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		<id>https://www.conservapedia.com/index.php?title=War_crimes&amp;diff=1846586</id>
		<title>War crimes</title>
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		<updated>2022-03-17T20:17:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;ChristianMom: Fixed a small technical error&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;United States war crimes are the violations of the laws and customs of war which the United States Armed Forces has committed against signatories after the signing of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These have included the summary execution of captured enemy combatants, the mistreatment of prisoners during interrogation, the use of torture, and the use of violence against civilians and non-combatants.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
War crimes can be prosecuted in the United States through the War Crimes Act of 1996 and through various articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). However, the Federal government of the United States strongly opposes the International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty, arguing that the Court lacks checks and balances,[1] and thus does not accept ICC jurisdiction over its nationals.[2]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Definition== &lt;br /&gt;
War crimes are defined as acts which violate the laws and customs of war established by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, or acts that are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II.[3] The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 extends the protection of civilians and prisoners of war during military occupation, even in the case where there is no armed resistance, for the period of one year after the end of hostilities, although the occupying power should be bound to several provisions of the convention as long as &amp;quot;such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory.&amp;quot;[4][5]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==List of war crimes in chronological order==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# American-Philippine War&lt;br /&gt;
Following the end of the Spanish–American War in 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States as part of the peace settlement. This triggered a conflict between the United States Armed Forces and revolutionary First Philippine Republic under President Emilio Aguinaldo, and the Moro fighters.&lt;br /&gt;
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&lt;br /&gt;
A photograph depicting the execution of Moro revolutionaries on a 1911 commemorative postcard.&lt;br /&gt;
War crimes committed by the United States Army in the Philippines include the March across Samar, which led to the court martial and forcible retirement of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith.[1] Smith instructed Major Littleton Waller, commanding officer of a battalion of 315 U.S. Marines assigned to bolster his forces in Samar, regarding the conduct of pacification, in which he stated the following:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States.[6][7][8]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
SMajor Littleton Waller asked:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;I would like to know the limit of age to respect, sir.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Ten years&amp;quot;, Smith responded.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;Persons of ten years and older are those designated as being capable of bearing arms?&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;Yes.&amp;quot; Smith confirmed his instructions a second time.[6][7][8]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A sustained and widespread massacre of Filipino civilians followed as American columns marched across the island. All food and trade to Samar were cut off, and the widespread destruction of land, homes, and draft animals occurred, with the intention of starving the Fillipino revolutionaries and the civilian populace into submission. Smith used his troops in sweeps of the interior in search for guerrilla bands and in attempts to capture Philippine General Vicente Lukbán, but he did nothing to prevent contact between the guerrillas and the population. Littleton Waller, in a report, stated that over an eleven-day period his men burned 255 dwellings, shot 13 carabaos, and killed 39 people.[9] An exhaustive research made by a British writer in the 1990s put the figure at about 2,500 dead; Filipino historians believe it to be around 50,000.[10] As a consequence of his order in Samar, Smith became known as &amp;quot;Howling Wilderness Smith&amp;quot;.[11]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A report written by General J.M. Bell in 1901 states: &amp;quot;I am now assembling in the neighborhood of 2,500 men who will be used in columns of about fifty men each. I take so large a command for the purpose of thoroughly searching each ravine, valley and mountain peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy everything I find outside of towns. All able bodied men will be killed or captured. ... These people need a thrashing to teach them some good common sense; and they should have it for the good of all concerned.&amp;quot;[12]&lt;br /&gt;
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A picture showing the aftermath of Moro crater battle or massacre.&lt;br /&gt;
The First Battle of Bud Dajo, also known as the Moro Crater Massacre, occurred on March 5–8, 1906, during the Moro Rebellion. During the engagement, 750 men and officers, under the command of Colonel J.W. Duncan, assaulted the volcanic crater of Bud Dajo (Tausūg: Būd Dahu), which was populated by 800 to 1,000 Tausug villagers. On March 2, Colonel J.W. Duncan was ordered to lead an expedition against Bud Dajo. The assault force consisted of 272 men of the 6th Infantry, 211 dismounted men of the 4th Cavalry, 68 men of the 28th Artillery Battery, 51 men of the Philippine Constabulary, 110 men of the 19th Infantry and 6 sailors from the gunboat Pampanga. The battle began on March 5, as mountain guns fired 40 rounds of shrapnel into the crater. During the night, the Americans hauled mountain guns to the crater's edge with block and tackle. At daybreak, the American guns, both the mountain guns and the guns of the Pampanga, opened fire on the Moros' fortifications in the crater. American forces then placed a &amp;quot;Machine Gun... in a position where it could sweep the crest of the mountain between us and the cotta,&amp;quot; killing all Moros in the crater.[13]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Only 6 Moros at Bud Dajo survived. 99% of Moros at Bud Dajo were killed, a higher percentage than in other incidents now considered massacres such as the Wounded Knee Massacre where 300 out of 350 Native Americans were killed, a death rate of 85%. The dead women and children. Moro men in the crater possessed melee weapons. While fighting was limited to ground action on Jolo, use of naval gunfire contributed significantly to the overwhelming firepower brought to bear against the Moros.[14][15][16]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Major Hugh Scott, the District Governor of Sulu Province, where the incidents occurred, recounted that those who fled to the crater &amp;quot;declared they had no intention of fighting, ran up there only in fright, and had some crops planted and desired to cultivate them.&amp;quot;[17] The description of the engagement as a &amp;quot;battle&amp;quot; is disputed because of both the overwhelming firepower of the attackers and the lopsided casualties. The author Vic Hurley wrote, &amp;quot;By no stretch of the imagination could Bud Dajo be termed a 'battle'&amp;quot;.[18] Mark Twain strongly condemned the incident in several articles he published,[19][20] and commented: &amp;quot;In what way was it a battle? It has no resemblance to a battle. We cleaned up our four days' work and made it complete by butchering these helpless people.&amp;quot;[21]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
One account claims that the Moros, armed with knives and spears, refused to surrender and held their positions. Some of the defenders rushed the Americans and were cut down by artillery fire. The Americans charged the surviving Moros with fixed bayonets, and the Moros fought back with their kalis, barung, improvised grenades made with black powder and seashells. Despite the inconsistencies among various accounts of the battle, one in which all occupants of Bud Dajo were gunned down, another in which defenders resisted in fierce hand-to-hand combat, all accounts agree that few, if any, Moros survived.[14]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In response to criticism, Wood's explanation of the high number of women and children killed stated that the women of Bud Dajo dressed as men and joined in the combat, and that the men used children as living shields.[15][16] Hagedorn supports this explanation, by presenting an account of Lieutenant Gordon Johnston, who was allegedly severely wounded by a female warrior.[22]&lt;br /&gt;
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A second explanation was given by the Governor-General of the Philippines, Henry Clay Ide, who reported that the women and children were collateral damage, having been killed during the artillery barrages.[15] These conflicting explanations of the high number of women and child casualties brought accusations of a cover-up, further adding fire to the criticism.[15] Furthermore, Wood's and Ide's explanation are at odds with Colonel J.W. Duncan's post-action report authored on March 12, 1906, describing the placement of a machine-gun at the edge of the crater to fire upon the occupants. Following Duncan's reports, the high number of non-combatants killed can be explained as the result of indiscriminate machine-gun fire.[13]&lt;br /&gt;
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==World War 2==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Pacific theater&lt;br /&gt;
On January 26, 1943, the submarine USS Wahoo fired on survivors in lifeboats from the Japanese transport Buyo Maru. Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood asserted that the survivors were Japanese soldiers who had turned machine-gun and rifle fire on the Wahoo after it surfaced, and that such resistance was common in submarine warfare.[27] According to the submarine's executive officer, the fire was intended to force the Japanese soldiers to abandon their boats and none of them were deliberately targeted.[28] Historian Clay Blair stated that the submarine's crew fired first and the shipwrecked survivors returned fire with handguns.[29] The survivors were later determined to have included Allied POWs of the Indian 2nd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment, who were guarded by Japanese Army Forces from the 26th Field Ordnance Depot.[30] Of 1,126 men originally aboard Buyo Maru, 195 Indians and 87 Japanese died, some killed during the torpedoing of the ship and some killed by the shootings afterwards.[31]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
During and after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 3–5, 1943), U.S. PT boats and Allied aircraft attacked Japanese rescue vessels as well as approximately 1,000 survivors from eight sunken Japanese troop transport ships.[32] The stated justification was that the Japanese personnel were close to their military destination and would be promptly returned to service in the battle.[32] Many of the Allied aircrew accepted the attacks as necessary, while others were sickened.[33]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
American servicemen in the Pacific War deliberately killed Japanese soldiers who had surrendered, according to Richard Aldrich, a professor of history at the University of Nottingham. Aldrich published a study of diaries kept by United States and Australian soldiers, wherein it was stated that they sometimes massacred prisoners of war.[34] According to John Dower, in &amp;quot;many instances ... Japanese who did become prisoners were killed on the spot or en route to prison compounds.&amp;quot;[35] According to Professor Aldrich, it was common practice for U.S. troops not to take prisoners.[36] His analysis is supported by British historian Niall Ferguson,[37] who also says that, in 1943, &amp;quot;a secret [U.S.] intelligence report noted that only the promise of ice cream and three days leave would ... induce American troops not to kill surrendering Japanese.&amp;quot;[37]: 150 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ferguson states that such practices played a role in the ratio of Japanese prisoners to dead being 1:100 in late 1944. That same year, efforts were taken by Allied high commanders to suppress &amp;quot;take no prisoners&amp;quot; attitudes[37]: 150  among their personnel (because it hampered intelligence gathering), and to encourage Japanese soldiers to surrender. Ferguson adds that measures by Allied commanders to improve the ratio of Japanese prisoners to Japanese dead resulted in it reaching 1:7, by mid-1945. Nevertheless, &amp;quot;taking no prisoners&amp;quot; was still &amp;quot;standard practice&amp;quot; among U.S. troops at the Battle of Okinawa, in April–June 1945.[37]: 181  Ferguson also suggests that &amp;quot;it was not only the fear of disciplinary action or of dishonor that deterred German and Japanese soldiers from surrendering. More important for most soldiers was the perception that prisoners would be killed by the enemy anyway, and so one might as well fight on.&amp;quot;[37]: 176 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Ulrich Straus, a U.S. Japanologist, suggests that Allied troops on the front line intensely hated Japanese military personnel and were &amp;quot;not easily persuaded&amp;quot; to take or protect prisoners, because they believed that Allied personnel who surrendered got &amp;quot;no mercy&amp;quot; from the Japanese.[38]: 116  Allied troops were told that Japanese soldiers were inclined to feign surrender in order to make surprise attacks,[38]: 116  a practice which was outlawed by the Hague Convention of 1907.[39] Therefore, according to Straus, &amp;quot;Senior officers opposed the taking of prisoners on the grounds that it needlessly exposed American troops to risks ...&amp;quot;[38]: 116  When prisoners were taken at Guadalcanal, Army interrogator Captain Burden noted that many times POWs were shot during transport because &amp;quot;it was too much bother to take [them] in&amp;quot;.[38]: 117 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
U.S. historian James J. Weingartner attributes the very low number of Japanese in U.S. prisoner of war compounds to two important factors, namely (1) a Japanese reluctance to surrender, and (2) a widespread American &amp;quot;conviction that the Japanese were 'animals' or 'subhuman' and unworthy of the normal treatment accorded to prisoners of war.&amp;quot;[40]: 55  The latter reason is supported by Ferguson, who says that &amp;quot;Allied troops often saw the Japanese in the same way that Germans regarded Russians—as Untermenschen (i.e., &amp;quot;subhuman&amp;quot;).&amp;quot;[37]: 182 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Mutilation of Japanese war dead&lt;br /&gt;
In the Pacific theater, American servicemen engaged in human trophy collecting. The phenomenon of &amp;quot;trophy-taking&amp;quot; was widespread enough that discussion of it featured prominently in magazines and newspapers. Franklin Roosevelt himself was reportedly given a gift of a letter-opener made of a Japanese soldier's arm by U.S. Representative Francis E. Walter in 1944, which Roosevelt later ordered to be returned, calling for its proper burial.[41]: 65 [42]: 825  The news was also widely reported to the Japanese public, where the Americans were portrayed as &amp;quot;deranged, primitive, racist and inhuman&amp;quot;. This, compounded by a previous Life magazine picture of a young woman with a skull trophy, was reprinted in the Japanese media and presented as a symbol of American barbarism, causing national shock and outrage.[43][42]: 833 &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* War rape &lt;br /&gt;
U.S. military personnel raped Okinawan women during the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.[44]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Based on several years of research, Okinawan historian Oshiro Masayasu (former director of the Okinawa Prefectural Historical Archives) writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Soon after the U.S. Marines landed, all the women of a village on Motobu Peninsula fell into the hands of American soldiers. At the time, there were only women, children, and old people in the village, as all the young men had been mobilized for the war. Soon after landing, the Marines &amp;quot;mopped up&amp;quot; the entire village, but found no signs of Japanese forces. Taking advantage of the situation, they started 'hunting for women' in broad daylight, and women who were hiding in the village or nearby air raid shelters were dragged out one after another.[45]&lt;br /&gt;
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According to interviews carried out by The New York Times and published by them in 2000, several elderly people from an Okinawan village confessed that after the United States had won the Battle of Okinawa, three armed Marines kept coming to the village every week to force the villagers to gather all the local women, who were then carried off into the hills and raped. The article goes deeper into the matter and claims that the villagers' tale—true or not—is part of a &amp;quot;dark, long-kept secret&amp;quot; the unraveling of which &amp;quot;refocused attention on what historians say is one of the most widely ignored crimes of the war&amp;quot;: &amp;quot;the widespread rape of Okinawan women by American servicemen.&amp;quot;[46] Although Japanese reports of rape were largely ignored at the time, one academic estimated that as many as 10,000 Okinawan women may have been raped. It has been claimed that the rape was so prevalent that most Okinawans over age 65 around the year 2000 either knew or had heard of a woman who was raped in the aftermath of the war.[47]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Professor of East Asian Studies and expert on Okinawa, Steve Rabson, said: &amp;quot;I have read many accounts of such rapes in Okinawan newspapers and books, but few people know about them or are willing to talk about them.&amp;quot;[47] He notes that plenty of old local books, diaries, articles and other documents refer to rapes by American soldiers of various races and backgrounds. An explanation given for why the US military has no record of any rapes is that few Okinawan women reported abuse, mostly out of fear and embarrassment. According to an Okinawan police spokesman: &amp;quot;Victimized women feel too ashamed to make it public.&amp;quot;[47] Those who did report them are believed by historians to have been ignored by the U.S. military police. Many people wondered why it never came to light after the inevitable American-Japanese babies the many women must have given birth to. In interviews, historians and Okinawan elders said that some of those Okinawan women who were raped and did not commit suicide did give birth to biracial children, but that many of them were immediately killed or left behind out of shame, disgust or fearful trauma. More often, however, rape victims underwent crude abortions with the help of village midwives. A large scale effort to determine the possible extent of these crimes has never been conducted. Over five decades after the war had ended, in the late-1990s, the women who were believed to have been raped still overwhelmingly refused to give public statements, instead speaking through relatives and a number of historians and scholars.[47]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
There is substantial evidence that the U.S. had at least some knowledge of what was going on. Samuel Saxton, a retired captain, explained that the American veterans and witnesses may have intentionally kept the rape a secret, largely out of shame: &amp;quot;It would be unfair for the public to get the impression that we were all a bunch of rapists after we worked so hard to serve our country.&amp;quot;[47] Military officials formally denied the mass rapes, and all surviving related veterans refused request for interviews from The New York Times. Masaie Ishihara, a sociology professor, supports this: &amp;quot;There is a lot of historical amnesia out there, many people don't want to acknowledge what really happened.&amp;quot;[47] Author George Feifer noted in his book Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb, that by 1946 there had been fewer than 10 reported cases of rape in Okinawa. He explained it was &amp;quot;partly because of shame and disgrace, partly because Americans were victors and occupiers. In all there were probably thousands of incidents, but the victims' silence kept rape another dirty secret of the campaign.&amp;quot;[48]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Some other authors have noted that Japanese civilians &amp;quot;were often surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from the American enemy.&amp;quot;[49][50] According to Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power by Mark Selden, the Americans &amp;quot;did not pursue a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military officials had warned.&amp;quot;[51]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
According to numerous academics, there were also 1,336 reported rapes during the first 10 days of the occupation of Kanagawa prefecture after the Japanese surrender, however, Brian Walsh states that this claim originated from a misreading of crime figures and that the Japanese Government had actually recorded 1,326 criminal incidents of all types involving American forces, of which an unspecified number were rapes.[44][52]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>ChristianMom</name></author>
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