion

2008-06-11T23:48:39Z

Jigue: The buses did burn and the second airstrike was withheld

The '''Bay of Pigs''' was the failed liberation landing on [[Cuba]] in April 1961. A group of over 1,500 Cuban patriots landed in the Bay of Pigs in the island of Cuba to liberate the nation from Castro's communist government. The idea was to repeat the same landing that Castro had done in the past.

The planning for this liberation landing started under the [[Eisenhower]] presidency, but his term ended before it was put into action. Kennedy inherited the project, and kept it going. The landing occurred three months after Kennedy's inauguration.

In Miami, the [[CIA]] was organizing the new government comprised of already existing exile organizations. The training for the freedom fighters took place n in Guatemala.

The landing was hurried, a second pre-attack air strike was withheld. The idea was that the people in Cuba would join the fight against Castro once they learned about the liberation forces landing. The resistance in the Escambray mountains and else where was blocked by massive militia encirclement (see [[War Against the Bandits]]); massive arrests of the order of 300,000 disrupted anti-Castro urban resistance(details below).

While militia and police were sacrificed in bloody charges, and died by the hundreds in burning buses along the swamp causways, Castro quickly moved artillery and tanks (supplied by the [[Soviet Union]]) and planes (inherited from the previous regime) to the landing site. Although the Cubans patriots fought heroically and better than the communist Cubans, the far greater numbers of Castro government troops and loss of air cover to protect supply lines brought an end to the invasion. Kennedy, and his advisors lost confidence and forbade direct American intervention by US Navy carriers already in the area. Within two days, over 100 of the anti-Castro Cubans were killed and over a thousand were captured. Castro government troops had far greater losses a matter still veiled by the present Cuban government (see below).

This incident led to the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].
[[Category:United States History]]
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===Details===

Time: April 15 - April 19, 1961

Place: [[Bay of Pigs]], South of Matanzas Province [[Cuba]]

Result: Victory for the Castro leadership of Cuba

Castro government commanders: [Fidel Castro]],[[Jose Ramon Fernandez]]and Hispano Soviet [[Francisco Ciutat de Miguel]]

Invader leadership CIA:
[[Grayston Lynch]]; Cuban exile:[[Pepe San Roman]] [[Erneido Oliva]]

Strength Castro forces: 51,000
Strength invading forces: 1,500

Casualties Castro forces various estimates; over 1,600 dead (Triay p. 81) to 5,000 total estimated (Grayston)

Casualties Invading forces 115 dead and 1,189 captured

The 1961 '''Bay of Pigs Invasion''' (also known in Cuba as the '''Playa Girón''' after the beach in the [[Bay of Pigs]] where the landing took place) was an unsuccessful [[United States]]-planned and funded attempted invasion by armed [[Cuban exile]]s in southwest [[Cuba]]. An attempt to overthrow the government of [[Fidel Castro]], this action accelerated a rapid deterioration in [[Cuban-American relations]], worsened by the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] the following year. The name Bay of Pigs comes from Bahia de Cochinos, where in all probability "Cochino" refers to a species of [[Triggerfish]] (Balistes vetula) [http://www.invemar.org.co/redcostera1/invemar/docs/Vol33/BIMC_33_03_Claro.pdf], rather than pigs [[Sus scrofa]].

==Background and preparation==
Tensions between [[The United States]] and [[Cuba]] had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. The [[Dwight Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administrations had judged that Castro's policies, including the [[expropriation]] of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated.

On March 17, 1960, the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] administration agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand"> ''A Thousand days:John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965 </ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the [[Sierra Madre de Chiapas|Sierra Madre]] mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>

The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran|Iranian]] prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president [[Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán]] in 1954. [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.]], one of [[Allen Dulles]]'s three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."

The original plan called for landing the [[Brigade 2506|exile brigade]] in the vicinity of the old colonial city of [[Trinidad, Cuba]], in the central province of [[Sancti Spiritus]] approximately 400 km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the [[Escambray Mountains|Escambray mountains]]. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter. Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in [[Guatemala]] for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat.

On [[February 17]] [[1961]], Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of [[A-26 Invader|B-26]] medium bombers, [[Hawker Sea Fury|Hawker Sea Furies]] (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven [[fighter-bomber]]) and [[T-33]] jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref>

As Washington's plans evolved, critical details were changed that were to hamper chances of a successful mission without direct U.S. help. These revised details included changing the landing area for Brigade 2506 to two points in [[Matanzas Province]], 202 km southeast of [[Havana]] on the eastern edge of the Zapata peninsula at the [[Bay of Pigs|Bahía de Cochinos]] (Bay of Pigs). The landings would now take place on the Girón and Playa Larga beaches. This change effectively cut off contact with the rebels in the Escambray "[[War Against the Bandits]]". The Castro government also had been warned by senior [[KGB]] agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who respectively died violently before and after the invasion. 

==Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces==

Cuban militia, artillery, and intelligence are necessary to field a regular army. Foreign advisors were brought from "Eastern Block" countries; the most senior of these were Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, [[Enrique Lister]], and [[Alberto Bayo]]<ref>(Paz-Sanchez, 2001, pp 189-199) </ref>. Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pablovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as [[La Coubre explosion]]; he was wounded in the foot during the [[War Against the Bandits]], the type of wound that is common to senior officers observing combat at the edge of effective rifle range. Date of wound is not given in references cited [http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Personajes/Militares/Militares1.htm], [http://lateclaconcafe.blogia.com/2006/120501].

==Invasion==
On the morning of [[April 15]], [[1961]], three flights of [[Douglas Aircraft Company|Douglas]] [[A-26 Invader|B-26B Invader]] light bomber aircraft displaying Cuban Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR - Revolutionary Air Force) markings bombed and strafed the Cuban airfields of [[San Antonio de Los Baños]], Antonio Maceo International Airport, and the airfield at Ciudad Libertad. Operation Puma, the code name given to the [[offensive counter air attack]]s against the [[Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces]], called for 48 hours of air strikes across the island to effectively eliminate the Cuban air force, ensuring Brigade 2506 complete air superiority over the island prior to the actual landing at the Bay of Pigs. This failed because the airstrikes were not continued, as was originally planned - limited by decisions at the highest level of US government. Castro also had prior knowledge of the invasion and had moved the airplanes out of harm's way.

Of the Brigade 2506 aircraft that sortied on the morning of [[April 15]], one was tasked with establishing the CIA cover story for the invasion. The slightly modified two-seat B-26B used for this mission was piloted by [[Captain]] Mario Zuniga. Prior to departure, the engine cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by maintenance personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. Captain Zuniga departed from the exile base in [[Nicaragua]] on a solo, low-level mission that would take him over the westernmost province of [[Pinar del Río|Pinar del Rio]], Cuba, and then northeast toward [[Key West, Florida]]. Once across the island, Captain Zuniga climbed steeply away from the waves of the [[Florida Straits]] to an altitude where he would be detected by US radar installations to the north of Cuba. At altitude and a safe distance north of the island, Captain Zuniga feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the engine cowling, radioed a mayday call, and requested immediate permission to land at Boca Chica Naval Air Station a few kilometers northeast of [[Key West, Florida]]. This account is at apparent variance with Cuban government reports that [[Sea Fury]], [[B-26]] fighter bombers and [[T-33]] trainers flown by the few Cuban (notable Rafael del Pino, (Lagas, 1964)) and some left-wing Chilean and Nicaraguan pilots (Lagas, 1964; Somoza-Debayle and Jack Cox, 1980), loyal to Castro attacked the older slower B-26s flown by the invading force.<ref>http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/ArticGiron1-e.html</ref>

By the time of Captain Zuniga's announcement to the world mid-morning on the 15th, all but one of the Brigade's Douglas bombers were back over the Caribbean on the three and a half hour return leg to their base in Nicaragua to re-arm and refuel. Upon landing, however, the flight crews were met with a cable from Washington ordering the indefinite stand-down of all further combat operations over Cuba.

On [[April 17]], four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the ''Houston'', ''Río Escondido'', ''Caribe'', and ''Atlántico'') transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the Southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI's), called the ''Blagar'' and ''Barbara J'', containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to [[Havana]]. The CIA assumed that the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the
Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel (see Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces above). By the time the Invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and [[William Alexander Morgan]]<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/morgan/Morgan-03-13-6]<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html</ref> ) Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano a catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundreds of thousands were imprisoned the others before, during and after the invasion (Priestland, 2003).

After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles (see much detail in printed references section below) involving heavy USSR equipment.<ref name="SPlister.htm">http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPlister.htm</ref> Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support (though four US pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban Airforce, which might have crippled the Cuban Airforce and given air superiority to the invaders. [[U.S. Marines]] were not sent in.

==Air action==

Aviation is commonly considered the deciding factor during the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The first airplane of the Cuban Armed forces was obtained in 1913; Cuban pilots, such as Francisco Terry Sánchez and Santiago Campuzano fought combat missions as early as WW I [http://www.nocastro.com/documents/aviacion/aviacion1.htm]. The 1931 Gibara landing against Machado was defeated in great part by Cuban Aviation [http://www.nocastro.com/documents/aviacion/aviacion2.htm]. However, by the end of January 1959 most Cuban pilots and support technicians from the Batista era were in jail [http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/80.81sp/Cuba4677.htm] or in exile.

During the Bay of Pigs invasion, the first Cuban exile attack with B-26 left Cuban forces with "two [[B-26]]s, two [[Sea Fury|Sea Furies]], and two [[T-33]]As at San Antonio de los Baños Airbase, and only one Sea Fury at the [[Antonio Maceo Airport]]" and two of the attacking bombers were damaged [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm] April 17 Cuban exile pilots and copilots/navigators: Matias Farias, Eddy Gonzalez, Osvaldo Piedra, Jose Fernandez, Raul Vianello, Jose, A. Crespo, Lorenzo Perez Lorenzo, Crispin Garcia, and Juan Mata Gonzalez are killed. April 19 US aviators Riley Shamburger, Wade Gray, Thomas W. Ray and Leo Baker, replacing exhausted Cuban exile fliers, die in action.

Cuban pilots Alvaro Galo and Willy Figueroa were jailed for cowardice, for not flying B-26; Captain Evans was accused of poisoning crews and also jailed.

Cuban Air Force pilots included Carlos Ulloa Rauz who was Nicaraguan; Jaques Lagas who flew a B-26 and survived is from Chile' Alfredo Noa died in battle in a plane piloted by Luis A. Silva Tablada also killed. Rafael del Pino. de Varens died in a B-26 accident in Camaguey. Laga lists dead Castro fliers as: Noa, Silva, Ulloa, Martin Torres, Reinaldo Gonzalez Calainada, and Orestes Acosta. On page 81 Lagas mentions Enrique Carrera Rola and Gustavo Borzac.

On page 82 Lagas mentions 16 exile planes in first attack, presumable B-26 bombers. Kraus mentions eight B-26 piloted by Cuban exiles [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm]. Lagas mentions Cuban pilot Alberto Fernandez. Juan Suarez Plaza Ernesto Carrera is mentioned as flying a Seafury, and another Nicaraguan; Seafuries were also flown by Cuban pilots including Douglas Rood and Sanchez de Mola. Lagas states he was the only B-26 pilot left on the 19th of April. By April 21 ten of twelve exile B-26B had been destroyed [http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/americas/cuba/Cuba-af-history.htm]. Eight Cuban pilots survived, only one from the B-26.

==Land action==

The land action was very bloody. Carlos Franqui writes: “We lost a lot of men. This frontal attack of men against machines (the enemy tanks) had nothing to do with guerrilla war; in fact it was a Russian tactic, probably the idea of the two Soviet generals, both of Spanish origin (they fought for the Republic in the Spanish Civil War and fled to the Soviet Union to later fight in World War II. One of them was a veteran, a fox named Ciutah. He (Ciutah) was sent by the Red Army and the Party as an advisor and was the father of the new Cuban army. He was the only person who could have taken charge of the Girón campaign. The other Hispano-Russian general was an expert in antiguerrilla war who ran the Escambray cleanup. But the real factor in our favor at Girón was the militias: Almejeira’s column embarked on a suicide mission, they were massacred but they reached the beach.”

==Casualties==
By the time fighting ended on [[April 21]], 68 exiles were dead and the rest were captured. Estimates of Cuban forces killed vary with the source, but were generally far higher.

The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for [[treason]]. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine.

It is generally assumed by some that during the Bay of Pigs Invasion Cuba's losses were high. Triay (2001 p. 110) mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch (p. 148) 50X or about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting.

In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by [[napalm]].<ref>http://www.serendipity.li/cia/bay-of-pigs.htm</ref><ref>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/EJR.htm</ref><ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/articles/bayofpigs.htm</ref>

The Cuban government initially reported their army losses as 87 dead with many more wounded. The number of those killed in action in Cuba's army during the battle eventually ran to 140, and then finally to 161. Thus in the most accepted calculations, a total of around 2,000 (perhaps as many as 5,000, see above) Cuban militia fighting for the Republic of Cuba may have been killed, wounded or missing in action.

The total casualties for the brigade were 104 members killed, and a few hundred more were wounded. Of those killed, ten died trying to escape Cuba in a boat (Celia), nine asphyxiated in a sealed truck on the way to Havana,<ref>http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15933592.htm</ref> five were executed after the invasion, five were executed after being captured infiltrating Cuba, five died in training at their base and two died in a Cuban prison camp.

In 1979 the body of Alabama National Guard Captain {Pilot} Thomas Willard Ray who was executed after capture was returned
to his family from Cuba; the CIA eventually ("in the late 90's") admitted to his links to the agency and awarded him their highest award the [[Intelligence Star]].<ref>Thomas, Eric 2007 (accessed 2-22-07) Local Man Forever Tied To Cuban Leader Father Frozen, Displayed By Fidel Castro KGO ABC7/KGO-TV/DT. ABC San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=assignment_7&id=5056129</ref>

==Release of most captive prisoners==
In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for five hundred bulldozers. The trade soon rose to $28 million [[United States dollars]].<ref name="thousand"/> Negotiations were non-productive until after the [[Cuban missile crisis]]. On December 21, 1962 Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for $53 million U.S. dollars in food and medicine, the money being raised by private donations.<ref>http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr60/fcuba1961.htm</ref> On December 29, 1962 Kennedy met with the returning brigade at [[Palm Beach]], [[Florida]].<ref name="thousand"/>

==Aftermath, reactions and re-evaluations==

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA director]] [[Allen Dulles]], [[Deputy Director of Central Intelligence|deputy CIA director]] [[Charles Cabell]], and Deputy Director of Operations [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.|Richard Bissell]] were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA. Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching [[the Cuban Project]] to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.

The CIA, apparently under a Presidential directive, wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. No blame was placed where it probably belonged, President Kennedy's most trusted advisers. Thus the report only mentions a number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

*The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.
*They believed that the involvement of the US in the incident could be denied.
*They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000).

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref> [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.

An [[April 29]] [[2000]] ''[[Washington Post]]'' article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the [[Soviet Union]] knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. [[Radio Moscow]] actually broadcast an English-language newscast on [[April 13]], [[1961]] predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister [[David Ormsby-Gore]], British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, showed that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion.<ref name="thousand"/>

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "[[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]]". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] a year and a half later.

There are still yearly nation-wide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion.

An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp. 287-298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains.

==Notes==
<div class="references-small">
<references/>
</div>

==Bibliography==
*Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7
*Corzo, Pedro 2003 Cuba Cronología de la lucha contra el totalitarismo. Ediciones Memorias, Miami. ISBN 1890829242
*Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111-128
*Grayston, Lynch L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6
*Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN-10 0870002287 ISBN-13: 978-0870002281
*Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4
*Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile.
*Lazo, Mario 1968, 1970 Dagger in the heart: American policy failures in Cuba. Twin Circle. New York. I968 edition Library of Congress number 6831632, 1970 edition, ASIN B0007DPNJS
*Lynch L. Grayston (see Grayston, Lynch L)
*de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960-1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644
*Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959-1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4
*[[Jean Edward Smith]], "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," ''The Nation'', (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360-363.
*Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169-180 ISBN 088279235
*Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5
*Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7
*Triay, Victor 2001 Andres Bay of Pigs. University Press of Florida, Gainesville ISBN 0-8130-2090-5
*Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
*Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40

==External links==
*[http://www.parascope.com/articles/1296/bayofpigs.htm Detail Information on the Bay of Pigs Invasion] — Includes maps of the Invasion and Documents.
*[http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/baypigs/pigs.htm History of Cuba] — Bay of Pigs Invasion.
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html National Security Archive chronology]
*[http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru/ArticGiron1-e.html The Sea Fury aircraft at Bay of Pigs]
*[http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-BayPigsI.html Reference on Bay of Pigs Invasion at Encylopedia.com]
*[http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-150695778.html?refid=hbw_rd Bay of pigs betrayal the betrayal of the Cuban people by the CIA, State Department, and staff members of the New York Times ranks as one of America's darkest foreign-policy moments]