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Louis XIV

2009-06-21T03:25:41Z

Honeil:

[[Image:LouisXIV.jpg|thumb|300px|right|King Louis XIV of France and Navarre, by Hyacinthe Rigaud]]
'''Louis XIV''' (1638-1715) sometimes called "The Sun King" ((''Roi soleil''),, was the king of [[France]] from childhood to old age, 1643 to 1715. He ruled France as an absolute monarch--"l'état, c'est moi" ("I am the state."). He was famous for his lavish entertainments at the [[Palace of Versailles]] near [[Paris]]. He ruled the most powerful and grandiose nation in Europe. His 72-year reign, the longest in French history, was superficially splendid but basically disastrous for France because of expensive foreign wars. His France dominated European cultural and political affairs. Louis typified the absolute monarchy of the Neoclassical age, established a sumptuous court at [[Versailles]], and fought most of Europe in four wars. Louis XIV dominated French culture by gaining international recognition of French arts, literature, and science, drastically transformed medieval France and introduced a more refined, sophisticated style of life.

==Early Life==
Louis XIV was born to [[Louis XIII]] and [[Anne of Austria]] at the royal Château Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 5, 1638 and was christened Louis Dieudonné ("gift of God"}, as his parents had been childless for twenty-two years. Even so, he was a neglected child and was kept under the care of servants. He succeeded his father on the throne at the age of four on May, 14 1643. His mother served as a regent, ruling France in in his place with the assistance of Italian-born Cardinal [[Mazarin]], who had been chief minister and tutor of five-year-old Louis. In 1648, the [[Thirty Years' War]] was brought to a successful conclusion in the [[Peace of Westphalia]] by Mazarin. The treaty ensured Dutch independence from [[Spain]] and the independence of German princes in the [[Holy Roman Empire]]. But France gained the most out of the treaty. All [[Habsburg]] claims in Alsace were ceded to France, as well as German states under Habsburg rule. The Peace of Westphalia severely weakened both the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs. In the closing years of the Thirty Years' War, the [[Fronde]] (1648-53) broke out, in which the aristocrats of Paris launched a major revolt in reaction the policies of centralization pursued by [[Cardinal Richelieu]] and Mazarin. The royal court was twice driven out of the kingdom. Louis, nine-years-old at the time, faced hunger, poverty, fear, and misfortune during the revolts. The revolts caused the young king to develop a fear of rebellion that he would keep for the rest of his life. He also would never forgive Paris and the nobles and would live in the royal palace of Versailles outside of Paris for much of his reign.

Mazarin, having been victorious over the rebels in 1653, sought to teach the young king his knowledge of foreign policies and diplomatic relations. The [[Thirty Years' War]] had ended for the most part, except for the war between France and Spain, whose outcome would transfer hegemony from the Habsburgs to the Bourbons. In 1658, Louis had fallen in love with Mazarin's niece, Marie Mancini. But he instead married for diplomatic reasons, marrying [[Marie-Thérèse]], daughter of the king of Spain, in 1660 in order to bring peace to the two warring countries and conclude the [[Treaty of the Pyrenees]].<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) p 117-8 </ref>

==Absolute Monarchy==
By the time Mazarin died in early 1661, Louis had become an astute military commander. He prided himself as an excellent horseman, a great dancer, and a lively conversationalist. Yet the king possessed little skill in governing and it was expected for Mazarin to most likely be succeeded by minister [[Michel Le Tellier]]. But Louis did what nobody had anticipated and declared that he would rule France without a chief minister and would rule as an absolute monarch. His reign represented the
apogee of centralized monarchical government; all his ministers paled in comparison with the regal figure of the king, who summed it up in the statement, "I am the state" ("L'Etat c'est moi").<ref> Louis probably never said it; his enemies claimed he did.</ref> State power under Louis achieved new stage of control over three critical administrative functions: use of armed force, formulation and execution of laws, and collection and expenditure of revenue.

Louis wielded unlimited authority and made all key decisions. Even the greatest of ministers were controlled by the king. His key ministers included [[Jean-Baptiste Colbert]] for home affairs, the [[Marquis de Louvois]] for war, and [[Hugues de Lionne]] for diplomacy.<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) pp 133-43 </ref>

Louis created a system of secret police to promote his popularity and hunt down subversives. He created a thicker network of surveillance and repression than his predecessors or any other contemporary ruler, when, in 1667, he created a lieutenant-general of police in Paris. (Previously the Parlement of Paris controlled the police.) By 1699 Louis had established the same system in all major cities, with the police reporting directly to him and not to local officials. In rural France he mounted a national police constabulary, the maréchaussée. At the least sign of revolt, Louis sent his police or his army. Thus the 1670 peasant uprisings in the Boulonnais and Languedoc were swiftly crushed. Thereafter no serious revolts threatened, even though the country periodically suffered devastating famines in the final two decades of his reign.<ref>W. Scott Haine and Frank W. Thackeray, ''The History of France''(2000) p. 57.</ref>

Louis accession to power is sometimes described as the first moment of aristocratic subjugation. In fact, the reign largely restored a stability that was lost by the great families during the administrations of Richelieu and Mazarin. Louis acted as a scrupulous regulator in distributing provincial governments and crown offices. He consolidated, rather than demolished, the social domination and the political preeminence of the high nobility. In this way, 1661 is really a great divide, the beginning of a more peaceful relationship, which explains the end of serious aristocratic uprisings.<ref>Katia Béguin, "Louis XIV et l'aristocratie: Coup de Majeste ou retour a la Tradition?" ''Histoire, Economie et Société'' 2000 19(4): 497-512. Issn: 0752-5702 </ref>

Everyone understood that the king made all the decisions; his generals understood this too well. While never opposing the king's ideas, from 1675 through the 1690s they subtly selected what information to present and how to present it, so that the king and his advisers would be manipulated to follow the thinking of the generals.

Beik (2005) examines differing historical theories concerning the limits of power of Louis XIV as an absolute monarch. In the 1970s, the dominant historiography concluded Louis' government was a form of collaboration between the king and various groups. One view of collaboration stressed the common interests of the state and other groups in society. Another perceived the collaboration as arising from the necessity of the state to cooperate with local authorities due to a lack of general interest on the part of the king. However, a minority of historians since the late 1980s have challenged the consensus and argued that there was little collaboration between the king and other powerful entities. These historians<ref> Including John J. Hurt, ''Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority'' (2004)</ref> argue that the majority of the decisions affecting the country were made by either the king or one of his appointed agents. Although this alternative interpretation sheds new light on the working of the French state, Beik concludes it fails to consider the substantial evidence of collaboration.<ref> William Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XIX as Social Collaboration." ''Past & Present'' 2005 (188): 195-224. Issn: 0031-2746 Fulltext online at [[OUP]]</ref> For example, much more money was urgently needed because of the War of the Spanish Succession. The king obtained it by selling judicial offices. This alarmed the parlementaires, who feared a loss in value of their own holdings. The complex negotiations between the king and these nobles reveal that the practice of absolutism in the king's late reign was neither all collaboration nor all coercion.<ref> Darryl Dee, "Judicial Politics, War Finance and Absolutism: the Parlement of Besancon and Venality of Office, 1699-1705." ''French History'' 2005 19(4): 440-462. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in [[OUP]]</ref>

===Political ideas===
Louis XIV left many writings commenting on the nature and source of the monarch's authority, particularly his own. Until recently, historians ignored these because they supposedly were written by staffers and secretaries. Now, a more careful analysis of the Sun King's various memoirs and instructions revealed that they are indeed basically the work of the king himself. It is known that Louis was familiar with the works of [[Thomas Hobbes]], and a Hobbesian interpretation of the origin of the state (a renunciation by individuals of some of their natural rights in order to maintain an orderly and well-regulated government) was reflected in the French king's thinking. Louis XIV wove into this idea a belief in God's election and guidance of true monarchs, who, in their human aspect, were but temporary guardians of their kingdoms with the responsibility of preserving the states under their care but, as divinely elected rulers, could not be removed, limited, or appointed by mere ordinary mortals.<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) p 371 </ref>

==The European Wars==
Impelled by a mix of commerce, revenge, and pique, Louis believed that war was the most perfect way to define his glory, that peacetime should be spent preparing for the next war, and that his diplomats' major function was to provide France with tactical or strategic advantages.<ref>James Nathan, "Force, Order, and Diplomacy in the Age of Louis XIV," ''Virginia Quarterly Review'' 1993 69(4): 633-649. Issn: 0042-675x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>

In his foreign relations Louis' policies were erratic, shifting back and forth. His permanent acquisitions were therefore meager compared with an almost superhuman expenditure of blood and treasure; indeed, the French absolute monarchy did not long survive him, for "he used it up." Louis was not concerned with national defense, but with glory and personal revenge. The revenge was against his hereditary enemy Leopold of Hapsburg, against the Dutch, whom he regarded as upstart "cheese merchants," and against the English, the heretic nation which, by its Revolution of 1688, overthrew his cousin and pensionary James II. It was Louis' capriciousness in the use of overwhelming force that impressed the alarmed contemporaries. Moreover, since he ruled by the theory of the divine right of kings, which made him responsible to God alone, he was arrogant and menacing to all, even to the papacy. This attitude on the part of the King has been expressed in the apocryphal remark attributed to him, L'état c'est moi. "I am the state."

Early in his personal reign, Louis fundamentally reformed French military institutions to assert royal control and to increase the effectiveness of his army. Reforms initiated by Louis included the subordination of fortress governors and army commanders and the end of pillaging by his troops within the borders of France. He also greatly expanded both the peacetime and permanent army. While he never solved critical questions of war finance, he brought important and lasting change to the army. The elite units of the French army, the Maison du Roi and the Gendarmerie de France, were comprised of members of the high aristocracy. Although the war ministers made inroads into the power of the social elite in these forces, the court aristocrats retained their influence over much of the administration and had more control over the elite forces by the end of the 17th century than in 1661. While Louis XIV is known for centralizing and increasing the efficiency of administration, he compromised with elite interests regarding the military in order to enhance the crown and his dynasty. The rising cost to those seeking membership in the elite forces resulted in a gap between the nobles of the elite forces and the poorer nobles who served in ordinary regiments.<ref> John A. Lynn, ''The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714'' (1999); Guy Rowlands, "Louis XIV, Aristocratic Power and the Elite Units of the French Army." ''French History''1999 13(3): 303-331; Rowlands, ''The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701'' (2002) </ref>

===The War of Devolution, 1667-1668===
Louis' first important international venture was a small "War of Devolution" in 1667-68 begun with his seizure in 1667 of a part of the Spanish succession lands.<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) p 199-212 </ref> His weak justification was that his wife Maria Theresa should receive all territory in the Spanish Netherlands in which, by local law or custom, private property devolved on a daughter by a first marriage in preference to a son by a second. Before there was time to object that laws about division of private property had nothing to do with succession to national territory, Louis sent Turenne with 35,000 troops to invade the Spanish Netherlands; Turenne captured a series of important cities (May 1667). Against this threat to the stability of Europe the [[Triple Alliance]] was formed in January 1668 by England, the Dutch United Provinces, and Sweden. But within a few weeks the French general Condé and his army captured Franche-Comté, on the eastern border of France. At the same time Louis signed a secret treaty with the Emperor Leopold dividing the Spanish possessions between them, to be carried into effect on the death of Charles II of Spain. With this trump card up his sleeve Louis accepted the [[Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle]] (May 1668), by which he surrendered Franche-Comté but retained some of his Flemish conquests, including Lille.
===The Dutch War, 1672-1678===
Meanwhile England and France were drawn together by resentment at the commercial success of the Dutch, who were exploiting the produce of the French and English colonies. Colbert's project for a commercial treaty between the two monarchies, directed against the trade of the Dutch republic, fell through (1669). At this point Louis arranged the secret [[Treaty of Dover]] (May 1670) with [[Charles II]] of England by which the two kings undertook to wage a war of extermination against the Dutch. Louis' motives were personal rather than national: the humiliation of the Dutch, and a close alliance with Charles (based on French subsidies); the latter would promote the cause of Roman Catholicism in England.<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) pp 213-66 </ref>

In June 1672, without even a declaration of war, Louis' armies of about 120,000 men invaded Dutch territory. A revolution in the United Provinces removed the De Witt brothers by massacre and placed [[William of Orange]] in supreme command. By dogged determination William wore down the French offensive and, on the withdrawal of the French in 1674, Louis was obliged to conduct a long series of indecisive campaigns which lasted until the signing of a general peace at Nijmegen in 1678. In these campaigns Louis did win back Franche-Comté, which he was allowed to retain at the peace settlement; he had, however, stirred European anger by a systematic devastation of the Rhenish Palatinate, where the population was mainly Protestant. What was to have been a short, quick war turned out to be a weary succession of campaigns and sieges, a comparative failure which increased the irritation of the King.
===War of the League of Augsburg, 1688-1697===
In the years immediately following, Louis' foreign relations appeared quiescent, but he actually maintained a continual state of tension in Europe; on pretexts as flimsy as his "devolution" claims he took over a number of cities, including Colmar and Strasbourg. These were confirmed to him in August 1684 by the Emperor and the Spanish government in the [[Treaty of Ratisbon]], which was an attempt at appeasement. This marked the high point of Louis' career, since he could now seize territories, not by the prowess of his armies, but because of the fears of his enemies. Ratisbon was soon followed by disquieting events--the revocation of the [[Edict of Nantes]] (1685), which antagonized Protestant rulers, and a poorly-founded claim to territory in the Rhenish Palatinate.

Europe's alarm was expressed in the formation of the [[League of Augsburg]] in July 1686, whereby the Emperor allied himself with several Protestant and Catholic princes for their common defense. [[William of Orange]], though not a signatory to this League, was the guiding spirit behind it. With the flight of [[James II]] and the success of the [[Glorious Revolution]] of 1688, he became William III of England and took the lead against Louis with the resources of England behind him and with the active help of the Emperor, Spain, and Brandenburg, and the tacit support of the pope.

The war which followed, commonly called the War of the League of Augsburg, was fought on land and at sea, in Flanders, in northern Italy, and on the Rhine, and was inaugurated by the second devastation of the Palatinate (1689). The only decisive battles were the [[Battle of the Boyne]] (July 1690), by which William expelled James II from Ireland, and the naval battle of La Hogue (May 1692), in which the British destroyed a large part of the French fleet. The war ended in a draw; by the [[Treaty of Ryswick]] (September 1697) Louis restored his conquests, recognized the sovereignty of William, and undertook not to give further assistance to the dethroned Stuart house of England.

===War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714===
By far the most serious war was the long, drawn-out War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714 that nearly bankrupted France while producing few major benefits. After the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick five years of uneasy peace followed; Louis and William failed in their attempts to settle the Spanish succession question by treaties of partition.<ref>John Wolf, ''Louis XIV'' (1968) p 499-578 </ref> Charles II of Spain died in November 1700 and by his will he left the entire succession to Philip, Duc d'Anjou, a younger grandson of Louis, a solution which was acceptable to war-weary Europe. But, like a true dictator, Louis could never leave well enough alone. The will stipulated that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. Louis flouted this by a decree that the contingent rights of the Duc d'Anjou to the French throne were inviolable; at the same time he filled the garrisons of the Flemish frontier towns with French troops. On the death of the former King of England James II in September 1701, Louis publicly recognized his son James, the "[[Old Pretender]]," as his successor, guaranteeing trouble with England. Meanwhile, in summer 1701, William organized the Grand Alliance of The Hague, consisting mainly of Britain, the Emperor, and the Dutch, to resist the renewed French threats.

In May 1702 Britain's [[Queen Anne]], William's successor, declared war on Louis. The "War of the Spanish Succession" differed markedly from Louis' earlier wars in that the forces opposing France were now under the command of a great leader, John Churchill, [[Duke of Marlborough]]; instead of the old spectacular sieges and aimless marches, there ensued a war of swift movement, directed by an overall strategy. The allies won a number of great battles, including [[Blenheim, battle of|Blenheim (1704)]], Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709). By contrast, in Spain, the French victory at Almanza (1707) served to place the Duc d'Anjou on the Spanish throne, where he ruled thereafter as [[Philip V]]. A change of ministry in England in 1710 displaced the party in favor of continuing the war, and the Tories, pledged to peace, signed the [[Treaty of Utrecht]] in April 1713.

By this treaty Louis recognized the Hanoverian succession in England, which was to follow upon Anne's death, and surrendered parts of the French possessions in [[Canada]]. The Dutch were protected by a line of barrier forts, and the southern Netherlands was transferred from the rule of Spain to that of the Austrian Emperor. The French northeastern frontier was left little changed, but Lille and Strasbourg remained French. Philip surrendered all contingent claims to the French throne and recognized the British conquest of [[Gibraltar]]. In view of his many defeats Louis got off very lightly, mainly because of disagreement among the allies. His fortitude during the disasters of this war had served to rally the patriotism of his subjects, but France was left impoverished and disillusioned.
===Religion===
Louis was willing enough to partner with Protestant states, but he opposed the Protestant Huguenots inside France. He tried to forcibly re-Catholicize the Huguenots by continued vexations, the employment of dragoons, and finally by the revocation (Oct. 18, 1685) of the liberal [[Edict of Nantes]] of 1598, which gave Huguenots legal rights. The revocation forbade Protestant services, the children were to be educated as Catholics, and emigration was prohibited. It proved disastrous to the Huguenots and costly for France. It precipitated civil bloodshed, ruined commerce, and resulted in the illegal flight from the country of several hundred thousand Protestants, many of whom became intellectuals, physicians and business leaders in Britain and the American colonies, as well as Holland, Prussia and South Africa. Those Huguenots who stayed became Catholics.<ref> </ref>

The Jansenists--ultra strict Catholics--also fell afoul of Louis. He used the [[Jesuit]] order to minimize their influence. He was a "Gallican" in Church affairs. That is, he favored a strong [[Papacy, history|Papacy]] as long as it was weak inside France and he controlled the bishops and abbeys.

==Image and memory==
===The official image===
Few rulers in world history commemorated themselves so grandly as Louis XIV.<ref> Peter Burke, "The fabrication of Louis XIV." ''History Today,'' (Feb 1992), Vol. 42, Issue 2 in [[EBSCO]]</ref> Pamphelteers used a standard vocabulary, portraying him (in English alphabetical order) as august, conquering, enlightened, generous, god-given, heroic, illustrious, immortal, invincible, just, magnanimous, pious, triumphant and wise. In a word, he was "great", an adjective officially adopted in 1671. Indeed, LOUIS LE GRAND was generally written in capital letters even in a text in lower case.

Louis XIV used court rituals as a way to mirror and maintain the control he exerted in other areas of his rule, both domestic and international. Theater, sculpture, court ceremonies, dance, and music were all carefully planned and staged to reinforce his power and to represent his view of proper order down to the smallest detail. The master of ceremonies, court composer, and court dance master were key players in this process.

From the start of Louis' reign, Jean Baptiste Colbert set up a centralized and institutionalized system for creating and perpetuating the royal image. The two main approaches were the ancient paradigm and the rivalry with ruling powers, notably Spain. The traditional images of the king in majesty and the king at war persisted in official paintings and busts and in the almanacs that concertedly spread royal propaganda among the people at large. The traditional representation of the king as a Roman emperor can be seen in Le Brun's plans for major monuments and in sculptures. Apollonian themes created a mythological environment, with painted decor and sculptures, rather than true likenesses. Portrayal of the reign in metal (medal stamping) was only in its infancy. The major works of the decade were tapestries, and these were either allegorical, depicting the elements and the seasons, or realist, portraying royal residences and, in particular, the history of the king. This was the most significant means by which the monarchy was mythicized before the Hall of Mirrors was created at Versailles.<ref>Gérard Sabatier, "La Gloire du Roi: Iconographie de Louis XIV de 1661 a 1672," ''Histoire, Economie et Société'' 2000 19(4): 527-560. </ref>
===Glorified portraits===
Louis commissioned over 300 formal portraits of himself; he also commissioned "war artists" to follow him on campaign and record his military triumphs on the spot. About 700 different engravings of Louis have survived. In the 1680s, a series of twenty statues of the king were commissioned for public squares in Paris and in provincial towns. Freestanding permanent triumphal arches were also erected in Paris and the provinces for the first time since the decline of the Roman Empire. Sixteenth-century rulers often issued twenty or thirty medals to commemorate the major events of their reigns, but Louis struck more than 300, celebrating the story of the king in a bronze that was enshrined in thousands of houses.

His court lionized the painter [[Hyacinthe Rigaud]], who helped to formulate what a state portrait should be. While Rigaud made a credible likeness of the king, his purpose was not to express Louis's character but to glorify the monarchy. His original "Portrait of Louis XIV of 1701," now in the Louvre, (see above for copy) was so popular that Rigaud had many copies made, both in full and half-length formats, often with the help of assistants. In this portrait from Rigaud's workshop, Louis XIV's ceremonial robes, elegant stance, and haughty expression proclaim his exalted status. Despite the vast expanses of canvas he covered, Rigaud remained concerned with the particular, describing the king's costume in great detail, even down to his shoe buckles.<ref> See also Amy M. Schmitter, "Representation and the Body of Power in French Academic Painting." ''Journal of the History of Ideas'' 2002 63(3): 399-424. Issn: 0022-5037 Fulltext: [[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037(200207)63%3A3%3C399%3ARATBOP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D in Jstor]</ref>

The earliest portraits of Louis as a child used the pictorial conventions of the day to present the future and then child king as already possessing the majesty becoming royalty, idealizing his person as the incarnation of the state. This idealization continued in later portraits, which not only avoided depicting any trace of the smallpox that the king suffered in 1647 but, by the 1660s, presented him as an Apollo or Alexander, vying with those seeking to reproduce his Habsburg traits. While the portraits at the end of his reign allowed the king's face to betray his advanced age, the conflict between the representation of Louis as a man and as king continued, as exemplified by the unnaturally young legs on which he stands in Riguad's painting of 1701.<ref>Stanis Perez, "Les Rides D'apollon: L'evolution Des Portraits de Louis XIV," ["Apollo's Wrinkles: the Evolution of Portraits of Louis XIV"]. ''Revue D'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine'' 2003 50(3): 62-95. Issn: 0048-8003 </ref>
===Versailles as power showcase===

[[Image:Versailles.jpg|thumb|455px|Palace and gardens at Versailles]]
His great château at [[Versailles]] integrated gardens, interior design, and the iconography of the paintings to express a royal plan to visually represent the power of the absolute monarchy personified by Louis. The Galerie des Glaces (Hall of Mirrors) at Versailles became the most prestigious section of the royal residence. Under the king's close supervision, [[Charles Le Brun]] (1619-90) finalized a political thematic decoration program for the hall in 1679 that retraces the important accomplishments of Louis's reign, ranging from his ascension to the throne to the War of Devolution (1667-68). Decorative arches place emphasis on the significant events of the war in Holland. The decorations, intended to demonstrate the king's grandeur, omit the defeats that his French army suffered and cover up the reality of the resulting Pyrrhic victory and the consequent responses of France's adversaries, which left Louis XIV's kingdom isolated.

===Ballet===
The king loved ballet, and in the early years he danced regularly in court ballets. He performed four dancing roles in three of [[Molière]]'s comédies-ballets (plays which were characterized by the inclusion of music and dance and written to be premiered before Louis XIV and his court): an Egyptian in "Le Mariage forcé" (1664), a Moorish Gentleman in "Le Sicilien" (1667) and Neptune and Apollo in "Les Amants magnifiques" (1670). However, the court performances differed from subsequent stagings in public theaters in Paris. In court, the music to accompany ballets performed by the king was suitably majestic, and the lyrics conveyed his power and benevolence as patron of the arts. In Paris performances, these parts no longer stood out from those of other ballet performers. In fact, those plays that most overtly promoted Louis XIV's royal image were not performed at all outside the court. These examples testify to Molière's readiness to adapt his plays according to the venue and the audience.<ref> Julia Prest, "Dancing King: Louis XIV's Roles in Moliere's Comedies-ballets, from Court to Town." ''Seventeenth Century'' 2001 16(2): 283-298. Issn: 0268-117x Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref>
===Piety===
Brought up to respect Catholicism, Louis was a pious and devout king. Seeing himself as the protector of the French Church, he made his devotions every day, wherever he was, following regularly the liturgical calendar. The royal religion, related and spread through the press, took place in the Chapelle Royale. Ostentation was a distinguishing feature of the daily masses, annual celebrations, like those of the Holy Week, and special ceremonies.<ref> Sébastien Gaudelus, "La Mise en Spectacle De La Religion Royale: Recherches sur la Devotion de Louis XIV," ''Histoire, Economie et Société'' 2000 19(4): 513-526.</ref>
===Public opinion===
Alongside official images and the discourse emanating from the court, Frenchmen followed a nonofficial discourse comprised mainly of clandestine publications, popular songs, and rumors, which provided an alternative interpretation of the king and his government. They focused the miseries caused by bad government, but also carried the hope for a better future in the event that the king escaped the influence of his ministers and mistresses and took the government into his own hands. On the other hand, petitions addressed either directly to the king or to his ministers exploited the traditional imagery and language of the monarchy and king, while the numerous denouncers of fake conspiracies against the king sought to manipulate the weaknesses of the monarchical system for their own ends. These varying images of the king abounded in self-contradictions that reflected the people's amalgamation of their everyday experiences with the ideal of the monarchy.<ref> Jens Ivo Engels, "Denigrer, Esperer, Assumer La Realite. Le Roi de France perçu par ses Sujets, 1680-1750" ["Disparaging, Hoping, Taking on Reality: the French King as Perceived by His Subjects, 1680-1750"]. ''Revue D'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine'' 2003 50(3): 96-126. </ref>

====notes====
<references/>
==Bibliography==
* Ashley, Maurice P. ''Louis XIV And The Greatness Of France'' (1965) [http://www.amazon.com/Louis-Greatness-France-Maurice-Ashley/dp/0029010802/ref=sr_1_22?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467644&sr=1-22 excerpt and text search]
* Beik, William. ''Louis XIV and Absolutism: A Brief Study with Documents'' (2000) [http://www.amazon.com/Louis-XIV-Absolutism-Documents-Bedford/dp/031213309X/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-4 excerpt and text search]
* Burke, Peter. ''The Fabrication of Louis XIV'' (1994) [http://www.amazon.com/Fabrication-Louis-XIV-Peter-Burke/dp/0300059434/ref=sr_1_6?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-6 excerpt and text search]
* ''Cambridge Modern History: Vol. 5 The Age Of Louis XIV'' (1908), old, solid articles by scholars; [http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenaref/cmh/cmh.html#cmh1 complete text online]
* Dunlop, Ian. ''Louis XIV'' (2000), 512pp [http://www.amazon.com/Louis-XIV-Ian-Dunlop/dp/0312261969/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-7 excerpt and text search]
* Goubert, Pierre. ''Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen'' (1972), social history from [[Annales School]]
* Lewis, W. H. ''The Splendid Century: Life in the France of Louis XIV'' (1997) [http://www.amazon.com/Splendid-Century-Life-France-Louis/dp/0881339210/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-2 excerpt and text search]; also [http://www.questia.com/read/6019084 online complete edition]
* Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel. ''The Ancien Regime: A History of France 1610 - 1774'' (1999), survey by leader of the [[Annales School]] [http://www.amazon.com/Ancien-Regime-History-France-1610/dp/0631211969/ref=sr_1_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202469887&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search]
* Lynn, John A. ''The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714'' (1999) [http://www.amazon.com/Wars-Louis-1667-1714-Modern-Perspective/dp/0582056292/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-5 excerpt and text search]
* Mitford, Nancy. ''The Sun King''(1995), popular [http://www.amazon.com/Sun-King-Nancy-Mitford/dp/0140239677/ref=pd_bbs_sr_3?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1202467216&sr=1-3 excerpt and text search]
* Rowlands, Guy. ''The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest, 1661-1701'' (2002) [http://www.questia.com/read/105134626 online edition]
* Shennan, J. H. ''Louis XIV'' (1993) [http://www.questia.com/read/108828773 online edition]
* Wilkinson, Rich. ''Louis XIV'' (2007)
* Wolf, John B. ''Louis XIV'' (1968), the standard scholarly biography [http://www.questia.com/read/103250721 online edition]
====Notes====
<references/>
[[Category:French Monarchs]]
[[Category:French History]]

Debate:Crusades... Good or Bad?

2009-06-21T02:59:13Z

Honeil:

{{debate}}

Were the [[Crusades]] Good or Bad

==Necessary==
This is no question of 'Good' or 'Bad'. It's a question of necessity. And it might be at the time to prepare for the next and maybe final crusade. It's about time to stand up and fight for your values. Currently Muslims all around the world are pressing us to accept their ridiculous values. If you do not agree it means flag burning and terrorism. So, killing people (even at war) is a bad thing, but it might be necessary for our own survival.--[[User:Jack Ketch|Jack Ketch]] 06:31, 27 March 2007 (EDT)

:Wait… you're suggesting we kill people for burning a piece of cloth that we've attached value to? Really, why is flag burning by aggressive individuals who, might I add, are not American themselves, significant? I am also wary of advocating "fighting for ones values". Where can we reconcile violence with "love one another"? [[User:Linus M.|Liπus the Turbogeek]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 09:09, 31 March 2007 (EDT)

Jack Ketch, are you being serious? because if so then that might have been the dumbest thing i have ever read.

==Good==

Crusades are good only if they involve Indiana Jones.

The first crusade was fine. It was wrong of the [[Muslim]]s to be killing pilgrims who traveled to [[Jerusalem]]. It was okay to fight back.

Reply: Only Against the guilty, As a Jew and a person extremely concerned with human rights my opinion is that: no matter for what reason the massive murder of civilians without cause other than religios orientation is sin. The Mass killings of Jews and Muslims are underplayed in todays textbook. Holy wars are fundamentally contradictory, as most religios scholars declare that killing is Wrong. History has tought us that murder is followed only by murder.

Today, if a nation took over Jerusalem and started killing [[Christian]]s who wanted to visit it, we would definitely fight back. On the other hand, the second and fourth crusades were not right and have left an embarrassing scar on the Christian world to this day. I don't know whose idea it was to sack [[Constantinople]], but it shows the true state of these other crusades. The third crusade was a slight exception to this general state of the later crusades, but its motives are debatable. I suppose that this whole argument really boils down to weather war is "right" or not. [[User:PhilipB|PhilipB]] 14:00, 13 December 2006 (EST)

I don't think either Billy or Tim really understand certain aspects of the crusades. First of all, Billy said there was no such thing as a just war, but really there are just reasons to fight. Not all the crusades were just but to say that no war is just is false. Billy quoted "Love thy neighbor as thy self." That's right but sometimes you need to choose the lesser of sins. Which is worse, to let the defenseless be slaughtered or to defend the defenseless? Either way you're violating the commandment. Which is why there is reconciliation. ''Double Edge''

Reply: There haven't been any credible sources that state that Christian pilgrims were killed or harassed in the Holy Land. If there was some killing, it was greatly exagerated by Pope Urban III at the Council of Clermont

Comment: Of course it is sinful to fight a war for the wrong reasons, but I don't believe that every war is by definition sinful. As noted above, war is sometimes the lesser of two evils. But remember that it only takes one party to start a fight. When someone is determined to start a fight, we cannot avoid it- we can only decide, through our actions, whether it will be a war or a massacre. We know that evil will result whichever course we take, but it does not follow that both courses are sinful. The course which leads to the lesser evil- or the greater good- is the right course, and therefore is not sinful. I believe that we all sin, but I do not believe that God puts us in positions where it is impossible for us to choose a course that pleases him. (See I Corinthians 10:13)- Chris J

Well said Double Edge. War is never morally right, war is never good. God never intended for war, but sadly, man is in a fallen state and has turned away from this original intent. War has become a very real thing in the world, but sometimes it is the lesser of two evils. [[User:PhilipB|PhilipB]] 18:19, 14 December 2006 (EST)

I don't see anything wrong with having a Christian holy war. Making Jerusalaem safe for defenseless pilgrims was a worthy goal. The Crusades were good.

Mr. Schlafly
:*Mr. Schlafly, if you are not familiar, the crusades were not uniformly good. The fourth crusade was not an attempt to recapture the holy land, but instead was a profitable and disgraceful act in which Pope Innocent III ordered the peasants to Constantinople. The out-of-control Crusaders ruthlessly and systematically violated the city's holy sanctuaries, destroying, defiling and stealing all they could lay hands on- nothing was spared. It was said that the total amount looted from Constantinople was about 900,000 silver marks. For further reading please see: Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, intro., xiii. [[User:Sunfun2|SunFun2]] 09:26, 30 January 2008 (EST)

Tim said the pilgrimages were useless. But the crusaders weren't only defending pilgrims they were defending their fellow christians in Byzantium and many of the jews that lived in the Middle-East.

: This is simply false. Many Jews died due to the crusades and many Christians in Byzantium were killed by the crusaders. Constantinople itself was sacked by the crusaders in 1204. The Jews were so harmed by the crusades that the standard Askenazi liturgy changed to remember the events(to give you an idea of how rare that is, the standard Orthodox liturgy didn't change at all after the Holocaust). [[User:JoshuaZ|JoshuaZ]] 14:58, 13 February 2007 (EST)

I believe that the first two crusades were in defense and justified and the second two were wrong. If you believe that all wars are sinful. Then a country cannot have a defense system or military at all. If someone were to try to kill and steal from your own family you would stop them by force or would you watch them get killed. This is the same thing with a war on a national level. Ultimatlely if you do not believe in war we would not have a nation. The United States had to have its own war for independence the Revolutionary war in which, many men died. The Ten Comandments says "Thy Shalt Not Kill", but are you not killing when you refuse to defend the defenseless? For example in War World II, if it were not for the Alled forces and the United States the entire Jewish people could have been destroyed. I guess when Hitler was taking over Europe you would sat back and watched because you are a pacifist. Deborah G.

---
Tim said that the Chrsitians should have been smart enough not to go somewhere where they might get killed, and that a country has a right to control its borders. ---

However, I would like to remind everybody that things were different back in the Middle-Ages, and that the first victamized christian pilgrims had no way of knowing about their impending doom. They couldn't just check the internet for the latest Middle Eastern travel information. ---

As for the Europeon reaction to such terrorism, how is it wrong? So your statement is implying that if your friends & family got intentionally mutilated by someone, that the only 'just' action would be to find a new travel desination? ---

Also all wars cannot be bad, if they were (are) then why does God often take sides? (see different Biblical wars, specifically involving the Old Testament) --- Joe B

If the European Christians were not willing to fight the expansionist Mohammedans, then the Mohammedans would have invaded Europe. Thanks to the Crusades, Europe
was not destroyed. [[User:RSchlafly|RSchlafly]] 15:27, 23 February 2007 (EST)

:I guess I will weigh in here, Europe was not destroyed because of Charles Martel victory in southern France The Battle of Tours 732 AD (before the 1st crusade) and the defeat (almost destruction) of the Ottoman Empire's army at the gates of Vienna 1529 (300 years after the last Crusade) and the successful defense at Malta 1292 AD (the year after the last Crusade). None of these events were concerned with the Crusades. The sacking of Constanstiople advanced the movement of Islam by weakening a power bulwarking Europe. Europe did advance in technology by exposure to the middle east as it was the more advanced of the two areas in some ways. I am saying that this looks to be more of socio/ethic/religious broad movements to me rather than the Crusades per say.

Question for above statement- How did the Crusades expose Western Europe to science and technology? From what I remember, the Rennaisance really started to kick in around the late 1300's and early 1400's, the same time that Greek-Orthodox scientists, scholars, and artists were fleeing the Turkish onslought. Nobodies ever heard of El Greco? Born as Greek-Orthodox in Crete and famous Rennaisance painter who introduced new styles? Imagine who he inspired and taught, and spread rennaisance tradition, all thanks to the Turkish onslought and the collapse of the Byzantine Empire.

Out of curiosity, why do you call Muslims "Mohammedans"? We don't call Americans "Washingtonans" or Jewish people "Abrahamans". I'm not saying the term "Mohammedan" is necessarily incorrect. It used to be the popular term for Muslims in the West. But why do you think it is appropriate?--[[User:Aschlafly|Aschlafly]] 01:38, 24 February 2007 (EST)

: Abraham did not create the Jewish religion, and Washington did not create American political philosophy. Lots of movements are named after their original founder and leader. I use the term "Mohammedan" because it is a neutral and well-understood term, and is the most accurate term for the way I was using it. Mohammad believed in using military force to expand his empire, and so did his followers. That makes it Mohammedan. Sometimes people use the term "moslem" or "muslim" to refer to narrower religious goals. Whether those narrower religious goals include territorial expansion would just be a distraction from the point I was making. The term Mohammedan is an ordinary dictionary word, and there is no reason not to use it. [[User:RSchlafly|RSchlafly]] 04:58, 24 February 2007 (EST)

::There is much revisionism on this subject; let's review some of the meta-historical aspects at work.

::Mohammadism arose in the vacuum of the collapse of the Roman Empire and was spread by force. However, pockets of non-Islamic and Christian communities remained throughout Asia Minor and the Middle East (as they do today). These non-Muslim's living in the midst of Islam were very oppressed, and thier lives were spared only by accepting [[dhimmi]] status. Trade relations between Europe and the East (India and China), which had been going down the [[silk route]] since ancient times was vital to all economies of ancient civilizations. The rise of Islam disrupted this.

::The first four Crusades were an attempt to "roll back" the encroachment of Islam on Western Civilization, end the oppression of Christian minorities in Muslim territiories, and restore the disruption of trade with the East which had an impact on prosperity and living standards worldwide. Western commercial trading interests, traveling the silk route in caravans were often taken hostage, forced to convert to Islam or suffer a hideous death such as beheading at the hands of persons and groups we today would probably describe as terrorists. By the end of the last Crusade it was apparant the approach of direct confrontation and rollback over two centuries had failed. Nevertheless, the economic impact of reduced trade on living standards had been felt.

::Christopher Columbus came up with an idea to restore trade with the East ''without'' direct military confrontation to gain access to the trade routes -- sail west to get east. Instead of confronting the problem head on, simply go around it. It was risky and had never been tried, but hopes of regaining the prosperity of old times fueled expectations. So Columbus was granted patronage by government in those desperate times to solve the threat of Islamic terrorists to Western commercial interests.

::History records what happened was bigger than anyones expections; rather than simply restore commercial contact between the Western Europe, India, and China, Western Europe embarked on an economic expansion throughout the [[Western hemisphere]] for the next 500 years. This was rewarding to the posterity of Europeans for several generations, however the original cause of the problem -- the threat of Islam to the economic interests and prosperity of the rest of the world -- had never been dealt with, and was forgotten.

:::Please could you provide your sources for the "disruption of trade" leading to economic problems in Western Europe? My understanding of the First Crusade is that it was largely based no reports of abuse of pilgrims, though whether that abuse was remotely institutionalised or simply the activity of individuals and small groups acting on their own behalf (just as there were thieves and bandits in Western Europe) is certainly open to debate.

::::The First Crusade is also known as the [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Crusade Pauper's Crusade]; IOW, because of the widespread economic disruption over several centuries which resulted with the rise of Islam, a vast army of unemployed with little hope under the status quo and nothing to lose answered the call for the Crusade. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 13:52, 28 March 2007 (EDT)

:The Paupers Crusade (Or Peasants Crusade) was actually the first ever crusade. It failed miserably though, the remnants finally meeting up with the de facto first crusade, which comprised of some of the mightiest princes of France. Some historians have went so far as to call it the Frankish Crusade. As per the original question, the Crusades were horrible, an act of genocide impossible to defend. When the Christians took Jerusalem, the blood of the Muslims, Jews and Eastern Christians went as high as their ankles. It truly was a bloody atrocity, and trying to frame it any other way is intellectually dishonest. In fact, a discussion like this wouldn't be found anywere else but conservapedia, which I suppose in itself is a good thing. What most amazes me about this debate is that some people can actually claim it was a good thing -> Pope John Paul II himself apologised for what is broadly considered one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of all time. [[User:Graham|Graham]] 12:49, 25 September 2007 (EDT)

:: It was bad because it was bloody? All wars are bloody. I suggest that you give us some more substantive reasons, and put them under "Bad". [[User:RSchlafly|RSchlafly]] 13:02, 25 September 2007 (EDT)

:I"m not saying it was bad because it was bloody - I'm saying it was bad because of the horrible atrocities based on race. It was in effect a genocide (The sack of Jerusalem, that is) [[User:Graham|Graham]] 13:15, 25 September 2007 (EDT)

Crusades were good, and bad depending on context to me. anytime religious folk want to murder one another over thier imaginary friend, im glad i live in a country where that sort of behavior is looked down upon (for now.) its bad when, you know, it turns into embarassing things like witch burnings and such. if 2 people or persons agree to disagree and have a throwdown, then there should be a designated area for them to express themselves. like an entire country for them to go to so people can kill themselves over thier imaginary friend...oh wait. "live and let live" seems too simple ,and too complicated ant the same time. iif you want to ruin with religion, cool! then can you at least try not to involve anyone i care about in it. and in turn just respect the fact that "dont care/believe about religion/god" does not equal "im an uncaring heretic baby raping,puppy kicking scumbag" and leave me out of the quarrel.

So, to summarize thoughts...
Thry needed to retake the land, also Pope wanted to show dignity, they needed Christian world(?)and land, Muslims were
first to kill pilgrims, so crusades were good.. 2008 (EDT)

==Bad==

Contrary to what some people believe I believe there is no such thing as a just war because war in and of itself is unjust, calling it a “Holy War” doesn’t change anything in fact it makes it worse because you are lying to yourself and your comrades ( no war is holy, just like no war is just.) The reason we know that no war is holy or just is that it is not just or holy to kill people for personal gain( if that is just then why are there laws and commandments to follow?). War goes against our teachings because we learn from the Bible and Jesus’ teachings to treasure human life and to be compassionate towards each other. You are neither treasuring human life nor being compassionate when you are killing your neighbor.
[[Billy M.=)]]

I Hate to say it but I Agree with Billy here, but not for the same reasons.
You can't justify a war just to protect pilgrims. It was not necessary for Christians to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Unlike Islam Christianity does NOT require pilgrimages. Jerusalem was nothing more than a tourist attraction. The Christian Pilgrims should have been smart enough to not go there because they could be killed. There is no justification for the crusades as a "Holy War." Christianity is not a violent religion. We do not start wars just because some Christians get murdered, if we did, we would be at war with China and many other countries that persecute Christians. A Country has a right to control who comes into that country. The Muslims had a right to control who came to Jerusalem. This does not mean that they were justified in killing the Christians, but the Christians should not have assumed the right to go wherever they wanted regardless of the wishes of the people who live there. If Muslims all of a sudden decided that they wanted to make pilgrimages to America for some reason, and did not think that the American government should have a say in the matter, we wouldn't let them would we? There may have been justification for a political war against the Muslims, if they were a threat to the the European countries. Even if there was reason for a political war, the crusades went way too far, and there was no justification for a holy war. The Pope was wrong to promise spiritual benefits to those who fought in the war. He tricked many people into joining the crusades because they thought that it would make them go to heaven if they died. Also most of the crusades were only fought for ambition and plunder.

Tim

Although I do not believe that the crusades were good, I Agree with double edge on one point: There ''IS'' such a thing as a just war! Billy's circular reasonings (see above) do not change that.

[[User:BenjaminS|Ben]]

Baaad!!!!!!!
--[[User:JessicaS|Jess]] 10:09, 3 January 2007 (EST)

Thoroughly bad, and completely undesirable. Killing people because of their beliefs is not justifiable. Admittedly, the Muslims were in the wrong to kill pilgrims to Jerusalem, but the wholesale massacre of the Muslims was not a viable response. Sorry to tell you, but cannibalism is not justifiable except under very extreme circumstances. (Like, say, the Donner Party, not just because you're hungry). [[User:Linus M.|Geekman314]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 15:53, 9 March 2007 (EST)

:But the Crusades were not just motivated by peoples beliefs; Islam had disrupted East-West trade and thus people's living standards by not allowing passage of trading caravans down the silk route, taking hostage of traders and forcing conversions, or killing them outright. There were economic factors at work. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 16:13, 9 March 2007 (EST)

::Killing people because you want more money. Yep, that's ''quite'' morally sound. [[User:Linus M.|Geekman314]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 17:48, 10 March 2007 (EST)

:::Has nothing to do with money; eating food is an "economic factor". [[User:RobS|RobS]] 17:54, 10 March 2007 (EST)

::::It's completely possible to grow your own food, thus removing the necessity for trade routes to obtain it. [[User:Linus M.|Geekman314]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 23:13, 10 March 2007 (EST)

:::::The thing that makes humans different from animals is trade. As Adam Smith said, no one ever saw two dogs trade one bone for the other. As Smith said, in that rude state of socierty before the division of labor is implemented, a man endevors to supply all his own needs, when he's hungray, he goes to the forest to hunt, when his roof needs patching, he goes to woods for material, etc. But once society reaches an advanced state of development (yes, even ancient Eygpt was an advanced state of development), a person cannot supply the everyday needs he has, and is far more dependant upon the produce of '''''other''''' peoples labor.

:::::Hence, trade was just as vital then for the economic needs of people and their survival as it is today. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 14:04, 4 April 2007 (EDT)

:::::Ummmm... Last time I checked, humans were actualy animals, being as they are mamals. AND, Animals do not farm, they scavenge. Learning ability and comprehension seperates us from other animals-[[eljawa]]
::::::umm a scavanger eats road kill, and thus is unkosher. Not all animals are scavangers. As Moses said, "ye shall learn the difference between clean and unclean." [[User:RobS|RobS]] 23:45, 24 July 2007 (EDT)

::::::That's it. I quit. I have more important things to do than try to bring people out of the middle ages. --[[User:Linus M.|Liπus the Turbogeek]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 11:46, 6 April 2007 (EDT)

::::::I'll put my retort to Rob's argument here when I have time, BTW, just so I'm not labeled as having run away because I have no defense. --[[User:Linus M.|Liπus the Turbogeek]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 13:08, 6 April 2007 (EDT)

:::::::Well, okay, I guess I don't quit. Here's my retort:

:::::::''Trade can take place within a single country.'' 'Nuff said. And don't get me started about the other claim… --[[User:Linus M.|Liπus the Turbogeek]]([[User talk:Linus M.|contact me]]) 23:01, 6 April 2007 (EDT)

==Comment==

Christian theologians, notably [[Thomas Aquinas]], developed a set of rules for deciding whether a war was a just war. Aquinas' formulation is part of the Catholic catechism.

Perhaps someone needs to write an article on [[Just War theory]]. [[User:Dpbsmith|Dpbsmith]] 14:09, 3 January 2007 (EST)

Thou shalt not kill. It seems pretty straight forward to me. Christians shouldn't use reconciliation as some kind of cop-out. It's an abuse of your religion if you know you're going out to do something bad and then stop at the church on the way back to confess.

'thou shalt not murder', actually, but you're still right - pretty much everything Jesus said was against war. [[User:Wikinterpreter|Wikinterpreter]]

==BAAAAAD!==

I've never heard of a situation where a bunch of barbarians burning, pillaging and raping everything on their path was a good thing...

The way I see it, the only way you could distinguish between the crusaders and the Mongols was by the colour of their skin.

[[User:Middle Man|Middle Man]]

:Actually, they were the [[Moors]]. I agree with you, but it does your argument a disservice. [[User:Underscoreb|Underscoreb]] 00:41, 8 November 2007 (EST)

:Ah yes. The widespread rape that occured. Good point. Tell me ''that'' was a good thing! --[[User:Hacker|Hacker]]<code>([[User talk:Hacker|Write some code]])</code> 12:58, 19 April 2007 (EDT)

::Yes indeed; so can we call this the neo-confederate view [http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=253] and fascist [http://www.sovlit.com/bios/ehrenburg.html] revisionism, condemning Sherman's march to sea and the Soviet atrocities during and after the Battle of Berlin. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 13:36, 19 April 2007 (EDT)

:::Why does this topic even exist? Is there really anyone out there who thinks it's OK to start a war (and conduct it in as brutal a way as possible) just because someone lives on land that you think you have some kind of historical claim to? [[User:EmanresU|EmanresU]] 16:06, 27 June 2007 (EDT)
::::Yes, the palestinians do, as do the supporters of [[Hamas]] and [[Hezbollah]]. [[User:Bohdan|Bohdan]] 16:08, 27 June 2007 (EDT)
:::::Um, the Palestinians are in exactly the opposite situation: someone else has claimed the land they live on. Besides, only a small minority of Palestinians and even Hamas supporters are warlike, just as only a small minority of Americans, and in particular Republicans, are warlike, despite the words and actions of those they have elected. Anyway, this is irrelevant, you can't justify actions by events that took place centuries later. [[User:EmanresU|EmanresU]] 13:35, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
:::I get it. When someone holds a knife to your thoat and says "convert or die," you're supposed to convert. Duh. Why didn't I think of that? [[User:RobS|RobS]] 16:31, 27 June 2007 (EDT)
::::I don't believe the Muslims at the time where ordering people to convert or die in the Holy Land. There are many accounts of non-Muslims living peacfully throughout the Caliphates at the time. Granted, there were instances of violence against pilgrams during the reign of some of the more extremist caliphs, but that did no last for long. [[User:Jtime|Jtime]] 16:49, 27 June 2007 (EDT)

::::::Well let's see; about the 700 A.D. Christians were the majority in Asia Minor and Palestine, the Levant, and other areas outside Arabia, or more specifically today, the Arabian Penninsula. By 1100, they were close to extinct, as they are today. Hmmm, what caused this to happen in what really is (if the human species is 130K years old) a short period of time....hmmmm..... [[User:RobS|RobS]] 18:02, 27 June 2007 (EDT)
:::::::No one ever wants to answer that question, or what happened to the followers of zoroastrianism. [[User:Bohdan|Bohdan]] 18:28, 27 June 2007 (EDT)
:::::::In other words, two wrongs make a right. War is very rarely justified IMHO. [[User:EmanresU|EmanresU]] 13:35, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
::::::::If it wasn't for war, Blacks would be slaves, America would be bowing to a king and calling Senators "Lord", and we'd all be eating sauer kraut and sushi. [[User:RobS|RobS]] 15:26, 12 July 2007 (EDT)
:::::::::Well, I obviously meant starting wars, and if there had never been a single war, it would probably have changed world history beyond recognition, so I don't think your predictions are valid, but I feel like a rant so I'll try to address them. :)
:::::::::Blacks would be slaves? Slavery is still alive and well anyway, but most countries abolished the slave trade peacefully. Bowing to a king and calling senators "Lord"? How is this worse than bowing to a president (the current one was not democratically elected anyway) and calling senators "Senator"? I'm not quite sure what to say about your last comment; do you honestly think a war over which foods you get to eat (assuming you have sufficient nutritious food either way, anyway what's wrong with Sauerkraut and sushi?) is justified? [[User:EmanresU|EmanresU]] 15:24, 13 July 2007 (EDT)

The crusades were wrong. The killing of people is wrong. It is only oaky to kill when you have to defend someone who deserves defending. As for the religious aspect of the war, religion is a poor excuse to start killing someone. Religion not like natural resources or land, its just something that gives comfort to those who strive for something to believe in. Just because you a piece of land that some guy walked on a thousand years before is not a viable reason to start a war.
by 1718

-The greed of the few outweighs the needs of the many ~ Anonymous

:"What you do to the least of these, you do unto me".... I'd say a lot of crusaders did a lot of harm to "the least of those" they came across.... [[User:Pandeism|Pandeism]] 22:39, 14 March 2008 (EDT)

==TRAGIC==

I can not say in my opinion that the Crusades were good or bad. I think they were both, and neither. I find it more fitting to label them as tragic. It is my belief that they should not have been carried out, or at the very least they should have been conducted differently, especially the later ones. However, the fact that they were carried out, then it is my belief that things would have been better had they been ultimately successful. That the West (and do not go deluding yourselves this was a religious thing, it was not, it was a political and cultural thing, religion was used to spur on the zealots on both sides...) should have retained the Holy Land, that the world would have been better for it, if we were to use today's world as a reference point (but then hindsight is always 20/20). The The powers that be bhind he Crusades should have left the Jews alone, and sacking Constantinople was absolute lunacy. But again, it was a different time, and you couldn't expect more from the common christian of that era to be hateful and virulent towards the "killers of Christ" nor could you expect any Pope of that era to abide any collusion or otherwise beneficial relations with "schismatics." So in a word, the whole affair was tragic.

Napoleon Bonaparte

2009-06-21T02:42:55Z

Honeil:

[[Image:Y8r587ig.jpg|right|thumb|300px|Napoleon I by [[Jacques Louis David]]]]
'''Napoleon''' ('''Napoleon Bonaparte''' or, after 1804, '''Napoleon I, Emperor of the French''') (15 August 1769 – 5 May 1821) was a world historic figure and First Consul of [[France]] from 1799 to 1804, Emperor of the French, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine from 1804 to 1814 and from 1 March to 22 June 1815. He was the greatest general of his age--perhaps any age, with a sure command of battlefield tactics and campaign strategies. He revolutionized the military applications of artillery, and routinely moved his troops faster and with fewer supplies than was then thought possible, allowing for amazingly large and rapid concentrations of force against his slower and less adaptable enemies.

As a civil leader he played a major role in the [[French Revolution]], then ended it when he became First Consul in 1799 and Emperor of France in 1804. He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems. The Napoleonic Civil Code is considered the first successful codification that strongly influenced the law of many other countries.

He was constantly at war against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies, forced to abdicate in 1814 and sent into exile at Elba (an island in the Tyrannian Sea). In 1815, after escaping from Elba, he took control of France again, raised a new army, and almost succeded in defeating the isolated Prussian and British forces but was defeated at the [[Battle of Waterloo]]. He was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean; there he died 6 years later, in 1821. His image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

==Early History==
He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa ([[Italy]]). He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes were, although members of the lower aristocracy, destitute.
Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French--he always had a thick Corsican accent--Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, a pauper even among the aristocratic poor, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in [[Paris]] to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.

There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence.<ref> Englund pp 29-33</ref> During his 10 years as a junior officer made 5 extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.<ref> Englund ch. 1-3</ref>

==Rise to Power==
[[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]]
Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref> Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref>
===Italy===
In Italy, Napoleon's rapid maneuvers proved brilliantly successful and had major long-term effects. He defeated [[Austria]], France's most dangerous enemy. He established French hegemony in the Italian peninsula, put Vienna in an impossible strategic situation, and solidified his reputation as a military genius beloved by the men in the ranks; he became a major national hero, and thus a political force in his own right.
===Egypt===
The governing Directory was happy to send Napoleon to far-off [[Egypt]]. In July 1798, Napoleon led the Armée d’Orient an expeditionary force of 36,000 men to conquer Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, the opening move in his plan to acquire a new colony for France, block England's access to India, and export the values of French republicanism to a modernized Middle East. Aware that Europe was ignorant of cultural and religious Islam, Napoleon brought along a hundred scholars and linguists. The scholars opened the field of [[Orientalism|Oriental]] studies; the third-ranking French general converted to Islam as Abdallah Menou.
[[Image:Rosetta Stone.jpg|thumb|200px|The [[Rosetta Stone]]]]

He easily defeated the 60,000-man army of the Mamelukes (horsemen) at the [[Battle of the Pyramids]] (July 21, 1798).

Intending to transplant French liberty to Egypt, Napoleon encountered stiff resistance and reacted with the same barbarism and repression used by the Ottomans. <ref> Juan Cole, ''Napoleon's Egypt'' (2007); Irene A. Bierman, ed., ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (2003)</ref> The British under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] sank Napoleon's entire fleet at the [[Battle of the Nile]] (August 1, 1798), trapping the French army as the [[Turkish]] main army approached. Napoleon attacked first, invading Syria and defeating the Turks in a bloody massacre. As he laid siege to Acre, plague broke out among his troops, forcing Napoleon to retreat back to Egypt. At the [[Battle of Aboukir]] (July 25, 1799), his 6000 men defeated a Turkish force three times as strong. Napoleon then slipped through the blockade and returned to France. <ref> The British defeated the French army in Egypt in 1801 and allowed it to return to France. </ref> Although he won great victories in Egypt, disease and the heat decimated his ranks. He left most of his forces in Egypt under the command of Jean-Baptiste Kleber, who continued to fight in Egypt for another two years.

===Coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire===

Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred,he muscled the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch. Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: no more representative government, assemblies, a collegian executive, or liberty.<ref> Furet (1996) p 212</ref>

==Diplomacy==
The long string of wars was broken by the Treaty of Amiens (1802), which proved to be only a 14 month pause. <ref> Historians often use the Treaty of Amiens to separate what they call the "French Revolutionary wars" from the "Napoleonic wars." The new wars were much more nationalistic and less ideological. John D. Grainger, ''The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803.'' (2004)</ref> Napoleon used the interlude to make major territorial gains in Italy and Germany without firing a shot, an unexpected development that forced the British back to the battlefield.
===Slavery===
Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean--sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever. Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic. <ref> Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse </ref> Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref> Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref>

==Military action to 1812==
[[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]]
Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>

Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.

His spectacular failure in [[Russia]] in 1812 was due primarily to his bad logistical planning, a blunder historians have been unable to explain. In battle he paid close attention to the overall picture, but left the critical decisions to his marshals. He rarely issued detailed guidance on corps level tactical employment; instead he devised the overall battle plans, and directed the combined attacks of infantry, cavalry reserves, and massed batteries of guns. Since he was simultaneously head of the government, he integrated the military, political and diplomatic dimensions. He was an accurate judge of his opponents, except that is for Britain and Russia. He could never be at peace with Britain; with Russia he let his need for diplomatic prestige overcome his military judgment.

===Austerlitz, 1805===
The [[Battle of Austerlitz]] on 2 December 1805 is celebrated as Napoleon's greatest victory. The collapse of the Peace of Amiens led Britain to assemble the "Third Coalition" in April 1805, including Austria, Russia, and Sweden. After threatening to invade Britain, Napoleon sent 200,000 soldiers marching east. He used six army corps, each a self-contained, all-arms combat force. The corps was a Napoleonic invention, and each was strong enough to operate independently, allowing the army to advance along a broad front, which facilitated logistics (each army seized supplies in its region), and increased the speed of the advance. Napoleon commanded in person in Germany; relying on the support of most of the south German states, he advanced to meet the Austrians who had invaded Bavaria. On the upper Danube he concentrated his 200,000 men, reinforced by Bernadotte, and by allied from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau. After the Austrians had been defeated in several engagements, their main army was surrounded at Ulm and surrendered 30,000 men on October 17, 1805 without a fight. At the same time the British navy won a total victory under [[Horatio Nelson]] sinking the combined French and Spanish fleet at [[Trafalgar]] on October 21, 1805, permanently destroying Napoleon's sea power. On December 2, 1805, at the [[Battle of Austerlitz]], called "the battle of the three emperors," Napoleon split the enemy center, encircled the enemy left, and won a smashing victory over the united forces of Austria and Russia. Napoleon lost 9000 men, the enemy 26,000. Austria made peace; the Russians retreated.
The Peace of Pressburg deprived Austria of territory and forced her to pay an indemnity. Napoleon then turned his attention to Prussia, who was going to attack France but didn't mobilize in time for the fighting. Napoleon declared war after the conclusion of the Peace of Pressburg and destroyed the Prussian army at the battle of Jena-Aurstadt. Napoleon, remembering that Russia hadn't sued for peace after Austerlitz decided to persue the retreating Russian army through Poland. He enjoyed early sucess, pushing the Russians back and capturing Warsaw but was weakened at a bloody stalemate at Eylau. Napoleon, determined on a "spring recovery" pushed the Russians further into Poland, delivering a crippling blow at the Battle of Friedland. The Peace of Tilsit between Prussia, Russia and France did little to the Russians, instead depriving Prussia of huge amounts of land while Russia only had to give up part of Poland. Aside from that, Prussia had to pay an indemnity and had it's army restricted to a certain size while Russia only had outlaw British goods from its ports. Napoleon and the Tsar became close friends after the Treaty.

===Artillery===
The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.<ref> Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(3): 617-640. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(200107)65%3A3%3C617%3ATROADN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z in Jstor]. McConachy rejects the alternative theory that growing reliance on artillery by the French army beginning in 1807 was an outgrowth of the declining quality of the French infantry and, later, France's inferiority in cavalry numbers. </ref>

===Russia to 1812===
===The Polish issue===
In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812. <ref> Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.

== Moscow ==

===Collapse, 1813-1814===
The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref> Thompson ch 13-14</ref>

Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in 1813.<ref> Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 77</ref> His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.<ref> Schroeder (1996) p. 495-6</ref>

Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813. Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive battle with the enemy's main force, Napoleon repeatedly detached large numbers of troops under ineffective commanders to capture the Prussian capital of Berlin. The heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French in these questionable undertakings left Napoleon's Grande Armée vulnerable to the massive Allied coalition that met him at [[Leipzig]]. He won at [[Dresden]] but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.<ref> Michael V. Leggiere, "From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon's Gamble in North Germany, 1813." ''Journal of Military History'' 2003 67(1): 39-84. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in [[Project Muse]] </ref>

Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the [[Leipzig, Battle of|Battle of Leipzig]], called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies. It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 80 </ref> Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms. In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France. The French army, now controlled by [[Louis XVIII]] numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.

===100 Days to Waterloo, 1815===
In March 1815, Napoleon secretly landed in France and rallied his supporters. They flocked to his cause as the French royal officials lost control; Napoleon entered Paris in triumph and raised new armies.
[[Image:1815waterloo.jpg|thumb|375px]]

The Allies, meeting at a peace conference in [[Vienna]], sent a million soldiers to stop him. The largest contingents was a multinational force under the command of the Briton, the [[Duke of Wellington]]. Napoleon defeated the German army under Blücher at Ligny but had to turn and stop Wellington before he merged forces with Blücher. At a very hard and closely fought battle of [[Waterloo, Battle of|Waterloo]] on June 18, 1815, Blücher arrived at the last moment and Napoleon was finally and totally defeated. He surrendered to the British who sent him in exile to the remote island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic, where he died a prisoner in 1821. His relatives lost their royal positions; his imperial army, and particularly the legendary Imperial Guard, were disbanded, and Europe entered an era of peace.

==Impact on France==
Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancient régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Law: Code Napoléon ===
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Religion===
Religion had been a major issue during the [[French Revolution]], and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems. Thereby he moved the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him. The Catholic system was reestablished by the [[Concordat of 1801]] (signed with Pope [[Pius VII]]), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants and atheists were tolerated.<ref> Sutherland (2003) ch 11</ref>
===Taxes===
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.
===Conscription===
Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerist sergeants and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>

==Impact on Europe==
Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.

The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and [[America]], application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the [[Catholic]] Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996) </ref>

Napoleon lifted all restriction on [[Jews]] in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref>

After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the [[Grand Duchy of Warsaw]], which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep [[Poland]] within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.

==Personality==
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence.Although short and not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation. After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general. <ref> See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975). </ref>

In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars. Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,<ref> Thompson, ''Napoleon Bonaparte'' (1951) p 285</ref> for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personality neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.<ref>Englund, ''Napoleon'' (2004) pp 379ff</ref>

Napoleon's ambition and drive inspired the term "[[Napoleonic Complex]]", which is used to describe a person who overcompensates for shortness or other physical deficiencies by excessive aggressiveness or will to dominate other people.

He married first [[Josephine Beauharnais]] (9 March 1796) and later Marie-Louise of Austria (11 March 1810). His only son, [[Napoleon II]] (1811 - 1832) the [[King of Rome]], died at the the age of 21.

=== Quote on Jesus ===

<blockquote>"[[Alexander]], [[Julius Caesar|Caesar]], [[Charlemagne]], and myself founded empires; but what foundation did we rest the creations of our genius? Upon force. [[Jesus Christ]] founded an empire upon love; and at this hour millions of men would die for Him."<ref>http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/2505</ref></blockquote>

==Propaganda and memory ==
[[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by J. L. David]]
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref>

The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref> Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref>
[[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]]
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004) </ref>

Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on plays and novels from the period 1893-1913, Datta examines how writers and critics of the "Belle Epoque" exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco </ref>

<blockquote>
''After being defeated by the British in 1815, the French Emperor was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean. Six years later, at the age of 52, Bonaparte whispered his last words, "Head of Army!"'' <ref>[http://www.livescience.com/history/070116_napoleon_bonaparte.html Mystery of Napoleon's Death Said Solved] </ref>
</blockquote>

==Basic further reading==
See the detailed Bibliography

* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best political biography [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0674018036/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197704843&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Harold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon'' (Penguin Lives) (2002) 208pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' (1963). 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986), Napoleon's ideas on warfare
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain

==Detailed bibliography==
===Major biographies===
* Asprey, Robert. ''The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte'' and ''The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte''. (2002); 2 vol, 1200pp well-written popular biography focusing on the military [http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Napoleon-Bonaparte-Robert-Asprey/dp/0465048811/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736126&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Barnett, Corelli. ''Bonaparte'' (1978), hostile
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), to 1799
* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Cronin, Vincent. ''Napoleon'' (1971), favorable popular bio
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), 672 pp; vol 1 of major new biography, to 1799 [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Path-Power-Philip-Dwyer/dp/0300137540/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-7 excerpt and text search]
* Ellis, Geoffry. ''Napoleon'' (1997)
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best (and most advanced) political biography; thin on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0684871424/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736235&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Fournier, August. ''Napoleon the First: A Biography'' (1903); 836 pages; excellent old biography [http://books.google.com/books?vid=02iZ1BDnhyMh95-cSu&id=jI0aAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon: A Penguin Life.'' (2002). 208 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Lefebvre, Georges: ''Napoleon,'' 1969, influential French perspective
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' 1963. 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search]
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Schom, Alan. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: A Life'' (1997), 944pp; very hostile; argues Napoleon was a paranoiac psychopath [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Bonaparte-Life-Alan-Schom/dp/0060929588/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736422&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain
* Tulard, Jean. ''Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour'' (1985), influential French biography
* Woloch, Isser. '' Napoleon and His Collaborators: the making of a dictatorship'' (2001) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-His-Collaborators-Making-Dictatorship/dp/0393323412/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736488&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

===General reference===
* Chandler, David. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1993)
* Esposito, Vincent J. and John R. Elting, ''A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1999); textbook; includes the West Point maps
* Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. ed. ''The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History'' (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective; stress on history of ideas
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Nafziger, George F. ''Historical Dictionary of the Napoleonic Era.'' 2002. 353 pp.
* Nicholls, David. ''Napoleon: A Biographical Companion.'' 1999. 300 pp.
* Pope, Stephen. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars.'' (2000). 572 pp.
* Smith, Digby. ''The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book'' (1998); 582pp; data on 2000+ individual battles, clashes, sieges, raids, capitulations, and naval engagements

===Military studies===
* Adkin, Mark. ''The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle'' (2002) 448pp [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Companion-Complete-Historys-Famous/dp/0811718549/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735456&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Arnold, James R. ''Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna.'' (1995). 247 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Conquers-Austria-Campaign-Vienna/dp/0275946940/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735487&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
*Bell, David A. ''The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It'' (2008) [http://www.amazon.com/First-Total-War-Napoleons-Warfare/dp/0618919813/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-10 excerpt and text search]
* Chandler, David. ''The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier'' (1973), 1216 pp; experts call it the best military synthesis
* Cole, Juan. ''Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Egypt-Invading-Middle-East/dp/1403964319/ref=sr_1_5/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189485491&sr=1-5 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]
* Connelly, Owen. ''Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns'' (2nd ed 2006) negative on Napoleon's skills
* Coote, Stephen. ''Napoleon and the Hundred Days.'' (2005). 320 pp.
* Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. ''Napoleon; A History of the Art of War'' (1904), old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=0N7HWOuEzfsHb6vtWh&id=Y6kfAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Austerlitz, 1805'' (1999)
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Borodino and the War of 1812'' (1999).
* Elting, John R. ''Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee'' (1997), influential study
* Epstein, Robert M. ''Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War'' (1994) on Austrian war of 1809
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815 '' (2008), 656pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Wars-International-History-1803-1815/dp/0670020303/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search]
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''The French Wars 1792-1815.'' (2001). 96pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102715226 online edition]
* Fisher, Todd. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2001-4) 3 vol; 96pp, short, well-illustrated operational history [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Essential-Histories-Specials/dp/1841768316/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search vol 1]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-1805-1807-Essential-Histories/dp/1579583571/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search vol 2]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Empires-Strike-1808-1812/dp/1579583660/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search vol 3]
* Forrest, Alan. ''Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire.'' 2002. 248 pp.
* Fortescue, J. W. ''A history of the British army'' (19v 1899-1930) [http://www.archive.org/details/historybritishp202fortuoft full text vol 4 pt2: 1789-1801][http://www.archive.org/download/britisharmy06fortuoft/britisharmy06fortuoft online edition vol 6: 1807-1809]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish07fortuoft/historyofbritish07fortuoft full text vol 7: 1809-1810]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish08fortuoft/historyofbritish08fortuoft full text vol 8: 1810-1812]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish09fortuoft full text vol 9: 1813-1814]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish10fortuoft full text vol 10: 1814-1815]
* Gates, David. ''The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815'' (1997) 304pp; attacks Connolly and says N's "brilliance as a military commander has rarely been equalled let alone surpassed"
* Gill, John. ''With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign'' (1992)
* Goetz, Robert. ''1805: Austerlitz; Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition'' (2005). 368pp
* Griffith, Paddy. ''The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789-1802,'' (1998); 304 pp; [http://www.amazon.com/Art-War-Revolutionary-France-1789-1802/dp/1853673358/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735789&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hamilton-Williams, David. ''Waterloo: New Perspectives; The Great Battle Reappraised.'' (1994). 416 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Perspectives-Great-Battle-Reappraised/dp/0471145718/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735763&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (1962) [http://ia331331.us.archive.org/2/items/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp_djvu.txt online edition]
* Kagan, Frederick W. "Russia's Wars with Napoleon: 1805–1815," in ''The Military History of Tsarist Russia,'' ed. Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (2002), 106–22.
* Kagan, Frederick W. ''The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805'' (2006) first of four promised volumes; covers the strengths and strategies of all the powers [http://www.amazon.com/End-Old-Order-Napoleon-1801-1805/dp/0306815451/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735729&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Leggiere, Michael V. ''Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813.'' 2002. 384 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Berlin-Franco-Prussian-Campaigns-Commanders/dp/0806133996/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735699&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Liaropoulos, Andrew N. "Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence - the Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs." ''Journal of Military History'' 2006 70(2): 363-384. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in Project Muse
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812–14)" ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 7#2 (2006) 283-308 online in [[Project Muse]]
* Luvaas, Jay. '' Napoleon on the Art of War'' (2001) 288 pp. A synthesis, arrangement, and translation of Napoleon's thinking. [http://books.google.com/books?id=zq8GhdLeK_kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:luvaas&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=AlNZSLjJErW2iQG1rOH5Bg&sig=knBV3L0vr0dptGr0fOa32pMlZ6k excerpt and text search]
* Lynn, John A. ''The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94'' (1984); influential analysis [http://www.amazon.com/Bayonets-Republic-History-Warfare/dp/0813329450/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735664&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Muir, Rory. ''Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon'' (2000), 466pp [http://www.amazon.com/Tactics-Experience-Battle-Age-Napoleon/dp/0300082703/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735639&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Nofi, Albert A. ''The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815.'' 1993. 333pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=100857568 online edition]
* Nosworthy, Brent. ''With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies.'' (1996). 528 pp.
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986)
* Pericoli, Ugo.''1815: The Armies at Waterloo'' (1973)
* Riley, J. P. "How Good Was Napoleon?" ''History Today,'' (July 2007) 57#7 10pp in [[EBSCO]]
* Riley, J. P. ''Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting.'' (2000). 480 pp
* Riley, Jonathon. ''Napoleon As a General: Command from the Battlefield to Grand Strategy'' (2007)
* Rogers, H.C.B. ''Napoleon's Army'' (1974)
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2006) 240pp, well illustrated synthesis by leading scholar [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Smithsonian-History-Warfare/dp/006085121X/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735584&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon'' 1978
* Schneid, Frederick C. ''Napoleon's Italian Campaigns: 1805-1815.'' (2002); 229pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101329281 online edition]
* Tarle, Eugene. ''Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. 1942.'' [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6522304 online edition]

===Impact on France===
* Bergeron, Louis. ''France under Napoleon'' (1981), French viewpoint
* Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals
* Furet, François. ''The French Revolution, 1770-1814'' (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
* Goubert, Pierre. ''The Course of French History.'' 1991; French textbook; ch. 14 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103458094 online edition]
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Paxton, John. ''Companion to the French Revolution'' (1987), hundreds of short entries.
* Scott, Samuel F. and Barry Rothaus. ''Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 1789-1799'' (1984), short essays by scholars
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order'' (2nd ed 2003), comprehensive survey
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''France 1789–1815. Revolution and Counter-Revolution'' (2nd ed. 2003, 430pp [http://www.amazon.com/French-Revolution-Empire-Quest-Civic/dp/0631233636/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189597597&sr=1-1 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]

===Diplomacy and impact on Europe===
* Blanning, T.C.W. ''The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802'' (1996).
* Broers, Michael. ''Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815'' (1996) 291pp, covers everything except the battles
* Bruun, Geoffrey. ''Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814'' 1938. excellent survey of all of Europe
* Dwyer, Philip G. ed.''Napoleon and Europe,'' (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
* Ellis, Geoffrey. ''The Napoleonic Empire'' (1991)
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hill, Peter P. ''Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815'' (2005)
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Muir, Rory. ''Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.'' (1996). 466 pp.
* Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 131–46. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199004)54%3A2%3C131%3AWDNIRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]
* Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History,'' Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C771%3ATOCAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR]
* Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.''Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
* Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
* Schroeder, Paul. ''The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848.'' 1996; Elaborate detail; advanced history; very hostile to Napoleon; [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=28171953 online edition]
* Woolf, Stuart. ''Napoleon's Integration of Europe'' (1991) 320pp [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103462796 online edition]
* ''Cambridge Modern History'' (1907) vol 9: Napoleon [http://books.google.com/books?id=gMgFAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=Cambridge+Modern+History+napoleon+waterloo online edition], older articles by scholars, 900pp

==Historiography and Memory==
* Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." ''European History Quarterly'' 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals
* Dunne, John. "Napoleon: For or against ... and Beyond." ''History Review.'' Issue: 27. 1997. pp 17+. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000519459 online edition]
* Geyl, Pieter. ''Napoleon: For and Against'' (1949) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59600303 online edition]
* Hazareesingh, Sudhir. "Memory and Political Imagination: the Legend of Napoleon Revisited." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 463-483. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in Oxford up
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)." ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 2006 7(2): 283-308. Issn: 1531-023x Fulltext: in Project Muse. Argues Alexander's successful strategy has been neglected
* Pinkney, David. ed., ''Napoleon: Historical Enigma'' (1969)

===Primary Sources===
* Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. ''The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook.'' (2002) 213pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108790059 online edition]

==Online resources==
* [http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/military.html#G. Richard Jensen, ed. ''Web Sources for Military History'' annotated links]
* [http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/chap7a.html War, terror and Resistance]
* [http://clk.about.com/?zi=1/XJ/Ya&sdn=europeanhistory&cdn=education&tm=10&gps=150_217_766_469&f=10&tt=14&bt=1&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.napoleonbonaparte.nl/ Napoleon Bonaparte: Internet Guide]

====notes====
<references/>

[[Category:Military Commanders]]
[[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]
[[Category:French History]]
[[Category:Military History]]
[[Category:European History]]
[[Category:French Revolution]]

Napoleon Bonaparte

2009-06-21T02:39:54Z

Honeil: created a section on the War of the 3rd Coalition

[[Image:Y8r587ig.jpg|right|thumb|300px|Napoleon I by [[Jacques Louis David]]]]
'''Napoleon''' ('''Napoleon Bonaparte''' or, after 1804, '''Napoleon I, Emperor of the French''') (15 August 1769 – 5 May 1821) was a world historic figure and First Consul of [[France]] from 1799 to 1804, Emperor of the French, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine from 1804 to 1814 and from 1 March to 22 June 1815. He was the greatest general of his age--perhaps any age, with a sure command of battlefield tactics and campaign strategies. He revolutionized the military applications of artillery, and routinely moved his troops faster and with fewer supplies than was then thought possible, allowing for amazingly large and rapid concentrations of force against his slower and less adaptable enemies.

As a civil leader he played a major role in the [[French Revolution]], then ended it when he became First Consul in 1799 and Emperor of France in 1804. He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems. The Napoleonic Civil Code is considered the first successful codification that strongly influenced the law of many other countries.

He was constantly at war against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies, forced to abdicate in 1814 and sent into exile at Elba (an island in the Tyrannian Sea). In 1815, after escaping from Elba, he took control of France again, raised a new army, and almost succeded in defeating the isolated Prussian and British forces but was defeated at the [[Battle of Waterloo]]. He was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean; there he died 6 years later, in 1821. His image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

==Early History==
He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa ([[Italy]]). He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer of the minor nobility; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonopartes were, although members of the lower aristocracy, destitute.
Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French--he always had a thick Corsican accent--Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, a pauper even among the aristocratic poor, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in [[Paris]] to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.

There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence.<ref> Englund pp 29-33</ref> During his 10 years as a junior officer made 5 extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.<ref> Englund ch. 1-3</ref>

==Rise to Power==
[[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]]
Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref> Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref>
===Italy===
In Italy, Napoleon's rapid maneuvers proved brilliantly successful and had major long-term effects. He defeated [[Austria]], France's most dangerous enemy. He established French hegemony in the Italian peninsula, put Vienna in an impossible strategic situation, and solidified his reputation as a military genius beloved by the men in the ranks; he became a major national hero, and thus a political force in his own right.
===Egypt===
The governing Directory was happy to send Napoleon to far-off [[Egypt]]. In July 1798, Napoleon led the Armée d’Orient an expeditionary force of 36,000 men to conquer Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, the opening move in his plan to acquire a new colony for France, block England's access to India, and export the values of French republicanism to a modernized Middle East. Aware that Europe was ignorant of cultural and religious Islam, Napoleon brought along a hundred scholars and linguists. The scholars opened the field of [[Orientalism|Oriental]] studies; the third-ranking French general converted to Islam as Abdallah Menou.
[[Image:Rosetta Stone.jpg|thumb|200px|The [[Rosetta Stone]]]]

He easily defeated the 60,000-man army of the Mamelukes (horsemen) at the [[Battle of the Pyramids]] (July 21, 1798).

Intending to transplant French liberty to Egypt, Napoleon encountered stiff resistance and reacted with the same barbarism and repression used by the Ottomans. <ref> Juan Cole, ''Napoleon's Egypt'' (2007); Irene A. Bierman, ed., ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (2003)</ref> The British under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] sank Napoleon's entire fleet at the [[Battle of the Nile]] (August 1, 1798), trapping the French army as the [[Turkish]] main army approached. Napoleon attacked first, invading Syria and defeating the Turks in a bloody massacre. As he laid siege to Acre, plague broke out among his troops, forcing Napoleon to retreat back to Egypt. At the [[Battle of Aboukir]] (July 25, 1799), his 6000 men defeated a Turkish force three times as strong. Napoleon then slipped through the blockade and returned to France. <ref> The British defeated the French army in Egypt in 1801 and allowed it to return to France. </ref> Although he won great victories in Egypt, disease and the heat decimated his ranks. He left most of his forces in Egypt under the command of Jean-Baptiste Kleber, who continued to fight in Egypt for another two years.

===Coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire===

Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred,he muscled the Council of 500 into electing a consular government as the executive branch. Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: no more representative government, assemblies, a collegian executive, or liberty.<ref> Furet (1996) p 212</ref>

==Diplomacy==
The long string of wars was broken by the Treaty of Amiens (1802), which proved to be only a 14 month pause. <ref> Historians often use the Treaty of Amiens to separate what they call the "French Revolutionary wars" from the "Napoleonic wars." The new wars were much more nationalistic and less ideological. John D. Grainger, ''The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803.'' (2004)</ref> Napoleon used the interlude to make major territorial gains in Italy and Germany without firing a shot, an unexpected development that forced the British back to the battlefield.
===Slavery===
Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean--sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever. Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic. <ref> Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse </ref> Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref> Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref>
==War of the Third Coalition==
In 1805, Britain persuaded Austria and Russia to declare war of France and attack from the east while Napoleon was occupied with his plans for an invasion of Britain (dashed by the naval battle at Trafalgar later in the campaign). Napoleon miraculously moved so quickly to react that not only was he able to catch 30,000 troops under the Archduke Ferdinand, isolated from the rest of the coalition, but completely surrounded them and forced their bloodless surrender (on the 20th October 1805, the Battle of Trafalgar took place on the day after). Napoleon continued to march into Austrian territory, capturing Vienna. Napoleon's army however was beginning to tire and he badly needed a battle by which he could force peace. He defeated the Austrians and Russians at the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2nd, the anniversary of his coronation. The battle destroyed the Russian and Austrian army under the personal command of the Tsar Nicholas. The Peace of Pressburg deprived Austria of territory and forced her to pay an indemnity. Napoleon then turned his attention to Prussia, who was going to attack France but didn't mobilize in time for the fighting. Napoleon declared war after the conclusion of the Peace of Pressburg and destroyed the Prussian army at the battle of Jena-Aurstadt. Napoleon, remembering that Russia hadn't sued for peace after Austerlitz decided to persue the retreating Russian army through Poland. He enjoyed early sucess, pushing the Russians back and capturing Warsaw but was weakened at a bloody stalemate at Eylau. Napoleon, determined on a "spring recovery" pushed the Russians further into Poland, delivering a crippling blow at the Battle of Friedland. The Peace of Tilsit between Prussia, Russia and France did little to the Russians, instead depriving Prussia of huge amounts of land while Russia only had to give up part of Poland. Aside from that, Prussia had to pay an indemnity and had it's army restricted to a certain size while Russia only had outlaw British goods from its ports. Napoleon and the Tsar became close friends after the Treaty.

==Military action to 1812==
[[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]]
Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>

Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.

His spectacular failure in [[Russia]] in 1812 was due primarily to his bad logistical planning, a blunder historians have been unable to explain. In battle he paid close attention to the overall picture, but left the critical decisions to his marshals. He rarely issued detailed guidance on corps level tactical employment; instead he devised the overall battle plans, and directed the combined attacks of infantry, cavalry reserves, and massed batteries of guns. Since he was simultaneously head of the government, he integrated the military, political and diplomatic dimensions. He was an accurate judge of his opponents, except that is for Britain and Russia. He could never be at peace with Britain; with Russia he let his need for diplomatic prestige overcome his military judgment.

===Austerlitz, 1805===
The [[Battle of Austerlitz]] on 2 December 1805 is celebrated as Napoleon's greatest victory. The collapse of the Peace of Amiens led Britain to assemble the "Third Coalition" in April 1805, including Austria, Russia, and Sweden. After threatening to invade Britain, Napoleon sent 200,000 soldiers marching east. He used six army corps, each a self-contained, all-arms combat force. The corps was a Napoleonic invention, and each was strong enough to operate independently, allowing the army to advance along a broad front, which facilitated logistics (each army seized supplies in its region), and increased the speed of the advance. Napoleon commanded in person in Germany; relying on the support of most of the south German states, he advanced to meet the Austrians who had invaded Bavaria. On the upper Danube he concentrated his 200,000 men, reinforced by Bernadotte, and by allied from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau. After the Austrians had been defeated in several engagements, their main army was surrounded at Ulm and surrendered 30,000 men on October 17, 1805 without a fight. At the same time the British navy won a total victory under [[Horatio Nelson]] sinking the combined French and Spanish fleet at [[Trafalgar]] on October 21, 1805, permanently destroying Napoleon's sea power. On December 2, 1805, at the [[Battle of Austerlitz]], called "the battle of the three emperors," Napoleon split the enemy center, encircled the enemy left, and won a smashing victory over the united forces of Austria and Russia. Napoleon lost 9000 men, the enemy 26,000. Austria made peace; the Russians retreated.

===Artillery===
The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.<ref> Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(3): 617-640. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(200107)65%3A3%3C617%3ATROADN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z in Jstor]. McConachy rejects the alternative theory that growing reliance on artillery by the French army beginning in 1807 was an outgrowth of the declining quality of the French infantry and, later, France's inferiority in cavalry numbers. </ref>

===Russia to 1812===
===The Polish issue===
In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812. <ref> Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.

== Moscow ==

===Collapse, 1813-1814===
The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref> Thompson ch 13-14</ref>

Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in 1813.<ref> Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 77</ref> His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.<ref> Schroeder (1996) p. 495-6</ref>

Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813. Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive battle with the enemy's main force, Napoleon repeatedly detached large numbers of troops under ineffective commanders to capture the Prussian capital of Berlin. The heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French in these questionable undertakings left Napoleon's Grande Armée vulnerable to the massive Allied coalition that met him at [[Leipzig]]. He won at [[Dresden]] but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.<ref> Michael V. Leggiere, "From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon's Gamble in North Germany, 1813." ''Journal of Military History'' 2003 67(1): 39-84. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in [[Project Muse]] </ref>

Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the [[Leipzig, Battle of|Battle of Leipzig]], called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies. It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 80 </ref> Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms. In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France. The French army, now controlled by [[Louis XVIII]] numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.

===100 Days to Waterloo, 1815===
In March 1815, Napoleon secretly landed in France and rallied his supporters. They flocked to his cause as the French royal officials lost control; Napoleon entered Paris in triumph and raised new armies.
[[Image:1815waterloo.jpg|thumb|375px]]

The Allies, meeting at a peace conference in [[Vienna]], sent a million soldiers to stop him. The largest contingents was a multinational force under the command of the Briton, the [[Duke of Wellington]]. Napoleon defeated the German army under Blücher at Ligny but had to turn and stop Wellington before he merged forces with Blücher. At a very hard and closely fought battle of [[Waterloo, Battle of|Waterloo]] on June 18, 1815, Blücher arrived at the last moment and Napoleon was finally and totally defeated. He surrendered to the British who sent him in exile to the remote island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic, where he died a prisoner in 1821. His relatives lost their royal positions; his imperial army, and particularly the legendary Imperial Guard, were disbanded, and Europe entered an era of peace.

==Impact on France==
Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancient régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Law: Code Napoléon ===
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Religion===
Religion had been a major issue during the [[French Revolution]], and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems. Thereby he moved the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him. The Catholic system was reestablished by the [[Concordat of 1801]] (signed with Pope [[Pius VII]]), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants and atheists were tolerated.<ref> Sutherland (2003) ch 11</ref>
===Taxes===
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.
===Conscription===
Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerist sergeants and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>

==Impact on Europe==
Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.

The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and [[America]], application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the [[Catholic]] Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996) </ref>

Napoleon lifted all restriction on [[Jews]] in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref>

After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the [[Grand Duchy of Warsaw]], which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep [[Poland]] within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.

==Personality==
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence.Although short and not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation. After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general. <ref> See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975). </ref>

In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars. Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,<ref> Thompson, ''Napoleon Bonaparte'' (1951) p 285</ref> for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personality neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.<ref>Englund, ''Napoleon'' (2004) pp 379ff</ref>

Napoleon's ambition and drive inspired the term "[[Napoleonic Complex]]", which is used to describe a person who overcompensates for shortness or other physical deficiencies by excessive aggressiveness or will to dominate other people.

He married first [[Josephine Beauharnais]] (9 March 1796) and later Marie-Louise of Austria (11 March 1810). His only son, [[Napoleon II]] (1811 - 1832) the [[King of Rome]], died at the the age of 21.

=== Quote on Jesus ===

<blockquote>"[[Alexander]], [[Julius Caesar|Caesar]], [[Charlemagne]], and myself founded empires; but what foundation did we rest the creations of our genius? Upon force. [[Jesus Christ]] founded an empire upon love; and at this hour millions of men would die for Him."<ref>http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/2505</ref></blockquote>

==Propaganda and memory ==
[[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by J. L. David]]
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref>

The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref> Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref>
[[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]]
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004) </ref>

Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on plays and novels from the period 1893-1913, Datta examines how writers and critics of the "Belle Epoque" exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco </ref>

<blockquote>
''After being defeated by the British in 1815, the French Emperor was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean. Six years later, at the age of 52, Bonaparte whispered his last words, "Head of Army!"'' <ref>[http://www.livescience.com/history/070116_napoleon_bonaparte.html Mystery of Napoleon's Death Said Solved] </ref>
</blockquote>

==Basic further reading==
See the detailed Bibliography

* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best political biography [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0674018036/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197704843&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Harold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon'' (Penguin Lives) (2002) 208pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' (1963). 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986), Napoleon's ideas on warfare
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain

==Detailed bibliography==
===Major biographies===
* Asprey, Robert. ''The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte'' and ''The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte''. (2002); 2 vol, 1200pp well-written popular biography focusing on the military [http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Napoleon-Bonaparte-Robert-Asprey/dp/0465048811/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736126&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Barnett, Corelli. ''Bonaparte'' (1978), hostile
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), to 1799
* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Cronin, Vincent. ''Napoleon'' (1971), favorable popular bio
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), 672 pp; vol 1 of major new biography, to 1799 [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Path-Power-Philip-Dwyer/dp/0300137540/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-7 excerpt and text search]
* Ellis, Geoffry. ''Napoleon'' (1997)
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best (and most advanced) political biography; thin on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0684871424/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736235&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Fournier, August. ''Napoleon the First: A Biography'' (1903); 836 pages; excellent old biography [http://books.google.com/books?vid=02iZ1BDnhyMh95-cSu&id=jI0aAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon: A Penguin Life.'' (2002). 208 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Lefebvre, Georges: ''Napoleon,'' 1969, influential French perspective
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' 1963. 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search]
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Schom, Alan. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: A Life'' (1997), 944pp; very hostile; argues Napoleon was a paranoiac psychopath [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Bonaparte-Life-Alan-Schom/dp/0060929588/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736422&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain
* Tulard, Jean. ''Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour'' (1985), influential French biography
* Woloch, Isser. '' Napoleon and His Collaborators: the making of a dictatorship'' (2001) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-His-Collaborators-Making-Dictatorship/dp/0393323412/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736488&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

===General reference===
* Chandler, David. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1993)
* Esposito, Vincent J. and John R. Elting, ''A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1999); textbook; includes the West Point maps
* Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. ed. ''The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History'' (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective; stress on history of ideas
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Nafziger, George F. ''Historical Dictionary of the Napoleonic Era.'' 2002. 353 pp.
* Nicholls, David. ''Napoleon: A Biographical Companion.'' 1999. 300 pp.
* Pope, Stephen. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars.'' (2000). 572 pp.
* Smith, Digby. ''The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book'' (1998); 582pp; data on 2000+ individual battles, clashes, sieges, raids, capitulations, and naval engagements

===Military studies===
* Adkin, Mark. ''The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle'' (2002) 448pp [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Companion-Complete-Historys-Famous/dp/0811718549/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735456&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Arnold, James R. ''Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna.'' (1995). 247 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Conquers-Austria-Campaign-Vienna/dp/0275946940/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735487&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
*Bell, David A. ''The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It'' (2008) [http://www.amazon.com/First-Total-War-Napoleons-Warfare/dp/0618919813/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-10 excerpt and text search]
* Chandler, David. ''The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier'' (1973), 1216 pp; experts call it the best military synthesis
* Cole, Juan. ''Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Egypt-Invading-Middle-East/dp/1403964319/ref=sr_1_5/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189485491&sr=1-5 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]
* Connelly, Owen. ''Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns'' (2nd ed 2006) negative on Napoleon's skills
* Coote, Stephen. ''Napoleon and the Hundred Days.'' (2005). 320 pp.
* Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. ''Napoleon; A History of the Art of War'' (1904), old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=0N7HWOuEzfsHb6vtWh&id=Y6kfAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Austerlitz, 1805'' (1999)
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Borodino and the War of 1812'' (1999).
* Elting, John R. ''Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee'' (1997), influential study
* Epstein, Robert M. ''Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War'' (1994) on Austrian war of 1809
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815 '' (2008), 656pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Wars-International-History-1803-1815/dp/0670020303/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search]
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''The French Wars 1792-1815.'' (2001). 96pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102715226 online edition]
* Fisher, Todd. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2001-4) 3 vol; 96pp, short, well-illustrated operational history [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Essential-Histories-Specials/dp/1841768316/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search vol 1]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-1805-1807-Essential-Histories/dp/1579583571/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search vol 2]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Empires-Strike-1808-1812/dp/1579583660/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search vol 3]
* Forrest, Alan. ''Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire.'' 2002. 248 pp.
* Fortescue, J. W. ''A history of the British army'' (19v 1899-1930) [http://www.archive.org/details/historybritishp202fortuoft full text vol 4 pt2: 1789-1801][http://www.archive.org/download/britisharmy06fortuoft/britisharmy06fortuoft online edition vol 6: 1807-1809]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish07fortuoft/historyofbritish07fortuoft full text vol 7: 1809-1810]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish08fortuoft/historyofbritish08fortuoft full text vol 8: 1810-1812]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish09fortuoft full text vol 9: 1813-1814]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish10fortuoft full text vol 10: 1814-1815]
* Gates, David. ''The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815'' (1997) 304pp; attacks Connolly and says N's "brilliance as a military commander has rarely been equalled let alone surpassed"
* Gill, John. ''With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign'' (1992)
* Goetz, Robert. ''1805: Austerlitz; Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition'' (2005). 368pp
* Griffith, Paddy. ''The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789-1802,'' (1998); 304 pp; [http://www.amazon.com/Art-War-Revolutionary-France-1789-1802/dp/1853673358/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735789&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hamilton-Williams, David. ''Waterloo: New Perspectives; The Great Battle Reappraised.'' (1994). 416 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Perspectives-Great-Battle-Reappraised/dp/0471145718/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735763&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (1962) [http://ia331331.us.archive.org/2/items/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp_djvu.txt online edition]
* Kagan, Frederick W. "Russia's Wars with Napoleon: 1805–1815," in ''The Military History of Tsarist Russia,'' ed. Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (2002), 106–22.
* Kagan, Frederick W. ''The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805'' (2006) first of four promised volumes; covers the strengths and strategies of all the powers [http://www.amazon.com/End-Old-Order-Napoleon-1801-1805/dp/0306815451/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735729&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Leggiere, Michael V. ''Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813.'' 2002. 384 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Berlin-Franco-Prussian-Campaigns-Commanders/dp/0806133996/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735699&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Liaropoulos, Andrew N. "Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence - the Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs." ''Journal of Military History'' 2006 70(2): 363-384. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in Project Muse
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812–14)" ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 7#2 (2006) 283-308 online in [[Project Muse]]
* Luvaas, Jay. '' Napoleon on the Art of War'' (2001) 288 pp. A synthesis, arrangement, and translation of Napoleon's thinking. [http://books.google.com/books?id=zq8GhdLeK_kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:luvaas&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=AlNZSLjJErW2iQG1rOH5Bg&sig=knBV3L0vr0dptGr0fOa32pMlZ6k excerpt and text search]
* Lynn, John A. ''The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94'' (1984); influential analysis [http://www.amazon.com/Bayonets-Republic-History-Warfare/dp/0813329450/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735664&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Muir, Rory. ''Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon'' (2000), 466pp [http://www.amazon.com/Tactics-Experience-Battle-Age-Napoleon/dp/0300082703/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735639&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Nofi, Albert A. ''The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815.'' 1993. 333pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=100857568 online edition]
* Nosworthy, Brent. ''With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies.'' (1996). 528 pp.
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986)
* Pericoli, Ugo.''1815: The Armies at Waterloo'' (1973)
* Riley, J. P. "How Good Was Napoleon?" ''History Today,'' (July 2007) 57#7 10pp in [[EBSCO]]
* Riley, J. P. ''Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting.'' (2000). 480 pp
* Riley, Jonathon. ''Napoleon As a General: Command from the Battlefield to Grand Strategy'' (2007)
* Rogers, H.C.B. ''Napoleon's Army'' (1974)
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2006) 240pp, well illustrated synthesis by leading scholar [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Smithsonian-History-Warfare/dp/006085121X/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735584&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon'' 1978
* Schneid, Frederick C. ''Napoleon's Italian Campaigns: 1805-1815.'' (2002); 229pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101329281 online edition]
* Tarle, Eugene. ''Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. 1942.'' [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6522304 online edition]

===Impact on France===
* Bergeron, Louis. ''France under Napoleon'' (1981), French viewpoint
* Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals
* Furet, François. ''The French Revolution, 1770-1814'' (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
* Goubert, Pierre. ''The Course of French History.'' 1991; French textbook; ch. 14 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103458094 online edition]
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Paxton, John. ''Companion to the French Revolution'' (1987), hundreds of short entries.
* Scott, Samuel F. and Barry Rothaus. ''Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 1789-1799'' (1984), short essays by scholars
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order'' (2nd ed 2003), comprehensive survey
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''France 1789–1815. Revolution and Counter-Revolution'' (2nd ed. 2003, 430pp [http://www.amazon.com/French-Revolution-Empire-Quest-Civic/dp/0631233636/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189597597&sr=1-1 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]

===Diplomacy and impact on Europe===
* Blanning, T.C.W. ''The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802'' (1996).
* Broers, Michael. ''Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815'' (1996) 291pp, covers everything except the battles
* Bruun, Geoffrey. ''Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814'' 1938. excellent survey of all of Europe
* Dwyer, Philip G. ed.''Napoleon and Europe,'' (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
* Ellis, Geoffrey. ''The Napoleonic Empire'' (1991)
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hill, Peter P. ''Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815'' (2005)
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Muir, Rory. ''Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.'' (1996). 466 pp.
* Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 131–46. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199004)54%3A2%3C131%3AWDNIRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]
* Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History,'' Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C771%3ATOCAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR]
* Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.''Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
* Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
* Schroeder, Paul. ''The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848.'' 1996; Elaborate detail; advanced history; very hostile to Napoleon; [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=28171953 online edition]
* Woolf, Stuart. ''Napoleon's Integration of Europe'' (1991) 320pp [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103462796 online edition]
* ''Cambridge Modern History'' (1907) vol 9: Napoleon [http://books.google.com/books?id=gMgFAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=Cambridge+Modern+History+napoleon+waterloo online edition], older articles by scholars, 900pp

==Historiography and Memory==
* Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." ''European History Quarterly'' 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals
* Dunne, John. "Napoleon: For or against ... and Beyond." ''History Review.'' Issue: 27. 1997. pp 17+. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000519459 online edition]
* Geyl, Pieter. ''Napoleon: For and Against'' (1949) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59600303 online edition]
* Hazareesingh, Sudhir. "Memory and Political Imagination: the Legend of Napoleon Revisited." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 463-483. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in Oxford up
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)." ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 2006 7(2): 283-308. Issn: 1531-023x Fulltext: in Project Muse. Argues Alexander's successful strategy has been neglected
* Pinkney, David. ed., ''Napoleon: Historical Enigma'' (1969)

===Primary Sources===
* Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. ''The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook.'' (2002) 213pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108790059 online edition]

==Online resources==
* [http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/military.html#G. Richard Jensen, ed. ''Web Sources for Military History'' annotated links]
* [http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/chap7a.html War, terror and Resistance]
* [http://clk.about.com/?zi=1/XJ/Ya&sdn=europeanhistory&cdn=education&tm=10&gps=150_217_766_469&f=10&tt=14&bt=1&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.napoleonbonaparte.nl/ Napoleon Bonaparte: Internet Guide]

====notes====
<references/>

[[Category:Military Commanders]]
[[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]
[[Category:French History]]
[[Category:Military History]]
[[Category:European History]]
[[Category:French Revolution]]

Napoleon Bonaparte

2009-06-21T02:11:28Z

Honeil: added some more info

[[Image:Y8r587ig.jpg|right|thumb|300px|Napoleon I by [[Jacques Louis David]]]]
'''Napoleon''' ('''Napoleon Bonaparte''' or, after 1804, '''Napoleon I, Emperor of the French''') (15 August 1769 – 5 May 1821) was a world historic figure and First Consul of [[France]] from 1799 to 1804, Emperor of the French, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine from 1804 to 1814 and from 1 March to 22 June 1815. He was the greatest general of his age--perhaps any age, with a sure command of battlefield tactics and campaign strategies. He revolutionized the military applications of artillery, and routinely moved his troops faster and with fewer supplies than was then thought possible, allowing for amazingly large and rapid concentrations of force against his slower and less adaptable enemies.

As a civil leader he played a major role in the [[French Revolution]], then ended it when he became First Consul in 1799 and Emperor of France in 1804. He modernized the French military, fiscal, political legal and religious systems. The Napoleonic Civil Code is considered the first successful codification that strongly influenced the law of many other countries.

He was constantly at war against Britain with a complex, ever-changing coalition of European nations on both sides. Refusing to compromise after his immense defeat in Russia in 1812, he was overwhelmed by a coalition of enemies, forced to abdicate in 1814 and sent into exile at Elba (an island in the Tyrannian Sea). In 1815, after escaping from Elba, he took control of France again, raised a new army, and almost succeded in defeating the isolated Prussian and British forces but was defeated at the [[Battle of Waterloo]]. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean; there he died 6 years later, in 1821. His image and memory are central to French national identity, but he is despised by the British and Russians and is a controversial figure in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

==Early History==
He was born ''Napoleone di Buonaparte'' in the town of Ajaccio, one year after the island of [[Corsica]] was transferred to France by the Republic of Genoa ([[Italy]]). He was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer with some claim to noble rank; his mother was Marie-Letizia Bonaparte. The Buonaparte's were a wealthy family from the Corsican nobility.

Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under [[Pasquale Paoli]]; he now switched and became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French--he always had a thick Corsican accent--Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, a pauper even among the aristocratic poor, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the top-ranked Ecole Militaire in [[Paris]] to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.

There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated mob violence.<ref> Englund pp 29-33</ref> During his 10 years as a junior officer made 5 extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.<ref> Englund ch. 1-3</ref>

==Rise to Power==
[[Image:1799italy.jpg|thumb|375px|Italy and Corsica in 1799]]
Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Promotions came very quickly now, and loyalty to the Revolution was as important as technical skill; Napoleon had both. His demerits were overlooked as he was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. Paris knew him as an intellectual soldier deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, where the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, an acting Lieutenant-Colonel, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. He was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under [[Robespierre]] to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He played a major role in defending Paris itself from counter-revolutionaries, and became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794. He married Josephine (Rose de Beauharnais) in 1796, after falling violently in love with the older aristocratic widow.<ref> Englund pp. 63-73, 91-2, 97-8</ref>
===Italy===
In Italy, Napoleon's rapid maneuvers proved brilliantly successful and had major long-term effects. He defeated [[Austria]], France's most dangerous enemy. He established French hegemony in the Italian peninsula, put Vienna in an impossible strategic situation, and solidified his reputation as a military genius beloved by the men in the ranks; he became a major national hero, and thus a political force in his own right.
===Egypt===
The governing Directory was happy to send Napoleon to far-off [[Egypt]]. In July 1798, Napoleon led the Armée d’Orient an expeditionary force of 36,000 men to conquer Egypt from the Ottoman Empire, the opening move in his plan to acquire a new colony for France, block England's access to India, and export the values of French republicanism to a modernized Middle East. Aware that Europe was ignorant of cultural and religious Islam, Napoleon brought along a hundred scholars and linguists. The scholars opened the field of [[Orientalism|Oriental]] studies; the third-ranking French general converted to Islam as Abdallah Menou.
[[Image:Rosetta Stone.jpg|thumb|200px|The [[Rosetta Stone]]]]

He easily defeated the 60,000-man army of the Marmelukes (horsemen) at the [[Battle of the Pyramids]] (July 21, 1798).

Intending to transplant French liberty to Egypt, Napoleon encountered stiff resistance and reacted with the same barbarism and repression used by the Ottomans. <ref> Juan Cole, ''Napoleon's Egypt'' (2007); Irene A. Bierman, ed., ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (2003)</ref> The British under Admiral [[Horatio Nelson]] sank Napoleon's entire fleet at the [[Battle of the Nile]] (August 1, 1798), trapping the French army as the [[Turkish]] main army approached. Napoleon attacked first, invading Syria and defeating the Turks in a bloody massacre. As he laid siege to Acre, plague broke out among his troops, forcing Napoleon to retreat back to Egypt. At the [[Battle of Aboukir]] (July 25, 1799), his 6000 men defeated a Turkish force three times as strong. Napoleon then slipped through the blockade and returned to France. <ref> The British defeated the French army in Egypt in 1801 and allowed it to return to France. </ref>

===Coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire===

Despite the failures in Egypt, Napoleon returned to a hero's welcome. In alliance with the director [[Emmanuel Sieyès]] and his brother, [[Lucien Bonaparte]], president of the council of five hundred, he overthrew the Directory by a coup d'etat on November 9, 1799 ("the 18th Brumaire" according to the revolutionary calendar), and closed down the council of five hundred. Napoleon became "first consul" for ten years, with two consuls appointed by him who had consultative voices only. His power was confirmed by the new constitution ("Constitution of the year VIII"), originally devised by Sieyès to give Napoleon a minor role, but rewritten by Napoleon, and accepted by direct popular vote (3,000,000 in favor, 1,567 opposed). The constitution preserved the appearance of a [[republic]] but in reality established a military dictatorship. The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived republic: no more representative government, assemblies, a collegian executive, or liberty.<ref> Furet (1996) p 212</ref>

==Diplomacy==
The long string of wars was broken by the Treaty of Amiens (1802), which proved to be only a 14 month pause. <ref> Historians often use the Treaty of Amiens to separate what they call the "French Revolutionary wars" from the "Napoleonic wars." The new wars were much more nationalistic and less ideological. John D. Grainger, ''The Amiens Truce: Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803.'' (2004)</ref> Napoleon used the interlude to make major territorial gains in Italy and Germany without firing a shot, an unexpected development that forced the British back to the battlefield.
===Slavery===
Napoleon's major adventure into the Caribbean--sending 30,000 troops in 1802 to retake Saint Domingue (Haiti) from ex-slaves under [[Toussaint L'Ouverture]] who had revolted. Napoleon wanted to preserve France's financial benefits from the colony's sugar and coffee crops; he then planned to establish a major base at New Orleans. He therefore reestablished slavery in Haiti and Guadeloupe, where it had been abolished after rebellions. Slaves and black freedmen fought the French for their freedom and independence. Revolutionary ideals played a central role in the fighting for it was the slaves and their comrades who were fighting for the revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality, while the French troops under General Charles Leclerc fought to restore the order of the ancien régime. The goal of reestablishing slavery - which explicitly contradicted the ideals of the French Revolution - demoralized the French troops. The demoralized French soldiers were unable to cope with the tropical diseases, and most died of yellow fever. Slavery was reimposed in Guadeloupe but not in Haiti, which became an independent black republic. <ref> Philippe R. Girard, "Liberte, Egalite, Esclavage: French Revolutionary Ideals and the Failure of the Leclerc Expedition to Saint-Domingue." ''French Colonial History'' 2005 6: 55-77. Issn: 1539-3402 Fulltext: in Project Muse </ref> Napoleon's vast colonial dreams for Egypt, India, the Caribbean, Louisiana, and even Australia were all doomed for lack of a fleet capable of matching Britain's Royal Navy. Realizing the fiasco Napoleon liquidated the Haiti project, brought home the survivors and sold off Louisiana to the U.S.<ref> Englund p 259. Slavery remained in Guadeloupe until 1848.</ref>

The treaty of Tilsit in 1807 ended the War of the Third Coalition--in which Russia, Prussia, and Austria defeated in turn and Napoleon gained control of most of the continent.

==Military action to 1812==
[[Image:David - Napoleon.jpg|thumb|left|330px|Napoleon Crossing The Alps by [[Jacques Louis David]]--Napoleon actually rode a sure-footed mule over the Alps]]
Napoleon's basic military strategy was to identify and defeat the enemy's main force. The goal was to break the enemy's will to resist so that favorable negotiations followed; the conquest of territory was won in negotiations. "I see only one thing," Napoleon explained in 1797, "namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves."<ref> Maximilian Yorck von Wartenburg, [http://books.google.com/books?id=CWwPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA39&dq=%22confident+that+secondary+matters+will+then+settle+%22&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0 ''Napoleon as a General'' (1902) p. 39]</ref>

Less flamboyant was his close attention to selecting his generals, and his calculations of the logistical needs of a campaign. He also pioneered the use of the [[division]] as a combined arms formation, although he did not standardize their organization. Napoleon also made much more routine use of maps and accurate watches, for synchronizing operations, than had previous military commanders.

His spectacular failure in [[Russia]] in 1812 was due primarily to his bad logistical planning, a blunder historians have been unable to explain. In battle he paid close attention to the overall picture, but left the critical decisions to his marshals. He rarely issued detailed guidance on corps level tactical employment; instead he devised the overall battle plans, and directed the combined attacks of infantry, cavalry reserves, and massed batteries of guns. Since he was simultaneously head of the government, he integrated the military, political and diplomatic dimensions. He was an accurate judge of his opponents, except that is for Britain and Russia. He could never be at peace with Britain; with Russia he let his need for diplomatic prestige overcome his military judgment.

===Austerlitz, 1805===
The [[Battle of Austerlitz]] on 2 December 1805 is celebrated as Napoleon's greatest victory. The collapse of the Peace of Amiens led Britain to assemble the "Third Coalition" in April 1805, including Austria, Russia, and Sweden. After threatening to invade Britain, Napoleon sent 200,000 soldiers marching east. He used six army corps, each a self-contained, all-arms combat force. The corps was a Napoleonic invention, and each was strong enough to operate independently, allowing the army to advance along a broad front, which facilitated logistics (each army seized supplies in its region), and increased the speed of the advance. Napoleon commanded in person in Germany; relying on the support of most of the south German states, he advanced to meet the Austrians who had invaded Bavaria. On the upper Danube he concentrated his 200,000 men, reinforced by Bernadotte, and by allied from Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau. After the Austrians had been defeated in several engagements, their main army was surrounded at Ulm and surrendered 30,000 men on October 17, 1805 without a fight. At the same time the British navy won a total victory under [[Horatio Nelson]] sinking the combined French and Spanish fleet at [[Trafalgar]] on October 21, 1805, permanently destroying Napoleon's sea power. On December 2, 1805, at the [[Battle of Austerlitz]], called "the battle of the three emperors," Napoleon split the enemy center, encircled the enemy left, and won a smashing victory over the united forces of Austria and Russia. Napoleon lost 9000 men, the enemy 26,000. Austria made peace; the Russians retreated.

===Artillery===
The increased importance of artillery after 1807 stemmed from Napoleon's creation of a highly mobile artillery force, the growth in artillery numbers, and changes in artillery practices. As a result of these factors, Napoleon, rather than relying on infantry to wear away the enemy's defenses, now could use massed artillery as a spearhead to pound a break in the enemy's line that was then exploited by supporting infantry and cavalry.<ref> Bruce McConachy, "The Roots of Artillery Doctrine: Napoleonic Artillery Tactics Reconsidered." ''Journal of Military History'' 2001 65(3): 617-640. Issn: 0899-3718 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(200107)65%3A3%3C617%3ATROADN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z in Jstor]. McConachy rejects the alternative theory that growing reliance on artillery by the French army beginning in 1807 was an outgrowth of the declining quality of the French infantry and, later, France's inferiority in cavalry numbers. </ref>

===Russia to 1812===
===The Polish issue===
In 1807 Napoleon created a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. [[Poland]] had recently been divided up by its neighbors, but Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia; its Grand Duke was Napoleon's ally the king of Saxony, but Napoleon appointed the intendants who ran the country. The 2.5 million Poles thrilled to the opportunity and by 1814 sent about 200,000 men to Napoleon's armies, including about 90,000 who marched with him to Moscow. The Russians strongly opposed any move toward an independent Poland and to punish them Napoleon invaded in 1812. <ref> Riley (2000) p. 27-8. The Grand Duchy was dissolved in 1815 and Poland would not be a state until 1918.</ref> Napoleon's impact on Poland was dramatic, including the Napoleonic legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.

== Moscow ==

===Collapse, 1813-1814===
The fiasco in Russia in 1812 wounded Napoleon's political prestige, emptied his treasury and encouraged his enemies to greater exertions and nations on the fence to turn against France. Diplomatic historians blame Napoleon's inflexibility and unwillingness to compromise when he was winning (before Russia), and, especially, when the odds had turned against him in 1813-14; in January 1813, Napoleon rejected Prussian terms; that summer he mishandled Austria; in early 1814 he fumbled the final offer of peace made at Chatillon in March 1814. That political failure doomed him. The Allies then signed a 20 year alliance (the Treaty of Chaumont), stuck together, and switched Bavaria away from Napoleon.<ref> Thompson ch 13-14</ref>

Military setbacks in Spain further weakened his cause and exposed France to an attack through Spain. While Napoleon could recruit replacement troops, the loss of experienced cavalry in 1812 meant that he could not exploit his victories at Luetzen and Bautzen in 1813.<ref> Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 77</ref> His army of raw and ill-equipped recruits was outnumbered and France was war-weary; on the other hand, the Allies were also exhausted, and had longer lines of communications and supply. Man for man, except for Wellington's British, the French probably remained better soldiers than their opponents to the very end.<ref> Schroeder (1996) p. 495-6</ref>

Napoleon mishandled the campaigns in north Germany in 1813. Instead of concentrating his forces for a decisive battle with the enemy's main force, Napoleon repeatedly detached large numbers of troops under ineffective commanders to capture the Prussian capital of Berlin. The heavy losses and strategic reverses sustained by the French in these questionable undertakings left Napoleon's Grande Armée vulnerable to the massive Allied coalition that met him at [[Leipzig]]. He won at [[Dresden]] but Napoleon's mistakes were uncharacteristic of him at a younger age; he now underestimated the strength of his enemies and overestimated his own, and he was driven less by calculation than by thirst for revenge against Prussia, a onetime ally who switched against him.<ref> Michael V. Leggiere, "From Berlin to Leipzig: Napoleon's Gamble in North Germany, 1813." ''Journal of Military History'' 2003 67(1): 39-84. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in [[Project Muse]] </ref>

Napoleon's decisive defeat came at the [[Leipzig, Battle of|Battle of Leipzig]], called "the battle of nations" in October 1813. Napoleon's 180,000 French and Saxon and Württemberg troops were overwhelmed by 320,000 Allies, comprising Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies. It was the biggest battle to date in European history, with 100,000 to 120,000 killed, wounded or captured on both sides.<ref>Chandler, ''Campaigns of Napoleon'' ch 80 </ref> Napoleon managed to escape to France with a portion of his army, but the disaster was almost as great as that in Russia in 1812 and even more irreparable; all the German states now joined the Allies, the Dutch expelled the French, and Denmark was forced to accept terms. In early January, 1814, 200,000 Allied troops invaded France. Napoleon scored some small victories but the Allies took Paris on March 31, his government declared him deposed, and his marshals deserted him. Napoleon abdicated and was sent into exile at Elba (an island north of Rome), as the old monarchy was brought back to France. The French army, now controlled by [[Louis XVIII]] numbered 460,000 men, but most were still loyal to Napoleon.

===100 Days to Waterloo, 1815===
In March 1815, Napoleon secretly landed in France and rallied his supporters. They flocked to his cause as the French royal officials lost control; Napoleon entered Paris in triumph and raised new armies.
[[Image:1815waterloo.jpg|thumb|375px]]

The Allies, meeting at a peace conference in [[Vienna]], sent a million soldiers to stop him. The largest contingents was a multinational force under the command of the Briton, the [[Duke of Wellington]]. Napoleon defeated the German army under Blücher at Ligny but had to turn and stop Wellington before he merged forces with Blücher. At a very hard and closely fought battle of [[Waterloo, Battle of|Waterloo]] on June 18, 1815, Blücher arrived at the last moment and Napoleon was finally and totally defeated. He surrendered to the British who sent him in exile to the remote island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic, where he died a prisoner in 1821. His relatives lost their royal positions; his imperial army, and particularly the legendary Imperial Guard, were disbanded, and Europe entered an era of peace.

==Impact on France==
Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed by all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancient régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Law: Code Napoléon ===
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon's supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>
===Religion===
Religion had been a major issue during the [[French Revolution]], and Napoleon resolved most of the outstanding problems. Thereby he moved the clergy and large numbers of devout Catholics from hostility to the government to support for him. The Catholic system was reestablished by the [[Concordat of 1801]] (signed with Pope [[Pius VII]]), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestants and atheists were tolerated.<ref> Sutherland (2003) ch 11</ref>
===Taxes===
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiled aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible.
===Conscription===
Napoleon kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerist sergeants and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshal's baton, it was said.<ref> Goubert (1991) ch 14</ref>

==Impact on Europe==
Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.

The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and [[America]], application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the [[Catholic]] Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996) </ref>

Napoleon lifted all restriction on [[Jews]] in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref>

After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the [[Grand Duchy of Warsaw]], which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep [[Poland]] within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.

==Personality==
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence.Although short and not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation. After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general. <ref> See Chandler, "General Introduction" to ''The Campaigns of Napoleon'' (1975). </ref>

In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars. Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,<ref> Thompson, ''Napoleon Bonaparte'' (1951) p 285</ref> for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personality neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.<ref>Englund, ''Napoleon'' (2004) pp 379ff</ref>

Napoleon's ambition and drive inspired the term "[[Napoleonic Complex]]", which is used to describe a person who overcompensates for shortness or other physical deficiencies by excessive aggressiveness or will to dominate other people.

He married first [[Josephine Beauharnais]] (9 March 1796) and later Marie-Louise of Austria (11 March 1810). His only son, [[Napoleon II]] (1811 - 1832) the [[King of Rome]], died at the the age of 21.

=== Quote on Jesus ===

<blockquote>"[[Alexander]], [[Julius Caesar|Caesar]], [[Charlemagne]], and myself founded empires; but what foundation did we rest the creations of our genius? Upon force. [[Jesus Christ]] founded an empire upon love; and at this hour millions of men would die for Him."<ref>http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/2505</ref></blockquote>

==Propaganda and memory ==
[[Image:David-Napoleon I.jpg|right|thumb|The Coronation of Napoleon in Notre Dame by J. L. David]]
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref>

The memory of Napoleon in Poland is highly favorable, for his support for independence and opposition to Russia, his legal code, the abolition of serfdom, and the introduction of modern middle class bureaucracies.<ref> Andrzej Nieuwazny, "Napoleon and Polish identity." ''History Today'', May 1998 v48 n5 pp. 50-55</ref>
[[Image:Napoleon's Tomb.jpg|thumb|left|280px|The tomb of Napoleon at Les Invalides, in Paris.]]
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood as playing a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. They spread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena; many talked openly of Napoleon as the great inspiration for French patriotism and for individual and collective liberties. A pro-Napoleon political mobilization appeared in open displays of the tricolor and rosettes, as well as celebrations of anniversaries of Napoleon's triumphs. Royal celebrations were disrupted by raucous laughter and buffoonery as the many supporters of Napoleon worked, without any central coordination, to destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref>See Hazareesingh (2004) </ref>

Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on plays and novels from the period 1893-1913, Datta examines how writers and critics of the "Belle Epoque" exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco </ref>

<blockquote>
''After being defeated by the British in 1815, the French Emperor was exiled to St. Helena--an island in the South Atlantic Ocean. Six years later, at the age of 52, Bonaparte whispered his last words, "Head of Army!"'' <ref>[http://www.livescience.com/history/070116_napoleon_bonaparte.html Mystery of Napoleon's Death Said Solved] </ref>
</blockquote>

==Basic further reading==
See the detailed Bibliography

* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best political biography [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0674018036/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1197704843&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Harold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon'' (Penguin Lives) (2002) 208pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' (1963). 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986), Napoleon's ideas on warfare
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain

==Detailed bibliography==
===Major biographies===
* Asprey, Robert. ''The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte'' and ''The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte''. (2002); 2 vol, 1200pp well-written popular biography focusing on the military [http://www.amazon.com/Rise-Napoleon-Bonaparte-Robert-Asprey/dp/0465048811/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736126&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Barnett, Corelli. ''Bonaparte'' (1978), hostile
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), to 1799
* Emsley, Clive. ''Napoleon'' 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
* Cronin, Vincent. ''Napoleon'' (1971), favorable popular bio
* Dwyer, Philip. ''Napoleon: The Path to Power'' (2008), 672 pp; vol 1 of major new biography, to 1799 [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Path-Power-Philip-Dwyer/dp/0300137540/ref=sr_1_7?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210582016&sr=8-7 excerpt and text search]
* Ellis, Geoffry. ''Napoleon'' (1997)
* Englund, Steven. ''Napoleon: A Political Life.'' (2004). 575 pages; the best (and most advanced) political biography; thin on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Political-Life-Steven-Englund/dp/0684871424/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736235&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Fisher, Herbert. ''Napoleon'' (1913) 256pp old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=04ZJfyyBn9evm4khfD&id=dJcaAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Fournier, August. ''Napoleon the First: A Biography'' (1903); 836 pages; excellent old biography [http://books.google.com/books?vid=02iZ1BDnhyMh95-cSu&id=jI0aAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''The Age of Napoleon'' (1963) 480pp, popular history stressing empire and diplomacy
* Johnson, Paul. ''Napoleon: A Penguin Life.'' (2002). 208 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Penguin-Lives-Paul-Johnson/dp/0670030783/ref=sr_1_4/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-4 excerpt and text search]
* Lefebvre, Georges: ''Napoleon,'' 1969, influential French perspective
* Markham, Felix. ''Napoleon'' 1963. 304pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10369968 online edition]
* McLynn, Frank. ''Napoleon: A Biography'' (2003) 752pp, stress on military [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Frank-McLynn/dp/1559706317/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736352&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search]
* Rose, John Holland. ''The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records,'' (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; [http://books.google.com/books?id=7qIfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 1] [http://books.google.com/books?id=DIYfAAAAMAAJ&dq=napoleon+John+Holland+Rose&as_brr=1 online editon vol 2]
* Schom, Alan. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: A Life'' (1997), 944pp; very hostile; argues Napoleon was a paranoiac psychopath [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Bonaparte-Life-Alan-Schom/dp/0060929588/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736422&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search]
* Thompson, J. M. ''Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall'' (1954), scholarly, well-balanced in topics, but pro-Britain
* Tulard, Jean. ''Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour'' (1985), influential French biography
* Woloch, Isser. '' Napoleon and His Collaborators: the making of a dictatorship'' (2001) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-His-Collaborators-Making-Dictatorship/dp/0393323412/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190736488&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

===General reference===
* Chandler, David. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1993)
* Esposito, Vincent J. and John R. Elting, ''A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars'' (1999); textbook; includes the West Point maps
* Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. ed. ''The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History'' (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective; stress on history of ideas
* Greiss, Thomas E. ''West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon'' (1986) 70pp; [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20war%20index.htm all maps are online]
* Nafziger, George F. ''Historical Dictionary of the Napoleonic Era.'' 2002. 353 pp.
* Nicholls, David. ''Napoleon: A Biographical Companion.'' 1999. 300 pp.
* Pope, Stephen. ''Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars.'' (2000). 572 pp.
* Smith, Digby. ''The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book'' (1998); 582pp; data on 2000+ individual battles, clashes, sieges, raids, capitulations, and naval engagements

===Military studies===
* Adkin, Mark. ''The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle'' (2002) 448pp [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Companion-Complete-Historys-Famous/dp/0811718549/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735456&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Arnold, James R. ''Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna.'' (1995). 247 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Conquers-Austria-Campaign-Vienna/dp/0275946940/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735487&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
*Bell, David A. ''The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It'' (2008) [http://www.amazon.com/First-Total-War-Napoleons-Warfare/dp/0618919813/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-10 excerpt and text search]
* Chandler, David. ''The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier'' (1973), 1216 pp; experts call it the best military synthesis
* Cole, Juan. ''Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East'' (2007) [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Egypt-Invading-Middle-East/dp/1403964319/ref=sr_1_5/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189485491&sr=1-5 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]
* Connelly, Owen. ''Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns'' (2nd ed 2006) negative on Napoleon's skills
* Coote, Stephen. ''Napoleon and the Hundred Days.'' (2005). 320 pp.
* Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. ''Napoleon; A History of the Art of War'' (1904), old classic [http://books.google.com/books?vid=0N7HWOuEzfsHb6vtWh&id=Y6kfAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=napoleon&as_brr=1 online edition]
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Austerlitz, 1805'' (1999)
* Duffy, Christopher. ''Borodino and the War of 1812'' (1999).
* Elting, John R. ''Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee'' (1997), influential study
* Epstein, Robert M. ''Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War'' (1994) on Austrian war of 1809
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815 '' (2008), 656pp [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleons-Wars-International-History-1803-1815/dp/0670020303/ref=sr_1_11?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244784677&sr=1-11 excerpt and text search]
* Esdaile, Charles J. ''The French Wars 1792-1815.'' (2001). 96pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102715226 online edition]
* Fisher, Todd. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2001-4) 3 vol; 96pp, short, well-illustrated operational history [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Essential-Histories-Specials/dp/1841768316/ref=sr_1_3/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-3 excerpt and text search vol 1]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-1805-1807-Essential-Histories/dp/1579583571/ref=sr_1_2/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-2 excerpt and text search vol 2]; [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Empires-Strike-1808-1812/dp/1579583660/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735873&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search vol 3]
* Forrest, Alan. ''Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire.'' 2002. 248 pp.
* Fortescue, J. W. ''A history of the British army'' (19v 1899-1930) [http://www.archive.org/details/historybritishp202fortuoft full text vol 4 pt2: 1789-1801][http://www.archive.org/download/britisharmy06fortuoft/britisharmy06fortuoft online edition vol 6: 1807-1809]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish07fortuoft/historyofbritish07fortuoft full text vol 7: 1809-1810]; [http://www.archive.org/download/historyofbritish08fortuoft/historyofbritish08fortuoft full text vol 8: 1810-1812]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish09fortuoft full text vol 9: 1813-1814]; [http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish10fortuoft full text vol 10: 1814-1815]
* Gates, David. ''The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815'' (1997) 304pp; attacks Connolly and says N's "brilliance as a military commander has rarely been equalled let alone surpassed"
* Gill, John. ''With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and his German Allies in the 1809 Campaign'' (1992)
* Goetz, Robert. ''1805: Austerlitz; Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition'' (2005). 368pp
* Griffith, Paddy. ''The Art of War of Revolutionary France 1789-1802,'' (1998); 304 pp; [http://www.amazon.com/Art-War-Revolutionary-France-1789-1802/dp/1853673358/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735789&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hamilton-Williams, David. ''Waterloo: New Perspectives; The Great Battle Reappraised.'' (1994). 416 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Waterloo-Perspectives-Great-Battle-Reappraised/dp/0471145718/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735763&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Herold, J. Christopher. ''Napoleon in Egypt'' (1962) [http://ia331331.us.archive.org/2/items/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp/bonaparteinegypt001528mbp_djvu.txt online edition]
* Kagan, Frederick W. "Russia's Wars with Napoleon: 1805–1815," in ''The Military History of Tsarist Russia,'' ed. Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (2002), 106–22.
* Kagan, Frederick W. ''The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805'' (2006) first of four promised volumes; covers the strengths and strategies of all the powers [http://www.amazon.com/End-Old-Order-Napoleon-1801-1805/dp/0306815451/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735729&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Leggiere, Michael V. ''Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813.'' 2002. 384 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Berlin-Franco-Prussian-Campaigns-Commanders/dp/0806133996/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735699&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Liaropoulos, Andrew N. "Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence - the Napoleonic and First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs." ''Journal of Military History'' 2006 70(2): 363-384. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: in Project Muse
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812–14)" ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 7#2 (2006) 283-308 online in [[Project Muse]]
* Luvaas, Jay. '' Napoleon on the Art of War'' (2001) 288 pp. A synthesis, arrangement, and translation of Napoleon's thinking. [http://books.google.com/books?id=zq8GhdLeK_kC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:luvaas&lr=&num=30&as_brr=0&ei=AlNZSLjJErW2iQG1rOH5Bg&sig=knBV3L0vr0dptGr0fOa32pMlZ6k excerpt and text search]
* Lynn, John A. ''The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94'' (1984); influential analysis [http://www.amazon.com/Bayonets-Republic-History-Warfare/dp/0813329450/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735664&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Muir, Rory. ''Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon'' (2000), 466pp [http://www.amazon.com/Tactics-Experience-Battle-Age-Napoleon/dp/0300082703/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735639&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Nofi, Albert A. ''The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815.'' 1993. 333pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=100857568 online edition]
* Nosworthy, Brent. ''With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies.'' (1996). 528 pp.
* Paret, Peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. ''Makers of Modern Strategy'' (1986)
* Pericoli, Ugo.''1815: The Armies at Waterloo'' (1973)
* Riley, J. P. "How Good Was Napoleon?" ''History Today,'' (July 2007) 57#7 10pp in [[EBSCO]]
* Riley, J. P. ''Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting.'' (2000). 480 pp
* Riley, Jonathon. ''Napoleon As a General: Command from the Battlefield to Grand Strategy'' (2007)
* Rogers, H.C.B. ''Napoleon's Army'' (1974)
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Napoleonic Wars'' (2006) 240pp, well illustrated synthesis by leading scholar [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleonic-Wars-Smithsonian-History-Warfare/dp/006085121X/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1190735584&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Rothenberg, Gunther. ''The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon'' 1978
* Schneid, Frederick C. ''Napoleon's Italian Campaigns: 1805-1815.'' (2002); 229pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101329281 online edition]
* Tarle, Eugene. ''Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. 1942.'' [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6522304 online edition]

===Impact on France===
* Bergeron, Louis. ''France under Napoleon'' (1981), French viewpoint
* Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals
* Furet, François. ''The French Revolution, 1770-1814'' (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
* Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. ''A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution'' (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
* Goubert, Pierre. ''The Course of French History.'' 1991; French textbook; ch. 14 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103458094 online edition]
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Paxton, John. ''Companion to the French Revolution'' (1987), hundreds of short entries.
* Scott, Samuel F. and Barry Rothaus. ''Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 1789-1799'' (1984), short essays by scholars
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order'' (2nd ed 2003), comprehensive survey
* Sutherland, D.M.G. ''France 1789–1815. Revolution and Counter-Revolution'' (2nd ed. 2003, 430pp [http://www.amazon.com/French-Revolution-Empire-Quest-Civic/dp/0631233636/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1189597597&sr=1-1 excerpts and online search from Amazon.com]

===Diplomacy and impact on Europe===
* Blanning, T.C.W. ''The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802'' (1996).
* Broers, Michael. ''Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815'' (1996) 291pp, covers everything except the battles
* Bruun, Geoffrey. ''Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814'' 1938. excellent survey of all of Europe
* Dwyer, Philip G. ed.''Napoleon and Europe,'' (2001), essays by scholars on each major power
* Ellis, Geoffrey. ''The Napoleonic Empire'' (1991)
* Grab, Alexander. ''Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.'' (2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis [http://www.amazon.com/Napoleon-Transformation-European-History-Perspective/dp/0333682742/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1210581950&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]
* Hill, Peter P. ''Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815'' (2005)
* Lyons, Martyn. ''Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution'' (1994)
* Muir, Rory. ''Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815.'' (1996). 466 pp.
* Parker, Harold T. "Why Did Napoleon Invade Russia? A Study in Motivation and the Interrelations of Personality and Social Structure," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 131–46. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199004)54%3A2%3C131%3AWDNIRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q in JSTOR]
* Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," ''Journal of Interdisciplinary History,'' Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C771%3ATOCAEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N in JSTOR]
* Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.''Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), scholarly survey
* Schroeder, Paul W. "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise," ''Journal of Military History'' 54 (April 1990): 147–62. Highly negative
* Schroeder, Paul. ''The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848.'' 1996; Elaborate detail; advanced history; very hostile to Napoleon; [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=28171953 online edition]
* Woolf, Stuart. ''Napoleon's Integration of Europe'' (1991) 320pp [https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103462796 online edition]
* ''Cambridge Modern History'' (1907) vol 9: Napoleon [http://books.google.com/books?id=gMgFAAAAIAAJ&printsec=toc&dq=Cambridge+Modern+History+napoleon+waterloo online edition], older articles by scholars, 900pp

==Historiography and Memory==
* Black, Jeremy. "Why the French Failed: New Work on the Military History of French Imperialism 1792-1815." ''European History Quarterly'' 2000 30(1): 105-115. Issn: 0265-6914 Fulltext: in Sage journals
* Dunne, John. "Napoleon: For or against ... and Beyond." ''History Review.'' Issue: 27. 1997. pp 17+. [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000519459 online edition]
* Geyl, Pieter. ''Napoleon: For and Against'' (1949) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59600303 online edition]
* Hazareesingh, Sudhir. "Memory and Political Imagination: the Legend of Napoleon Revisited." ''French History,'' 2004 18(4): 463-483. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in Oxford up
* Lieven, Dominic. "Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)." ''Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History'' 2006 7(2): 283-308. Issn: 1531-023x Fulltext: in Project Muse. Argues Alexander's successful strategy has been neglected
* Pinkney, David. ed., ''Napoleon: Historical Enigma'' (1969)

===Primary Sources===
* Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. ''The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook.'' (2002) 213pp [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=108790059 online edition]

==Online resources==
* [http://tigger.uic.edu/~rjensen/military.html#G. Richard Jensen, ed. ''Web Sources for Military History'' annotated links]
* [http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/chap7a.html War, terror and Resistance]
* [http://clk.about.com/?zi=1/XJ/Ya&sdn=europeanhistory&cdn=education&tm=10&gps=150_217_766_469&f=10&tt=14&bt=1&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.napoleonbonaparte.nl/ Napoleon Bonaparte: Internet Guide]

====notes====
<references/>

[[Category:Military Commanders]]
[[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]
[[Category:French History]]
[[Category:Military History]]
[[Category:European History]]
[[Category:French Revolution]]